EisenhowerMacArthur meeting fails

to reveal plans for ending Korean conflict

All of us have long realized that there can be no simple formula for bringing a swift, victorious end to this war. . . . the training of Republic of Korea forces can and should be expanded and speeded. . . . certain problems of [military] supply have reached rather serious proportions and require early correction. . . . On December 17th he and General MacArthur held a lengthy conference at the home of Mr. Dulles, but, while Korea was discussed, no revelation of the conversations was made at the time or later. There the Korean problem rested while the new administration prepared to take over the direction of government, and with it the responsibility for foreign policy.

In his inaugural address on January 20, 1953, President Eisenhower made only passing references to the war in Korea. In his first message to the Congress on the State of the Union, however, the new president devoted several paragraphs to the subject.

President Eisenhower's first "State of the Union" message

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS ON THE STATE OF THE UNION, WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 2, 1953: ... This war [in Korea] is, for Americans, the most painful phase of Communist aggression throughout the world. It is clearly a part of the same calculated assault that the aggressor is simultaneously pressing in Indochina and in Malaya, and of the strategic situation that manifestly embraces the island of Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist forces there. The working out of any military solution to the Korean war will inevitably affect all these areas. The Administration is giving immediate increased attention to the development of additional Republic of Korea forces. . . . Increased assistance to Korea . . . conforms fully to our global policies. . . . In June 1950

.. the United States Seventh Fleet was instructed both to prevent attack upon Formosa and also to insure that Formosa should not be used as a base of operations against the Chinese Communist mainland. This has meant that the United States Navy was required to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China. . . . there is no longer any logic or any sense in a condition that required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists. . . . I am, therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China. This order implies no aggressive intent on our part. But we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea.

Thus, the new administration took up where the old left off-with the Korean truce talks still deadlocked over the issue of prisoner exchange; with the armies still arrayed against each other on the peninsula and hostilities in a sort of suspended animation; with the UN still unable to effect a settlement. Only the relief of the Seventh Fleet from the duty of patrolling the waters between the mainland and Formosa was a new element in the situation. President Eisenhower's action in withdrawing the fleet and "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek was hailed as an example of the bold, dynamic approach to Far Eastern affairs promised by the Republicans in the 1952 campaign. Whether Marshal Chiang was in a position to move against the mainland was not at once evident. But he was now free to do so without interference from the United States.

9. Building the Pacific Defense Program

Pacific defense

becomes a necessity with spread of communism

As the United States entered more and more deeply into Far Eastern affairs during and after World War II, it became evident that defense of the Pacific Ocean area would be one of the major concerns of America for years to come. Just as the problem of Western Europe and the North Atlantic regions grew acute in face of the threats of the RomeBerlin axis in the late 1930's, so the rise of Japan and the expansion of that power threatened the peace of the Pacific at the same period. Then, when these menaces in the West and in the East were destroyed by the victories of World War II, new imperialistic designs -this time on the part of Soviet Russia and world communism-once more threatened the security of vast regions of the globe.

We have seen how the United States met the challenge in Europe with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And we have examined the steps taken by the United States in the Far East to stop communist aggression in Korea, to bring Japan back into a position of equality and sovereignty, but this time on the side of the free world, and to redress the loss of China to the Reds. It remains for us now to describe the measures taken by the United States to prevent further inroads by the communists in the Pacific Ocean area by means of a series of

mutual defense arrangements concluded during 1951.

Mr. Dulles explores Pacific defense possibilities

The question of defense arrangements in the Pacific similar to those in the North Atlantic area was closely studied by State Department planners, especially after the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. It was not until early 1951, however, that the results of these studies began to take definite form. On January 11, 1951, when John Foster Dulles was designated as the President's special representative to go to Japan to arrange for the peace treaty with that nation, he was also instructed to explore the subject of defense arrangements with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.52 Secretary Acheson indicated, on February 21st, that conversations with several Pacific countries were in progress, saying, in part:

We expect that these discussions will continue and that many proposals for increased cooperation will be considered. It is impossible, at this time, to say what plan or proposal can be agreed upon or whether, in fact, any proposal will find ultimate general acceptance. Whatever method can be found, our objectives and those of our friends will remain the same: the sound and secure development of the nations of the Pacific area, free from the fear of aggression and the threat of encroachment on their sovereignty and independence. 53

In late February 1951 Mr. Dulles conferred with Percy C. Spender, then Foreign Minister of Australia,54 and Frederick W. Doidge, Foreign Minis

Mr. Dulles visits Australia and New Zealand

ter of New Zealand. The three statesmen reached general agreement upon the terms of a treaty which would insure that in the event of an armed attack in the Pacific area on any one of the three nations involved, each would act to meet the common danger. On April 18, 1951, President Truman announced that the discussions on the proposed Australia - New Zealand - United States mutual defense pact were progressing toJapan and ward a conclusion. He also said that Philippines post-peace treaty arrangements with also considered Japan were being negotiated, and intimated that somewhat similar ar

52 The fact that Mr. Dulles' trip to Japan had this additional purpose was not revealed until a later date.

53 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIV: 369, Mar. 5, 1951. 54 Mr. Spender was shortly thereafter named Australian Ambassador to the United States.

rangements were being discussed with the government of the Philippine Republic.

The ANZUS pact, 1951

The ANZUS pact (as the Australia-New Zealand-United States treaty was popularly designated) was initialed by Percy Spender and Sir Carl Berendsen, Ambassador of New Zealand to the United States, on July 12, 1951 in Washington. On August 8th it was announced that the treaty would be signed at San Francisco on September 1, 1951 as a preliminary to the meetings of the Japanese peace conference. The signing was accomplished on schedule with Secretary Acheson, Mr. Dulles, Senator Tom Connally and Senator Alexander Wiley signing for the United States.

TRIPARTITE SECURITY TREATY, SAN FRANCISCO, SEPTEMBER 1, 1951: I. The Parties undertake . . . to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means... and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. . . . II. In order . . . to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of

self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. . . . III. The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.... IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. . . . V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. . . . VI. This treaty does not affect. . . in any way the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations. ... VII. The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies... to meet at any time. . . . VIII . . . the Council. . . is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific area. X. This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of

...

the Council . . one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia. . . . The conclusion of the mutual defense treaty with the Philippines was announced on August 16, 1951, and the treaty was signed United States at Washington on August 30, just and Philippine before Secretary Acheson set out for Republic the San Francisco conference. Presisign treaty dent Elpidio Quirino of the Philippine Republic, and General Carlos P. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the Philippine government, signed for the island republic. The terms of the treaty were much the same as those of the ANZUS pact. Only those parts which differ materially in phraseology from that pact are given here.

PHILIPPINE-UNITED STATES MUTUAL ASSISTANCE TREATY, WASHINGTON, AUGUST 30, 1951: . . . Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against imperialist aggression during the last war, Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area, Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area the United States and the Philippines

...

agree as follows: . . . [Articles I and II follow the language of the ANZUS pact] III. The Parties through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies will consult together from time to time. . . . VIII . . . Either Party may terminate . . . [this treaty] one year after notice has been given to the other Party. As for the security treaty negotiated with Japan there is little different to say. It could not be signed until after the treaty of peace with Japan had been adopted, and its terms, of course, would differ in some respects from those of the ANZUS and Philippine pacts. At the conclusion of the San Francisco conference on September 8, 1951, American and Japanese dignitaries met at The Presidio, a United States military reservation overlooking the Golden Gate at San Francisco. Here Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida of Japan, Secretary Acheson, Senator Alexander Wiley, and Senator Styles Bridges, of New Hampshire, signed the treaty.

AmericanJapanese treaty signed

UNITED STATES JAPANESE SECURITY TREATY, SAN FRANCISCO, SEPTEMBER 8, 1951: ... On the coming into force of ... [the treaty of peace with the Allies] Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has been disarmed. . . . The Treaty of Peace recognizes that Japan as a sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and, further, the Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan. The United States. . . is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense

...

always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat. . . . Accordingly, the two countries have agreed as follows: Article I. Japan grants

the right [of the United States] to dispose .. land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers. Article II. . . . Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States any bases or any rights, powers or authority to . forces of any third power. ... Article III. The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States ... in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreement between the two Governments. Article IV. This Treaty shall expire whenever ... there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan area.

...

the Pacific, stretching from Australia and New Zealand on the south, through the Philippine archipelago, and north to the Japanese islands which almost touch the Soviet island possessions in the Pacific.

U. S. Senate ratifies the Pacific treaties

The problem of securing ratification by the United States Senate of the four Pacific treaties was not a difficult one. Secretary Acheson presented the case for ratification to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 21, 1952 and the Senate voted on all four treaties on March 20th. The Japanese Peace Treaty, as has been mentioned, was approved by a vote of 66 to 10. The security pact with Japan was accepted by a vote of 58 to 9, and the ANZUS and Philippine pacts were each adopted by a voice vote, with only Senator William Jenner, of Indiana, recorded as opposed. The Japanese security treaty became effective on April 28, 1952, and the ANZUS pact the following day. The Philippine defense agreement went into force on August 27, 1952. Meanwhile, on January 29, 1952, the United States and Japan opened conversations in Tokyo on the administrative agreements called for in Article III of the Security Treaty of September 1951. Mr. Dean Rusk, special representative of the President, headed the American delegation at these meetings.

First meeting of the ANZUS Council

In the early summer of 1952 the State Department announced that the first meeting of the ANZUS Council, provided for in Article VII of the pact, would take place in Honolulu in August. Secretary Acheson left for Hawaii on August 1, 1952. On leaving Washington, the Secretary said, in part:

The principal work of this Conference will be to reach agreement on the organization of the Council and the functions of the Council. We will take up various political and military matters affecting our common relationships in the Pacific. We think that the result of this first meeting ought to be to set up an organization which will provide an opportunity for closer and more effective government-to-government relations with our Australian and New Zealand

United Kingdom shows interest

in becoming a member of ANZUS group

tinued through August 6th. The three ministers, Secretary Acheson for the United States, Richard G. Carey, for Australia, and T. Clifton Webb, for New Zealand, agreed that the Council should meet annually. They proposed that military advisors from each of the three nations be appointed to work out measures of military cooperation.56 It was further agreed that it was premature at this stage to attempt to establish relationships with other states or regional organizations, although some indication had already been received that the United Kingdom and other nations involved in the Pacific area believed that they should be included in the planning for Pacific defense arrangements.57 Secretary Acheson returned to Washington from Hawaii on August 12, 1952, and in a press conference statement reviewed the accomplishments of the Council meeting. He emphasized that the sessions. "neither reached any decisions nor undertook any commitments regarding matters of direct concern to our friends in the Pacific or elsewhere," and indicated that the talks were mostly concerned with organizational details.58

United States and Republic of Korea sign treaty, 1953

The American presidential elections and the change of administration intervened at this point to slow down further steps toward building Pacific defense arrangements. The new administration, with its its avowed interest in Asian affairs could be depended upon to view with favor plans for improving the defenses of the Pacific area. While the Korean war still held paramount concern for the planners in Washington they gave continued consideration to enlarging the system of interlocking pacts. Just after the armistice for Korea was signed on July 27, 1953, the Republic of Korea was joined to the Pacific defense arrangement by a treaty with the United States,

5 Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN, was designated American representative on this advisory group.

57 On Dec. 14, 1952 it was reported from London that Prime Minister Churchill, after a conference there with the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand, Robert G. Menzies and Sidney G. Holland, would seek "friendly discussion" with the United States concerning admission of the United Kingdom to the ANZUS pact.

58 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXVII: 284-85, Aug. 25, 1952. The next meeting of the ANZUS Council took place in Washington, Sept. 9-10, 1953. See ibid., XXIX: 414-18, Sept. 28, 1953, for a review of the Council's actions.

negotiated by Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Pyun Yung Tai, August 8th. The treaty followed the same general form as the pact between the United States and the Philippines (1951) and the Japanese-American pact of 1951.59 The mutual defense treaty between the United States and Korea was sent to the Senate on January 12, 1954.60 The Korean National Assembly ratified the treaty shortly thereafter, on January 15th. And on the 19th the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate voted unanimously to recommend approval by the United States of the document. This the Senate did on January 26th by a margin of 81 to 6.

Another link in the Pacific defense chain

With the Republic of Korea in the Pacific defense arrangement the northern end of the ring was anchored to the Asian mainland. KoreaJapan The Philippines - New Zealand-Australia (with the United States joined to each of these nations by a mutual defense pact) formed a chain of growing strength -not yet encircling the communist centers of South and East Asia, but gradually adding the links that would make the Pacific defense arrangement a counterpart of NATO.

Before we take up the developments for putting new links in the chain it would be best to retrace our steps and examine the trends of Far Eastern policies as they were worked out by the Eisenhower administration during its first year in control of the State Department. The story will necessarily be incomplete because much of what was done in 1953 cannot be assessed. The facts are not yet public and many of the actions were contingent upon follow-up activities which are still in the process of being planned and executed. If much of the following Far Eastern sections appears journalistic in its recital of day-to-day developments, the reader should appreciate that any discussion of comparatively current events carries with it this disability. As much as possible, the attempt will be made to present only those happenings that indicate continuing trends and discernible landmarks in American foreign policy.

59 For text of the proposed U.S.-ROK pact see U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIX: 204, Aug. 17, 1953. The formal signing of the treaty took place in Washington, Oct. 1, 1953. See ibid., 484-86, Oct. 12, 1953.

60 See ibid., XXX:131-34, Jan. 25, 1954, for President Eisenhower's letter of transmittal and Secretary Dulles' statement explaining the treaty.

10. Armistice in Korea and

Alarm in Indochina

With a new administration in power in Washington, America's concern with the Pacific area gave promise of growing considerably. President Eisenhower and the Republicans

New had been voted into office in 1952 administration on a number of counts. But among promises to the major ones was the promise, give greater both stated and implied, to devote attention to greater attention to America's posithe Far East tion in the Far East. By the pressure

of events, as well as by the demands of influential politicians and publicists, it was clear that 1953 would subject the course of American diplomacy as it faced Pacific area problems to searching appraisal by the public, the press, and the nation's lawmakers. Likewise, foreign nations, whether they were our allies, the neutral powers, or the countries of the communist bloc, would be scrutinizing every statement and action on the part of our government with a view to determining the effect of United States policy as related to the Far East in particular, or to the world in general. It was recognized by almost everyone that problems affecting Europe would not be neglected. But, it was obvious that the Far East would probably assume greater importance for the United States than it had at any time in our history, even counting the period of actual hostilities in Korea.61

Achieving an early settlement of the Korean conflict was one of the first concerns of the incoming administration. We have already seen the

frustrating developments of 1952 Solution over the prisoner issue. And we to the have mentioned President EisenKorean hower's assurance, in his first "State problem of the Union" message, that the one of first United States was endeavoring to goals of new develop greater strength in the ROK administration armed forces.62 While the applause which greeted the President's announcement in this address that he was freeing the Seventh Fleet from its task of standing between the opposing forces of Nationalist and

61 For a review of the world situation as it appeared upon the accession of a new Secretary of State and a new adminis tration, see Sec. Dulles' radio report to the nation on Jan. 27, 1953. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXVIII:212-16, Feb. 9, 1953. 2 See p. 214 above.