was possible to save China from the Reds? Were there communist conspirators in high and strategic places to influence American policy and American actions toward support of the Chinese communists? Were the alleged, and often admitted, corruption and inefficiency of the Kuomintang leaders too great for the efforts of the loyal Chinese and their American supporters to overcome? Was the bulk of the Chinese population ready and willing to try the unknown attractions of the communist system rather than continue under the regime that had so far failed to provide that vast country with peace and prosperity? These, and dozens of other questions, remain subjects for speculation, investigation, and determination at a time not yet in view.

However, the Chinese problem was a real and an immediate one in 1950, and events have shown that the problem remains, even if situations have changed in the past five years. The loss of mainland China to the communists is one of the West's greatest deprivations of the postwar era. Whatever the record, somehow there is the inner belief that the United States-the nation and its peoples, rather than just its diplomats and leaders -was in good measure responsible for that loss. American leadership and example in the postwar world failed to provide a rallying point sufficiently apparent and magnetic to draw the Chinese people to it before the events of 1950 solidified the barriers to successful appeal to the people of mainland China.

4. The Occupation of Japan and the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951

Before we go on to a discussion of the Korean war it would be well to interrupt the recital of America's postwar relations in the Far East with a story which has a relatively happy ending. This is the episode of the American occupation of Japan which terminated in the negotiation and signing of the peace treaty between the allies and the Japanese government in 1951. Of all the postwar international problems faced by American policymakers since 1945, the Japanese question has been the most successfully managed and the most happily concluded, in the light of popular acceptance.

We have seen what the preliminary occupation policy of the United States was considered to be as laid down in a directive from Washington to General MacArthur on September 6, 1945. And we have noted that this preliminary policy was reinforced by a basic initial post-surrender policy on November 1, 1945.16 General MacArthur vigorously pursued a program of demilitarizing Japan and moved rapidly to enable the Japanese people to institute reforms in the governmental structure to encourage the development of democratic representative institutions.

Creation of Far Eastern Commission (FEC)

In order to lessen the criticism by our former allies of the United States' position of paramount control of the occupation, Secretary Byrnes at the Moscow conference of December 1945 agreed to the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission, with headquarters in Washington. This commission was to consist of the Pacific powers which had fought against Japan; it numbered eleven nations at the outset. An Allied Council was also to be set up in Tokyo, representing the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the U.S.S.R., and China. The Commission (FEC) was to make policy and to review directives and policy actions of the Supreme Allied Commander, usually known as SCAP (Supreme Commander, Allied Powers). The Council was to act as an advisory body to SCAP. On December 30, 1945 General MacArthur announced that he had not been consulted on the agreement reached at Moscow, but that he would attempt to carry out its terms, although he did not favor the type of control set up by the three foreign ministers at Moscow.

Actually the FEC and the Allied Council had very little real effect upon American occupation

fluence in the surrender of Japan, the inability of Chinese, French, or British Commonwealth forces to participate in the occupation, and the unwillingness of the Soviets to do so, and you have the main reasons why the Japanese occupation continued to be American in character, personnel, and plan.

General MacArthur's attack upon the problems of Japanese rehabilitation was twofold-along economic and along political lines. The detailed

General MacArthur moves toward economic and political reforms in Japan

story of the economic measures and reforms in the Japanese industrial structure is one that is too complicated for presentation here. By January 1947 the various economic measures taken under MacArthur's direction indicated that reasonable objectives had been reached and the time had come for Japan to be allowed a higher level of industrial production than had been set under the punitive policies of the first year of occupation. In the political field, reforms were even more widespread. The Japanese Diet, under pressure from SCAP, passed a democratic electoral law on December 17, 1945. Elections, the first in which Japanese women had the opportunity to vote, were held April 10, 1946.17 The Diet so chosen drafted a new constitution

which modeled the government on British, French, and American plans. It reduced the Emperor to figurehead stature and made the executive (Prime Minister and cabinet) responsible to the two-house Diet, or parliament. This constitution was adopted by the Diet on November 3, 1946, to become effective May 3, 1947.

Thus, in about eighteen months of occupation, Japan had taken, under the guidance and supervision of SCAP, important steps on the way back to membership in the world comFEC munity of nations. The contrast post-surrender with the situation of Germany in policy this respect is noteworthy and American authorities did not lose the opportunity to point out what had been accomplished in an area relatively free from Soviet obstructionism. With these facts in view it is interesting to see some of the terms of the basic

17 The results gave seats in the Diet to the following parties: Liberals, 122; Progressives, 88; Socialists, 79; Independents, 75; non-party, 12; Communists, 3. The Liberal and Progressive parties (both conservative) formed the government.

post-surrender policy for Japan adopted by the FEC in June 1947, most of which echoed the directives of September 6 and November 1, 1945.

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION'S BASIC POSTSURRENDER POLICY FOR JAPAN, WASHINGTON, JUNE 19, 1947: . . . THE NATIONS18 COMPOSING THIS COMMISSION. . . . ARE. . . AGREED: To ensure the fulfillment of Japan's obligations to the Allied Powers; to complete the task of physical and spiritual demilitarization of Japan by measures of total disarmament, economic reform designed to deprive Japan of power to make war, elimination of militaristic influences, and stern justice to war criminals, and requiring a period of strict control; and to help the people of Japan in their own interest as well as that of the world at large to find means whereby they may develop within the framework of a democractic society an intercourse among themselves and with other countries along economic and cultural lines that will enable them to satisfy their reasonable individual and national needs and bring them into permanently peaceful relationship with all

General MacArthur calls for end of occupation, 1947

omission was the phrase used earlier that "the policies of the United States will govern" in the event of differences of opinion among the allies. But actually American policies did continue to "govern." In fact, on March 17, 1947, General MacArthur had told a press conference that the time had come to draw up a treaty of peace with Japan, end the occupation, and hand over direction of Japanese affairs to the United Nations. MacArthur added that he believed democracy was in Japan to stay.

On July 11, 1947 the United States suggested to the FEC that a preliminary conference be held in August to discuss peace terms for Japan. The Soviet Union and China both expressed unwillingness to go along with the American suggestion. Russia said that the question of a Japanese treaty must first come before the Council of Foreign Ministers. And China objected to what it fancied was the American attitude of friendliness toward Japan at the expense of China. The opposition of these two important Pacific powers caused the

18 Australia, Canada, China, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Reparation payments ended, 1949

American proposal to be postponed for the time being. The British Commonwealth of Nations conference on the Japanese peace, held at Canberra, Australia, in August 1947, however, endorsed the American plan. Meanwhile, in Washington, American examination of the problems of making the peace went on in various government departments. Throughout the remainder of 1947 and all of 1948 the question of a Japanese peace treaty was pushed into the background by developing events in China. On May 12, 1949 the American representative on the FEC announced that in the interests of Japanese economic recovery reparations payments from Japan were being terminated. This marked another step in the restoration of Japan to a status of freedom from the penalties of defeat. On the fourth anniversary of Japan's surrender, General MacArthur declared that Japan had earned the right to an immediate peace treaty. But still the Soviets and the Chinese Reds, as well as the Chinese Nationalists, blocked any serious discussion of a peace treaty.

Russia and China block peace treaty for Japan

Another year went by before action to secure a treaty again became evident. On September 14, 1950, President Truman announced that he had directed the State Department to begin a new effort toward obtaining a treaty. At the UN the Soviet delegation, on October 20, 1950, replied to an American query that the U.S.S.R. would be interested to have the American proposals for such a treaty. Six days later John Foster Dulles, serving as a member of the United States delegation to the UN, presented Jakob Malik, Soviet delegate, with a summary of the American views on a Japanese treaty. Mr. Dulles had conferred in Tokyo with General MacArthur, from June 2127, 1950, on the content of a proposed treaty. In late October he had several conferences with Mr. Malik, but the Russian delegate broke off the talks. Russia's reaction to the American plan was to question the possibility of concluding a treaty unless Red China participated in the treaty negotiations a point which the United States was unwilling to concede.

In answer to Russia's stand, the United States sent a memorandum to all the member nations of FEC, on November 24, 1950, setting forth the principles for a Japanese peace treaty.19 The main provisions were as follows:

UNITED STATES MEMORANDUM ON PRINCIPLES FOR A TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN, WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 24, 1950: . The United States proposes a treaty with United States Japan which would end the state of war, outlines restore Japanese sovereignty and bring back Japan as an equal in the society of terms for free peoples. .. the treaty would reflect a proposed [these] principles. . . . 1. Parties. peace treaty Any and all nations at war with Japan which are willing to make peace on the basis proposed. . . . 2. United Nations. Membership by Japan would be contemplated. 3. Territory. Japan would (a) recognize the independence of Korea; (b) agree to U.N. trusteeship, with the U. S. as administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands and (c) accept the future decision of the U.K., U.S.S.R., China, and U.S. with reference to the status of Formosa, Pescadores, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles.... Special rights and interests in China would be renounced. 4. Security. The Treaty would contemplate that, pending satisfactory alternative security arrangements such as U.N. assumption of effective responsibility, there would be continuing cooperative responsibility between Japanese facilities and U.S. and perhaps other forces for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan

area.

These terms indicated the main ideas of the United States for peace with Japan. Except for the restriction of Japan to the four home islands

Korean affair shows need

of Japan on side of free world

there was to be no punishment beyond that which Japan had already undergone. There were to be no limitations on Japanese rearmament, nor would economic restrictions or reparations be imposed upon Japan. In short, the Korean outbreak of June 1950 had convinced the United States that it was better to have a Japan linked to the democracies by a generous treaty than a Japan embittered by a vindictive peace document. And the defense of Japan, possibly by Japanese forces, would be a necessity, if events in the Far East grew more serious--even though the new Japanese constitution prohibited Japan from maintaining armed forces. Since the proposed treaty

1 India and Pakistan had been added to the membership of FEC, Nov. 17, 1949.

would not forbid Japanese rearmament, the Japanese constitution could be amended to allow Japan to cooperate in the defense of the home islands and to contribute to the defense of the Pacific area if the need should arise.

United States is prepared to act without U. S. S. R.

if necessary

The Soviets responded to Mr. Dulles' suggestions of October 26, 1950, which were in effect the same as those in the American memorandum of November 24, in the expected vein of protest against the possible rearmament of Japan and the exclusion of Red China from the treaty negotiations. The United States answered the Soviet questions and objections in detail on December 27, 1950, saying both in effect and in so many words, "The United States does not. . . concede that any one nation has a perpetual power to veto the conclusion by others of peace with Japan."20 By this statement, the United States gave notice that if the U.S.S.R. chose to delay the negotiation of a Japanese treaty, the United States was prepared to act unilaterally, or with other nations, to bring the treaty to a conclusion.

Work of Mr. Dulles for a peace treaty

In succeeding months the work of arranging a treaty went on. Mr. Dulles, named on January 11, 1951 by President Truman as his special representative with the rank of ambassador, was instructed to carry on the necessary discussions and negotiations. During the spring of 1951 Mr. Dulles traveled to many of the countries concerned in drafting the peace terms. In January he went to Japan to confer with General MacArthur, other occupation officials, and Japanese leaders. From Japan he visited the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Back in this country he talked with various officials of other governments, mainly at the UN and in Washington. In April, Ambassador Dulles returned to Japan to see General Ridgway, who had succeeded General MacArthur as SCAP, and to meet again with Japanese leaders.21 In June 1951 Mr. Dulles was off once more, this time to England and France. In London, Mr. Dulles and

20 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIV: 65, Jan. 8, 1951. 21 Gen. MacArthur had been relieved of his commands as SCAP and leader of the UN forces in Korea, Apr. 10, 1951. See p. 206 below.

British Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison agreed fully on the draft treaty. In Paris, the agreement between the Ambassador and Foreign Minister Robert Schuman was equally complete. On July 11, 1951, Mr. Dulles announced that the draft of the treaty was ready for release to the public. He pointed out that the procedure of getting the draft into shape was unique in that he had visited many of the countries concerned. As he explained:

We have used diplomatic discussions instead of a general conference because some of the nations concerned are not on speaking terms with each other and could never be brought together in a conference.22

Now the draft treaty was ready and the peace conference set for San Francisco on September 4, 1951. The United States invited 50 nations to attend, among them the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and Poland, all of whom had been involved in the war with Japan.23

On July 20, 1951, President Truman named the American delegation to the conference. Secretary Acheson; Ambassador Dulles; Senator Tom Con

American delegation to the Japanese peace conference

nally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Senator Alexander Wiley, Wiley, of of Michigan, ranking minority member of the same committee; Senator John J. Sparkman, of Alabama; Senator H. Alexander Smith, of New Jersey; Senator Walter F. George, of Georgia; Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, of Iowa; Representative Mike Mansfield, of Montana; and Representative Walter H. Judd, of Minnesota comprised the membership of the delegation.24 The heavy representation from Congress is interesting and an indication of the administration's desire to have Congressional approval of the treaty insured insofar as possible by the attendance of several members of that branch of the government at the signing of the document.

The preparations for the treaty conference were among the most elaborate of modern times.

22 U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXV:132, July 23, 1951. Mr. Dulles did not visit the U.S.S.R., neither Red nor Nationalist China, nor any satellite countries.

23 Of the invited countries, Burma, India, and Yugoslavia failed to attend for a variety of reasons.

24 Sens. Sparkman, Smith, George, and Hickenlooper were members of the subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Reps. Mansfield and Judd were respectively chairman and ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs Far Eastern Subcommittee.

The ornate San Francisco Opera House (a me

The San Francisco conference, September 1951

morial to those who served in World War I) was the scene of the plenary sessions.25 Many of the meetings of the treaty conferees were broadcast over the first nationwide television network. For the first time millions of Americans could see as well as hear the making of history, internationally speaking.(72) Secretary Acheson presided as permanent president of the conference and his skill in parrying the parliamentary manoeuvres of the principal Soviet delegate, Andrei Gromyko, was evident to those who watched the television screens. President Truman addressed the opening session on September 4, 1951, and Secretary Acheson took over as president of the conference the following day. Frequent objections to procedural matters and to the terms of the treaty were made by delegates from the U.S.S.R., Poland, and Czechoslovakia, but in each case their protests were ruled as out of order or were voted down by overwhelming majorities in record ballots.

At the final signing of the treaty, on September 8, 1951, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the U.S.S.R. refused to agree to the terms and their delegates did not sign the document. Delegates from forty-eight nations put their signatures to the treaty, and then the delegates from Japan were asked to come forward and sign. This they did and the treaty was declared ready for ratification by the various signatory nations.

THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN, SAN FRANCISCO, SEPTEMBER 8, 1951: Whereas the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in The Japanese friendly association to promote their Peace Treaty common welfare and to maintain inter

national peace and security, and are therefore desirous of concluding a Treaty of Peace ... Whereas Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations. . . The Allied Powers and Japan have therefore determined to conclude the present Treaty of Peace... and... have agreed on the following provisions:

Territorial terms

...

Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea. (b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores. . . . (c) .. to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905. (d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate System, and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of April 2, 1947, extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.

...

...

shall be

(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area. . . . (F) . . . [and] to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands. Article 3. Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority . . . [certain Pacific island groups]. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise any and all powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands. . . . Article 5. (a) Japan accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. . . . (c) The Allied Powers. . . recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements. Article 6. (a) All occupation forces withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible . . . and in any case not later than 90 days [after the effective date of this Treaty]. Nothing in this provision shall prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements . . . between one or more of the Allied Powers . . . and Japan. Article 10. Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China. Article 11. Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts . . and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan. . . . Article 12. (a) Japan declares its readiness. . . to enter into negotiations for the conclusion with each of the Allied Powers of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis [of reciprocity, most favored nation treatment, and nondiscrimination]. . . . Article 14. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose

...

Occupation troops to be withdrawn from Japan

...