within the limits of a State is to be determined according to the laws of the tribe. Holland v. Pack, Peck, 151.

In the absence of proof the presumption is that, in a savage tribe, there are no laws regulating the descent of property, and that being in a state of nature the property of the deceased belongs to the first occupant. Brashear v. Williams, 10 Ala. 630.

So long as the Indians adhere to their tribal customs, and their affairs are managed by agents of the Federal Government, they are not subject to State laws so far as marriage and inheritance are concerned. Boyer v. Dively, 58 Mo. 510; Morgan . McGhee, 5 Humph. 13; Wall v. Williamson, 11 Ala. 826; s. c. 8 Ala. 48.

A marriage between Indians, which is valid according to the usages of the tribe, will be deemed valid everywhere, although the tribe at the time was on a reservation within the limits of a State. Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48; S. C. 11 Ala. 826; Boyer v. Dively, 58 Mo. 510; Morgan v. McGhee, 5 Humph. 13; Johnson v. Johnson, 30 Mo. 72.

If a marriage between Indians is dissolved according to the law of the tribe, the dissolution will be deemed valid everywhere, although the tribe at the time was on a reservation within the limits of a State. Wall v. Williamson, 8 Ala. 48; S. C. 11 Ala. 826.

A marriage between Indians in a State after the tribe has removed from it, must conform to the laws of the State in order to be valid. Roche v. Washington, 19 Ind. 53.

The condition of an Indian on a reserve in a State, in reference to his contracts, is not distinguishable from that of a foreigner sojourning in the State. Murch v. Tomeer, 21 Me. 535.

Indians are not foreign citizens or subjects. Karrahoo v. Adams, 1 Dillon, 344.

An Indian may be a resident alien in a State. Parent v. Walmsley, 20 Ind. 82.

If an Indian leaves his tribe or nation and takes up his abode among the white population, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges which belong to an emigrant from any other foreign people. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393.

The Cherokee territory is a domestic territory, and its laws and proceedings stand on the same footing as those of other territories. Mackey v. Coxe, 18 How. 100.

A white man may incorporate himself with an Indian tribe, be adopted by it and become a member of the tribe. After adoption he is subject to all the burdens, and entitled to all the immunities of native born citizens or subjects. U. S. v. Ragsdale, Hemp. 497.

Naturalization.

(d) The power of naturalization is vested exclusively in Congress. Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259; U. S. v. Villato, 2 Dall. 370; Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393; Matthews v. Ray, 3 Cranch C. C. 699; contra, Collet v. Collet, 2 Dall. 294.

The object to be attained by the exercise of the power of naturalization is to make citizens of the respective States. Ex parte Frank Knowles, 5 Cal. 300.

If the language is examined closely and according to the rules of rigid construction always applicable to delegated powers, it will be found that the power to naturalize in fact is not given to Congress, but simply the power to establish a uniform rule. The States are not forbidden to naturalize, nor is there anything in the exercise of the power by them incongruous or incompatible with the power of Congress to establish a uniform rule. That the States, if they choose to exercise the power as an original one, must abide by the rule which Congress makes, there can not be the slightest difference of opinion. The power given to Congress was intended to provide a rule for the action of the States, and not a rule for the action of the Federal Government. Ex parte Frank Knowles, 5 Cal. 300.

The power granted to Congress to establish an uniform system of naturalization is, by the well understood meaning of the word, confined to persons born in a foreign country under a foreign government. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393; U. S. v. Rhodes, 1 Abb. C. C. 281.

Indians may be naturalized by the authority of Congress like the subjects of any other foreign government, and become citizens of a State and of the United States. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393.

Congress has the power to admit by law to the rights of American citizenship, entire classes or races who were born and continue to reside within the United States, or upon soil acquired by the general government. Races, tribes and communities, irrespective of color, have been admitted in mass and by a single act of national sovereignty in repeated instances. People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658.

Congress has the power by statute to confer the rights of citizenship upon all native born persons, now that the disability of slavery has been removed. People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658.

Congress having power to make a uniform rule has the right to make the exercise of it a judicial power, and fix upon the class of courts which may be invested with the jurisdiction. This it can do as a part of the rule, although it may not directly confer the jurisdiction. Ex parte Frank Knowles, 5 Cal. 300; Ex parte Beavins, 33 N. H. 89.

Congress has the power to impart validity to an act which it may authorize a State tribunal to perform, although it may assume the form of a

judicial act. If a State court has inherent jurisdiction adequate to the performance of everything required to be done in the process of naturalization, Congress may empower it to naturalize aliens and give validity to the act when done. Morgan v. Dudley, 18 B. Mon. 693; Rump v. Comm. 30 Penn. 475.

If a State law gives jurisdiction to the courts enumerated in the act of Congress, they may entertain proceedings for naturalization. Ex parte Frank Knowles, 5 Cal. 300; Rump v. Comm. 30 Penn. 475.

The Constitution does not point out any State functionaries or any State action as necessary or requisite to carry this power into effect. No power is conferred on Congress to require the aid of the States in its execution, while full power is conferred on Congress for that purpose. The States can not, therefore, be compelled to enforce the enactments of a uniform system of naturalization. Ex parte Beavins, 33 N. H. 89.

No State can confer the jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for naturalization on any tribunal which does not come within the terms of the act of Congress. State v. Whittemore, 50 N. H. 245.

A State may prohibit its courts from entertaining proceedings for naturalization. Ex parte Alexander Stephens, 70 Mass. 559; Ex parte Beavins, 33 N. H. 89.

Previous to the adoption of the Constitution, every State had the right to confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of citizen, and endow him with all its right. This power was not surrendered by the adoption of the Constitution. Each State may still confer the rights and privileges of a citizen upon an alien or any one it thinks proper, or upon any class or description of persons. No State however can, by naturalizing an alien, invest him with the rights and privileges secured to a citizen of a State under the Federal Government, although so far as the State alone is concerned he would be entitled to the rights of a citizen, and clothed with all the rights and immunities which the Constitution and the laws of the State attach to that character. The rights which he would acquire would be restricted to the State which gave them. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393; Ex parte Carl Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443; Vaux v. Nesbit, 1 McCord Ch. 352.

The rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits must not be confounded with the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union. It does not by any means follow because a person has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393.

A State by conferring the right to vote on aliens, thereby gives them an equal voice with any other citizen in the Government of the United States. Ex parte Carl Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 443.

No State can make the subject of a foreign prince a citizen of the State in any other mode than that provided by the naturalization laws of Congress. Lans v. Randall, 3 Cent. L. J. 688.

No State can superadd to the naturalization laws of Congress any requisitions before an alien can be relieved from the incapacities of alienage, and acquire the privileges and immunities of citizens. Comm. v. Towles, 5 Leigh, 743.

Bankruptcy.

(e) The subject is divisible in its nature into bankrupt and insolvent laws, though the line of partition between them is not so distinctly marked as to enable any person to say with positive precision what belongs exclusively to one and not to the other class of laws. The difficulty of discriminating with any accuracy between insolvent and bankrupt laws would lead to the opinion that a bankrupt law may contain those regulations which are generally found in insolvent laws, and that an insolvent law may contain those which are common to a bankrupt law. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat.

122.

The word bankruptcy is employed in the Constitution in the plural and as part of an expression, "the subject of bankruptcies." The ideas attached to the word in this connection are numerous and complicated. They form a subject of extensive and complicated legislation. Of this subject Congress has general jurisdiction. In re Edward Klein, 1 How. 277, note; S. C. 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 185; In re Silverman, 4 B. R. 523; S. C. I Saw. 410; 2 Abb. C. C. 243.

Bankruptcy bears a meaning co-extensive with insolvency, and is equivalent to that word in the Constitution. Kunzler v. Kohaus, 5 Hill, 317; Sackett v. Andross, 5 Hill, 327; Morse v. Hovey, 1 Barb. Ch. 404; S. C. I Sandf. Ch. 187.

The grant is a grant of plenary power over the "subject of bankruptcies." The subject of bankruptcies includes the distribution of the property of the fraudulent or insolvent debtor among his creditors, and the discharge of the debtor from his contracts and legal liabilities, as well as all the intermediate and incidental matters tending to the accomplishment or promotion of these two principal ends. Congress is given full power over this subject, with the one qualification, that its laws thereon shall be uniform throughout the United States. In re Silverman, 4 B. R. 523; S. C. I Saw. 410; 2 Abb. C. C. 243; In re Reiman & Friedlander, 11 B. R. 21; S. C. 13 B. R. 128; 7 Ben. 455; 12 Blatch. 562.

The power of Congress extends to all cases where the law causes the property of a debtor to be distributed among his creditors. This is its least limit. Its greatest is a discharge of the 'debtor from his contracts. All intermediate legislation affecting substance and form, but tending to

further the great end of the subject-distribution and discharge—is in the competency and discretion of Congress. In re Edward Klein, 1 How. 277, note; S. C. 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 185; In re Silverman, 4 B. R. 523; S. C. I Saw. 410; 2 Abb. C. C. 243.

To this power there is no limitation, and consequently it is competent for Congress to act on the whole subject of bankruptcy with a plenary discretion. In re Irwine, 1 Penn. L. J. 291.

The power conferred is without restriction, save in its uniformity. It is plenary, and in reference to its subject may be exercised with the same latitude as the like power has been and may be by the British Parliament. Kunzler v. Kohaus, 5 Hill, 317; In re Edward Klein, 1 How. 277, note; S. C. 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 185.

Congress in passing laws on the subject of bankruptcies is not restricted to laws with such scope only as the English bankrupt laws had when the Constitution was adopted. The power is general, unlimited and unrestricted over the subject. In re Silverman, 4 B. R. 523; S. C. I Saw. 410; 2 Abb. C. C. 243; In re Reiman & Friedlander, 11 B. R. 21; S. C. 13 B. R. 128; 7 Ben. 455; 12 Blatch. 562; Thompson v. Alger, 53 Mass. 428.

The framers of the Constitution did not intend to limit the power to any particular class of persons. Morse v. Hovey, 1 Sandf. Ch. 187; s. C. 1 Barb. Ch. 404; In re Edward Klein, 1 How. 277, note; s. c. 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 185; Kunzler v. Kohaus, 5 Hill, 317; In re California Pacific R. R. Co. 11 B. R. 193; In re Silverman, 4 B. R. 523; S. C. I Saw. 410; 2 Abb. C. C. 243.

It is not necessary that a bankrupt law shall provide for the debtor's discharge. In re California Pacific R. R. Co. 11 B. R. 193.

Congress may establish a system of voluntary as well as involuntary bankruptcy. Loud v. Pierce, 25 Me. 233; Lalor v. Wattles, 8 Ill. 225; Kunzler v. Kohaus, 5 Hill, 317; In re Edward Klein, 1 How. 277, note; S. C. 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 185; Morse v. Hovey, 1 Sandf. Ch. 187; S. C. I Barb. Ch. 404; Thompson v. Alger, 53 Mass. 428; State Bank v. Wilborn. 6 Ark. 35; Keene v. Mould, 16 Ohio, 12; Cutter v. Folsom, 17 N. H. 139; McCormick v. Pickering, 4 N. Y. 276; Rowan v. Holcomb, 16 Ohio, 463; Dresser v. Brooks, 3 Barb. 429; Hastings v. Fowler, 2 Ind. 216; Reed v. Vaughan, 15 Mo. 137; In re Irwine, 1 Penn. L. J. 291.

The directly granted power over bankruptcies carries the incidental authority to modify the obligation of contracts so far as the modification may result from a legitimate exercise of the delegated power. A discharge may therefore be granted releasing the debtor from contracts subsisting at the I time when the law was passed. Kunzler v. Kohaus, 5 Hill, 317; Sackett v. Andross, 5 Hill, 327; In re Edward Klein, 1 How. 277, note; S. C. 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 185; Morse v. Hovey, 1 Sandf. Ch. 187; s. c. 1 Barb. Ch