Provisions for searches and seizures to aid in the collection of the revenue by duties, are not repugnant to this clause. In the matter of John R. Platt, 7 Ben. 261; S. C. 19 I. R. R. 132.

Congress has no power to organize a board of revision to nullify titles confirmed many years before by the authorized agents of the Government. Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wall. 160.

A statute which perfects a voidable entry and gives a patent therefor, is valid, although it divests a grant made after the entry but before its passage. Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117.

A board of election officers constituted under State laws is not a judicial tribunal, and has no power to adjudge the guilt or innocence of an alleged violator of the laws of the United States. A trial before such officers is not due process of law. Huber v. Reily, 53 Penn. 112.

Congress has no power to provide for the absolute forfeiture of land, as a penalty for the non-payment of taxes, without any process. Martin v. Snowden, 18 Gratt. 100.

This section prohibits the passage of a law by Congress, authorizing the arrest of a citizen without just cause, because such arrest deprives him of his liberty. Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370.

A statute repealing a prior grant of land is void. U. S. v. Minn. & N. W. R. R. Co. 1 Minn. 127; S. C. I Black, 358.

The law of the land authorizes the employment of auditors, and an inquisition without notice, and a warrant of distress, to enforce the payment of balances due from receivers of the revenue. Although "due process of law" generally implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings, yet this is not universally true. Murray v. Hoboken Co. 18 How. 272.

Whenever the Government seeks the property of the citizen, in the exercise of the right of taxation, the processes for seizure and assessment are in the most plenary sense within the discretion of the legislature. Pullan v. Kinsinger, 2 Abb. C. C. 94.

Congress can not annul the judgment of a court already rendered, or the rights determined thereby. When they have passed into judgment they become absolute. State v. Wheeling Bridge Co. 18 How. 421.

After the entry of a decree requiring the removal of an obstruction to navigation, Congress may pass an act legalizing the obstruction, and the decree can not then be enforced. Congress may interfere with that part of the decree which remains executory. State v. Wheeling Bridge Co. 18 How. 421.

A statute authorizing the filing of a bill of review, to set aside a decree rendered in favor of a fictitious person, does not divest any vested right, and is not an exercise of judicial powers. Sampeyreac v. U. S. 7 Pet.

222.

A rebel may lawfully be slain in battle and thus be deprived of life, or he may be lawfully captured in battle and thus deprived of liberty, because these being acts of war are authorized by those other provisions of the Constitution which authorize the prosecution of the war. Norris v. Doniphan, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 385.

A statute which makes an order of the President a sufficient defense for an act previously done, is void. Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142.

A statute which attempts to deprive a person of his right to recover a rent which had previously been paid to a provost marshal, is unconstitutional. Clark v. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 564.

Public Use.

(e) The right to appropriate private property to private use, has been deemed to be precluded by the provision authorizing it to be taken for public use only upon just compensation. Newcomb v. Smith, I Chand. 71.

This clause was established: for the protection of personal safety and private property. It addresses itself to the common sense of the people, and ought not to be filed away by legal subtleties. It has its foundations in natural justice, and without its pervading efficacy other rights would be useless. If the legislature possessed an irresponsible power over every man's private estate, whether acquired by will, deed or inheritance, all inducement to acquisition, industry and economy would be removed. The principal object of government is the administration of justice and the promotion of morals. But if property is subject to the caprice of an annual assemblage of legislators acting tumultuously and without rule or precedent, and without hearing the party, stability in property will cease and justice be at an end. If the Government is interdicted from taking private property, even for public use, without just compensation, how can the legislature take it from one man and dispose of it as they think fit? The great principle is that a man's property is his own, and that he shall enjoy it according to his pleasure, until it is proved in due process of law that it is not his, but belongs to another. Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. 256.

The power of the Government respecting public improvements, is a sovereign power. It rests in the wisdom of Congress to determine when and in what manner the public necessities require its exercise, and with the reasonableness of the exercise of that discretion the courts will not interfere. Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427; Avery v. Fox, 1 Abb. C. C. 246.

The constitutionality of the right is not measured by the precise amount or degree of the public benefit to be conferred. Wherever there is even an apparent public interest to sustain a statute, the legislative power, or such subordinate person or body as it may designate, is the proper judge of its necessity. The question in all such cases is, not whether the law is indispensable, but whether it may be useful and convenient. Newcomb v. Smith, I Chand. 71.

The Constitution does not recognize military necessity, nor any other necessity whatever, as an authority for "taking private property for public use," in peace or in war, without just compensation. Norris v. Doniphan, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 385; Corbin v. Marsh, 2 Duvall, 193.

Extraordinary and unforseen occasions arise in cases of extreme necessity in time of war, or of immediate and impending public danger, in which private property may be impressed into the public service, or may be seized and appropriated to the public use, or may even be destroyed, without the consent of the owner. U. S. v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623.

The right of the Government to destroy or appropriate private property, without compensation, in cases of emergency, is not confined to enemy's country, but may be exercised wherever military operations are carried on upon which the emergency arises. Taylor v. Railroad Co. 6 Cold. 646.

The public danger must be immediate, imminent and impending, and the emergency in the public service must be extreme and imperative, and such as will not admit of delay or a resort to any other source of supply, and the circumstances must be such as imperatively require the exercise of that extreme power in respect to the particular property so impressed, appropriated or destroyed. U. S. v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623.

The necessity which justifies the taking by a military officer need not be an overpowering necessity, which admits of no alternative; but if the interests of the Government may probably be promoted thereby, it his right and duty to take and appropriate it. Taylor v. Railroad Co. 6 Cold. 646.

While active military operations are being carried on, the military commander is the judge of the necessity for taking private property, and he can not be held responsible in a civil tribunal for mere errors of judgment. Taylor v. Railroad Co. 6 Cold. 646.

If a military commander, in a time of war, acts in good faith for the ac-complishment of the purposes of the war, his acts, whether of destruction or appropriation, are valid. Taylor v. Railroad Co. 6 Cold. 646.

If movable property is taken in good faith by a military commander for the public use, with the intent to appropriate it absolutely and permanently to such use, the title vests in the Government, and will not revert to the original owner upon the subsequent discovery that it is not necessary ac

tually to consume the property in such use. Taylor v. Railroad Co. 6 Cold. 646; Williams v. Wickerman, 44 Mo. 484.

The rightful taking of private property for use or destruction when the public exigency demands it, by a military officer, is an exercise of the right of eminent domain, and compensation must be made by the Government to the owner. Grant v. U. S. 1 Ct. Cl. 41; S. C. 2 Ct. Cl. 551; Wiggins v. U. S. 3 Ct. Cl. 412.

The courts can not interfere and declare such acts void, unless in cases of palpable and wanton abuse of power, or when the evidence of a departure from the rule of public use is manifest on the face of the act. Newcomb v. Smith, 1 Chand. 71.

The Constitution only provides for the general principle. The means of ascertaining the just compensation are left to be decided by the public authority which shall give the power to take private property for public use. Ches. & O. Canal Co. v. Key, 3 Cranch C. C. 599.

As the Constitution does not provide any mode in which the amount of compensation shall be ascertained, it is fairly to be presumed that the framers of that instrument intended to leave that subject to be regulated in such manner as Congress, in its discretion, might deem best calculated to carry into effect the constitutional provision, according to its spirit and intent. Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427.

The Constitution does not require that the value shall be paid, but that just compensation shall be given. Just compensation means a compensation which will be just in regard to the public as well as in regard to the individual. Ches. & O. Canal Co. v. Key, 3 Cranch C. C. 599.

A statute which allows the jury to consider the benefits from a public improvement in estimating the damages, is valid. Ches. & O. Canal Co. v. Key, 3 Cranch C. C. 599.

If the law taking private property for public use provides a special tribunal for ascertaining the compensation, the owner can not resort to any other. Meade v. U. S. 2 Ct. Cl. 224.

The framers of this clause did not intend that every subordinate officer, or petty agent of the United States, might undertake to decide for himself when the exigency has occurred, or the necessity exists, for the seizure and appropriation of the property of the citizen, and every attempt on the part of any public officer to do so, unless justified by some pressing emergency or overruling necessity, is a simple trespass, for which he is amenable to the law, but for which, being beyond the scope of his powers, the United States is in nowise responsible. Pitcher v. U. S. 1 N. & H. 7.

This provision has always been understood as referring only to a direct

appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457; contra, Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall, 603; S. C. 2 Duvall, 20.

A statute which makes treasury notes a legal tender in payment of debts is valid, for it makes the notes as valuable as gold coin for all commercial purposes. The difference between the value of gold coin and the value of such notes can not be regarded, because it is not recognized by law. Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400.

A proceeding by complaint to assess damages for taking land for public use, where the right of trial by jury is preserved, is due process of law. Newcomb v. Smith, 1 Chand 71.

Whether the statute does or does not require that notice shall be given to the owner of the property of the proceedings to assess the damages, will not affect its constitutionality. Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427.

The title of the owner is not divested until indemnity is afforded him. Corbin v. Marsh, 2 Duvall, 193.

A statute diminishing tolls which have been mortgaged to secure bonds, is void, because it takes private property for public use without due compensation. U. S. v. Louisville Canal Co. 1 Cent. L. J. 101.

This provision is not applicable to taxation. Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Slack, 22 I. R. R. 337.

The power to confiscate the property of public enemies is not affected by the restrictions imposed by this amendment. Miller v. U. S. 11 Wall. 268.

A statute authorizing the taking of private property for use as mill sites and mill dams, is valid. Newcomb v. Smith, I Chand. 71.

The grant of the power to a corporation to condemn land for the purpose of constructing a canal or railroad is valid. If the object designed by the legislature in the granting of the charter is the public interest, to be secured by the exercise of powers delegated for that purpose, then, although private interest may be incidentally promoted, the corporation is essentially the trustee of the Government for the promotion of the objects desired a mere agent to which authority is delegated to work out the public interest through the means provided by the Government for that purpose, and broadly distinguishable from one created for the attainment of no public end, and from which no benefit accrues to the community, except such as results incidentally and not necessarily from its operations. In the creation of this class of corporations, public duties and public interests are involved, and the discharge of those duties and the attainment of those interests are the primary objects to be worked out through the