The States, in the exercise of this right, may limit the time for remedies upon the judgments of other States, fixing a less or larger time than that of the common law to raise a presumption of payment, or altogether bar suits upon such judgments, if they are not brought within the time stated in the statute. A plea of the statute of limitations is a plea to the remedy, and consequently the lex fori must prevail. M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312; Bacon v. Howard, 20 How._22.

The law of a State may fix different times for barring the remedy in a suit upon a judgment of another State, and upon a judgment of its own tribunals. M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312; Bacon v. Howard, 20 How. 22; Robinson v. Peyton, 4 Tex. 276.

The probate of a will, being but a decree in rem, is confined in its operation to things within the State setting up the court which takes the probate. "Full faith and credit" is given to it abroad when the same faith and credit is given to it which it has at home, and that is, that it is to be conclusive evidence of the validity of the will as affording title to things within the jurisdictional limits of the court at the death of the testator, whether such title comes in contest within or without those limits, but de jure no evidence whatever of title to things not then within those limits. Bowen v. Johnson, 5 R. I. 112; Olney v. Angell, 5 R. I, 198.

A discharge from imprisonment for debt under the laws of one State will not prevent an arrest under the laws of another State. Joice v. Scales, 18 Geo. 725.

SECTION II.

I. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.

These expressions are confined to those privileges and immunities which are in their nature fundamental, which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union from the time of their becoming free, independent and sovereign. What these fundamental privileges are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads to wit, protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one State to pass through or to reside in any other State for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute

and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the State; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws and Constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised. These and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities. Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371; Bennett v. Boggs, Bald. 60; Comm. v. Milton, 12 B. Mon. 212.

Privilege and immunity are synonymous, or nearly so. Privilege signifies a peculiar advantage, exemption, immunity; immunity signifies exemption, privilege. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535.

This clause means that the citizens of all the States shall have the peculiar advantage of acquiring and holding real as well as personal property, and that such property shall be protected and secured by the laws of the State in the same manner as the property of the citizens of the State is protected. It means that such property shall not be liable to any taxes or burdens which the property of the citizens is not subject to. It secures and protects personal rights. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535; Ward v. Morris, 4 H. & McH. 330.

A particular and limited operation is to be given to these words, and not a full and comprehensive one. They do not mean the right of election, the right of holding office, or the right of being elected. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535; Murray v. McCarty, 2 Munf. 393; Allen v. Sarah, 2 Harring. 434; Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299.

This clause does not exempt the citizen of another State from any condition which the laws of the State impose upon its own citizens, nor confer upon him any privilege which the law gives to particular persons for special purposes, or upon prescribed conditions. Comm, v. Milton, 12 B. Mon.

212.

This clause does not apply to a person who, being a citizen of a State, migrates to another State, for then he becomes subject to the laws of the State in which he lives, and he is no longer a citizen of the State from which he removed. The State in which he resides may then determine his status or condition, and deny him the privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393; Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130; contra, Abbott v. Bayley, 23 Mass. 89.

An individual who permanently resides and is domiciled in a State, and who is entitled to all the privileges and immunities of a citizen of that State, can not be regarded otherwise than as a citizen of that State. Comm. v. Towles, 5 Leigh, 743.

The citizens of other States are not to be deemed aliens. They are not to be accounted as foreigners, or as persons who may become enemies. They are to have the right to carry on business; to inherit and transmit property; to enter upon, reside in, and remove from the territory of each State at their pleasure, yielding obedience to, and receiving protection from, the laws. Such are some of the privileges and immunities conferred by this clause, and all that are granted by it are of the same character. State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. 138.

No privileges are secured by this clause, except those which belong to citizenship. Rights attached by the law to contracts by reason of the place where such contracts are made or executed, wholly irrespective of the citizenship of the parties to those contracts, can not be deemed "privileges of a citizen" within the meaning of the Constitution. Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591.

This clause relieves citizens from the disabilities of alienage in other States. It inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States. It gives them the right of free ingress into other States, and egress from them. It insures to them in other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition and enjoyment of property, and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them in other States the equal protection of their laws. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168.

So far as the mere rights of persons are concerned, this provision is confined to citizens of a State who are temporarily in another State without taking up their residence there. It gives them no political rights in the State as to voting or holding office, or in any other respect, for a citizen of one State has no right to participate in the government of another. But if he ranks as a citizen in the State to which he belongs, then whenever he goes into another State, the Constitution clothes him, as to the rights of persons, with all the privileges and immunities which belong to citizens of the State. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393.

This clause gives to the citizens of each State entire freedom of intercourse with every other State, and any law which attempts to deny them free ingress or egress is void. Lemmon v. People, 20 N. Y. 562; S. C. 2 Sandf. 681; 26 Barb. 270.

The right of transit through each State, with every species of property known to the Constitution, and recognized by that paramount law, is secured by that instrument to each person, and does not depend on the uncertain and changeable ground of every mere comity. Ex parte Archy, 9 Cal. 147; Willard v. People, 5 Ill. 461; Julia v. McKinney, 3 Mo. 270.

This clause secures and protects the right of a citizen of one State to pass into any other State for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce,

trade, or business, without molestation; to acquire personal property; to take and hold real estate; and to maintain actions in the courts of the State. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; S. C. 31 Md. 279.

The main object of this clause was to prevent each State from discriminating in favor of its own people, or against those of any other. It secures not only absolute equality of rights and privileges with every citizen of each State, but all such privileges and immunities in any State as are by the laws and Constitution thereof secured and extended to her own people of the same class and otherwise similarly situated. Davis v. Pierce, 7 Minn. 13.

When in the regulation of any subject of internal police, a regard to justice and the due and convenient enforcement of its laws require a State to adopt a different mode of proceeding, or a modification of the regulation in respect to persons residing out of the State, in order to fairly meet and provide for the circumstance of their non-residence, the competency of the State so to act is not taken away by this clause. Baker v. Wise, 16 Gratt. 139.

This clause was not intended to give the laws of any one State the slightest force in another State. It secures to the citizens of each State in every other State, not the laws, or peculiar privileges which they may be entitled to in their own State, but such protection and benefit of the laws of any and every other State as are common to the citizens thereof in virtue of their being citizens. They do not, by force of this clause, acquire any peculiar privileges in another State, except upon the condition on which they may be held or enjoyed by the citizens of such other State. Comm. v. Milton, 12 B. Mon. 212; Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Lemmon v. People, 5 Sandf. 681; s. C. 20 N. Y. 562; 26 Barb. 270.

A marked distinction has always been made between the rights and powers of the citizens of a State and the rights and powers of all other persons resident within the limits of the State, whether they are citizens of other States or foreigners. State v. Medbury, 3 R, I. 138.

This clause is intended to secure the citizens of one State against discriminations made by another State in favor of its own citizens, and not to secure the citizens of any State against discriminations made by their own State in favor of the citizens of other States, nor to secure one class of citizens against discriminations made between them and another class of citizens of the same State. Comm. v. Griffin, 3 B. Mon. 208.

A citizen of the State whose laws are complained of, can not claim the protection afforded by this clause. Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130.

The citizens of other States are not entitled to greater privileges than the State grants to its own citizens. Lemmon v. People, 26 Barb. 270; S. C. 5 Sandf. 681; 20 N. Y. 562.

Where the laws of the several States differ, a citizen of one State asserting rights in another must claim them according to the laws of that State, and not according to those which obtain in his own State. Lemmon v. People, 26 Barb. 270; s. C. 5 Sandf. 681; 20 N. Y. 562.

No State can pass a law to punish a sale of property in another State where the right exists by the laws of the locality to make such a sale. People v. Merrill, 2 Parker C. C. 590.

The Constitution makes the people of the United States subjects of one government quoad everything within the national power and jurisdiction, but leaves them subjects of separate and distinct governments. Abbott v. Bayley, 23 Mass. 89.

It is most probable that the clause was intended to compel the general Government to extend the same privileges to the citizens of every State, and not permit that Government to grant privileges or immunities to citizens of some of the States and withhold them from those of others, and was never designed to interfere with the local policy of the State governments as to their own citizens. Kincaid v. Francis, Cooke, 49.

The clause may also mean that the citizens of other States shall be on the same footing with citizens of the State, in the payment of the debts of a deceased debtor. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535.

The word "citizen," excludes every description of persons who were not fully recognized as citizens in the several States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and foreigners who have become citizens of some one of the States since that time, without naturalization. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393; Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13.

The word "citizen," means citizens of the United States. It does not authorize every one whom either of the States may recognize as a citizen, or may elevate to State citizenship, to demand in every State all the privileges and immunities accorded to its citizens. Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13.

The right to vote does not necessarily render a party a citizen. Foreigners not naturalized may be allowed to vote, yet this clause would not apply to them. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393.

The citizens here spoken of, are those who are entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens. The meaning of the language is, that no privilege enjoyed by, or immunity allowed to the most favored class of citizens of the State, shall be withheld from a citizen of any other State. State v. Claiborne, Meigs, 331.

The word "citizen," imports the same as the word "freeman," and means every person who by birth or naturalization is, or may be qualified to exercise and enjoy under like circumstances, all the rights which any