his brake valve-and yet it is evident that he was doing what he thought was best, for he was calling for brakes-and he had a dread of violating a rule that forbid him running with his brake valve cut in. Would it not be well for railroad officials where double-heading is practiced to post bulletins instructing engineers on second engines to run with brake valves cut out and to place brake valve handles in emergency position, and to use the cut-out cock in the same manner and under the same circumstances that a conductor would use his valve to stop a train? This would at least give authority to the second man to violate the rule to not cut in, and just when to violate it.

Two Men in Cab.

Hardly a month passes that something does not occur to an engineer in a doublecab locomotive that might or does result in disaster. The Jersey Central wreck, being so destructive to life and property, has attracted attention to the necessity of some provisions being made to protect the head-end of a train when the engineer becomes disabled, and the fireman is back in his cab, where he can not know what has happened.

Last month an account was published of an engineer being killed in his cab in Tennessee and the train ran eight miles before the fireman noticed that something was wrong. The following is from the Newark, Ohio, Tribune, of February 28th:

Engineer John Smith, of Dennison, one of the oldest passenger engineers on the Panhandle, was found dead in the cab of his engine, with his hand on the throttle, while the train was running at a rapid rate of speed, west of Newark, early this morning. The unfortunate man was running an engine on the second section of Panhandle Train No. 5, which left Newark this morning about 1 o'clock for the west. All trains have very slow orders for the temporary trestle at Big Walnut, but when No. 5 was nearly to the bridge, the fireman, whose name could not be learned, noticed that the engineer did not slow up as he should have done. The fireman crept around the end of the immense boiler to the seat where the engineer sits with his hand on the throttle that controls the action of the iron monster, and there found the lifeless form of Smith, with his head hanging out of the window. The fireman, with rare presence of mind, stopped the train just as it was running on the bridge, and then notified the conductor of his horrible find.

The fireman took the train on into Columbus with but little delay. It is not

known if Smith was hit by a mail crane or if his death was caused by heart trouble. His remains were taken to Columbus and prepared for burial.

Engineer Smith's cap was found near Summit, a number of miles east of where the train was stopped, and it is supposed he was dead when he passed that village.

In several States bills have been introduced which require railway companies operating double-cab engines to employ a second man in the cab with the engineer. These legislative measures have been advocated by the public and train employes, except the engineers, who, with the railway companies oppose the adoption of the law. In some instances others than engineers have been employed by the companies to travel to distant States to lobby against the bills.

The New York Times, of February 19th, says, in a special report from the capital of that State:

A large delegation of locomotive engineers appeared today before the Assembly Committee on Railroads to oppose the bill introduced by Assemblyman Finnegan requiring an assistant to the engineer and fireman in the cabs of locomotives. The measure was also opposed by W. S. Rudd, counsel for the New York Central Railroad.

His

M. Flannery and John Mack, who run the fastest trains on the New York Central, told the committee that they would consider the extra man in the cab as a danger rather than a safeguard. presence there, they declared, would distract the engineer, because, having nothing to do, he would be inclined to talk. They said that they never knew of a railroad accident which could have been prevented by the presence of a third man in the cab.

A. W. Young, chairman of the Executive Committee of the State Legislative Board of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, said: “Put another man in the cab, and it would distract my attention. I don't want any man to speak to me when I am running a train. The other man would be asking me for a match at a critical moment."

Some of those who are advocating the bill, and who were surprised by the antagonism of the engineers, offered the explanation that the engineers do not want a third man in the cab who would have nothing to do but to acquire the knowledge necessary for the running of an engine.

The Indianapolis News publishes the following, descriptive of how the bills were opposed before the Indiana Legislature:

A dozen or more railroad engineers and firemen were before the Senate Committee on Railroads before the opening of today's session, in opposition to Representative Van Fleet's bill, providing for two enginemen in all double-cab engines.

The men were mostly from Ohio and Pennsylvania, and they admitted that they were here on orders of their roads, though they said that they did not know the object of their business until they arrived here, and were met at English's Hotel by W. O. Johnson, attorney for the Erie.

The gist of their objection to the bill was that a second engineman, which by the definition means a second engineer, would divide the responsibility and thereby lessen the vigilance now exercised by the one enginneer.

A. B. Chapman, of Toledo, a Lake Shore engineer of twenty-six years' ex

Erie road; J. Rhoades, Erie road; C. Sweetman, Erie road; F. Steele, Erie road: E. Smith, Baltimore & Ohio road, and A. B. Chapman, Lake Shore road. There was a lobby of railroad lawyers on hand to defeat the bill if possible. Among them were E. C. Field, of the Monon; Daniel Simms, of the Wabash; Smiley Chambers and L. P. Newby, of the Pennsylvania, and Frank Littleton, of the Big Four; John B. Cockrum, of the Lake Erie; John Beasley, of the Evansville & Terre Haute, and N. D. Daughman, of the Nickel-Plate.

Secretary William M. Blythe, of the local Brotherhood of Locomotive Engi

perience, was the spokesman for the group. He expressed the fear that one result of the proposed law would be to lessen engineers' wages, as an unnecessary man would be added to the pay roll. He argued that a second engineman would be in the way. He said he did not know of any wrecks that could possibly have been prevented by a second engineman.

W. P. Friesner, of Huntington, chairman of the State Legislative Board of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, and George Diveley, of this city, chairman of the State Legislative Board of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, spoke for the bill.

With the visiting delegation were several master mechanics. The members of the delegation were much opposed to having their names published: Among them were Charles Cascaden, Meadville, Penn.,

neers, has received the following telegram from P. M. Arthur, grand chief of the B. of L. E. :

"Please have legislative board do all they can to secure the passage of bill now before the House, which, I believe, is No. 68."

It is said that the names given by these opposing railroad employes in some instances Smith" of the B. & O. is a member of were assumed; that the "E. the B. L. F., who was brought all the way from Baltimore, Md., to appear against the Indiana bill, and his name is not exactly "Smith." If these reports are true it will be evident that railway men can "scab" on each other even when there is no strike.

The argument of the engineers against the bills in the several States is that two men in a double-cab engine will do more harm than good; that the second man will "talk to the engineer and take his attention from his business." If this is a good argument, then all engines should have double cabs, so that the fireman can not talk to the engineer. When we remember that on at least 90 per cent. of the locomotives in use today there is al ways two men in the cab, and on most freight engines three men, counting the head brakeman, it will be seen how silly is the argument of those engineers who oppose this law. Probably the true reasons for the opposition of the engineers is that they fear that the third man on an engine may affect their wages in some

manner.

Engineers should not fear a reduction of wages because of the presence of another man on the engine any more than the conductor should when a flagman is added to the crew at the back end of the train. Firemen favor this law for the

same reason that they favored the "Safety Appliance" law. They desire to save their own and their fellow workmen's lives from the unnecessary dangers of railroading and their knowledge that engineers habitually "nap" when engines are doubling the road makes them desire that two men be placed in the front cab of a twocab engine.

`The Cranford Wreck.

So much has been said about the disastrous wreck on the Jersey Central that

the finding of the coroner's jury will be of more than usual interest, and is therefore published, as follows:

From the evidence brought out at the inquest, we believe that this collision was caused by the failure of the engineer, James H. Davis, of engine No. 27, J. C. R. R., operated by the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad, drawing train No. 621, to observe the following signals displayed to warn him of approaching danger:

1. The red lamp set on the ground at Cranford, which notified him to stop for orders.

2. The distance or cautionary blocksignal. a green light just west of the Westfield station, which gave warning that the block ahead was occupied.

3. A red lantern swung back and forth across the track by the flagman at the Broad street crossing, Westfield, 374 feet from the last mentioned block-signal.

4. A red lantern swung by the rear brakeman of train No. 13 (this man claims that he was within about thirty

yards of the road crossing when the train No. 621 passed him); and, finally, the home block-signal, showing red and green lights, which indicated that he must come to a full stop, as the track ahead was occupied. This signal is located 2,136 feet from the warning signal. Although, from the evidence, we can not find that the railroad company, or any of the officials, can be held criminally responsible, there are certain mitigating circumstances in regard to the action of the engineer which should be taken into consideration. The said James N. Davis, who has since died from injuries received in this accident, was 34 years old. in the best of health, and was one of the most experienced and valued engineers on the road.

morning with train No. 614, his own en

On the run from Philadelphia in the

gine, No. 321, became disabled and he was obliged to leave it at Trenton Junction and take engine No. 27 from a local milk train, to bring his train to Jersey City. Although this engine appears to have been in good condition on January 27, 1903, an examination of the work books of the company shows that it was in the shop between January 7 and 17. 1903, for the repair of a crack in the That after leaving the shop the engine was steam chest and various minor repairs. reported for repairs to piston packing, etc., several times, and, although there is no report against the engine in regard to leaking steam after January 24th, there is no doubt that there was an unusual amount of steam escaping from some part of the engine during the run from Jersey City to Westfield the night of the accident. This escaping steam, the engineer claims in his ante-mortem statement, obscured his vision so that he could not see the signals without shutting off steam. As the air was heavy, this steam settling around the engine, was probably the cause of his not seeing the train order signal at Cranford, consisting of a red lantern

placed on the ground, thus failing to receive the warning from the train dispatcher that train No. 13 was on the track ahead.

Engineer Davis states that, finding it necessary for him to get at the injector, he missed a signal. This was probably the cautionary signal before referred to just west of the Westfield station, and, as it has been shown by actual experi ment, that, at the rate of speed he was going at the time, it would only take forty seconds after passing Westfield to strike the rear of train No. 13.

The time-table shows that, as a usual thing, he would have a clear track, with nothing ahead, from Cranford Junction to Plainfield, but, owing to a stalled train on track No. 4, the Easton train, No. 13, had been ordered to run ahead of No. 621 on track No. 2. Engineer Davis, failing to receive his order at Cranford, did not know that this train was ahead, and, unfortunately, train No. 13 had a hot journal on the tender which, in the judgment of the engineer, required his

attention, and caused him to make an unusual stop a short distance west of the Westfield station, where the accident happened.

We make this lengthy explanation to show that, although the engineer, James N. Davis, with his great responsibility in caring for the lives under his charge, failed in his duty in not keeping a lookout for the signals, the instances above narrated were against him; namely, the escaping steam, train No. 13 on an unusual track and an accident to train No. 13 which caused it to make an unusual stop.

The fire which occurred immediately

Jersey and the other large trunk lines have probably reached the limit in providing the best possible system for the running of trains by visual signals, but they have not yet succeeded in reaching a point to cover human fallibility at critical moments.

After a thorough examination, we believe the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company, and the Central Railroad of New Jersey to be free from any criminal responsibility for the accident above referred to.

We have carefully considered measures that should be taken to guard against the repetition of accidents of this

after the collision and added greatly to the horrors of the wreck, was probably caused by the explosion of the headlight and burning gases escaping from the tubes of the engine when the smoke-box was broken in. However, there are two stoves in each of the two wrecked cars, which probably increased the rapidity of the conflagration.

Our investigation shows that this division of the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, between Jersey City and Bound Brook, is equipped with the electric, pneumatic, automatic block system, which is operated automatically by the movement of trains over the track; the signals are placed on posts which display arms of the semaphore type by day and lights by night, and this system is said to be one of the best installed on any railroad.

The Central Railroad Company of New

kind, and would suggest close study of the following questions:

Is the traffic of this railroad greater than can be safely handled, considering the very large amount of high speed service required; if so, what is the remedy?

Should not all stoves be prohibited, and all passenger cars be heated by steam from the locomotive?

Should not the headlights on engines be electric or something safer than a lamp containing a large quantity of oil, which, in cases of accident, is liable to cause fire?

Should railroads be required to provide another man in the cab, whose sole duty it would be to look out for signals?

Should not a stricter observance of the rules relating to signals be insisted upon by the railroad officials, this especially in regard to distance or green signals?.

While there is no evidence before us

that these signals are not regularly observed on the railroads concerned in this collision, there is a general feeling that a laxity prevails in this matter all over the country.

Should not the railroads adopt, in connection with their automatic visual signals, some one of the automatic safety devices that are now in the market, which actually shut off the steam, apply the brakes and stop the train if the train is blocked or out of order?

To arrive at a correct decision in these matters, which require a great deal of serious and expert study, we would suggest that the Legislature of the State of New Jersey, now in session, pass a bill providing for a State Railroad Commission, to be appointed by the Governor, composed mainly of disinterested experts or practical railroad men, who shall investigate the above questions, and others of equal importance which may be brought to their attention.

This commission should have the power to enforce such rulings and to require the adoption of such devices as will add 'to the safety and comfort of the large traveling public throughout this State.

We would call attention to the fact that statistics show that in Great Britain, where trains are run equally as fast and where the traffic is much more crowded, but where trains are operated strictly on the block system, not a single passenger lost his life during the year 1901, while in this country, where many roads are still without block signals, there were, during the three months ending October 1, 1902, 1,434 collisions, in which 148 persons were killed.

Mysterious Boiler Explosions.

When a boiler explodes the proprietor or supervising official nearly always assigns "low water" as the cause of the explosion. This is an easy way out of an annoying situation, and it is so much easier to place the responsibility upon the dead engineer than to attempt to offer any other explanation. Not many months ago a locomotive on a certain Western road "dropped her crown sheet," and, following the ancient custom, the master mechanic discharged the engineer for "burning his engine." Friends of the engineer secured the services of an expert boiler inspector from Chicago, who submitted the following report, after a thorough inspection of the exploded boiler:

"I found the said crown sheet to be down about six inches, about twenty-four inches from the flue sheet, this being about the center of the bulge in the crown sheet. The said bulge extended over to within ten inches of each side of the firebox. I also found that the radial stays were broken off close to the crown sheet inside, and heads blown or pulled out

of the holes. I examined the said sheet very carefully and had Mr. foreman boilermaker of the shops at and Mr.

-, general foreman of the shops, in the fire-box with me when I made the examination. "We cleaned the crown sheet off thoroughly in the back end of the fire-box, where the crown sheet had not been disturbed, and using my magnifying glasses on same could find no difference in appearance of the bulged part of the crown sheet and the part that had not been disturbed, which would indicate that the bulge was not caused by lack of water, and overheating of crown sheet. The bulged part of the crown sheet and the part that had not been disturbed being both identically the same in appearance would be a correct indication that the sheet had not been subject to any intense heat caused by lack of water.

*

*

"There are several things that might have caused this dropping of the crown sheet. These bolts not having a bearing all around, I will here state the reason why this may be one of them: The wagon-top having a radius of eighty-four inches, it would not give a uniform circle between the wagon-top and the crown sheet. When these bolts are screwed into the crown sheet it is absolutely impossible for them to have an equal bearing all around, and it may be that when they were screwed in they did not come up close on one side, perhaps all the way from a sixteenth to a fourth of an inch; consequently a heavy hammer was used to hammer these bolts up on the side that stood off from the crown sheet, in order to close the heads of the radial stays close to the sheet, thereby fracturing the radial stays close to the head. This would make a fractured bolt." * * *

Other possible causes of the bulging of the crown sheet are stated in the report of the boiler inspector, but it was known that the engineer who was running the engine at the time of the explosion was in no way to blame.

Railway and Locomotive Engineering, a standard authority on locomotive matters, says of boiler explosions and their preventives:

"When a disastrous explosion of a locomotive boiler happens, the blame is thrown upon the engineer in charge, if possible, and failing in that, upon the master mechanic or the foreman immediately responsible for the systematic inspection of the boiler; but all these personages are mere buffers to prevent the shocks of the real responsibility from flying upward to the real culprits. The demand to keep the motive power working at any cost is what induces the underlings to risk the neglect of inspection. The prevailing sentiment among directors is 'move freight and passengers at all hazards. Do the work safely if practicable, but move it.'

"Laws ought to be established that would make the systematic inspection of