in the end remain a free nation, therefore we urge all liberty loving citizens and especially union men to remember and obey Article 2 of the Constitution of the

United States, which reads as follows: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

It is just such idiocy as this that our oppressors are praying for. These resolutions were adopted because of the Wabash injunction but remember one thing if the American workingmen have not enough sense to protect themselves with their ballots they will not have sense enough to succeed by any revolutionary proceedings. Let us hope that the working people will make "government by injunction" the "paramount issue" of coming political campaigns, and let us hope that every man who desires future liberty for the American people will register a vow to vote for no man who is not known to be in favor of putting a stop to "government by injunction."

The Editor has carefully read the decision of Judge Adams, and while he finds that the Judge has partially receded from the ridiculous position which he had assumed, and while he takes occasion to recite some rights of labor that no one but the judges have questioned, the fact remains that Judge Adams has established a precedent that will be enlarged upon by those who expect to crush the hopes and ambitions of the working people.

If Jones robs Smith of his property, because Brown has incited him to do the act, Jones is none the less guilty of a crime.

If Jones robs Smith of his property, because Brown swears that Smith is going to injure him, Jones is none the less guilty of a crime.

If Jones robs Smith of his property, and his act arouses the people against him, and the populace rise up and denounce him for his act, so as to cause Jones to return to Smith the stolen property, Jones is none the less guilty of a crime.

If Jones robs Smith of his property, and becomes repentant, so that he returns the property to Smith, while the consequent punishment would perhaps be less severe, Jones is none the less guilty of a crime.

It is the illegal act of Jones that makes him guilty of the crime, which subsequent circumstances can only mitigate.

If a federal judge robs the working people of their constitutional rights and liberty, because an employer incites him to do the act, the judge is none the less guilty of a judicial crime.

If a federal judge robs the working people of their constitutional rights and liberty, because an employer swears that the working people are going to injure him, the judge is none the less guilty of a judicial crime.

If a federal judge robs the working people of their constitutional rights and liberty, and his act arouses the public against him, and the populace rise up and denounce him for his act, so as to cause the judge to return to the working people their liberty, the judge is none the less guilty of a judicial crime.

If a federal judge robs the working people of their constitutional rights and liberty, and becomes repentant, so that he returns to the working people their rights and liberty, while the consequent condemnation would perhaps be less severe, the judge is none the less guilty of a judicial crime.

It is the illegal act of the judge that makes him guilty of crime, which subsequent circumstances can only mitigate.

On March 3, 1903, a federal judge, one Elmer B. Adams, issued an injunction against the following named persons:

Charles A. Lewton, Fred Englehardt, B. W. Schafer, Charles J. Augur, A. H. Martin, H. C. Niemeyer, J. R. Courtney, E. C. White, F. H. Hecox, Geo. W. Bradly, Jos. Sell, F. G. Shepard, W. E. Rowe, C. H. Wilkins, M. McManus, Wm. McKay, A. E. Jordan, John J. Hannahan, P. H. Morrissey, W. G. Lee, T. R. Dodge, F. W. Arnold, Timothy Shea, "each of them individually, and as representatives of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, their representatives, clerks, agents and attorneys, and all others who may be aiding and abetting, or acting in concert with them, and under their direction."

The first seventeen named in the above list were employes of the Wabash Railway Company, with whom the other locomotive firemen and trainmen employed by that company were "acting in concert" in an endeavor to secure an increase of wages and modification of rules of employment. These seventeen men had communicated to their employers the fact that the locomotive firemen and trainmen employed by that road had by referendum vote decided to leave the service of the company if the demands were not granted. The injunction was addressed to every person, no matter what their avocation, who should aid, or abet, or act in concert with the persons named. The fact that the names of certain officers of the firemen's and trainmen's associations were

ing.

In this now notorious Wabash injunetion Judge Adams deliberately robbed the working people of the rights guaranteed them by the Constitution of the United States which he had sworn to observe.

Judge Adams ordered them "absolutely to desist and refrain from in any way or manner ordering, coercing, persuading, inducing, or otherwise causing, directly or indirectly, the employes of the Wabash Railroad Company, complainant, engaged in or about the operation of its trains within the United States, as brakemen, switchmen, or locomotive firemen, to strike or quit the service of said company."

If any employe of the Wabash, or any friend of such employe, or any newspaper, or any other imaginable person had "acted in concert" or "aided," or "abetted," by "persuading, inducing, or otherwise causing, directly or indirectly, the employes of the Wabash Railroad Company" to "quit the service of said company," that person would have violated the injunction and would have been imprisoned by Judge Adams, without the privilege of a trial by jury.

Among the provisions of the Constitution of the United States are the following:

Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble.

*

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.*

**

** * *

diction.

His judicial edict did "abridge the freedom of speech" and "of the press." He did "deprive" the employes of their "liberty" to "quit the service" of their masters. He did "enforce" a "law" which did "abridge the privileges" "of citizens He would have of the United States." denied these working people "the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial His jury" had they violated his edict. injunction did enforce "involutary servitude" upon the employes of the Wabash Railway Company. He as a "judge" ignored the Constitution of the United States and was not "bound thereby."

Not since that similar usurpation of power by Judge Jenkins has there been such a protest from the people and the press. Judge Adams was denounced from one end of the land to the other. His act was nothing short of a judicial crime. He found himself assailed from all sides. Eminent business men, jurists, and politicians expressed surprise and alarm at the act of Judge Adams. His only friends were those who, for their own private gain, hoped to crush the working people and their unions.

Is it strange, then, that Judge Adams partially receded from his absurd position? But how far has he receded?

He has dissolved the injunction, after enforcing "involuntary servitude" upon the employes of the Wabash for a period of four weeks.

In his decision which sets aside his former edict he recites his reasons for granting that obnoxious and notorious injunction, which are certain affidavits of the officials of the Wabash Railroad Company. In defense of his usurpation of power in depriving working people of their liberty, and in suppressing the free speech and the free press assured and protected by the Constitution of the United States Judge Adams says:

"Such an order on the showing made by the bill of complaint was not only warranted, but imperatively required by well recognized principles of equitable jurisprudence, as well as by controlling satisfactory and abundant authority in cases of similar character in this country and in England."

This assertion of Judge Adams is a bold proclamation that "in cases of similar character" he will do the same thing

From this all working people may understand that unless they elect men to the Senate and the House of Representatives, of the United States Congress, who will enact legislation curtailing "government by injunction" they may expect a repetition of the Wabash injunction whenever there is a "case of similar character." Judge Adams says that he was authorized to rob men of their liberty, to suppress free speech and a free press, by "principles of equitable jurisprudence." Then why was it left to Judge Adams to

(From Boyce's Weekly)

Russia or Afghanstan to do with American citizens? Verily, Judge Adams has forgotten that between the Governments of those countries and the American people there intervenes the Constitution of the United States. If a Russian court enforces "involuntary servitude;" or if an English judge suppress "freedom of speech and of the public press," does Judge Adams regulate his judicial procedure by such foreign laws and usages, and in violation of the American Constitution? No wonder that the venerable

"Without notice to the defendants, because it appeared from the averments of the bill that there was immediate danger of irreparable injury, unless it was so made."

Regardless of the fact that Judge Adams finally dissolves his injunction he gave the employer the benefit of it for a period of four weeks!

Judge Adams cites many previous decisions of other judges concerning the rights of employes to form unions and to "leave the service" of their employers, all of which are at variance with the Wabash injunction, and says:

"I might continue at length in the citation of cases stating or illustrating the foregoing proposition, but enough has been said to clearly indicate the general rule, which may be briefly summarized as follows: An employe has an unquestionable right to place a price and impose conditions upon his labor at the outset of his employment, or unless restrained by contract obligation, upon the continuance of his labor at any time thereafter; and if the terms and conditions are not complied with by the employer, he has a clear right either not to engage or having engaged in his service to cease from work. What one may do all may do."

Judge Adams should have remembered this "general rule" and should not have issued his injunction which effectively prevented employes "quitting the service of the said Wabash Railroad Company." Judge Adams now says of employes: "They may seek and obtain counsel and advice concerning their rights, duties and obligations in relation to their employer; and persons interested in their welfare may advise, aid and assist them in securing such terms and condition of service as will best subserve their interests: and what they may lawfully do singly, or together, they may organize and combine to accomplish."

Then why did Judge Adams deny them these very rights, the rights he now says they possess? If they possess that right why did he issue an injunction forbidding them? His injunction forbade anyone "aiding" the Wabash employes, and now he says that "any person interested in their welfare may advise, aid and assist them." Was there ever such a confession of sin?

Judge Adams says:

"They may by peaceable and lawful combination and concert of action, be able

And yet Judge Adams directed his injunction especially at this "concert of action," suspending this right for a period of four weeks.

The Judge says:

"It now becomes my serious and anxious duty to reach a just and righteous conclusion upon the issues already stated with absolute fidelity to the truth as disclosed by the proof before me."

It was Juvenal who said: "Man, wretched man, whene'er he stoops to sin,

Feels with the act, a strong remorse within."

But what of this "righteous conclusion?"

stantiate the charge made in the bill to "The proof, in my opinion, fails to subthe effect, that the complainant's employes are entirely satisfied with their wages and conditions of service."

Suppose the proof had not refuted this charge; is it to be understood that the injunction would have been made perpetual, and the right of free speech forever denied to all of those against whom the injunction was directed? If employes have the right to "cease from work" or to "seek and obtain counsel and advice," etc., how does the charge that employes "are entirely satisfied," even though proved, affect those rights?

As reasons for dissolving his injunction Judge Adams itemizes as follows:

"At the time in question, there was a very general demand for an increase of wages and change in rules and conditions of service by employes of railroads operated in this regiou."

Suppose the defendants had failed to prove that "there was a very general demand for an increase of wages and a change in general rules and conditions of service by employes," etc., would free speech have been forever enjoined by

Judge Adams?

The Judge continues as reasons for dissolving the injunction:

"That such demands had come to the attention of complainant's chief executive officer, and had been recognized by him."

Suppose that the "complainant's chief executive officer" had not recognized such demands; would that have affected the dissolving of the injunction? The Judge then proceeds to explain that "the committees and officers of the Brotherhoods" were only exercising the functions of their offices and that they had "secured written authorization from a large number of members of their orders to repre

sent them in securing the concessions requested."

Judge Adams says:

"It is not for me to pass or express any opinion upon the reasonableness of the demands made by or in behalf of the employes."

Taking this statement, which is the plain truth, into consideration, can we not ask why Judge Adams undertook "to pass or express any opinion" about any part of this controversy? Are we to understand that it is a part of the business of a federal judge to interfere in all or any disputes that may arise between employes and their masters?

Again Judge Adams says in dissolving the injunction:

"It is the privilege and right of employes to impose any conditions upon their service deemed wise or prudent by them, and to demand such compensation therefor as they deem reasonable, and that on failure to secure the concessions insisted upon by them, to retire from the service of the employer."

Then why did Judge Adams enjoin them from the benefits of this privilege for a period of four weeks? If the employes had not had the support of wealthy organizations, that procured the best legal talent obtainable to defend them in court, we must believe that Judge Adams would have perpetually enjoined them from these privileges to which he now says they are entitled.

Again Judge Adams says in dissolving the injunction :

"It is shown by the proof that no strikes can lawfully occur by employes who are members of either of the Brotherhoods in question, without the sanction of the Grand Master and General Grievance Committee of the Order. To enjoin them, therefore, from ordering or otherwise causing a strike, is in substance and effect an injunction against resort to a strike by employes who may be members of the orders for the redress of asserted grievances. This, under well settled law, can not be done."

And yet Judge Adams did enjoin them from these very things that he now says they are entitled to do by law. He says of his injunction that "it can not be done," and yet he has done that very thing. Was there ever such inconsistency?