sive, and the grain is trodden out by mules, as it was formerly in Europe, and as it is still in Egypt, by Oxen. . . ... The Indian corn, or maize, is very generally cultivated, and forms the supply of bread for the great mass of the people. . . . Sugar is made by the Indians in most parts of Mexico, though formerly imported from Spain. It is sold in small cakes, at a very reasonable rate. . Coffee is grown, though not very generally. . . Cotton of a very fine quality is abundantly produced in most of the warm parts, but is manufactured to great disadvantage by the natives. . . . The machine for extracting the seed is not known, and this troublesome process is performed by hand. The Indians also expose for sale great quantities of coarse calico, of their own making.. Excellent tobacco is produced in many parts of Mexico, and it was used in the form of segars in such quantities as to yield, in the time of the Spaniards, a net revenue of £833,400 . ... I found . . . that several respectable English mercantile houses had been established . . . and that others were preparing; strong hopes were entertained that the heavy import duties would shortly be lessened, and the facilities for transporting goods into the interior be increased. A plan for the establishing of waggons on the great road to the capital had been partially acted on by some gentlemen from the United States, and promised to be successful, especially if the road were put into a state of repair, and a few of the unfinished points of connexion completed, which would not be attended with very considerable expense, with the exception of one place, as it lies principally through a populous country, abounding with good stone for the purpose. Without it, the conveyance of the heavy cast iron machinery of the steam-engines, with the necessary iron tools, &c. for the mines now about to be opened, will be a labour of great difficulty. The duties and other expenses on the landing of goods at Vera Cruz are enormously high, and tend much to discourage the mercantile speculator; eight and a half per cent. ad valorem is paid on all cargoes from Europe at the Spanish castle of St. Juan de Ulua, and twenty-seven and a half to the town. This too is on their own arbitrary valuation, and is often three times the original cost. One dollar each package is charged for the hospital, and four and a half dollars per ton on the ship, according to her register; three rials per ton for water; eight dollars for the captain of the port; and thirty-two dollars each trip for the use of large boats for landing the cargo: to these may be added the expense of porterage to the custom-house, and afterwards to the stores of the merchants; even this is expensive, as labour of all kinds is here excessively high-priced, and the insolence of the negro porters is intolerable. The above are the principal charges at the port, to which the removal of goods to Mexico adds much, as they pay an additional duty of about twelve per cent. on their arrival, and the carriage of every horse or muleload, from two to three hundred weight, is from eighteen to twenty-two dollars. The goods sold in Mexico pay again another duty, on being removed to the provinces; but if they are intended, when landed, to be removed direct to the cities beyond Mexico, an arrangement can be made at the port custom-house which will save some of the expenses. . . . The contraband trade carried on by the Castle is a source of considerable loss and trouble to the fair trader, as it is notorious that, by intriguing with its officers of the customs, goods to a vast amount may be clandestinely conveyed into the country. . . . It is principally the Spanish merchants who are thus enabled to avoid the heavy duties and charges demanded by the Mexican government, and who by these means are competent to undersell the fair trader in the article of his own manufacture. This state of things cannot be of long continuance . . . The state of trade has already undergone as great a change as the politics of Mexico, and the further alterations of fashions will introduce a more extensive demand for our manufactures. . . The prosperity of Mexico must always depend on the cultivation of her immense mineral wealth. The silver mines have already produced more riches than those of any other portion of the globe, and more rapid fortunes have been made by individuals than are possessed by any in Europe. .. Mining operations, it is believed, have never been well conducted here, notwithstanding which, more than one thousand six hundred millions sterling have been issued from the treasury. Nothing is now wanting, in my opinion, to re-establish the prosperity of this fine country, but an acknowledgment of its independence by Great Britain. That it is for ever severed from the mother-country I have not the smallest doubt: but in its present state it may yet linger, from the debility to which it is reduced by the revolution, for years, unless cherished by our assistance, with which it would shortly rise and be again in opulence and productiveness . . . William] Bullock, Six Months' Residence and Travels in Mexico (London, 1824), 52-498 passim. 147. The Monroe Doctrine as Monroe Stated it (1817-1824) BY PRESIDENT JAMES MONROE The Monroe Doctrine, so-called, was a growth, the germs of which could be found as far back as the beginning of the nation. Rooted in the conviction that the United States should remain free from all the inter-relationships of the European states, it was brought to maturity by the fear that that freedom was endangered. The final growth during Monroe's administration is traced in the extracts below taken from his inaugural addresses and annual messages. — For Monroe, see No. 74 above. Bibliography as in No. 142 above. — For other articles on this policy, see Nos. 84, 106 above, and No. 148 below. ANGERS from abroad are not less deserving of attention. [March 4, 1817.] DANG Experiencing the fortune of other nations, the United States may be again involved in war, and it may in that event be the object of the adverse party to overset our Government, to break our Union, and demolish us as a nation. Our distance from Europe and the just, moderate, and pacific policy of our Government may form some security against these dangers, but they ought to be anticipated and guarded against. . . . ... [December 2.] It was anticipated at an early stage that the contest between Spain and the colonies would become highly interesting to the United States. It was natural that our citizens should sympathize in events which affected their neighbors. It seemed probable also that the prosecution of the conflict along our coast and in contiguous countries would occasionally interrupt our commerce and otherwise affect the persons and property of our citizens. These anticipations have been realized. Such injuries have been received from persons acting under authority of both the parties, and for which redress has in most instances been withheld. Through every stage of the conflict the United States have maintained an impartial neutrality, giving aid to neither of the parties in men, money, ships, or munitions of war. They have regarded the contest not in the light of an ordinary insurrection or rebellion, but as a civil war between parties nearly equal, having as to neutral powers equal rights. Our ports have been open to both, and every article the fruit of our soil or of the industry of our citizens which either was permitted to take has been equally free to the other. Should the colonies establish their independence, it is proper now to state that this Government neither seeks nor would accept from them any advantage in commerce or otherwise which will not be equally open to all other nations. The colonies will in that event become independent states, free from any obligation to or connection with us which it may not then be their interest to form on the basis of a fair reciprocity. . . . [November 16, 1818.] By a circular note addressed by the ministers of Spain to the allied powers, with whom they are respectively accredited, it appears that the allies have undertaken to mediate between Spain and the South American Provinces, and that the manner and extent of their interposition would be settled by a congress which was to have met at Aix-la-Chapelle in September last. From the general policy and course of proceeding observed by the allied powers in regard to this contest it is inferred that they will confine their interposition to the expression of their sentiments, abstaining from the application of force. I state this impression that force will not be applied with the greater satisfaction because it is a course more consistent with justice and likewise authorizes a hope that the calamities of the war will be confined to the parties only, and will be of shorter duration. From the view taken of this subject, founded on all the information that we have been able to obtain, there is good cause to be satisfied with the course heretofore pursued by the United States in regard to this contest, and to conclude that it is proper to adhere to it, especially in the present state of affairs. . . [December 7, 1819.] This contest has from its commencement been very interesting to other powers, and to none more so than to the United States. A virtuous people may and will confine themselves within the limit of a strict neutrality; but it is not in their power to behold a conflict so vitally important to their neighbors without the sensibility and sympathy which naturally belong to such a case. It has been the steady purpose of this Government to prevent that feeling leading to excess, and it is very gratifying to have it in my power to state that so strong has been the sense throughout the whole community of what was due to the character and obligations of the nation that very few examples of a contrary kind have occurred. The distance of the colonies from the parent country and the great extent of their population and resources gave them advantages which it was anticipated at a very early period would be difficult for Spain to surmount. The steadiness, consistency, and success with which they have pursued their object, as evinced more particularly by the undisturbed sovereignty which Buenos Ayres has so long enjoyed, evidently give them a strong claim to the favorable consideration of other nations. These sentiments on the part of the United States have not been withheld from other powers, with whom it is desirable to act in concert. Should it become manifest to the world that the efforts of Spain to subdue these Provinces will be fruitless, it may be presumed that the Spanish Government itself will give up the contest. In producing such a determination it can not be doubted that the opinion of friendly powers who have taken no part in the controversy will have their merited influence. . . . [November 14, 1820.] . . . No facts are known to this Government to warrant the belief that any of the powers of Europe will take part in the contest, whence it may be inferred, considering all circumstances which must have weight in producing the result, that an adjustment will finally take place on the basis proposed by the colonies. To promote that result by friendly counsels with other powers, including Spain herself, has been the uniform policy of this Government. . . . [March 5, 1821.] This contest was considered at an early stage by my predecessor a civil war in which the parties were entitled to equal rights in our ports. This decision, the first made by any power, being formed on great consideration of the comparative strength and resources of the parties, the length of time, and successful opposition made by the colonies, and of all other circumstances on which it ought to depend, was in strict accord with the law of nations. . . . ... [December 3, 1821.] . . . It has long been manifest that it would be impossible for Spain to reduce these colonies by force, and equally so that no conditions short of their independence would be satisfactory to them. It may therefore be presumed, and it is earnestly hoped, that the Government of Spain, guided by enlightened and liberal councils. will find it to comport with its interests and due to its magnanimity to terminate this exhausting controversy on that basis. To promote this result by friendly counsel with the Government of Spain will be the object of the Government of the United States. . . . [December 2, 1823.] At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. . . . In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate |