mands for its profitable investment, and when the course of business is most successful, then does money command the highest rates of interest.

For hundreds of years to come it will be so. When, at last, our land, like England, shall groan under the burden of a crowded population, when every acre shall be tilled,-when the sky shall be curtained with the smoke of our countless manufactories, and every one of our seas and lakes and rivers shall be vexed with our commerce;-when every device and expedient by which money can be gathered together, shall for a long succession of years have been discovered and employed, -and when wealth shall have far outgrown the demand for its employment, then will this golden consummation be indicated by diminished rates of interest; but even then, we should be slow to consider these diminished rates as proofs of national prosperity. Till that time shall arrive, let it be remembered by every American legislator, that, as a general rule, with us public prosperity is at its highest pitch when money commands the highest price.

Even during the late crisis, when other causes of an extraordinary character lent their aid to raise the price of money, any merchant of Boston will probably be ready to say, that the first cause of the unusual rates of interest was a previous unexampled increase of profitable business, by which hundreds had been induced to extend their credits far beyond the bounds of prudence.

So much for the first principle of political economy assumed by our laws.

The second principle assumed by the law is, that the rate of interest, and consequently (on the European notion) the degree of public prosperity, can be fixed by the Legislature.

This idea carries upon the very face of it the impress of absurdity. It has already been shown that the price of money is determined, like the price of every thing else, by the relation existing between the demand and the supply. It is obvious that the law cannot affect either of these elements. They depend upon the vicissitudes of trade,-which, in turn, depend upon the operation of causes as numerous and as widely spread, as are the efforts of human enterprise and ingenuity. Every change of the breeze wafts to our ears the knowledge of facts which affect the market;-from every quarter of the globe, and from every kingdom of nature, and from every department

of mortal toil, comes that information to our merchants and manufacturers, and farmers, by which their investments and expenditures are regulated. How vain, therefore, is every law which attempts to control that which is the effect of causes so various, so numerous, and so perfectly beyond the reach of legislation!

A fifth argument against Usury Laws is their inconsistency. Are they intended to prevent prodigality? They tolerate it in every form but that of borrowing.

Are they intended to protect the simple? They allow him to lend his money at any rate, however low, and even to throw it away unrebuked.

Are they intended to shield the poor? They do not allow him to lend his money at its full value; they drive him as a borrower from the market when money cannot be procured at the legal rate, or else, by the perils of law, force him to pay enormous usury. All this we have proved. But this is not the inconsistency at present complained of. Besides this, the laws allow an indefinite rate of interest to be charged and paid on certain sorts of loans, which cannot, in principle, be distinguished from loans on which the rate is by law limited to six per cent.

Thus on Bottomry bonds the lender may charge what he pleases, and the borrower may pay what he chooses.

Is there any peculiarity in this kind of loan, or in the circumstances attending it, to justify the distinction made by the law?

Before investigating this question, our readers will allow us to remind them of two facts, the importance of which, in any discussion of the usury laws, is very considerable. The first is, that no person in business complains of the liberty given by law to this maritime contract; but on the contrary it is universally confessed to be just and proper. The second fact is, that, in the practice of lending and borrowing on Bottomry, although there is no legal restriction, no law of maritime usury, yet no evils arise from this freedom,-no abuses or extortious exactions are complained of;-all parties feel that they are even benefited by the absence of legislative interference. One would imagine that such facts might shake the belief of those who advocate usury laws.

Now let us see what entitles Bottomry to such legal exemption.

Sir Wm. Blackstone says, that trade carried on by sea is of such value and importance, that it ought to be allowed perfect freedom of all such contracts as are needful to its existence or convenience. His remark is very true: but it is as true of business carried on by land:-it proves as much in relation to the common terra-firma contract of hiring and letting money, as it does with regard to maritime contracts. We confess that if, during a voyage, a ship's company are brought into want of money, and money cannot be hired at the common rate of interest, the captain ought to have the power and the right of borrowing at such other rate as he can. But so, also, do we affirm that if, in his ordinary business upon land, a merchant finds himself in want of money,-without which he must suffer, he ought to have, and to exercise, the same right of borrowing at the best possible rate. Both captain and merchant are entitled to be the sole judges of their own respective wants and ability.

The law therefore makes a distinction where, in this particular respect at least, there is no difference.

But, says Mr. Ord, in his Treatise on Usury, Bottomry is not a loan, as other kinds of borrowing and lending are,-because the money lent is put at hazard; whereas in a loan the sum lent is not at risk. We do not insist on calling Bottomry a loan; A rose by any other name will smell as sweet: but we do insist upon truth in the statement of facts. When it is affirmed that the sum lent is not, in the case of ordinary loans, put at risk, we must deny the assertion.

The money lent upon Bottomry is put at the hazard of sea perils, of the winds and waves and rocks of the great highway of nations. In common loans it is put at the risk of every breath of fortune,-of every conceivable form of the manyshaped monster, Danger,-of every circumstance by which may be affected the inclination or ability of the borrower to fulfil his contract.

No such distinction can, therefore, be justly claimed in favor of Bottomry; but he who reasons justly and candidly must confess, that if in the one case exemption from legal restraint is called for by the necessity or nature of the contract, the same reasons demand an equal exemption for the other.

But we need not confine the illustration of legal inconsistency to a comparison between the different sorts of loans. Truth and justice sustain us in saying that there is not, in the

whole circle of human affairs, any species of contract whatsoever, voluntarily formed by and between persons of sound mind, whether it be purchase or sale, or lease, or charter-party, or any other mode of traffic devised by human ingenuity, ever prompt to relieve its own necessities,-which the law, if consistent with itself, ought not to restrict by the same regulations which now encumber the letting to hire of money; and we need not fear to defy the most subtle intellect, to point out a solid reason for the invidious distinction which now exists. Time was when the legislature extended its interference with private rights to almost every act of private life. But that was a day of political darkness. The wisdom of the people has ever since been increasing; one after another of these legal abuses has been removed by more intelligent legislatures, until no relic remains of the old regime of error, excepting the laws against usury. A still farther reform will follow that increase of knowledge which is now enlightening the community, -and we trust that the time is not very distant when these will disappear.

Such are some of the arguments which seem to us to prove that usury laws ought not to exist. It would be easy to multiply them, but we trust that we have said enough to satisfy any reasonable man of the truth of the proposition which we have endeavored to prove. We have seen that usury laws are needless infringements of individual liberty, called for by no public necessity and producing no beneficial effect. We have seen that they are a dead letter, always violated and evaded. We have seen that they are productive of enormous evils to both borrowers and lenders, the largest share of the evils being inflicted on those who borrow. We have seen that they are founded upon false notions of political economy; and finally that they are inconsistent in principle, and partial in their operation. In view of all these arguments, and remembering that in strict justice it is incumbent upon the advocates of such laws to prove their claims upon our favorable regard, we feel ourselves authorized to conclude that they ought to be abolished.

ART. V.-The Free Cities of Flanders.

1. Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne de la Maison de Valois. Par M. de BARANTE. 11 tom. 8vo. Paris. 1825. 2. Histoire de la Flandre depuis le Comte Gui de

Dampierre jusqu'aux Ducs de Bourgogne. Par JULES VAN PRAET. 2 tom. 8vo. Bruxelles. 1828. 3. Notice Historique sur la Ville de Gand. Par A. VOISIN. 12mo. Gand. 1826.

THE history of a community, which has run its career of public freedom, is fraught with peculiar interest to those of later times, who are still engaged in trying a similar great experiment on the capacity of man for self-government. Its example addresses instruction and admonition to them, equally as to the rest of the world. And they can enter, with all the sympathy of perfect fellow-feeling, into the triumphs which honored, or the reverses and errors which saddened, the sojourn of liberty in the bosom of a people which has now ceased to be free. The commonwealths of Greece and Rome, by reason of their long-continued power and classic celebrity,—the Italian republics of the middle age, by their conspicuous position in the very front of modern European refinement,—have attracted, as they ought, the larger share of study and admiration. There is another class of communities, in many respects resembling those of Greece and Italy, which, with less of external splendor to fix regard, are yet entitled to a careful examination on the part of us, the immediate descendants of the northern nations of Europe,-namely, the great cities of England, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and the Baltic. Whilst, in the rural districts of these countries, the feudal system struck deep root, and the great baronial aristocracy were exclusively possessed of power,-in the large cities, on the contrary, with their dense population, there was a spirit of liberty at work from the beginning; and out of them issued forth the power and influence of the commons, and tiers-état, to change the face of all Europe.

We propose, in illustration of this important subject, after saying a few words on the political organization of the communities in question, to run over the leading incidents in the history of one of them, Ghent, the chief among the Flemish free