Conceive, for instance, that the American squadron, employed to blockade the French ships in Liverpool, were short handed, but, from being in daily expectation of bringing their enemy to action, it had become an object of great consequence with them to get their ships manned. And suppose, likewise, that it were perfectly notorious to all parties, that, on board every English ship arriving or sailing from the port in question, there were several American citizens, but calling themselves English, and having in their possession protections,' or certificates to that effect, sworn to in regular form, but well known to be false, and such as might be bought for 4s. 6d. any day. Things being in this situation, if the American men-of-war, off the English port, were then to fire at and stop every ship, and, besides overhauling her papers and cargo, were to take out any seaman, to work their own guns withal, whom they had reason, or supposed, or said they had reason, to consider American citizens, or whose country they guessed from dialect, or appearance; I wish to know with what degree of patience this would be submitted to on the Exchange at Liverpool, or elsewhere in England?

It signifies nothing to say that such a case could not occur, as the Americans do not impress seamen; for all who have attended to such subjects know well enough, that if they come to be engaged in a protracted war, especially at a distance from their own shores, there is no other possible way by which they can keep their armed ships manned. This, however, is not the point now in discussion. I merely wish to put the general case broadly before our own eyes, in order that we may bring it distinctly home to ourselves, and then see whether or not the Americans had reason for their indignation.

annoyed; and if the might makes right,'

The truth is, they had very good reason to be guiding practical maxim amongst nations be, that as I conceive it always has been, and ever will be, so long as powder and shot exist, with money to back them, and energy to wield them, — then we really cannot pretend to find fault with the Americans, because they took advantage, or tried to take advantage, of that moment when, our 'right' being the same, our 'might' appeared to be waning. I allude to their declaring war against us in 1812, when we, fighting singlehanded, in the cause of European independence, were so hard pressed by Napoleon and others. For the Americans to have taken an earlier share in the struggle against us, when we were lords of the ascendant, would have been the extremity of Quixotism. But when John Bull was pressed on all hands by numbers, and his strength exhausted by long

contests, albeit in the cause of liberty, which his brother Jonathan professes to adore, he, Jonathan, would have been a fool, a character which he certainly never was accused of enacting, if he had not taken advantage of the moment to try his strength. The provocation we gave was certainly considerable, and the retort, it must be owned, very dexterously managed. The result, I trust, is, that things are on a better footing than before; both parties have learned civility and caution, and they will not agree the worse on that account. To forgive and forget, is the old English maxim, as our friends well know. Let them imitate us in this respect, and they will be all the happier, and not a whit less powerful.

In putting a parallel case to ours off New York, and supposing Liverpool to be blockaded by the Americans on the ground of their watching some French ships, I omitted to throw in one item, which is necessary to complete the parallel, and make it fit the one from which it is drawn. Suppose the blockading American ships off Liverpool, in firing a shot ahead of a vessel they wished to examine, had accidentally hit, not that vessel, but a small coaster, so far beyond her, that she was not even noticed by the blockading ships. And suppose, further, this unlucky chance-shot to have killed one of the crew on board the said coaster: the vessel would, of course, proceed immediately to Liverpool with the body of their slaughtered countryman; and, in fairness, it may be asked, what would have been the effect of such a spectacle on the population of England — more particularly if such an event had occurred at the moment of a general election, when party politics, raging on this very question of foreign interference, was at its height?

This is not an imaginary case; for it actually occurred in 1804, when we were blockading the French frigates in New York. A casual shot from the Leander hit an unfortunate sloop's main-boom; and the broken spar striking the mate, John Pierce by name, killed him instantly. The sloop sailed on to New York, where the mangled body, raised on a platform, was paraded through the streets, in order to augment the vehement indignation, already at a high pitch, against the English.

Now, let us be candid to our rivals; and ask ourselves, whether the Americans would have been worthy of our friendship, or even of our hostility, had they tamely submitted to indignities which, if passed upon ourselves, would have roused not only Liverpool, but the whole country, into a towering passion of nationality?

Captain Basil Hall, Fragments of Voyages and Travels [First Series] (Edinburgh, etc., 1831), I, 292–301.

117. Courtesies of English Cruisers (1804)

BY ROBERT SUTCLIFF

Sutcliff was an English Quaker who came to America on business in 1804 and kept a running account of his travels. The experience here described was one that all incoming American vessels had to suffer, for the government did nothing to protect them, except to protest. - Bibliography as in No. 116 above.

AF

FTER a tedious time spent in the gulf stream, we at length arrived on the coast of North America; and on 1st day morning, the 29th of the 7th Month [1804], we were favoured with the sight of Long Island. . .

...

The next morning, about four o'clock, 7th Month, 30th, I was waked by the report of a great gun, which was followed by considerable bustle upon deck. After getting up, I understood that a shot had been fired over us by an English frigate, called the Boston, which, in company with the Leander and Cambrian men of war, and Driver sloop of war, was then cruizing near us; and as the cannon-ball that was fired over us, was an earnest of what we might expect if we did not stop to receive an officer from the frigate, the topsails were immediately backed, and we shortened sail that they might have an opportunity of coming to us. A Lieutenant and Midshipman were sent on board. After spending about half an hour in conversation with us, and exchanging intelligence and newspapers, they left the ship; and, at parting, observed that they believed all our seamen were citizens of the United States, and therefore did not wish to examine them; but that they hoped we would not hoist our sails until we had a signal from the frigate; which was complied with. . . .

...

The different ships of war, which I have just mentioned, made a very gay appearance; for the weather being fine and clear, and but little wind, they had most of their sails spread; and continued sailing to and fro before Sandyhook; the Never-sink Mountains being in the back ground. Their object was to watch two French frigates then lying in New-York, as the Lieutenant of the Boston informed us, and, at the same time, to examine all American ships in order to discover if there were any of the subjects of Great Britain serving on board, with a view to impress them. It appeared to be an arduous and delicate situation in which the Commander of these ships was placed. Having to fulfil the orders of his Government on the one hand, and being in danger of giving offence

to the Americans on the other, it seemed impossible for him to steer clear, unless possessed of a very uncommon share of prudence and discretion.

Robert Sutcliff, Travels in some Parts of North America, in the Years 1804, 1805, & 1806 (Philadelphia, 1812), 20–23 passim.

118. The British Case against America (1805)

BY JAMES STEPHEN

Stephen was an English barrister who spent several years in the West Indies and became well acquainted with the conditions of the West Indian trade and the horrors of slavery. On his return to England in 1794 he became Wilberforce's brother-in-law and active supporter in the anti-slavery crusade; later he sat in Parliament and was made master in chancery. He published this pamphlet anonymously. It aroused much attention and is commonly supposed to have been a chief cause of the Orders in Council, of which Stephen has been called the father. Bibliography as in No. 116 above.

L

ET us next enquire what use has been made by neutral merchants, of the indulgences which the British government has thus liberally granted. We have suffered neutrals to trade with the colonies of our enemy, directly to or from the ports of their own respective countries, but not directly to or from any other part of the world, England, during the last war, excepted. Have they been content to observe the restriction? . .

The chief danger of our so far receding from the full extent of our belligerent rights, as to allow the neutral states to import directly the produce of the hostile colonies, was that it might be re-exported, and sent either to the mother country in Europe, or to neighbouring neutral ports, from which the produce itself, or its proceeds, might be easily remitted to the hostile country; in which case our enemies would scarcely feel any serious ill effect from the war, in regard to their colonial trade. . . .

To the Americans especially, whether dealing on their own account, or as secret agents of the enemy, the profit would have been comparatively small, and the business itself inconsiderable, had they not been allowed to send forward to Europe, at least in a circuitous way, the produce they brought from the islands. The obligation of first importing into their own country, was an inconvenience which their geographical

position made of little moment; but the European, and not the Ameri. can market, was that in which alone the ultimate profit could be reaped, or the neutralizing commission secured. . . .

From these causes it has naturally happened that the protection given by the American flag, to the intercourse between our European enemies and their colonies, since the instruction of January, 1794, has chiefly been in the way of a double voyage, in which America has been the half-way house, or central point of communication. The fabrics and commodities of France, Spain, and Holland, have been brought under American colours to ports in the United States; and from thence re-exported, under the same flag, for the supply of the hostile colonies. Again, the produce of those colonies has been brought, in a like manner, to the American ports, and from thence re-shipped to Europe. . . .

It seems scarcely necessary to shew, that, by this practice, the licence accorded by the British government was grossly abused. . . .

By the merchants, and custom-house officers of the United States, the line of neutral duty in this case was evidently not misconceived; for the departures from it, were carefully concealed, by artful and fraudulent contrivance. When a ship arrived at one of their ports to neutralize a voyage that fell within the restriction, e. g. from a Spanish colony to Spain, all her papers were immediately sent on shore, or destroyed. Not one document was left, which could disclose the fact that her cargo had been taken in at a colonial port: and new bills of lading, invoices, clearances, and passports were put on board, all importing that it had been shipped in America. Nor were official certificates, or oaths wanting, to support the fallacious pretence. The fraudulent precaution of the agents often went so far, as to discharge all the officers and crew, and sometimes even the master, and to ship an entire new company in their stead, who, being ignorant of the former branch of the voyage, could, in case of examination or capture, support the new papers by their declarations and oaths, as far as their knowledge extended, with a safe conscience. Thus, the ship and' cargo were sent to sea again, perhaps within eight and forty hours from the time of her arrival, in a condition to defy the scrutiny of any British cruizer, by which she should be stopped and examined in the course of her passage to Europe. . . . With such facilities, it is not strange that this fraudulent practice should have prevailed to a great extent, before it met the attention of our prize tribunals.

Those who are conversant with the business of the prize court, well