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v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479; S. C. 44 Ala. 493; Southern Express Co. v. Mayor, 49 Ala. 404.

A State tax upon vessels owned by a citizen of the State, ratably with other property within the State, is valid. Howell v. State, 3 Gill, 14; State v. Charleston, 4 Rich. 286.

A State may impose a tax on the capital or stock invested by its citizens in steamboats, although they are employed in commerce between the States. Perry v. Torrence, 8 Ohio, 521; People v. Commissioners, 48 Barb. 157.

A State tax upon the officers and crew of a vessel of the United States is a regulation of commerce, and unconstitutional. People v. Brooks, 4 Denio, 469; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; S. C. 45 Mass. 282.

A State has no jurisdiction to impose a tax on a vessel temporarily entering its ports for the purposes of commerce, if the home port is in another State. Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co. 17 How. 596; St. Louis v. Ferry Co. 11 Wall. 423; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471.

Sale is the object of importation, and is an essential ingredient of that intercourse of which importation constitutes a part. It is as essential an ingredient, as indispensable to the existence of the entire thing, as importation itself. It must be considered as a component part of the power to regulate commerce. Congress has a right not only to authorize importation, but to authorize the importer to sell. Brown v. State, 12 Wheat. 419; vide Biddle v. Comm. 13 S. & R. 405.

Any penalty inflicted on the importer for selling an imported article in his character of importer is in opposition to the act of Congress which authorizes importation. Any charge on the introduction and incorporation of the articles into and with the mass of property in the country, is hostile to the power given to Congress to regulate commerce, since an essential part of that regulation and principal object of it is to prescribe the regular means for that introduction and incorporation. Brown v. State, 12 Wheat. 419; State v Shapleigh, 27 Mo. 344.

The line which separates the power of the Federal Government to regulate commerce among the States from the authority of the States to tax persons, property, business, or occupations within their limits, is difficult to define with distinctness. A tax upon imported goods, so soon as the importer has broken the original packages and made the first sale, obstructs importation quite as much as an equal impost upon the unbroken packages before they have gone into the market. State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall, 284.

The power which insures uniformity of commercial regulation must cover the property which is transported as an article of commerce from hostile or interfering legislation until it has mingled with and become a part

of the general property of the country, and subjected, like it, to similar protection, and to no greater burdens. Welton v. State, 91 U. S. 275; s. C. 55 Mo. 288.

The commercial power continues until the commodity has ceased to be the subject of discriminating legislation. That power protects it, even after it has entered the State, from any burdens imposed by reason of its foreign origin. Welton v. State, 91 U. S. 275; s. C. 55 Mo. 288.

If an importer intends to break the original package and sell the liquor therein contained in violation of the prohibitory law of the State, the package may be forfeited under the State law. State v. Blackwell, 65 Me. 556. No one but the importer himself has the right to sell except as allowed by the laws of the State, and he can sell only in the original packages. State v. Robinson, 49 Me. 285.

The products of other States which are brought into a State for sale are not subject to State taxation until a change in the ownership or condition of the merchandise takes place, so that it becomes incorporated with and forms a part of the property of the State. State v. Kennedy, 19 La. Ann. 397.

The mere conveyance of property from one State to another will not exempt it from taxation and general regulation by the laws of the latter State. License Cases, 5 How. 504; S. C. 13 N. H. 536; State v. Pinckney, 10 Rich. 474.

A State may levy a tax on capital, although it is continuously invested in cotton purchased for exportation. People v. Tax Commissioner, 17 N. Y. Supr. 255.

A tax on merchants according to the amount of their capital, without any distinction in regard to the articles in which they deal, is not a tax on imports, nor does it interfere with the power of Congress to regulate commerce. Raguet v. Wade, 4 Ohio, 107; License Cases, 5 How. 504; S. C. 13 N. H. 536; Padelford v. Savannah, 14 Ga. 438; Smith v. People, 1 Parker Cr. Cas. 583.

A State law imposing a tax upon the sale of articles which are not of the growth, product or manufacture of the State, is void. Welton v. State, 91 U. S. 275; s. C. 55 Mo. 288; State v. North, 27 Mo. 464; State v. Kennedy, 19 La. Ann. 397; State v. Browning, 62 Mo. 591; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123; S. C. 14 Ala. 334; Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148; S. C. 40 Ala. 123; Crow v. State, 14 Mo. 237; contra, Davis v. Dashiel, Phillips, 114; Morrill v. State, 38 Wis. 428; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; Wynne v. Wright, 4 Dev. & Bat. 19; Biddle v. Comm. 13 S. & R. 405; Cowles v. Brittain, 2 Hawks, 204; Cummings v. Savannah, R. M. Charlt. 26; Tracy v. State, 3 Mo. 3.

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A State tax upon telegraph companies, which is graduated to the amount of their business, and does not discriminate in favor of or against any company, is valid. West. U. Tel. Co. v. Richmond, 26 Gratt. I.

A State may impose a tax upon the sale of liquor introduced from another State when a tax to the same extent is imposed upon liquors manufactured in the State. Hinson v. Lott, 40 Ala. 123; S. C. 8 Wall. 148.

A tax on business which does not discriminate as to the residence or citizenship of the person engaged in the business, is not a regulation of commerce. Speer v. Comm. 23 Gratt. 935.

A State law requiring a license from non-resident traders to vend foreign merchandise is not a regulation of commerce. Sears v. Commissioners, 36 Ind. 267.

A State law requiring hawkers and peddlers to take out a license is valid. Comm. v. Ober, 66 Mass. 493.

A State tax upon the sale of articles manufactured in the State is valid. Downham v. Alexandria, 10 Wall. 173.

A State statute which imposes a penalty upon those who sell articles not of the product of the United States, does not interfere with the power to regulate commerce. Beall v. State, 4 Blackf. 107.

A State law imposing a penalty upon those who sell articles brought from another State, and allowing a fee to the inspector for his services, is valid. State v. Fosdick, 21 La. Ann. 256; Board v. Pleasants, 23 La. Ann. 349.

The States can not constitutionally tax the commerce of the United States for the purpose of paying any expense incident to the execution of their police laws. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; s. C. 45 Mass. 282.

A State law requiring a vessel to pay a fee to a port warden, whether he is called on to perform any service or not, is void. Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31.

A State law regulating the rates of wharfage, owing to the intimate and necessary connection of the subject-matter with navigation, may be a regulation of commerce, but is not invalid in the absence of any act of Congress, for the subject is not such as to require it to be considered to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government. The Ann Ryan, 7 Ben. 20; Municipality v. Pease, 2 La. Ann. 538.

A municipal ordinance imposing a charge for the use of wharves owned by the city, is valid. Worseley Municipality, 9 Rob. 324; Municipality v. Pease, 2 La. Ann. 538.

A State law requiring horses and cattle to be landed at a particular

locality, and compelling the owners to pay for the facilities afforded in the wharves erected there is valid. State v. Pagan, 22 La. Ann. 545.

A State tax on the gross receipts of a telegraph company is valid, although they accrued from messages which originated or terminated at points outside of the State. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mayer, 6 A. L. T. (N. S.) 500.

Transportation of Persons.

A State statute which requires the master or owner to give a bond for the support of every passenger landed in the United States, but allows a commutation and release from the bond upon the payment of a small sum, † is in effect a tax on passengers, and is void. Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U.

S. 59.

A State statute allowing a commissioner to inspect passengers, and determine who are improper to land, and to prohibit their landing, unless a bond is given, and allowing a commutation for the bond, is void. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275; contra, Commissioners v. Brandt, 26 La. Ann. 29.

A State statute imposing a tax upon passengers coming into the ports of the State, is a regulation of commerce, and therefore unconstitutional + and void. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; S. C. 45 Mass. 282; People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169; contra, Smith v. Marston, 5 Tex. 426.

The right to exclude immigrants is a power to tax them, and the converse of the proposition is also true, that a power to tax is a power to exclude. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; S. C. 45 Mass. 282.

A State law which obstructs the entrance into the State of persons who are neither paupers, vagabonds nor criminals, nor in anywise unsound or infirm in body or in mind, is not an exercise of the police power of the State, and is void. State v. Constitution, 42 Cal. 578.

It is as competent and as necessary for a State to provide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagrants, and possibly convicts, as it is to guard against physical pestilence which may arise from unsound and infectious articles imported, or from a ship the crew of which may be laboring under an infectious disease. Mayor v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; S. C. 2 Paine, 429; New York v. Staples, 6 Cow. 169.

A statute of a State requiring the captain of every vessel to make a report concerning the passengers brought to a port of the State in the vessel is not a regulation of commerce, but of police. Mayor v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; Norris v. Boston, 45 Mass. 282.

The police power of the State may be exercised by precautionary measures against the increase of crime or pauperism, or the spread of infectious diseases from persons coming from other countries. The State may entirely exclude convicts, lepers and persons afflicted with incurable disease,

may refuse admission to paupers, idiots and lunatics, and others who from physical causes are likely to become a charge upon the public, until security is afforded that they will not become such a charge, and may isolate the temporarily diseased until the danger of contagion is gone. Ex parte Ah Fong, 3 Saw. 144; S. C. 20 I. R. R. 112.

Where the evil apprehended by the State from the ingress of foreigners is that such foreigners will disregard the laws of the State, and thus be injurious to its peace, the remedy lies in the more vigorous enforcement of the laws, and not in the exclusion of the parties. Ex parte Ah Fong, 3 Saw. 144; S. C. 20 I. R. R. 112.

The extent of the power of the State to exclude a foreigner from its territory is limited by the right in which it has its origin,-the right of selfdefense. Whatever outside of the legitimate exercise of this right, affects the intercourse of foreigners with our people, their immigration to this country and residence therein is exclusively with the general government. Ex parte Ah Fong, 3 Saw. 144; S. C. 20 I. R. R. 112.

A State law requiring that negroes coming into the State shall give a bond for their good behaviour, and that they will not become a public charge, is not a regulation of commerce. State Cooper, 5 Blackf. 258; Baptiste v. State, 5 Blackf, 283.

A State law which prohibits common carriers from discriminating against passengers on account of race or color, is valid. Decuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. I.

Commerce can not be carried on without the agency of persons, and a tax the effect of which is to diminish personal intercourse is necessarily a tax on commerce. A tax on an alien after he has landed as a condition of residence in the State, is void. Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534.

Aliens can not be taxed for the privilege of residing in a State, without reference to their condition or character. They may be taxed as other residents, but they can not be set apart as special subjects of taxation, and compelled to contribute to the revenue of the State in their character of foreigners. Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534.

Every State may tax foreigners within its territorial limits, with the exception of foreign ambassadors, and agents and their retinue. People v. Naglee, I Cal. 231.

Bridges.

Congress has the power to keep navigable waters open and free from any obstruction to their navigation interposed by the States or otherwise, to remove such obstructions when they exist, and to provide by such sanctions as it may deem proper, against the occurrence of the evil, and for the punishment of offenders. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713.

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