Page images
PDF
EPUB

possibility of reaching an agreement on the matter of prisoner of war exchanges, only a single point of difference separated the two sides. The UN refused to return prisoners who were not willing to go back to the communist controlled areas of North Korea and China. The Reds insisted upon the return of all prisoners. Failing to resolve this question, the truce talks were suspended indefinitely on October 8, 1952.

In the main the United States was firm in its support of the direction of UN affairs by the Secretary General, Trygvie Lie. When the Soviet

Soviet opposition causes

resignation of Trygvie Lie

bloc accused Mr. Lie of using his nonpartisan post to favor anti-communist members and their proposals, the American delegation, along with others, came to the defense of the Norwegian statesman. Finally

Mr. Lie submitted his resignation as Secretary General on November 10, 1952, insisting that he could not perform his functions properly if he could not command the support of all member nations. The Security Council on a number of occasions debated the question of a successor for Mr. Lie but the various groups within the Council were unable to Dag agree upon a nominee for the post. Hammarskjoeld Meanwhile Mr. Lie continued to selected as act in his capacity as Secretary Gensuccessor eral.27 It was not until March 31, to Lie 1953 that the members of the Council settled upon the Swedish Deputy Foreign Minister Dag Hammarskjoeld as the new Secretary General. His nomination was approved by the General Assembly on April 7, 1953.

In the midst of the question of who should succeed Mr. Lie, the UN Secretariat and the United States government became involved in a

[blocks in formation]

UN to advance the cause of world communism. Secretary Lie defended the right of the UN to handle the matters of disloyalty and subversion within its own organization. However, a series of protests by congressional investigating committees and by the State Department aroused American public opinion to such a degree that the UN administration agreed to cooperate with the government in Washington in weeding out American employees whose character and activities were proven detrimental to the safety of American interests. The question was a delicate one, of course. Employees of the UN had a certain loyalty to the international organization. But when this loyalty conflicted with their loyalty to their own country there could be little doubt that their usefulness to the UN was impaired. And if they chose to use their positions in the UN to work against their own country and for an alien master, they obviously were disloyal to both the UN and their parent nation. Moreover, the presence of the principal organs of the UN in New York made it particularly easy for disloyal employees to consort with, supply information to, and work for agents of the communist conspiracy.

The question of divided loyalties

The question of screening American employees of the UN for loyalty to the United States may have seemed a minor matter while the world struggled with the problems of peace and security on a large scale. Nevertheless, the situation was but a reflection of some of the larger difficulties confronting an internationally-minded United States. This problem of the loyalty of American employees of the UN has continued to vex both the United States government and the United Nations administration. One of the first acts of the newly appointed chief delegate of the United States at the UN, Henry Cabot

[blocks in formation]

UN agencies. As a result of these investigations 21 Americans were discharged from their UN posts by the Secretary General.

The cases of dismissed employees before the bar

to

A number of these discharged employees appealed their cases to the UN Administrative Tribunal and, on September 1, 1953, that body ruled that 11 of the 21 had been illegally dismissed. The Tribunal ordered the restoration of four of the eleven to their posts, and directed the Secretary General to give back pay and money damages to all eleven. It upheld the dismissal of nine of the individuals. A long legal struggle ensued over the problem of whether the General Assembly could be compelled to authorize these payments. On December 9, 1953 the Assembly asked the International Court of Justice at The Hague for an advisory opinion on the case. The United States argued against the proposal make the payments. However, on July 13, 1954, the International Court by a 9 to 3 vote decided that the General Assembly could not refuse to authorize the payments. The issue came to a vote during the autumn session of the Assembly in 1954. On the final day of its 1954 session the General Assembly voted 52 to 5 to honor the payment of $179,420 in indemnities to the 11 Americans. The United States voted in the affirmative and only the Soviet bloc was opposed.29 So, in this case, as in a number of others involving differences of opinion between the United States government and the membership of a heterogeneous world body, solutions will have to be reached by compromise and adjustment. And those solutions are not always likely to be to the exact desires of the United States.

8. The Eisenhower Administration and the United Nations: 1953-54

[blocks in formation]

quarters over the failure of the UN to measure up to the hopes of 1945. But the majority of the UN's critics admitted that the intransigence of the Soviet bloc was more responsible for the shortcomings of the UN than the concept of the organization itself. With a new administration taking power in 1953, the principal affect upon American policy toward the UN was reflected in the shifts in membership of the American delegation. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., former Republican Senator from Massachusetts, was named as chief delegate with the rank of ambassador.30 He replaced the former Republican Senator from Vermont, Warren Austin. James J. Wadsworth, of New York, was selected as Mr. Lodge's deputy. A number of distinguished public men and women have served as members of the United States delegation in the General Assembly and on the several boards and commissions of the United Nations under the Eisenhower administration.31

When the General Assembly reconvened on February 24, 1953, after its two-month recess, M1.

[blocks in formation]

30 It is one of the coincidences of American history that the grandson of the man who was largely responsible for the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations in 1919 became the top representative of the United States in the new international organization 34 years after his grandfather blocked American participation in its predecessor.

31 These have included during the Eisenhower administration, Gov. James F. Byrnes, of South Carolina; Dr. Charles W. Mayo, of Minnesota; Mrs. Oswald Lord, of New York; Lt. Gen. L. W. Johnson. USAF; Lt. Gen. W. A. Burress, USA; Vice Adm. A. D. Struble, USN, etc. Many Americans are on the permanent staff of the UN and hold high offices in the organization. Notable among these are Ralph J. Bunche, formerly Director of the Trusteeship Council and now Undersecretary of the UN; Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary General; and Byron Price, Assistant Secretary General of the UN until the spring of 1954.

of Ohio. Senator Taft was ill and could not deliver

his speech, but it was read to an audience at Cincinatti on May 26th by his son Robert Taft, Jr. The burden of Senator Taft's address was that the United States should by-pass the United Nations and attempt to effect a truce in Korea by unilateral action. If this could not be accomplished, said the Senator, then the United States should withdraw from the peace talks and "go it alone" in the Far East. Because of the influential position held by Senator Taft in the Republican party, this view of

the United States taking a "free hand President in Asia" was widely interpreted as Eisenhower being administration policy. Presirepudiates dent Eisenhower quickly repudiated "go-it-alone" this interpretation, on May 28th, policy saying, "If you are going to go it alone in one place, you, of course have to go it alone everywhere.' "32 The President's answer to Senator Taft's suggestion indicated that the administration had no thought of disassociating the United States from the collective security action of the UN in respect to Korea. On June 4, Senator Taft explained that he had intended to suggest an association of powers in Asia, similar to NATO, for collective action in that area. While it lasted, this furore over the Taft address gave the appearance of disunity of purpose in the higher echelons of the Republican leadership. The death of Senator Taft on July 31, 1953, removed this important American from the center of the stage in the legislative branch and his successor, Senator William F. Knowland, of California, whose championship of Chiang Kai-shek is well advertised, has been unable to wield the power in the party councils that Senator Taft so long possessed and exercised.

Death of Senator Taft weakens Republican leadership

Four days before Senator Taft's death, the Korean armistice was signed-at Panmunjom on

Korean armistice July 27, 1953

July 27, 1953.33 On August 18 the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly met to plan the details of the Korean peace talks.

a2 New York Times, May 29, 1953, p. 4. The President continued, "No single free nation can live alone in the world. We have to have friends.'" Ibid.

33 The armistice terms included provisions for handling the exchange of prisoners. This complicated and prolonged process was carried out during the autumn of 1953. Its implications for American foreign policy are discussed in a subsequent chapter. See pp. 219-22 below.

General Assembly

Discussion over which nations should make up the political conference membership occupied most of the rest of the month. On August 28th the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for a peace conference in which the 16 nations which had contributed military forces to the UN effort in Korea plus the Republic of Korea would participate on the UN side. Red China and North Korea would be the parties on the other side and a special invitation was to be sent to the U.S.S.R. to join those two parties if it so wished. The Assembly session of 1952-1953 then ended.

calls for

a Korean peace conference

[blocks in formation]

...

SECRETARY DULLES' ADDRESS AT OPENING OF EIGHTH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 17, 1953: . . . We must admit that the United Nations has not realized all the hopes that were held for it. That is largely because many of those hopes were unrealistic. . . . The United Nations was built largely on the expectation that the leaders of the Grand Alliance would continue

voluntarily to work together for peace. . . . The alliance was the product of Fascist danger, and, when that threat was battered down, allied unity disappeared to be replaced by new division and new fears. These reached a peak when the Korean aggression occurred. It is to the eternal credit of the United Nations that it was not then indifferent. . . . Korea became the place where, for the first time in history, international organization was instrumental in actually repelling armed aggression. . . . The nations are groping for the spirit and the institutions which will enable man to dominate matter. It has unhappily so far been impossible to provide either the spirit or the institutions on a universal basis. Therefore, some

an

34

of the nations have developed their own community measures to deter aggression and to give protection to moral values that they cherish... community arrangements are the least likely to be aggressive. .. Military force which is distributed through several countries cannot be used effectively unless all of the countries concerned are in agreement. . . . A community defense system. . . . makes it possible for the small and the weak to get real security. Also it assures that even the great and the strong cannot pervert the system by using it for aggression. The United States has already put forward a series of proposals [for the limitation of armaments] here which have attracted widespread support. . . There must be effective safeguards to insure compliance of all nations and to give adequate warning of possible evasions or violations. . . . I have no doubt that a review conference [as provided in Article 109 of the Charter] will be held [in 1956, to consider revision of the Charter]. . . Such a conference will not work miracles, but it can be of major importance.

.

the task should promptly engage the best thought and attention of all member nations-not merely their governments but also private organizations. . . . We should also welcome suggestions from those nonmember nations which aspire for membership. . . . This Assembly is the only world forum where the attitudes of the world community make themselves felt. No one can take part in the deliberations of this Assembly without feeling the impact of moral forces. . . .

Soviets fail to win approval in UN for several proposals

The Soviet Union met with several rebuffs in the opening days of the session. The U.S.S.R. failed in a move to win a seat in the UN for Red China, and on September 22nd the Assembly voted down Vishinsky's demand that the composition of the Korean peace conference be reconsidered. And, on October 5th, Turkey was named to a place on the Security Council for a two-year term, defeating the Soviet candidate, Poland, in the Assembly vote. Red China. and North Korea, whether at Russia's direction is not known, agreed on October 10th to the American proposal for preliminary talks to ar

[blocks in formation]

"35

composition of the conference be settled before the date and place were named. The talks dragged on into November. Finally, on December 10th Ambassador Dean withdrew from the talks after, as he charged, the United States was accused by the Red Chinese delegate "of perfidy or deliberate treachery in connection with the release of prisoners by President Rhee . . . on June 17-18. . . In a radio broadcast on December 21, 1953, Mr. Dean reported to the American people on the frustrations he experienced at Panmunjom. As he indicated, agreement as to the time and place of the peace conference could probably be reached. The difficulty was its composition. The Red side wanted to include the U.S.S.R. as a neutral and to add India as a neutral in the hope of driving a wedge between that country and the West. As Mr. Dean observed:

I do believe the Chinese Communists are determined to keep North Korea politically and economically integrated into their own economy. The outlook is discouraging but by no means hopeless. . . . Communists are in no hurry. .. They believe that at a long-drawn-out conference, the American negotiators will be forced by American public opinion to give in. . . . Impatience mounts as no progress is reported. The Communists know this and burn bonfires under the American negotiators and utter rude, insulting arrogant demands. . . . The issue between us and the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communistsslavery or freedom-is fundamental. There is no easy formula which can either hide it or solve it.36 Meanwhile, attention at the UN was focused on a number of other problems too detailed to discuss here-the question of admission of new members, the Palestine situation, disarmament,37 germ warfare charges, racial problems in South Africa, matters affecting French colonial policies in North Africa, and the oft-recurring question of revision of the UN Charter. The United States position on this last matter was voiced by Governor James F. Byrnes, of South Carolina, appointed by President

Governor

Byrnes presents American position on UN Charter revision

[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]

GOVERNOR BYRNES' STATEMENT ON REVISION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, NEW YORK, OCTOBER 20, 1953: ... The United States favors the holding of a review conference [as provided for in Article 109]. . . . We do not believe that changes in language alone will transform the behavior of nations. . . . We should utilize the time between now and the review conference to study with great care the possibilities of revision and any proposals that may be suggested. . . . My delegation is persuaded that it may very well prove useful for the Assembly to set up . . . [an advisory] committee after the basic materials for its work become available. . . my Government has an open mind on this whole question. We are only at the beginning stage of preparations. Our aim should be to build up what

President Eisenhower's plan for the peaceful use of atomic energy

we have, not to tear it down. . . . Perhaps the most dramatic event of the autumn sessions of the General Assembly was the personal appeal by President Eisenhower to the delegates from the 60 member nations on December 8, 1953, for the creation of a pool of uranium and fissionable materials to be used for the betterment of all mankind. This suggestion, made in a speech to the General Assembly by the President indicated the degree of trust which the United States reposed in the UN as an agency of worldwide cooperative action.39 Anyone who heard or who reads the President's speech of December 8th cannot doubt the sincerity of his offer or the good will with which the United States government supports the concept and the activities of the UN.

With the beginning of a new year the United Nations had its fill of problems and the United States was in the midst of many of them for example, the Korean peace, Red Russia's efforts to gain UN membership for Red China,40 the persisting problems of IsraeliArab conflicts,41 and the overriding question of improvements in the mechanism of the

Secretary Dulles on UN Charter revision

38 Considerable criticism of the appointment of Gov. Byrnes was reported at the time. His outspoken support of racial segregation in the South and his views on social legislation, opponents said, made his appointment to a body where the United States was endeavoring to act as the leader of democratic nations particularly inappropriate. Others saw the selection of Gov. Byrnes as a reward for his endorsement of the presidential candidacy of General Eisenhower.

39 The text of the speech will be found in U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIX:847-51, Dec. 21, 1953. It is discussed and reprinted in excerpt in an earlier section of this study. See pp. 108-109 above.

UN itself. On this point Secretary Dulles made a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in mid-January which spelled out some of the American ideas.

SECRETARY

...

[ocr errors]

DULLES' STATEMENT ON UNITED NATIONS CHARTER REVIEW, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 18, 1954: It must be recognized that the high hopes of 1945 have not been fully realized. . . . Many initial hopes were exaggerated. . . . many provisions of the charter depended on cooperation by the so-called "great powers," and in fact the members of the Soviet Communist bloc have pursued policies which departed from the spirit, and indeed the language, of the charter. . . . The greatest weakness of the United Nations. is the Security Council's inability to discharge its "primary responsibilty for the maintenance of international peace and security." . . . The Council's inability to function as designed has been primarily due to the abuse by the Soviet Union of its so-called veto power. . . . We are now approaching a time when in all probability there will be a review of the charter with a view to its possible amendment. . . . The United States has already indicated that it expects to favor the holding of a review conference. . . . We have not yet taken any firm position with respect to charter amendments.

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

...

some of the major questions which might be brought before the Charter Review Conference. . . [are] ... [1] problems of universality or limited membership. . . . It seems at the present time that most of the members of the United Nations feel that it is better to have even discordant members in the organization rather than to attempt to confine membership to those who hold the same views. . . . [2] Can Charter changes better enable . . . [the Security Council] to discharge . . . [its] responsibility? Or must that primary responsibility be left to security organizations, the formation of which is authorized by Article 51? Or should greater responsibility be given to the General Assembly, where there is no veto? [3] Are the present provisions

for membership and voting in the Security Council conducive to its maximum effectiveness? Should the veto power be taken away in respect of questions involving Pacific Settlement of Disputes (Chapter VI) and in respect of the admission of members. Presumably, the United States would itself hesitate to go much further than this in now

new

40 On Mar. 18, 1954, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, former British delegate to the UN and newly named British ambassador to France, said that the Red Chinese should be admitted to the UN as soon as a majority of the UN members were convinced that the Communists had abandoned aggression in Korea or Indochina. UN Secretary General Hammarskjoeld reportedly approved Jebb's idea. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Foreign Minister, on Mar. 22, 1954, said Canada would consider recognizing Red China if the Reds showed a conciliatory attitude at Geneva. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, of Canada, said he knew of no move by Canada to recognize Red China at that time.

41 These included not only mutual accusations of truce violations and border incidents, but also Israel's dispute with Egypt over Egyptian action in closing the Suez Canal to ships bound for Israel.

« PreviousContinue »