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Conclusion

In the past 17 years, I have witnessed bail abuse in

many of our Country's States--including my own jurisdiction.

I have worked with countless local, county, and state officials on the problems posed by such abuse. I have testified in some cases of bail abuse. At the heart of most of this abuse is the hypocrisy which permits judges to jail people under the guise of setting a release condition too burdensome to meet. The only way to eliminate this situation is to do exactly what S.1554 proposes: eliminate money as a means by which release is secured and permit an on-the-record confrontation of the issue of danger.

Thank you for your attention.

89-649 0-82--15

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I respectfully submit this letter as a follow-up to the testimony I provided the Subcommittee last Wednesday (October 21, 1981) during hearings on S.1554 (Bail Reform Act Amendments). At the conclusion of my testimony, I was asked to respond to the following five (5) questions:

1.

I understand that the rate of no-shows has been significantly reduced in many districts where Pretrial Services Agencies have been established. To what degree have they been reduced? To what do you attribute any success in reducing the number of fugitives?

a.) As I understand it, both the Pretrial Services Division of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (responsible for the administration of the 10 federal demonstration agencies created under the Speedy Trial Act) and the Lazar Institute (a Washington, D.C. based consultant firm that has just completed an evaluation of several state systems) have both concluded that both "no-show" and "rearrest" rates have improved with the advent of pretrial services agencies and with the use of alternative methods of release that have generally replaced the traditional surety bond alternative. I respectfully refer you to Mr. Guy Willetts (633-6449) of the Pretrial Services Division and Ms Mary Toborg (232-2400) for specific data.

Honorable Orrin G. Hatch

October 28, 1981

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b.) To answer this question, I should caution you that the word fugitive is usually used to identify someone who has fled a particular jurisdiction to avoid prosecution. These are few in number comprising fewer than 1 or 2% of the total number of people released. Data gathered by the Pretrial Services Resource Center (a federally funded clearinghouse of data concerning all types of pretrial services) indicates that most true fugitives are "recovered" by law enforcement officials. (You may contact Alan Henry or Don Pryor at 638-3080 for further information.) Of more concern than fugitivity as a matter of court disruption is concern over the failure to appear rate a rate made up of persons who miss court dates for various reasons but do not flee. Data show that these rates have been significantly reduced by services provided by pretrial services agencies. In the District of Columbia, where our Agency has operated since 1963, we have learned that better than 50% () of the failures to appear are non-willful on the part of the defendant, e.g., he is in jail, in the hospital, or has an otherwise valid reason for failing to appear. Special cfforts on our part have reduced the failure to appear rate from about 12% four years ago to less than 8% in 1980. 2. How would you compare your services in pretrial supervision with the services provided by professional bail bondsmen? Which do you think comes closest to fulfilling the classical role of a surety? What is the cost to the government involved in your services?

a.) The services we provide to the Court System and the pretrial releasees are far more comprehensive and intensive than those provided by the professional surety. In the initial instance, we gather background information about community ties, criminal histories, etc., on every defendant brought before the court for bail hearing. The Court, the Prosecutor, and others are given a full report that enables a much more accurate and informed decision to be made. Also, most of the information becomes a matter of public record that is available for subsequent legal considerations such as sentence, diagnostic classification by correctional personnel, etc. In addition,

Honorable Orrin G. Hatch

October 28, 1981

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subsequent to release, every defendant is notified of every court date; weekly contact is maintained with most releasees; assistance in locating and procuring various social services is provided; and, most important, the "system" is advised in writing of any violation of any court ordered condition of release. In contrast, the bondsman interviews only those he chooses; provides no information to the court initially other than notice of intent to "bail" the defendant; is not concerned with and generally does not monitor safety control conditions ordered by the court; and does not generally provide information at sentence.

b.) In the feudal days, the surety literally stood in the place of a defendant for whom he stood bail. Usually a relative or close friend, the bond between bailor and bailee was close. In fact, in a case of default, the surety went to jail in place of the defendant. Modern practice results in an attenuated relationship between surety and defendant that is based strictly on a financial incentive contract mutually defined by bondsman and defendant with the Court having little or no say in the bargaining. In the words of one jurist often quoted, "...the bondsman (not the Court) holds the key to the jailhouse in his pocket." A bondsman's only incentive is profit. Pretrial Services Agencies, on the other hand, are interested in assisting both the Courts and the defendants. As a result, their role is much closer to that of the original surety.

c.)

Our program costs the D.C. Government $1,250,000 per year. For this cost, over 25,000 reports are delivered at initial bail setting; over 50,000 notification letters are dispatched; over 15,000 cases are supervised for a minimum of a 9 month average; and presentence writeups are delivered in over 1,000 cases. Average cost: $50 per case. While certainly not all these people would be jailed, it must be remembered that as little as 5 years ago, there was a jail overcrowding problem in the District of Columbia. The new facility

Honorable Orrin G. Hatch
October 28, 1981

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built to replace one constructed in the early 19th century was scaled down saving nearly $20,000,000. in construction and maintenance costs. The cost to maintain a prisoner in an institution in D.C. exceeds $55 per day according to D.C. Department of Correction estimates. Since this figure includes fixed costs overhead, building maintenance, etc.,

it might be misleading to calculate savings based on that computation. We have been told, however, that transportation and "out-of-pocket" costs for food, clothing, etc., exceeds $30 per day per prisoner. A quick mathematical computation shows that 41,667 days can be bought for the amount of our budget. This means that 154 people could be detained for 9 months. Without our services, given 9000 felonies of which 1500 are considered dangerous under the D.C. Statute, only 10% could be detained for the equivalency investment of our budget. These figures, of course, do not even - address the issues of human costs, right to release, etc. Suffice to say, as was said by the United States Department of Justice in citing the D.C. Pretrial Services Agency as one of 35 exemplary programs so designated since the inception of LEAA:

3.

"After nearly 20 years of experience and
research, the Pretrial Services Agency
has shown that the courts can grant non-
financial release to the majority of de-
fendants without increasing rates of
rearrest or failure to appear. The Agency's
services are exceptionally comprehensive,
well documented, and adaptable to juris-
dictions of any size."

One of the major objections to money bail is that
judges have used it as a means to achieve pretrial
detention in the absence of a statute allowing them
to detain suspects on account of the threat they may
pose to the community. If this Bill does as you
recommend in making dangerousness a factor in bail
proceedings, then judges should not have to use money
bail as a subterfuge. With that problem out of the
way, would it not be appropriate to let the court,
in its discretion, continue to use financial induce-
ment to appear for trial? If we eliminate the need
for courts to abuse money bail, why should we eliminate
this additional tool to get defendants to court?

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