both knowledge and assent, as it is, for instance in the reprobate, and in all devils."* Tilenus, speaking of justifying faith, says, "This faith is called nooraois, by the apostle, because it is not an empty notion floating in the mind, but it realizes those things which as yet are in anticipation, and experimentally unknown to us, so that they appear, and exist. It is also called λeyyos, because it demonstrates with so much certainty to the mind and to the hopes those things which as yet are unseen, of themselves, like as the light with certainty declares to the eyes of the body, those things which are visible. Heb. 11: 1. This faith is not only a notion united with assent, but also with confidence; by which the believer is persuaded that the promise pertains to himself."+ "Hactenus materia fulei justificantis. Sequitur forma, quae constitit in tribus partibus, nempe, notitia, assensu, et fiducia. Notitia est prima fidei pars, qua, quae de salutis nostrae ratione scriptura tradit, seu quae ad salutem scitu sunt necessaria, cognoscimus: Graecis iniyvwois. Assensus est altera fidei pars, qua, quae ex scriptura novimus a Deo revelata, pro veris habemus: Graecis ovyzará980s. Fiducia est tertia et principalis pars fidei justificantis, qua generales Evangelii promissiones nobis applicamus, et nos, propter Christi meritum justos a Deo reputari, aeternaque vitae haeredes fore, plene persuasum habemus: Graecis πληροφορία seu πεποίθησις. Respectu fiduciae hujus fides appellatur salvifica, et justificans. Neminem enim justificat Deus, nisi qui fiduciam in Christo collocat, et propter ejus meritum sibi peccata remitti firmiter credit. Itaque ad salutem non sufficit vel notitia mysteriorum divinarum, vel assensus etiam generalis: sed necessario requiritur quoque fiducia. Esse autem fidem fiduciam probamus: (1) Ex appellationibus, quae in scriptura ipsi tribuuntur, appellatur enim agros, confidentia, Jobn 16: 33.* gogia, plena el firma persuasio, Heb. 10: 22. лaggyoia, libertas fiduci alis, Heb. 3: 6. пεпоidησis, firma persuasio, Eph. 3: 12. nóotασis twv škπigoμévov, subsistentia rerum speratarum, quae facit res speratas coram existere. Nomina haec simplici notitiae mysteriorum vel assensus generali minime conveniunt. Credit enim Satan, quoad notitiam et assensum cui tamen θάρσος, πληροφορία et παρρησία nulla comperit quia credendo contremiscit. (2) Quia, qui vere credunt in Christum sciunt se habere vitam aeternam. 1 John 5: 13. Haec scribo vobis, qui creditis in nomen Filii Dei, ut sciatis vos vitam aeternam habere. Atqui ex nuda notitia et assensu generali nemo scit se vitam aeternam habere: imo cum notitia et assensu desperatio potest esse conjuncta et est in multis reprobis, omnibusque diabolis, conjuncta. Vide Chris. Theolog. Wendelini, Lib. I. cap. XXIV. p. 544–549. "Haec fides ab Apostolo vocatur vnóσtaois, quia non est inane spectrum, in mente volitans, sed efficit, ut quae in expectatione sunt Polanus, is the last that we shall quote. In his system of Theology, pp. 1883, 1884, he uses the following language. "The essential form of saving faith is a full and sure persuasion, an absence of doubt and dispute, concerning the truth, fidelity, power and mercy of God: and therefore concerning our reconciliation to God through Christ. See Luke 1: 37, etc. For which cause saving faith is not a naked notion, or knowledge of truth to be believed, or even a firm assent, but it is also a confidence of the mercy of God and of eternal salvation by and for the sake of Christ. This is clear from the following arguments. 1. Saving faith is a niŋoogoola, that is, a full persuasion that what God has promised he is able to perform. Thus is the faith of Abraham described, Rom. 4: 11, and of Sarah, Heb. 11: 11. Now a persuasion of the power of God in performing his promises, is not a notion only, but a firm and undoubted confidence. 2. Saving faith is a strict acquiescence in the divine benevolence and favor. But it is objected 1. That the effect of saving faith is not its essential form; but confidence is the effect of faith; and therefore it is not the essential form of saving faith. The assumption is proved by the testimony of Paul in Eph. 3: 12, "In whom we have freedom and access with confidence, through faith in him." But to this I answer, that the assumption is to be distinguished, because it is ambiguous. For confidence in itself, as in the passage cited from Paul is a sure persuasion that prayer will be heard, if it be made in faith, and in the name of Christ. But confidence which is the essential form of saving faith, is a most certain persuasion of the truth, fidelity, power, and mercy of God, and reconciliation with him. through Christ. The confidence of prayer is rightly said to be the effect of faith. But it is again objected that confidence is the essential form of no intellectual virtue; but faith is an intellectual virtue; therefore confidence is not the essential form of faith. To this posita, eoque essentiae videntur expertia, exstent quodammodo, ac subsistant. Item vocatur lyxos, quod tam certo demonstret menti ac spei, ea quae per se sunt inaspectabilia, quam certo lux manifestat oculis corporis, quae sunt adspectabilia Heb. 11: 1.-Fides haec non solum notitia est cum assensu, sed etiam cum fiducia conjuncta, qua credens persuasum habet promissionen etiam ad se pertinere. Syntag. Tilen. p. 709, 1063. I answer that it is true, confidence is not the essential form of any intellectual virtue; that is, of a virtue purely intellectual. But I deny that faith is a virtue purely intellectual. It is objected 3. etc. etc."* Here then we find Gomar, and Polanus, (to specify no other instances,) personally engaged in the very controversy that is now considered as separating Arminians and Calvinists. And we find Gomar also, (who is, according to the standard of Turretin a much more orthodox Calvinist than Calvin himself,) taking that side of the question which is now repudiated as Arminian. The very arguments that Gomar advances, Po * Essentialis forma salvicae fidei, est πληροφορία αδιάκριτος, id est plena ac certa persuasio, dubitationis ac disceptationis expers, de veracitate, fidelilate, potentia, et misericordia Dei, ac proinde de reconciliatione nostri cum Deo per Christum, Luc. 1: 37. Rom. 4:21. Collos. 2: 2. Heb. 10: 22, and 11: 19, quae etiam dicitur лɛñoidŋσis, persuasio, Rom. 8:38. 2 Cor. 3: 4. Eph. 3: 12, et vлoσtaσis, Heb. 11:1. Quocirca fides salvifica non est nuda notitia seu cognitio veritatis credendae, sed etiam firma assensio, sed etiam лλŋgogogia seu fiducia misericordiae Dei et salutis aeternae per et propter Christum. Id manifestum est ex sequentibus argumentis: 1. Quia fides salvifica est niŋgogogia, id est, plena persuasio, Deum quod promisit, posse etiam efficere. Sic enim describitur fides Abrahami Roman. 4: 21, quod plene persuasum habuerit, Deum quod promiserat posse etiam efficere: et fides Sarae Heb. 11: 11, quod fidelem esse duxerit eum promiserat: autem persuasio de potentia Dei in praestandis promissis, non est tantum notitia, sed firma ac indubitata fiducia. 2. Quia fides salvifica est intima acquiescentia in divina benevolentia ac gratia. OBJICITUR 1. Effectum fidei salvificae non est essentialis forma ejus. Fiducia est effectum fidei salvificae. Ergo non est essentialis forma fidei salvificae. Assumptio probatur testimonio Pauli Ephes. 3: 12. In quo habemus libertatem et auditum cum fiducia per fidem in ipsum. RESP. Assumptio est distinguenda, quia est ambigua. Nam fiducia in ea, ut in dicto Pauli allegato, est persuasio curta de exauditione precum in nomine et fide Christi factarum: Sed fiducia quae est essentialis forma fidei salvificae est persuasio certissima, de veracitate, fidelitate, potentiae, ac misericordia Dei, et reconciliatione nostri cum Deo per Christum. Fiducia exauditionis recte dicitur esse effectum fidei. OBJICITUR 2. Nullius virtutis intellectualis, forma essentialis est fiducia: Fides est virtus intellectualis: Ergo fidei forma essentialis non est fiducia. RESP. Nullius virtutis, intellectualis, nimirum tantum intellectualis, tantum in intellectu sitae, forma essentialis est fiducia. At fidem esse virtutem tantum intellectualem, negatur: quia totius anima est perfectio. OBJICITUR 3. Quicquid, etc." Vide Syntag. Chris. Theol. Lib. IX. cap. 6. lanus disposes of; and the very arguments that Polanus urges, Gomar responds to each considers himself in the right; and yet each esteems his brother as a sound orthodox Calvinist. We might show by other quotations that Dr. Gomar has completely set aside those very objections which are now urged against the view which he takes of Rom. 4: 3, or Gen. 15: 6. But we forbear. The length of our discussion admonishes us to hasten to the concluding topic announced in the question at the head of this article.* ARTICLE VIII. THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECCLESIASTES. Translated from the German MS. of Dr. I. Nordheimer, Prof. in the University of the city of New York, by Wm. W. Turner; and revised by the Author.f "Rectum iter quod sero cognovit lassusque errando aliis monstrat." Seneca. THE book Koheleth, or as it is more frequently denominated Ecclesiastes, has already been made the subject of laborious inquiries by many learned men, stimulated thereto by the hope of being enabled to illumine the obscurity of its style and to extract the deep spiritual meaning which it seems to contain. As each writer regarded it from his own peculiar point of view, one taking it for one thing and one for another, it is easy to imagine that its fortunes must have been extremely various at various times. And thus in fact it was: for, in consequence of the apparently contradictory nature of its contents, it has been looked upon both as the gloomy imaginings of a melancholy misanthrope, and as the licentious suggestions of an Epicurean profligate; as the disputation of a wavering skeptic, and as a justification of God's providence in ruling the world. We regret the necessity of again postponing the remaining section of this article. It will be concluded in the next number of the Repository.-ED. Written in the year 1833, as an Introduction to a new translation of Ecclesiastes accompanied with critical and philological notes, which may appear in future Nos. of this Periodical. Some again, with the view of freeing it from objections to which it has appeared to them obnoxious, have even gone so far as to convert it into a dialogue in which the preacher is made to speak as a learner, the bold tone of whose language is rebuked and softened down by the calm and soothing voice of his instructor. Another natural consequence of the variety of lights in which it has been viewed, is that it has met by turns with both advocates and opposers, and its tendency been regarded as beneficial or injurious accordingly. It is not at present the writer's intention to enter into a particular enumeration and refutation of the numerous theories that have been broached and defended with greater or less ability by others, but simply to lay before the public, in addition to what has already been advanced, his own ideas with regard to this portion of Holy Writ. In order to combine the requisite degree of brevity with a satisfactory illustration of his positions, he will confine himself in his exhibition of the Philosophy of Ecclesiastes to a consideration of the two following questions: First, To what description of work does the book belong? And Secondly, What is its object, and what are its contents? I. In reply to the first of these queries, when we consider the form, the course of ideas, and the contents of the work, we feel no hesitation in affirming it to be a philosophic didactic poem, whose design is to ascertain and exhibit the obligations of man to himself, to his fellow-man, and to God. This proposition having been advanced, we are now under the necessity of examining by the rules of art its author's style and train of thought; these not unfrequently appear obscure and enigmatic, on account of the apparent want of connection occasioned by the rapidity of his transitions from one idea to another, now proving and lamenting, now exhorting and encouraging. The writer of a philosophic didactic poem, whose principal object must be the development of moral truths, should seek to avoid the two extremes of wandering too far into the realms of poesy, or of restraining himself too strictly within philosophic bounds. His style should not be too constantly poetic, nor ever be allowed to become too animated, too lyric, or too pathetic; on the contrary, he should observe a proper moderation in the employment of ornaments, images, and allegories; and frequently vary the tone of his discourse. Again, he should not deliver his philosophic truths in scholastic phraseology encumbered with proofs and explanations, or observe a too pre |