become the property of actual settlers. The following circular has been issued by the Chicago Federation of Labor :

CHICAGO, Jan. 2, 1903.

DEAR SIR AND BROTHER:

There is a fight on in Congress now which we ought to take hold of quick and strong.

We got the National Irrigation Law through in the last session of Congress, and there is now over ten million dollars in the treasury to build Government irrigation works.

But the land thieves are stealing the Government land so fast under the old Desert Land Act and Commutation Clause of the Homestead Act that at the rate they are going the Government will soon have no land left to reclaim.

The land grabbers and speculators are robbing the people of the public lands at the rate of over two million acres a month. Just think of that!

Will you not get in and help us to stop it? The only way to stop it is to repeal the Desert Land Law and the Commutation Clause of the Homestead Act in this session of Congress. Unless this is done the very choicest tracts of public land will be stolen before Congress meets again.

Will you not have your organization pass strong resolutions demanding the repeal in this session of Congress of the Desert Land Act and the Commutation Clause of the Homestead Act, as the President recommended in his Message to Congress; and send copies of your resolutions, as quick as you possibly can, to

your Senators and Representatives in Congress.

Please let me know when you write them and send me a copy of your resolution. Fraternally yours,

WALTER CARMODY,

Secretary.

Brotherhood of Railroad Freight and Baggage Handlers.-The following circular makes it evident that the spirit of unionism is spreading throughout the ranks of railway employes:

The Brotherhood of Railroad Freight and Baggage Handlers is a distinct railroad craft organization, founded to improve the terms and conditions of employment for freight and baggage handlers and place them in a position to obtain proper remuneration for their work. "In Union there is Strength." The Brotherhood is organizing and uniting all classes of men employed on the platforms of all railroad freight and transfer houses, terminal, storage and transfer warehouses in the United States and Canada; also the depot baggage handlers employed by the railways. The Brotherhood is conducted on business lines for the benefit of all members. The Brotherhood provides for and takes care of sick members and the burial of deceased members.

All information desired in regard to forming local divisions of the Brotherhood, initiation fees and dues can be ob tained by addressing the International Headquarters, 38 Market street, Lancaster, Pa.

Agreement to Hire Injured Em

AN

ploye for Life.

N ACTION was brought by John H. Usher against the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad to recover damages for the breach of a contract by which the plaintiff claimed that the defendant employed him to work for life at a monthly compensation of $35, about half pay. There was evidence from which the jury was justified in concluding that such a contract was entered into between the plaintiff and William G. Watson, now deceased, then superintendent of the Hudson River division, one of the defendant's railroads. The plaintiff had been injured while in the defendant's employ as brakeman, the injury resulting in the amputation of his leg, and he

claimed the right to damages in conse quence of it; and the evidence tended to establish that in the interview between him and Watson, he received a check for $128, being one-half wages for the period that he was laid up, and also received from Watson the promise of life employment as flagman at a certain crossing. The plaintiff, in consideration of the payment, and, as the proof tended to show, of the promise of permanent employment, then executed a general release to the defendant, whereupon he was given the promised employment, and retained it about five and one-half years, when he was discharged without cause. In the supreme court of New York, appellate division, a judgment for plaintiff has just been affirmed, though two of the justices dissented.

"The main contention on the part of the appellant is that the contract, if made, was not binding upon the company, for the reason that the division superintendent had no power to make it in the absence of express authority, and that the contract was in itself unreasonable. In Carney vs. Insurance Co., 162 N. Y. 453, 57 N. E. 78, 49 L. R. A. 471, 76 Am. St. Rep. 347, it was held that a contract by which a person was employed for life, made by the executive officers of a life insurance company, assuming to act under a by-law, previously adopted by the board of trustees, empowering them 'to appoint, remove and fix the compensation of each and every person, except agents, employed by the company,' was unreasonable, and not contemplated thereby. The court held that, because the term of office of the trustees was limited by statute, it must be assumed that they would not adopt a by-law authorizing the imposition of unreasonable contracts upon their successors in office. The contract was executory on both sides, and the decision rested upon the construction of the by-law, and a judicial determination of the power designed to be conferred by it. By a parity of reasoning, it may be conceded in this case that the general employment by the executive officers of the defendant of their employes for life would be unreasonable, and beyond the power conferred upon them or upon the defendant by the statute from which it derives its corporate life and functions. But the case presented is not one of a simple and naked contract of employment, but is the case of the immediate and final settlement and adjustment of a claim for compensation for serious injuries alleged to have been oc casioned by the defendant's negligence, and the reasoning of the decision cited has no necessary application. In such a case, where an employe has been rendered nearly helpless by the company's fault, and without any fault of his own, it could hardly be said to be unreasonable, in consideration of a release of his claim for damages, for the company to agree to put him to such work as he was still competent to perform in his crippled condition, to pay him for it one-half of what he was previously able to earn, and to keep him at it for life; that is, during good behavior, obedience and competency. It is within general knowledge that such contracts under such circumstances are by no means unusual, and, to whatever other objection they may be obnoxious,

of unreason, as infringing upon the powers of succeeding corporate officers.

"But even if the contract was beyond the scope of the division superintendent's authority, and ultra vires as to the defendant, the defendant is not in position to assert the fact in defense of the plaintiff's claim. That Watson had authority to settle the plaintiff's claim for damages can scarcely be disputed, inasmuch as the defendant has taken a release of the claim from the plaintiff through his agency, has kept it until the plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations, has asserted it as a defense in the answer, and has produced it upon the trial. The settlement of the plaintiff's claim for damages is not an act which is ultra vires, and, assuming that the agreement of hiring is such, yet the plaintiff has fully performed his part of the contract, and his cause of action can not be restored to him. The transaction between Watson and the plaintiff was in effect but a single agreement by which the latter released his claim, and the former agreed to hire him for life in consideration of such release. To permit the defense now under consideration would relieve the defendant from all liability on a contract which the plaintiff fully performed when he relinquished his claim. A corporation, when sued, can not set up an ultra vires as a defense to an action for breach of contract, or even for specific performance, when it has had the full benefit of the contract, and the other party has duly performed it; nor will such plea avail, whether interposed for or against a corporation, when it will not advance justice, but will accomplish a legal wrong."

Justice Woodward, writing the dissenting opinion, said in part:

"The judgment in this case should be reversed, because the contract set forth in the complaint, and which is the basis of the recovery, was void as against publie policy, and because there does not appear to have been any consideration for the alleged contract.

"Assuming Mr. Watson to have made the alleged contract, and assuming that the minds of Mr. Watson and the plaintiff met in an agreement that, for and in consideration of the plaintiff refraining from bringing an action, the latter should have a life position as gateman, was he in the execution of any agency of the defendant, real or apparent? Was it within the power of the corporation to make the contract in the first instance? If it was not, then, clearly, the defend

ant's agent was not acting within the apparent scope of his employment, and the plaintiff could gain no rights under his contract. Corporations are artificial creations existing by virtue of some statute, and organized for the purposes defined in their charters. A person dealing with a corporation is chargeable with notice of its powers and the purposes for which it is formed, and, when dealing with its agents or officers, is bound to know the extent of their power and authority. A corporation necessarily carries its charter wherever it goes, for that is the law of its existence. It follows that the plaintiff must have known, or is chargeable with knowledge of, the corporate powers of the defendant, and of the extent to which its superintendent of a division of the railroad could bind the corporation. Jemison vs. Bank, 122 N. Y. 135, 140, 25 N. E. 264, 9 L. R. A. 708, 19 Am. St. Rep. 482, and authorities there cited. The defendant's purposes could be manifested only through agencies duly authorized or having apparent authority to represent it; and persons dealing with the officers or a corporation, or with persons assuming to represent it, are chargeable with notice of the purposes of its creation and its powers, and with the authority, actual or apparent, of its officers or agents, with whom they deal; and, when they seek to charge the corporation with liability upon a contract made apparently in its behalf, the burden is upon them to prove the authority of the person assuming the act as such officer or agent to so make it. Wilson vs. Railroad Co., 114 N. Y. 487, 492, 21 N. E. 1015, and authorities there cited.

"If it appears, therefore, that the defendant had no lawful power to make a life contract with the plaintiff, it must follow that the division superintendent had no such power, either real or apparent, and that he was not acting within the scope of his agency in attempting to make the contract, if he ever did attempt to do so. The defendant could not, as a consequence, be presumed to have had notice of this alleged contract, and the employment of the plaintiff must, therefore, have stood upon no other basis than that of other employes of the corporation, and his employment, in the absence of knowledge on the part of the defendant that it was being performed under this alleged contract, could not work an estoppel. Railroad corporations within this State have their powers defined by the general corporation law, the stock corporation law and the railroad law."

Usher vs. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 78 N. Y. Supp. 508.

Automatic Coupler Decisions.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina in a recent decision holding that a railroad company's failure to equip its cars with automatic couplers is a continuing negligence, making it liable for an injury to an employe while making a coupling in the discharge of his duties, notwithstanding his contributory negligence, also holding that failure to equip a locomotive with an automatic coupler in general use is negligence as much as the failure to so equip car. (Fleming vs. Southern Railway Company, 42 S. E. Rep. 905.)

Two interesting decisions have also recently been rendered by federal courts, though they are not altogether consistent. In the case of Voekler vs. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (116 Fed. Rep. 867), District Judge Shiras, of the eastern district of North Dakota, rendered an opinion holding that Act Cong. March 2, 1893, requiring cars used in moving interstate commerce to be equipped with couplers coupling automatically, applies to a car designed for interstate traffic, though at the time being hauled empty, and failure to equip a car with a coupler coupling automatically, by reason of which a car coupler was obliged to go between the cars, where he was crushed, is the proximate cause of the accident, though the cars were forced together by the engine kicking all other cars against them. Also that a carrier, by permitting a coupler, originally sufficient, to become worn out and unoperative, is within the prohibition of the act.

In the other case, Johnson vs. Southern Pacific Company (117 Fed. Rep. 462), the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit, holds that cars loaded with articles shipped to other States, and started, whether in yards on side tracks, or in trains, are used in moving interstate traffic. But vacant cars in yards, on side tracks, in repair shops, or in trains which are not loaded with, or in use to move articles of, interstate commerce, do not fall within the terms or meaning of the act of March 2, 1893. A dining car standing empty on a side track at an intermediate station, where it had been left by a train engaged in interstate traffic until it should be taken by another train engaged in the same traffic, going in the opposite direction, and which the owner intended to use in interstate traffic, was drawn by a

Washington Gossip.

What Congress Is Not Doing. - A chronicle of the present session under this heading would be quite lengthy. It would include many things, both good and evil. Seldom has there been a short session when the members had such an air of earnestly praying that the days would pass so quickly that nothing would be expected of them. About the holidays there was a flurry because it seemed as if the Senate would bestir itself and pass the eight-hour bill in the amended form in which it came from the Committee on Education and Labor.

When the bill emerged from the committee it looked as though the ship-building contractors had labored successfully to see how many mischievous things, contrary to the original spirit of the measure, they could get inserted under the original title. The title was about all the labor people had left.

It is getting to be a standard joke at the Capitol to cut the heart out of any labor measure which may pass one branch of Congress, and then threaten to have the other branch pass the "amended" measure, which will do more damage than no law at all. Recent instances of this have been the Chinese Exclusion measure, which actually became a law, and the Anti-Injunction Bill, which seems not to have awakened from its slumbers this session.

The Eight-Hour Bill, as now before the Senate, provides that eight hours shall nominally constitute the day on government contract work, but that the rule shall be suspended in case of emergency, and any little sub-contractor can invent an "emergency" whenever he feels in the mood. Then the bill provides that an employe may put in eight hours for the government and as many more as he is required on "other work."

What a nice time they would have keeping tab on the eight-hour day under such a plan. And it disposes of the main contention heretofore advanced by the contractors, namely, that men could not be shifted at the end of eight hours without damaging the work. The bill has a number of other provisions which take it a long distance from its original intent. At first it was thought the Senate would pass the measure and send it to the usual joint conference committee and get the acceptance of the House. But now it seems that both House and Senate are too busy with other matters. There is only a month left, and there has to be some show of activity in anti-trust legislation.

It is well understood, however, that nothing is to be done. This weary and expiring Congress is entirely willing to leave that and every other national problem to the next Congress, already elected.

Roosevelt, the Trusts and His Party.— "We Republicans are wondering why people make such a fuss over Roosevelt," said a machine Republican, rather high in the councils of his party, to me the other day.

"Why, don't you admire him?"

“Oh, well, it isn't exactly that, but we feel in our bones that he'll tip the apple cart over one of these days. He's sure to get us into trouble before the next national convention."

"Thought his appointment of the Coal Commission and his attitude on trusts saved the day for you in the congressional election?"

"Well, maybe, we're not saying but he has done pretty well so far, but you never can tell what he's going to do next, and we veterans simply feel that there is trouble in the air."

Roosevelt's independence of thought and speech surely does cause much anxiety to those who believe in the

routine "machine" management of affairs to bring party success.

With the splendid knowledge of Attorney-General Knox as to just what can be done to curb trusts at his service, the President every day gets more impatient with one Congress which will do nothing because, it is nearing its close, and another which is elected but can't get down to business until near the end of the year. It's apt to make him feel, as Mark Twain says, that a king is the ideal ruler, if only he is the ideal kind of a king.

Knox, on Trusts.-Only a short time ago Attorney-General Knox transmitted to Congress a statement of how far the Sherman Anti-Trust law would be effective, and what amendments it needed to meet the existing situation. His statement received scant courtesy at the hands of the daily press, but it will repay careful study. Knox is a man of fine intelligence and vast experience in dealing with corporations. He had always been retained for them, previous to holding his present position.

Being asked by Roosevelt what could legally be done to oppose dangerous trusts, Knox applied the impartial legal training as readily in that direction as the other. Hence what he says about existing laws and necessary amendments may be taken as an impartial opinion coming from a trained mind, thoroughly capable of appreciating every phase of the subject.

But there is no hurry about it. Nothing will be done for at least a year.

In

Dissatisfaction with the Coal Commission. Coal gets more scarce and more high every day in the East. There is positive suffering among well-to-do people, let alcne the families of wage workers. Washington the big hotels and apartment houses are comfortably heated, because therein dwell members of Congress, and the coal dealer seems to have received a hint that they must be kept comfortable so they won't confiscate the coal mines for the use of the public. Even the most reasonable of citizens are disposed to grumble at the long delay of the Commission in getting to a decision.

Here are the miners working patiently at the same wages which they struck to improve, and here is the consumer freezing to death and paying the price of rose diamonds for coal-yet the Commission hears testimony and adjourns and hears testimony and adjourns. There is a strong feeling that it could do better if it would.

Congress has a committee investigating the local stringency of the coal market, but the net result seems to be the information that the situation will be no better for some months to come.

Representative

To Prevent Strikes. Gibson, of Tennessee, has introduced a bill making it the duty of the AttorneyGeneral to apply to the Federal courts for a receiver in case of any strike or disagreement which stops the operation of coal mines. The bill won't become a law, so we needn't waste much time over it, but it is interesting as a sample of the trend of industrial legislation. If it provided that the receiver should employ the men at the wages and hours asked, pending a settlement between their respresentatives and those of the employers, it might be a good thing, but the inference is rather that the receiver should attempt to employ the men on the old terms pending a settlement. Still it would be very awkward for the employers to have the Federal court put some one else in charge while industrial troubles were being settled. A prospect of this sort would make employers more open to reason when their organized employes wanted an advance. But the bill won't pass.

These Voluntary Advances in Wages.A railroad magnate, sojourning for a few days in Washington, has had himself interviewed and says with delightful frankness that the voluntary advances in wages, of which we have heard much lately, are largely because the men are well organized and were about to make a demand anyway. The concession would have been given to the organization, and the voluntary part of it was merely a grandstand play.

Universities and Unions.-Johns Hopkins and other universities are getting right sensible in dealing with economics. An effort is being made to collect all trade union literature that can be had, including constitutions and official journals, so that the kindergartners in economics may have some idea of the practical trade union movement. The students are urged to read up on such subjects before rushing off to interview union officials. The union official is nearly always an overworked and underpaid individual, and when the callow college youth approaches him, is apt to say:

"Well, what is it you want to know?" To find out what they want to know is now the laudable aim of many of these