were commenced before the act took effect. Stockwell v. Silloway, 100 Mass. 287.

In an action on a bond given on the arrest of the debtor, and conditioned that he will apply for the benefit of the State insolvent laws, a plea that he has since obtained a discharge under the bankrupt law is a valid plea, unless the debt is one that is not released by a discharge. Hubert v. Horter, 14 B. R. 430; s. C. 81 Penn. 39; Barber v. Rogers, 71 Penn. 362; Nesbit v. Greaves, 6 W. & S. 120.

A bond to apply for the benefit of the State insolvent laws, and if he fails to be discharged to surrender himself to the sheriff, is valid. The undertaking is in the alternative, either to obtain a discharge or to return to the condition from which he was released. If he can not apply for the benefit of the State insolvent laws because they are suspended, he must perform the other alternative of the condition. Steelman v. Mattix, 36 N. J. 344.

A State insolvent law which merely protects the person from imprisonment, without affecting contracts, is not superseded, although it also provides for the distribution of the debtor's property. Sullivan v. Hieskill, Crabbe, 525; s. C. 4 Penn. L. J. 171.

A State law providing for the arrest and debtors is not suspended by the bankrupt law, Penn. 324.

punishment of fraudulent Scully v. Kirkpatrick, 79

The bankrupt law does not supersede the State laws relating to the settlement of the insolvent estate of lunatics, spendthrifts or deceased perHawkins v. Learned, 54 N. H. 333..

sons.

A State law which makes a transfer by an insolvent with intent to give a preference, operate as an assignment for the benefit of all creditors, is not an insolvent law and is not superseded by the bankrupt law. Ebersole v. Adams, 13 B. R. 141; S. C. 10 Bush. 83; Linthicum v. Fenley, 11 Bush. 131.

The bankrupt law does not supersede a State law regulating assignments for the benefit of creditors. Mayer v. Hellman, 13 B. R. 440; S. C. 91 U. S. 496; in re Hawkins et al. 2 B. R. 378; s. C. 34 Conn. 548; Beck v. Parker, 65 Penn. 262; Maltbie v. Hotchkiss, 5 B. R. 485; S. C. 38 Conn. 80; Von Hein v. Elkus, 15 B. R. 195; S. C. 15 N. Y. Supr. 516.

The law allowing assignments for the benefit of creditors is not a part of the insolvent laws, and is not superseded by the bankrupt law. Cook v. Rogers, 13 B. R. 97; S. C. 31 Mich. 391; 14 A. L. Reg. 633.

A State law which provides the mode of apportioning the losses of a savings bank among the depositors, is valid although it was passed while

the bankrupt law was in force. Simpson v. Savings Bank, 15 B. R. 385; S. C. 56 N. H. 466.

A provision in a State law, which prohibits an insolvent corporation from transferring its property with the intention of giving a preference, is superseded. French v. O'Brien, 52 How. Pr. 394.

An act which provides for the arrest of a debtor who removes or disposes of his property with the intent to defraud his creditors, is not superseded. Gregg v. Hilsen, 34 Leg. Int. 20.

An assignment made as a part of the machinery of a State insolvent law, and deriving all its validity and efficacy from the statute is void. Shryock v. Bashore, 13 B. R. 481; s. C. 15 B. R. 283; 82 Penn. 159; Rowe v. Page, 13 B. R. 366; s. C. 54 N. H. 190.

'Whether an assignment in proceedings under a State insolvent law is void, is a question that may be raised in a collateral action. Shryock v. Bashore, 13 B. R. 481; s. C. 15 B. R. 283; 82 Penn. 159.

The insolvent laws are no further suspended than they seek upon notorious grounds to seize and distribute the effects of the debtor among his creditors generally. A statute for the more effectual appropriation of a debtor's property to satisfy an individual debt is not suspended. Berthelon v. Betts, 4 Hill, 577.

Day

The State insolvent laws were not suspended until June 1, 1867. v. Bardwell et al, 3 B. R. 455; s. C. 97 Mass. 246; Martin v. Berry, 2 B. R. 629; S. C. 37 Cal. 208; 2 L. T. B. 180; Chamberlain v. Perkins, 51 N. H. 336; Augsbury v. Crossman, 17 N. Y. Supr. 387.

The State laws are operative to some extent and for some purposes. They are clearly operative in all cases which are not within the provisions of the bankrupt law. Shepardson's Appeal, 36 Conn. 23; Clarke v. Ray, 1 H. & J. 318; in re Winternitz, 4 B. R. (quarto), 127; S. C. 18 Pitts. L. J. 61.

The bankrupt law applies only to cases where the debtor owes debts provable under the act exceeding the amount of three hundred dollars. When the debts do not exceed that amount, the case is not within the purview of the act. Before proceedings under the State law can be held to be erroneous, it must affirmatively appear that the debts are more than that amount. Until then there is no conflict of laws, and courts will not presume that the debts are more or less than that amount. Shepardson's Appeal, 36 Conn. 23.

The State insolvent laws are still in force so far as they affect debts that will not be released by a discharge under the bankrupt act, such as debts created by the fraud of the bankrupt. Where the bankrupt act expressly

excepts a class of cases, it must have been the intention of Congress not to interfere, in such specified class, with the laws of the several States. A party imprisoned under a judgment founded npon a fraudulent debt, may take the benefit of the State insolvent laws for the purpose of obtaining a release and discharge from that debt. In re Winternitz, 4 B. R. (quarto), 127; S. C. 18 Pitts. L. J. 61; Stepp v. Stahl, 2 W. N. 80.

The State insolvent laws are suspended even as between citizens of the same State. Cassard et al. v. Kroner, 4 B. R. 569.

An attachment law which permits a writ of attachment to issue for the causes which would be sufficient to authorize the institution of proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy, and authorizes the distribution of the property equally among all the creditors, is superseded. Tobin v. Trump, 3 Brews. 288; s. c. 7 Phila. 123.

There is a material distinction between discharging a debtor and distributing his assets among his creditors. The bankrupt act was demanded and passed mainly for the former. The latter is in its nature incidental to the former, which is the principal thing. There probably existed in every State, at the time of the passage of the bankrupt law, some statutory provisions for the distribution of the effects of insolvent debtors among their creditors, and it can hardly be supposed that Congress intended to repeal or suspend those State laws, except so far as was necessary for the accomplishment of the main object in view, and that necessity may well be limited to those cases over which the Federal courts actually assert their jurisdiction within the time limited for that purpose. An assignment under the State law is good unless attacked within six months. If all the parties concerned desire that the estate may be settled in the State courts, it can be done. Should a case arise in which there will be an actual conflict of jurisdiction, the State courts must yield to the Federal courts, and when the bankrupt court, within the time limited, asserts its jurisdiction, the proceedings in the State court are thereby superseded. Should the State courts attempt to grant a certificate of discharge to an insolvent debtor, no court would give any effect to it. Maltbie v. Hotchkiss, 5 B. R. 485; s. c. 38 Conn. 80; Reed v. Taylor, 4 B. R. 710; S. C. 32 Iowa, 209.

If the debtor has not committed an act of bankruptcy, and declines to go into voluntary bankruptcy, a creditor may proceed against him under the State insolvent law, where such proceedings are in harmony with the purpose of the bankrupt law, for the State insolvent law remains in full force in respect to all persons and matters over which the bankrupt law declines to take jurisdiction. Geery's Appeal, 43 Conn. 289.

Whether a State insolvent law is unconstitutional is a question that can not be raised by the defendant in an action by an insolvent trustee to recover a debt due to the estate. Shryock v. Bashore, 13 B. R. 48; S. C. 15 B. R. 283; 82 Penn. 159.

As a bankrupt law merely suspends State insolvent laws without repealing them, they revive and are in force on the repeal of the bankrupt law, and need not be re-enacted. Lavender v. Gosnell, 12 B. R. 282; S. C. 43 Md. 153.

The bankrupt law must prevail in cases where it conflicts with the ordinance of 1787. Stow v. Parks, 1 Chand. 60.

more.

Currency.

(ƒ) The term money is used in different places in the Constitution, as it is elsewhere, in somewhat different senses. Here, however, it means metallic money-gold, silver and copper, or the metals used for coin, and no The phrase "coining" can not, without violence, be applied to the issue of paper money. To coin money is to make, stamp and issue coins as money. Coins are pieces of metal of a particular weight and standard, and to which a particular value is given in account and payment. The clause which follows, " to regulate the value thereof," evidently means to authorize the regulation of the value of the coins thus issued or the money coined, and that is metallic money. Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400; Hague v. Powers, 39 Barb. 427; Thayer v. Hedges, 22 Ind. 282; Maynard v. Newman, 1 Nev. 271.

The National Government is to "coin money," that is, to fix the national stamp upon the metals which are to be used as money, to determine the character of the national currency, and what shall be the measure or standard of value, and what the different kinds used for money, and into what denominations the money shall be divided, or of what it shall consist. Hague v. Powers, 39 Barb. 427; Griswold v. Hepburn, 2 Duval, 20.

The language of the Constitution, by its proper signification, is limited to the faculty in Congress of coining and of stamping the standard of value upon what the Government creates or shall adopt, and of punishing the offense of producing a false representation of what may have been so created or adopted. Fox v. State, 5 How. 410.

The Constitution clearly designed to take all questions of currency, whether paper or metal, from the several States; and it is in the discretion of Congress to make of its tokens, whether of one substance or another, tenders in such amounts and for such purposes as may be determined upon. Van Husan v. Kanouse, 13 Mich. 303.

The power to regulate the value of money is without any limitation or restriction whatever. On that subject Congress has as supreme and unlimited powers as any sovereignty in the world. George v. Concord, 45 N. H. 434; Maynard v. Newman, 1 Nev. 271; Shollenberger v. Brinton, 52 Penn. 9.

The grant of the power to coin money does not contain an implied prohibition against the enactment of laws making treasury notes a legal tender. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457.

The power to regulate the value of coin does not make that coin of necessity a legal tender at the value so fixed. Van Husan v. Kanouse, 13 Mich. 303.

The power to coin money is one power, and the power to declare anything a legal tender is another and different power. Thayer v. Hedges, 22 Ind. 282.

The power to declare what shall or shall not be a legal tender, or in other words lawful money of a country, is a necessary incident of sovereignty, and has ever been exercised by the sovereign power in all civilized nations. ✔ The power to make tender laws is an implied power, and may be derived from many of the express powers conferred upon Congress. Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400; George v. Concord, 45 N. H. 434; Van Husan v. Kanouse, 13 Mich. 303; Maynard v. Newman, 1 Nev. 271; Shollenberger v. Brinton, 52 Penn. 9.

A statute making treasury notes a legal tender in time of war, with the design of preserving the Government, is valid. Dooley v. Smith, 13 Wall. 604; Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 15 Wall. 195; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457; Black v. Lusk, 69 Ill. 70; Hague v. Powers, 39 Barb. 427; Reynolds v. Bank, 18 Ind. 467; Lick v. Faulkner, 25 Cal. 404; Curiac v. Albadie, 25 Cal. 502; Kierski v. Matthews, 25 Cal. 591; Thayer v. Hedges, 23 Ind. 141; George v. Concord, 45 N. H, 434; Latham v. U. S. 1 Ct. Cl. 149; S. C. 2 Ct. Cl. 573; Hintrager v. Bates, 18 Iowa, 174; Shollenberger v. Brinton, 52 Penn. 9; Jones v. Harker, 37 Geo. 503; contra, Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603; S. C. 2 Duval, 20.

The power to make treasury notes a legal tender is not to be resorted to except upon extraordinary and pressing occasions, such as war or other public exigencies of great gravity and importance, and should be no longer exerted than all the circumstances of the case demand. It is for the legislative department of the Government to judge of the occasions when, and of the times how long, it shall be exercised and in force. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457.

There is no well-founded distinction between the constitutional validity of an act of Congress declaring treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of debts contracted after its passage, and that of an act making them a legal tender for the discharge of all debts, as well those incurred before as those made after its enactment. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457.

The obligation of a contract to pay money, is to pay that which the law shall recognize as money when the payment is to be made. Every contract for the payment of money is subject to the constitutional power of the