The Confederate Government had no authority to confiscate and order a sale of the property of citizens of the United States, on the ground that they were alien enemies. Central R. R. Co. v. Ward, 37 Geo. 515; Keppel v. Petersburg R. R. Co. Chase, 167; Perdicaris v. Charleston Gaslight Co. Chase, 435.

An act to sequester debts due to loyal citizens is void, and the payment to the Confederate Government does not release the debtors. Sequestration Cases, 30 Tex. 688; Vance v. Burtis, 39 Tex. 88; Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457; Shortridge v. Macon, Chase, 136.

An obligation incurred by a public corporation in aid of a rebellion can not be enforced after the rebellion has been suppressed. Bibb v. Commissioners, 44 Ala. 119.

Notes of a municipal corporation issued for the purpose of aiding a rebellion against the United States, are void, and can not be enforced. Evans v. Richmond, Chase, 551.

A statute which attempts to force the circulation of the bonds and treasury notes of the Confederate States, for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of the war of rebellion, is void. Ray v. Thompson, 43 Ala. 434; Irvine v. Armstead, 46 Ala. 363; Martin v. Hewitt, 44 Ala. 418.

Treasury notes issued by a State for the purpose of prosecute a rebellion against the United States, are void. lor, 42 Miss. 651.

raising means to Thomas v. Tay

An act repealing a statute requiring the indorsement of the governor as a prerequisite to the valid transfer of bonds belonging to it, passed by the legislature when the State is in rebellion against the United States, is a nullity as to bonds issued without such indorsement, and for the purpose of aiding the rebellion. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700; Texas v. Hardenberg, 10 Wall. 68.

Whether the alienation of bonds belonging to a State by a rebellious government divests the title of the State, depends on other circumstances than the quality of the government. The validity of the alienation depends on the object and purpose of it; if that was just and laudable in itself, the alienation is valid. Huntington v. Texas, 16 Wall. 402.

A payment to the officers of an insurrectionary State government of a debt due by a corporation to a State, for the purpose of enabling them to prosecute the rebellion, is void, Miss. C. R. R. Co. v. State, 46 Miss. 157.

The Confederate Government could not, by any statute or order of one of its departments, divest any right or property of the United States. U. S. v. Kechler, 9 Wall. 83.

The Confederate States was an unlawful assemblage, without corporate

power to take, hold or convey a valid title to property, real or personal. Sprott v. U. S. 8 Ct. Cl. 499; S. C. 20 Wall. 469.

An investment of the funds belonging to an estate in Confederate bonds, by an executor, is illegal, although it was made under a law of the rebellious State, and was approved by the probate court. Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570; Head v. Starke, Chase, 312; Houston v. Deloach, 43 Ala. 364; Powell v. Boon, 43 Ala. 469; Hall v. Hall, 43 Ala. 488.

The State is not liable for services rendered by an officer to a rebellious government established over it. Buck v. Vasser, 47 Miss. 551.

A judge elected by a rebellious State can not claim compensation for his services from a lawful government subsequently organized. Chisholm v. Coleman, 43 Ala. 204.

When a rebellious State is conquered the officers of the State can no longer exercise the functions of their respective offices. Cooke v Cooke, Phillips, 583.

When a rebellious State government is overthrown, the civil authorities do not necessarily cease at once to exist, but continue in being charged with the duty of maintaining order until superseded by the Government. Woodson v. Fleck, Chase, 305.

The statutes of a rebellious State intended solely to promote the good order and well being of society will be enforced. Wallace v. State, 33 Tex. 445; Hill v. Boyland, 40 Miss. 618; Buchanan v. Smith, 43 Miss. 90.

The statutes of a rebellious State which have been adopted by a government lawfully reorganized, will be deemed valid. Reynolds v. Taylor, 43 Ala. 420.

A charter of incorporation granted by the government of a rebellious State is valid. U. S. v. Home Ins. Co. 8 Ct. Cl. 449; S. C 22 Wall. 99.

A treasury note issued by a rebellious State in aid of the rebellion is not binding on a lawful government subsequently organized. Thomas v. Taylor, 42 Miss. 651; Rand v. State, 65 N. C. 194; Leak v. Commissioners, 64 N. C. 132.

A sale by a tax collector under the Confederate Government passed a valid title to the property of a citizen of the Confederate States. Cassell v. Backrack, 42 Miss. 56.

A contract which contains a stipulation for payment in Confederate notes may be enforced after the restoration of peace to the extent of its just obligation. Thorington v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1; Herbert v. Easton, 43 Ala. 547 ; Jordan v. Cobb, 47 Ala. 132; Mathews v. Rucker, 41 Tex. 636; contra, Latham v. Clarke, 25 Ark. 574; Reavis v. Blackshear, 30 Tex. 753; Shepard v. Taylor, 35 Tex. 774; Prigeon v. Smith, 31 Tex. 171; Lob

dell v. Fowler, 33 Tex. 346; Brown v. Read, 33 Tex. 629; McGar v. Nixon, 36 Tex. 289.

Confederate notes were a valid consideration for a contract between citizens of the Confederate States.

Rodes v. Patillo, 5 Bush, 271; Martin v. Horton, 1 Bush, 629; Rivers v. Moss, 6 Bush, 600; Naff v. Crawford, I Heisk. 111; Miller v. Gould, 38 Geo. 465; Sherfy v. Argenbright, 1 Heisk. 128; Taylor v. Turley, 33 Md. 500; Rodgers v. Bass, 46 Tex. 505; Delmas v. Ins. Co. 14 Wall. 661; Forcheimer v. Holly, 14 Fla. 239; Green v. Sizer, 40 Miss. 530; contra, Bailey v. Milner, 1 Abb. C. C. 261; Goodman v. McGehee, 31 Tex. 252; Wright v. Overall, 2 Cold. 336; Thornburg v. Harris, 3 Cold. 157; Hale v. Sharp, 4 Cold. 275; Fain v. Headerick, 4 Cold. 327; Hale v. Huston, 44 Ala. 134; Lawson v. Miller, 44 Ala. 616; Robertson v. Shores, 7 Cold. 164; Fox v. Woods, 34 Tex. 220; Wilson v. Bozeman, 48 Ala. 71; Dittmar v. Myers, 39 Tex. 295.

An administrator, executor or other person suing in a fiduciary capacity may maintain an action on a contract payable in Confederate currency. Shearon v. Henderson, 38 Tex. 245; Thompson v. Bohannon, 38 Tex. 241; Hamilton v. Pleasants, 31 Tex. 638; contra, Smith v. Nelson, 34 Tex. 516. A bond issued by a rebellious State convention does not constitute a good consideration for a contract. Hanauer v. Woodruff, 15 Wall. 439.

The judicial proceedings of the courts in a rebellious State, so far as they do not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national author⚫ity or the just rights of citizens under the Constitution, are valid. Riddle v. Hill, 51 Ala. 224; Powell v. Young, 51 Ala. 518; Berry v. Bellows, 30 Ark. 198; Cook v. Oliver, 1 Woods, 437; Tarver v. Tankersley, 51 Ala. 309; Randolph v. Baldwin, 41 Ala. 305; Pepin v. Lachenmeyer, 45 N. Y. 27; Ray v. Thompson, 43 Ala. 434; White v. Cannon, 5 Wall. 443; Parks v. Coffey, 52 Ala. 32; Martin v. Hewitt, 44 Ala. 418; Shaw v. Lindsay, 46 Ala. 290; Hughes v. Stinson, 21 La. Ann. 540; French v. Tumlin, 19 A. L. Reg. 641; contra, Penn v. Tollison, 26 Ark. 545; Thompson v. Mankin, 26 Ark. 586; Timms v. Grace, 26 Ark. 598; Martin v. Hewitt, 44 Ala. 418; Carroll v. Boyd, 27 Ark. 183; Cowser v. State, 27 Ark. 444; Vinsant v. Knox, 27 Ark. 266.

A bail bond given for the surrender of an accused person while the State was in rebellion may be enforced. Thompson v. State, 31 Tex. 166.

A court organized by the Confederate Government was a nullity, and could exercise no rightful jurisdiction. Hickman v. Jones, 9 Wall. 197.

A decree of a probate court approving of an investment by an executor in Confederate bonds, is a nullity. Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570.

Crimes committed during the existence of a rebellion may be punished under the laws of the State after the restoration of peace. Harlan v. State, 41 'Miss. 566.

Federal and State Governments Distinct.

The General Government and the States, although both exist within the same territorial limits, are separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other within their respective spheres. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113.

A State court or judge who is authorized by the laws of the State, has the right to issue a writ of habeas corpus in any case where a party is imprisoned within its territorial limits, provided it does not appear when the application is made that the person imprisoned is in custody under the authority of the United States. The court or judge has a right to inquire in this mode of proceeding for what cause and by what authority the prisoner is confined within the limits of the State sovereignty. It is the duty of the marshal or other person having the custody of the prisoner to make known to the judge or court, by a proper return, the authority by which he holds him in custody. This right to inquire by process of habeas corpus, and the duty of the officer to make a return, grow necessarily out of the complex character of our Government and the existence of two distinct and separate sovereignties within the same territorial space, each of them restricted in its powers, and each, within its sphere of action prescribed by the Constitution, independent of the other. Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; S. C. 3 Wis. 1; Ex parte Simeon Bushnell, 8 Ohio St. 599.

After a return is made to a writ of habeas corpus, and the State judge or court are judicially apprised that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, they can proceed no further. They then know that the prisoner is within the dominion and jurisdiction of another government, and that neither the writ of habeas corpus, nor any other process issued under State authority, can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties. He is then within the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. If he has committed an offense against their laws, their tribunals alone can punish him. If he is wrongfully imprisoned, their judicial tribunals can release him and afford him redress. Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; s. C. 3 Wis. 1.

Although it is the duty of the marshal or other person holding a prisoner to make known, by a proper return, the authority under which he detains him, it is at the same time imperatively his duty to obey the process of the United States, to hold the prisoner in custody under it, and to refuse obedience to the mandate or process of any other government. Consequently it is his duty not to take the prisoner, nor suffer him to be taken, before a State judge or court upon a habeas corpus issued under State authority. No State judge or court, after they are judicially informed that the party is imprisoned under the authority of the United States, has any right to interfere with him, or to require him to be brought before them. No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or

FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS DISTINCT. 335

judge by whom it is issued. Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; S. C. 3 Wis. 1; Ex parte Le Bur, 49 Cal. 160; People v. Fiske, 45 Barb. 294; State v. Gulich, 29 N. J. 409; Ex parte Charles E. Hopson, 40 Barb. 34; Ex parte J. J. Hill, 5 Nev. 154; Ex parte John D. Berwick, 25 How. Pr. 149; contra. Lockington's Case, Brightly, 269; Olmstead's Case, Brightly, 9; Ex parte H. H. Robinson, 6 McLean, 355.

The power of the General Government and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other within their respective spheres; and the sphere of action of the General Government is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a State judge or a State court, as if the line of division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye. Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; S. C. 3 Wis. 1.

A person who is liable to arrest for the non-payment of taxes may be arrested after he has enlisted in the army. Webster v. Seymour, 8 Vt. 135.

A State court has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction restraining a register and receiver acting under the laws of the United States from selling public lands. Brewer v. Kidd, 23 Mich. 440.

A State court has no jurisdiction to inquire into the regularity of a draft made under the laws of the United States, and the legality of the detention of the drafted man. Ex parte Jacob Spangler, 11 Mich. 298.

No judicial officer of a State has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus, or to continue proceedings under the writ when issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of the enlistment of a soldier into the military service of the United States, and to discharge him from such service, when, in his judgment the enlistment has not been made in conformity to the laws of the United States. Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397; Ex parte Jacob Spangler, 11 Mich. 298; State v. Gulich, 29 N. J. 409; Ex parte Husted, 1 Johns. Cas. 136; Ex parte Jeremiah Ferguson, 9 Johns. 239; Ex parte Emanuel Roberts, 2 Hall's L. J. 192; Ex parte Wm. J. Jordan, 11 A. L. Reg. 749; Ex parte Ferrand 1 Abb. C. C. 140; Phelan's Case, 9 Abb. Pr. 286; contra, Ex parte Carlton, 7 Cow. 471; State v. Dimish, 12 N. H. 194; Comm. v. Fox, 7 Penn. 336; Dabb's Case, 12 Abb. Pr. 113; Ex parte Barrett, 42 Barb. 479.

The State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal courts in all cases of illegal confinement under color of the authority of the United States, when that confinement is not the consequence of a suit or prosecution pending in the Federal courts in which the allegation upon which the commitment is made, will be tried. Ex parte Wm. Pool, 2 Va. Cas. 276; contra, State v. Plime, T. U. P. Charlt. 142.

A discharge under a State insolvent law does not entitle the insolvent