316; Osborne v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738; Pittsburgh v. Nat'l Bank, 55 Penn. 45 Collins v. Chicago, 4 Biss. 472; contra, Comm. v. Morrison, 2 A. K. Marsh. 73.

A State can not tax the notes of a national bank. M'Culloch v. State, 4 Wheat. 316; Horne v. Green, 52 Miss. 452; contra, Montgomery v. Elston, 32 Ind. 27.

A tax upon the operations of a national bank is a tax on the operation of an instrument employed by the Federal Government to carry its powers into execution, and is unconstitutional. M'Culloch v. State, 4 Wheat. 316; Pittsburgh v. Nat'l Bank, 55 Penn. 45; contra, Comm. v. Morrison, 2 A. K. Marsh. 75.

The State may tax the dividends declared to an individual holder of stock in a national bank. State v. Collector, 2 Bailey, 654.

To tax the faculties, trade or occupation of a national bank is to tax the bank itself. To destroy or preserve the one is to destroy or preserve the other. If the trade of the bank is essential to its character as a machine for the fiscal operations of the Government, that trade must be as exempt from State control as the actual conveyance of the public money. Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738.

A State can not tax a national bank for the privilege of transacting business in the State. Nat'l Bank v. Mayor, 8 Heisk. 814.

A State may tax the shares of stock held by an individual in a national bank. State v. Haight, 31 N J. 399; State v. Hart, 31 N. J. 434; Stetson v. Bangor, 56 Me. 274; Bulow v. Charleston, 1 N. & M. 527; People v. Bradley, 39 Ill. 130; City v. Churchill, 31 N. Y. 161; S. C. 43 Barb. 550.

The shares held by an individual in a national bank, are not subject to taxation by a State, except by the permission of Congress. People v. Assessors, 44 Barb. 148.

Congress may permit the States to tax the national banks.

Van Allen

v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573; S. C. 33 N. Y. 161; 43 Barb. 550; State v. Haight, 31 N. J 399; Frazer v. Seibern, 16 Ohio St. 614; Mintzer v. Montgomery, 54 Penn. 139; Austin v. Boston, 96 Mass. 359.

A State may tax or prohibit a business which is taxed by Congress, for the power of taxation is concurrent. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475.

A State tax on every passenger who leaves the State, or passes through it, is void. Crandall v. State, 6 Wall. 35; S. C. 1 Nev. 294.

The property of a private corporation created by Congress for individual trade and profit, and not for public and national purposes, may be taxed

by a State. Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Lincoln County, I Dillon, 314; Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5; Huntington v. Central Pac. R. R. Co. 2 Saw. 503.

The real estate or other property of a corporation not organized under an act of Congress, is not, in the absence of express legislation to that effect, exempt from State taxation, because of the employment of the corporation in the services of the Government. Thomson v. Pacific Railroad,

9 Wall. 579.

Congress may leave the States free to tax the shares of national banks in the hands of the shareholder. Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wall. 573; S. C. 33 N. Y. 161; 43 Barb. 550; City v. Churchill, 33 N. Y. 161; S. C 43 Barb. 550; People v. Barton, 44 Barb. 148; People v. Commissioners, 4 Wall. 244; S. C. 35 N. Y. 423.

The implied inhibition is the same, whether the corporation whose property is taxed was created by Congress or by a State legislature. Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5.

If the capital of a corporation is converted into Government securities for a few days, for the express purpose of defeating any imposition of taxes, such investment is colorable and fraudulent, and its capital remains taxable to the same extent and in the same manner as if such conversion had never taken place. Holly Springs S. & I. Co. v. Marshall Co. 52 Miss.

281.

A national bank is subject to State legislation, except where such legislation is in conflict with some act of Congress, or tends to impair or destroy the utility of the bank as an agent or instrumentality of the United States, or interferes with the purposes of its creation. Waite v. Dowley, 9 C. L. N. 263.

A State law requiring a national bank to pay the tax on the shares of its stockholders, is valid. National Bank v. Comm. 9 Wall. 353; S. C. 4 Bush, 98; contra, Markoe v. Hartranft, 15 A. L. Reg. 487.

A State law which requires the cashier of a national bank to transmit to the clerk of the town in which each shareholder resides, a list of such shareholders and the number of shares held by each, is valid. Waite v. Dowley, 9 C. L. N. 263.

Secession.

A State, in the ordinary sense of the Constitution, is a political community of free citizens, occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and organized under a government sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, and established by the consent of the governed. Texas v. White, 7

Wall. 700.

The union of the States never was a purely artificial and arbitrary relation. It began among the colonies, and grew out of common origin, mutual sympathies, kindred principles, similar interests and geographical relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by the necessities of war, and received definite form and character and sanetion from the articles of confederation. By these the Union was solemnly declared to "be perpetual." When these articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the Constitution was ordained "to form a more perfect Union." It is difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these words. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700; Chancely v. Bailey, 37 Geo. 532.

The preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National Government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700.

A constitution is framed for ages to come, and is designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it. Its course can not always be tranquil. It is exposed to storms and tempests, and its framers must be unwise statesmen if they have not provided it, as far as its nature will permit, with the means of self-preservation from the perils it may be destined to encounter. No government ought to be so defective in its organization as not to contain within itself the means to secure the execution of its own laws against other dangers than those which occur every day. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.

The United States form, for many and for most important purposes, a single nation. In war we are one people. In making peace we are one people. In all commercial regulations we are one and the same people. In many other respects the American people are one, and the government which is alone capable of controlling and managing their interests in all these respects, is the government of the Union. It is their government, and in that character they have no other. America has chosen to be, in many respects and to many purposes, a nation, and for all these purposes her government is complete; to all these objects it is competent. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.

The people have declared that in the exercise of all powers given for national objects, the General Government is supreme. It can, in effecting these objects, legitimately control all individuals or governments within the American territory. The Constitution and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void. These States are constituent parts of the United States. They are members of one great empire-for some purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.

The Constitution was designed to operate upon States in their corporate capacities. It is crowded with provisions which restrain or annul the sovereignty of the States in some of the highest branches of their prerogatives. The tenth section of the first article contains a long list of prohibitions and disabilities imposed upon States. When such essential portions of State sovereignty are taken away or prohibited to be exercised, it can not be correctly asserted that the Constitution does not act upon the States. Martin v. Hunter, I Wheat. 304; S. C. 4 Munf. 1.

The powers of sovereignty are divided between the Federal Government and the governments of the States. They are each sovereign with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other. McCulloch v. State, 4 Wheat. 316; Comm. v. Morrison, 2 A. K. Marsh. 75; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; S. C. I Woods, 308.

The Sovereignty of a State does not reside in the persons who fill the different departments of its government, but in the people from whom the government emanated, and who may change it at their discretion. Sovereignty abides with the constituency, and not with the agent. Spooner v. McConnell, 3 McLean, 337.

Allegiance is the duty which the citizen or subject owes to the sovereign. Allegiance is due to both the Federal and the State governments, the two constituting, in a legal point of view, one government in each State, so long as they keep within their respective constitutional limits. State v. Hunt, 2 Hill (S. C.) 1; Hawkins v. Filkins, 24 Ark. 286; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; S. C. 1 Woods, 308.

It

The people made the Constitution, and the people can unmake it. is the creature of their will, and lives only by their will. But this supreme and irresistible power to make or unmake resides only in the whole body of the people, not in any subdivision of them. The attempt of any of the parts to exercise it is usurpation, and ought to be repelled by those to whom the people have delegated their power of repelling it. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.

When a State becomes one of the United States, she enters into an indissoluble relation. The act which consummates her admission into the Union is something more than a compact; it is the incorporation of a new member into the political body. It is final. The union is as complete as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original States. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700.

A citizen can not withdraw his allegiance without the consent of the Government, express or implied, and the addition of a number of others similarly circumstanced can not confer what none possess. A State can not release its citizens from that allegiance, since the State itself is but a

fractional part of a magnificent whole, and in its collective capacity is only the aggregation of its individual citizens, all of whom are alike incapable of effecting their own release, whether taken individually or collectively. Hence a State can not secede from the Union. Hood v. Maxwell, 1 W. Va. 219.

The Constitution expressly negatives the legal right of a State to secede, for a sovereign State may irrevocably bind itself by a voluntary compact. Chancely v. Bailey, 37 Geo. 532; Central R. R. Co. v. Ward, 37 Geo. 515; Sequestration Cases, 30 Tex. 688; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646; s. C. 39 Geo. 306.

The passage of an ordinance of secession by a State convention does not suspend or destroy the existence of the State government, but it continues to exist de jure, and its acts are valid and binding as though no attempt were made to secede. Hawkins v. Filkins, 24 Ark. 286; White v. Cannon, 6 Wall. 443; State v. Sears, Phil. 146; Harlan v. State, 41 Miss. 566.

An ordinance of secession is absolutely null. It is utterly without operation in law. After the adoption of such ordinance, the obligations of the State as a member of the Union, and of every citizen of the State as a citizen of the United States, remain perfect and unimpaired. The State does not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of the Union. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700; U. S. v. Cathcart, 1 Bond, 586; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646; s. c. 39 Geo. 306; U. S. v. Morrison, Chase, 521.

The constitutional duties and obligations of a State are not affected by its rebellion, but remain the same. Homestead Cases, 23 Gratt. 266; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646; S. C. 39 Geo. 306.

A rebellious State is bound by the Constitution, and all acts in violation of it are void. Sequestration Cases, 30 Tex. 688.

A government of a rebellious State is not a de facto government, for a State has no existence outside of and independent of the Constitution. Penn v. Tollison, 26 Ark. 545; Thompson v. Mankin, 26 Ark. 586; Thomas v. Taylor, 42 Miss. 651.

Acts in furtherance or support of rebellion against the United States, or intended to defeat the just rights of citizens, must in general be regard. ed as invalid and void. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700; Hatch v. Burroughs, I Woods, 439.

Acts necessary to peace and good order among citizens, which would be valid if emanating from a lawful government, must be regarded in general as valid when proceeding from an actual, though unlawful government. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700; Sequestration Cases, 30 Tex. 688; Chappell v. Williamson, 49 Ala. 153; Cook v. Oliver, 1 Woods, 437.