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There was also a Treaty of General Relations signed on July 4, 1946, recognizing Philippine independence and providing for the withdrawal of the United States from the islands, save for certain bases retained there by agreement with the Philippine government.

Independence, once gained, was not an unmixed blessing for the Filipinos.(67) Independence But independence was what they not an had fought for, worked for, and unmixed prayed for and it was their own blessing for the now. We shall note in our discusFilipinos sion of later defense arrangements in the Pacific area some of the problems raised by Philippine independence.

Like the Filipinos, other peoples of Asia sought freedom from control by western powers. And the example of the United States in carrying out its promises to the Filipinos was not "White" rule lost upon the subjects or the rulers in Asia of Indonesia, Indochina, Malaya, loses prestige Burma, Ceylon, and the vast subduring continent of India. Moreover, the World War II defeats inflicted upon the "white" nations by Japan in the early days of the war had broken forever the myth of the white rulers' supremacy throughout south and east Asia. American policy toward these areas was for the most part "correct," yet hopeful. The American leaders hoped that the European powers would see their way clear to granting greater freedom to their dependent peoples in Asia, even complete independence if that were possible. But, during the war, the interallied cooperation made it unwise and impolitic for American officials to express views which would be out of line with British, French, or Dutch policy in their respective colonial spheres.

Great Britain was the first to take positive action toward relinquishing its controls in Asia. On September 19, 1945, Prime Minister Attlee an

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India and of Pakistan.5 Ceylon became a dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations on February 4, 1948, under the Ceylon Independence Act of 1947. By a treaty signed in London on October 17, 1947, Burma became a fully independent nation on January 4, 1948. Only Hong Kong and Singapore of Britain's once vast empire in Asia remained in colonial status after the war, since the former Straits Settlement colony gave way to the Malayan Union on April 1, 1946 and later to the Federation of Malaya which was set up February 1, 1948.

Indonesia becomes a republic, 1949

The Netherlands experienced considerable difficulty with its colonials in Indonesia, and the issue finally was brought before the Security Council of the UN as has been previously noted. The Republic of Indonesia came into being on December 28, 1949 after a round table conference at The Hague from August 23 to November 2, 1949. In the French colony of Indochina the postwar situation has continued in turmoil. On March 9, 1945 the Japanese occupation authorities proclaimed the "independence" of Indochina. Just before their defeat in August 1945 the Japanese allowed the Vietminh rebels to establish a republic. The French reoccupied portions of the colony in September 1945 and periods of civil war have alternated with French attempts to expel the communist forces from their strongholds. On March 8, 1949 France recognized the independence of the VietNam republic as an integral member of the French Union. The United States accorded recognition to this republic on February 7, 1950.

France creates the Associated States of Indochina

From this brief recital of the recent course of colonialism in south and east Asia, it may be seen that the declining power of the western nations. was accelerated by the events of the first postwar years. The United States has been officially sympathetic to the problems of the allied nations involved, but there is no doubt that American public opinion has looked favorably upon the rise of nationalism in the area with its resultant inde

India became a sovereign democratic republic on January 26, 1950. France likewise recognized Laos as an independent state within the French Union on July 19, 1949, and Cambodia as an associated state on the same terms on Nov. 18, 1949. The United States recognition of 1950 applied to all three states.

pendence movements. Having freed the Philippines, the Americans have easily convinced themselves that all former and present colonial peoples should be free. And never having depended upon a colonial empire for trade, raw materials, defense outposts, and areas for settlement, Americans are not inclined to have too much patience with nations which do depend on colonies for such reasons. As we shall see in subsequent sections, American sympathy with colonials wishing freedom from European rule has frequently complicated our relations with the parent nations. This has been especially true in respect to the Far East and Southeast Asia since 1945. Our attempts to reconcile our dependence upon European allies, in Europe and in the UN, with our professed interest in promoting the advance of colonial peoples, in Asia and Africa, provide one of the most difficult dilemmas which have confronted American policymakers in the postwar world.

2. Background of the China Question

China regarded as a major world power in 1945

As has been noted, China, by virtue of its long and at last successful struggle against Japanese imperialism, emerged from the war in 1945 as one of the major powers of the world. Whether this ranking was based upon reality is now a question, but in 1945 few Western statesmen had the termerity to express doubts that China had earned a place on the permanent list of the Security Council of the UN and at the postwar meetings where solutions to world problems, especially those affecting the Far East, were to be sought. So China and its representatives were welcomed into the councils of the victorious nations and every effort was made to treat China as the principal spokesman of Asia's vast population.

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But his domestic policies left much to be wished. American efforts therefore were directed chiefly toward convincing Chiang and his supporters to broaden the base of their political rule to accord recognition to the elements within Chinese society -among whom were the Chinese communists— regarded as liberals.

At Yalta, the Big Three had agreed that the Soviet Union should enter into a treaty of friendship and alliance with the government of Na

Sino-Soviet pact of 1945

tionalist China. This the Soviets did on August 14, 1945. The pact granted the U.S.S.R. essentially the rights held by the Czarist regime in Manchuria before 1904, and certain rights in the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. In turn, the Russians promised to support the Kuomintang (or Nationalist) government of Chiang Kai-sheka direct pledge to see that Chiang's administration was preserved in power when Japan went down to defeat. The Russians carried out their promises only to the extent of evacuating Manchuria (although dismantling a good portion of the industrial plants of that province). Except for their holdings at Port Arthur and Dairen, the Russians were ostensibly out of Chinese territory shortly after the close of the war. However, large amounts of materiel abandoned by the Japanese fell into the hands of the Chinese communists in Manchuria.

American policy toward China was stated by President Truman late in 1945.

STATEMENT ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD CHINA, WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 16, 1945: ... It is the firm belief of this government that a strong, united, and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of . . . [the] United Nations... and for world peace. A China disorganized and divided

President
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states American policy toward China

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by foreign aggression . . . or by violent internal strife is an undermining influence to world stability and peace. . . . The .. United States believes it essential: (1) That a cessation of hostilities be arranged between the armies of the National Government and the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese armed forces for the purpose of completing the return of all China to effective Chinese control. . . . (2) That a national conference of representatives of major political elements be arranged to develop an early solution to the present internal

strife. . . . The United States and the other United Nations have recognized the present National Government... as the only legal government in China. . . United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife. . . . The United States is cognizant that the present National Government of China is a "one-party government" and believes that peace, unity, and democratic reform in China will be furthered if the basis of this government is broadened to include other political elements in the country.... The existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist army is inconsistent with . . political unity in China. . . . autonomous armies should be eliminated . . . and all armed forces . . integrated effectively into the Chinese National Army. . . . As China moves toward peace and unity. . . the United States would be prepared to assist the National Government in every reasonable way to rehabilitate the country. . . . it would be prepared to give favorable consideration to Chinese requests for credits and loans . . . for projects which would contribute toward the development of a healthy economy. . . .

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A month before this statement of American policy, President Truman had appointed General

George C. Marshall as his special President emissary to China with the rank of Truman ambassador. General Marshall set sends General out for the Far East on December Marshall to 15, 1945, arriving at Shanghai on China as a the 20th and at Nanking the folspecial envoy lowing day. Meanwhile, at the Mos

cow conference of foreign ministers Secretary Byrnes, Mr. Bevin, and Mr. Molotov agreed on the need for a unified and democratic China under Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government. They also reaffirmed their support of the policy of non-interference in Chinese domestic affairs. Secretary Byrnes and Mr. Molotov agreed, in addition, that American and Soviet troops would be withdrawn at the earliest practicable date.

At the outset, General Marshall's mission met with some success. On January 10, 1946 he induced the Chinese communists and the Kuomintang leaders to accept an armistice. He set up truce teams which effected a number of separate truce arrangements in the contested areas of China. Under General Marshall's influence the two factions agreed upon the creation of an interim government. This

Chinese leaders agree on interim government

agreement, adopted January 31, 1946 by the Political Consultative Conference, called for the convening of a National Assembly to draft a constitution and set up the structure of a coalition government. In February 1946 further agreements were reached on a unification of armed forces into a new national army. General Marshall left China in March to return to Washington for consultations.

The China situation disintegrates

While General Marshall was in the United States the carefully worked out arrangements in China disintegrated and civil war between the communists and the Kuomintang broke out. The General hurried back to China. He was unable to bring the opposing factions back into agreement and several months of fruitless negotiation only served to embitter the communists under their Moscow-trained leader, Mao Tse-tung. Likewise, Chiang's Nationalists, although they occasionally indicated willingness to go along with American suggestions for compromise, were either too weak or too reluctant to take necessary steps to achieve unity within their own ranks. In addition, the continuance of American financial and military aid to China, by force of circumstances, appeared to be going almost exclusively to the Nationalist faction, thereby creating further animosity toward the United States on the part of the communists who re

Difficulties of the American position

ceived little benefit from the large sums of money and military supplies from America. And, in this country, too, the aid program was attacked by those sympathetic toward the anti-Nationalists. Although these opponents of the administration policy might not be friendly to communism, they were of the opinion that American aid was being employed to keep in power a reactionary and corrupt regime at the expense of the creation of a democratic and popularly based unified China.

On August 12, 1946, General Marshall and his chief American advisor in China, Dr. John Leighton Stuart, who had recently been named American ambassador to China, issued a statement which declared that agreement between the communists and the Kuomintang appeared impossible.

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A further statement of American policy toward China

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PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S STATEMENT ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD CHINA, WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 18, 1946: . . . We [believe that] a united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to world peace... a broadening of the base of the National Government to make it representative of the Chinese people will further China's progress toward this goal, and that China has a clear responsibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed conflict within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and peace. It was made clear at Moscow last year that these views are shared by our Allies, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. . . . General Marshall .. knew full well in undertaking [his]. mission that halting civil strife, broadening the base of the Chinese Government, and bringing about a united, democratic China were tasks for the Chinese themselves. . . . In March [1946] General Marshall returned to this country. He reported... that... [the agreements already worked out] could not be satisfactorily implemented . . . unless China's economic disintegration were checked. . . . Political unity could not be built on economic chaos. . . . Before General Marshall arrived in China for the second time, in April [1946], there was evidence that the truce agreement was being disregarded. . . . A change in the course of events in the political field was equally disappointing. . . . Much has been said of the presence of United States armed forces in China during the past year. Last fall these forces were relatively large. They had to be. No one could prophesy in advance how well the Japanese forces in China would observe

the surrender terms.

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When it became obvious that the armed Japanese would not be a problem beyond the capabilities of the Chinese Armies to handle, redeployment was begun at once. . . It is a matter of deep regret that China has not yet been able to achieve unity by peaceful methods. . . . The views expressed a year ago by this Government are valid today.... While avoiding involvement in [China's] civil strife, we will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and economic recovery in their country. The draft constitution for China was completed on December 25, 1946 and was scheduled to take effect one year later. During the interim period the Social Democratic and Young China parties were to be given a role, although subordinate, in the provisional govGeneral Marshall and Ambassador Stuart were credited with having influenced the Kuomintang to liberalize the basis of this constitution. General Marshall made a report on his mission to the American people upon his return to the United States in January 1947.

China's new draft constitution

ernment.

General Marshall reports on his mission to China, 1947

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GENERAL MARSHALL'S REPORT ON CHINA, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 7, 1947: . . . the greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other. The leaders of the Government are convinced .. that the Communist-expressed desire to participate in a government . . . had for its purpose only a destructive intention. The Communists felt... that the Government was insincere. . . and intended by coercion of military force and the action of secret police to obliterate the Communist Party. On the side of the National Government there is a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government. On the side of the Chinese Communist Party there are . . . liberals as well as radicals. . . . there is a definite liberal group among the Communists, especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments-men who would put the interest of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish a Communist ideology in the immediate future. The dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end. . . . They completely distrust the leaders of the Kuomintang. a very harmful and immensely provocative phase of the... Communist

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Party procedure has been in the character of its propaganda... in the deliberate misrepresentation and abuse of the action, policies, and purposes of our Government. . . . the Nationalist Government publicity agency has made numerous misrepresentations, though not of the vicious nature of the Communist propaganda. . . . Sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both sides. . . . irreconcilable groups within the Kuomintang, interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China, evidently had no intention of implementing [the agreements

reached in January 1946]. . . . the course which the ... Communist Party has pursued in recent months indicated an unwillingness to make a fair compromise.... The reactionaries in the Government have evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their actions. The Communists . . . are evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the Government. ... The salvation... as I see it, would be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the Government and in the minority parties. Successful action on their part under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would . . . lead to unity through good government. . . . It is unfortunate that the Communists did not see fit to participate in the [National] Assembly, since the constitution that has been adopted seems to include every major point that they wanted.

.. Now that the form for a democratic China has been laid down by the newly adopted constitution, practical measures will be the test.

American effort to reconcile opposing factions in China fails

Despite General Marshall's ending on a hopeful note, there appeared little chance that the new constitution would be the answer to China's problems. It was clear that the American effort to bring the two opposing sides together, General Marshall's mission, must be counted a failure. The United States would have to drop its program for unifying the Communists and the Kuomintang. As alternative, stepped-up aid to Chiang Kai-shek to enable him to defeat the Communists in the field and to strengthen his hold on the domestic political situation seemed the only choice. But such a course

General Wedemeyer sent to China by President Truman

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would be expensive, and the success of any program which called for backing Chiang had its debatable aspects. Partly to ascertain the possibilities of success and partly as a check on other information coming out of China, President Truman called upon

General Albert E. Wedemeyer, a veteran of the Far Eastern war, to make an investigation of conditions both in China and in Korea. General Wedemeyer was selected for this task on July 11, 1947 and began his return from the Orient on August 24th. With the Wedemeyer trip the China question entered a more controversial phase-a phase which will be described in the section which follows.

3. The Loss of Mainland China

to the Communists

General Wedemeyer criticizes corruption in Nationalist government

General Wedemeyer's trip to China in the summer of 1947 was advertised as a "fact-finding" journey. Since he had been friendly with Chiang Kai-shek during his wartime service in China, it was expected that Wedemeyer's findings would not be comforting to the communists. In fact, the general visited no areas which were predominately under communist control. After extensive investigations, General Wedemeyer addressed a joint meeting of the State Council and the National Government cabinet ministers at Nanking. In this address, delivered on August 22, 1947, the general criticized the corruption and inefficiency of the government, especially in its military efforts. According to State Department reports, Chiang Kai-shek and a number of high government officials were distinctly displeased with General Wedemeyer's remarks.

On August 24 as he was about to leave Nanking on his return trip to the United States, General Wedemeyer amplified his observations on the

apathy and lethargy he had enChinese countered in high places in China. Nationalists He concluded by saying: "To redisappointed gain and maintain the confidence by Wedemeyer of the people, the Central governreactions ment will have to effect immediately drastic, far-reaching political and economic reforms. Promises will no longer suffice. Performance is absolutely necessary. It should be accepted that military force in itself will not eliminate Communism." Chinese government officials were understandably disappointed by Wedemeyer's criticisms. They had expected the U. S. Dept. of State, United States Relations with China (Washington: U. S. Gov. Printing Office, 1949), p. 764.

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