power being given to the daughter, to dispose of such "bequest as she pleased, “by a last will and testament duly executed by her." In September, 1875, the daughter died, leaving a will executed in September, 1871, which recited that she was "entitled to legacies" under the will of her mother, and to a distributive share in the estates of a sister and a brother, “" and notwithstanding my coverture, have full testamentary power to dispose of the same," and then bequeathed to her husband, C., "the entire property and estate to which I am now in any wise entitled and which I may hereafter acquire, of whatever the same may cousist," "absolutely and in fee simple; " Held, (1) The court is authorized to put itself in the position occupied by the daughter when she made her will, in order to discover from that standpoint, in view of the circumstances then existing, what she intended; (2) The will of the daughter was intended by her to be, and was, a full execution of the power, because it referred expressly to the subject matter of the power; (3) The statement in it as to "full testamentary power referred to the fact that, although she was a married woman, she had power to "dispose of the saine" by a will, such power being given to her by the will of her mother, and did not refer to the provision of the constitution of 1868 of South Carolina, and the legislation consequent thereon, enabling married women to dispose of their own property by will; (4) Outside of her interest in the bond and mortgage, she had practically no property. Lee v. Simpson, 572. See EVIDENCE, 1, 2, 3; JURISDICTION, A, 2. WITNESS. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3. it to impose further taxation within the limit of the unexhausted power, for his benefit. Macon County v. Huidekoper, 332. 3. The validity of a state tax upon corporations created under its laws, or doing business within its territory, can in no way be dependent upon the mode which the State may deem fit to adopt in fixing the amount for any year which it will exact for the franchise. Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 594. The provision in the constitution of Louisiana declaring a tax-title to be prima facie valid is intended to be applied to cases in which the taxtitle is attacked for alleged informalities in the proceedings; but not to cases in which it is attacked for fraud and collusion in effecting the sale. Mendenhall v. Hall, 559. See EQUITY, 10. TENDER. See EQUITY, 10. TRUST. 1. A trustee of real estate, after a court of equity, on his own motion, has discharged him and relieved him of his trust and appointed another trustee in his place, has no remaining interest in the property which he can convey by deed. Kenaday v. Edwards, 117. 2. A trustee of real estate, appointed by the court, subject to its control and order, cannot give good title to the trust estate by a deed made without the consent of the court. Ib. TRUSTEE. See APPEAL 4. VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1, 2. WARRANTY. See CONTRACT, 8, 9, 10, 11. WILL. A testatrix, residing in South Carolina, who died in July, 1866, left a will made by her in 1863, by a codicil to which, made in January, 1866, she bequeathed to her daughter, then married to C., three-fourths of her. interest in a bond and mortgage debt, to be vested in a trustee, who was appointed, and to be enjoyed by the daughter during her life, INDEX. TAX AND TAXATION. 791 1. The plaintiff in error failed to make a return of its loans to the state authorities as required by law, whereupon the auditor general, under direction of state law, made out an account against it containing the following charge: "Nominal value of scrip, bonds and certificates of indebtedness held by residents of Pennsylvania, $539,000-tax three mills-$1617.00." The company appealed from this court to the Court of Common Pleas, which decided in its favor, and the Commonwealth from thence to the Supreme Court of the State, which rendered a judgment in favor of the Commonwealth for $666. Among the grounds for the appeal was, that the tax was in violation of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the assessment was for the nominal value, and not for the real value of the bonds; because the owners of the bonds had no notice, and no opportunity to be heard; because the company was taxed for property that it did not own; and because the deduction of the tax from the interest due the bondholders in Pennsylvania took their property without due process of law, and denied to them the equal protection of the laws. The case being brought to this court from the state court by writ of error, a motion was made to dismiss for want of jurisdiction; to which was united a motion to affirm; Held, (1) That there was clearly a federal question raised, and the writ could not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction; (2) That although it was doubtful whether, under the rules, there was sufficient color for the motion to dismiss to justify the court in considering the motion to affirm, yet, as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in its opinion, did not seem to have expressly passed upon the federal question, which was clearly in the record, the court could consider that there was color for making that motion; (3) That the provision for the assessment of the tax upon the nominal or face value of the bonds, instead of upon their actual value, was a part of the state system of taxation, authorized by its constitution and laws, and violated no provision of the Constitution of the United States; (4) That the failure to give personal notice to the owners of the bonds involved no violation of due process of law, when executed according to customary forms and established usages, or in subordination to the principles which underlie them; (5) That it was not true, in point of fact, that the corporation was taxed for property which it did not own. Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232. 2. The power conferred by the statutes of Missouri upon counties within the State, to levy and collect annually a tax of one-half of one per cent upon all the taxable wealth of the county for county revenue, is not exhausted by a levy of thirty cents on every one hundred dollars of taxable property for county purposes, and the levy of twenty cents on the same by the board of townships for township and bridge purposes; and a judgment creditor of such a county has a right to requir was plainly intended to cover the whole subject embraced by both, and to prescribe the only rules in respect to that subject which are Tracy v. Tuffly, 206. to govern. 2. Upon the construction of the constitution and laws of a State this court, as a general rule, follows the decisions of the highest court of the State, unless they conflict with, or impair the efficacy of some provision of the federal constitution, or of a federal statute, or a rule of general commercial law; and this is especially the case when affecting title of property, a line of such decisions have become a rule to real estate within the State. Gormley v. Clark, 338. 3. When there is an ambiguity in a section of the Revised Statutes, resort may be had to the original statute from which the section was taken, to ascertain what, if any, change of phraseology there is, and whether such change should be construed as changing the law. United States v. Lacher, 624. 4. Penal statutes, like all others, are to be fairly construed according to the legislative intent, as expressed in the act. Ib. B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES. See ADMIRALTY, 1; CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2; PATENT FOR INVENTION, 1. COMMISSIONERS OF CIRCUIT COURTS, 1; JURISDICTION, B, 1; C, 3; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10, 17; C. STATUTES OF STATES AND TERRITORIES. Colorado. Idaho. Iowa. Louisiana. Michigan. Nebraska. New York. Ohio. See EX POST FACTO LAW. See JURISDICTION, C, 1, 2. See EQUITY, 5. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 12; See CORPORATION, 4. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14, 15, 16. TAX AND Taxation, 2. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17, 18; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 5, 6. See MORTGAGE, 2. See TAX AND TAXATION, 1. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 19. |