*Includes both "willful" and other failures. The study did not attach much significance to the statistics quoted above; however, it should be noted that neither did the study attach importance to the re-arrest statistics which have initiated so much of the testimony before this subcommittee. We are two attorneys who have substantial experience both state and federal in many jurisdictions. James Reilley is presently practicing in Chicago, Illinois and Tyce Smith in Pulaski County, Missouri. We suggest that prior to enacting the legislation as proposed, the trickle-down effect relative to the State Criminal Jurisdiction must be considered, as a majority of the fifty states have enacted all or substantial portion of the Federal Bail Reform Act. Much of the testimony before this subcommittee would indicate that this downward influence is one of the major goals of this bill. We are afraid that the radical modifications of this bill will cause eradication of an efficiently operating system. Professor Freed, once a major opponent of money bail in any form, has advocated modification of action to this subcommittee and has argued for all forms of presently existing money release options, including the professional surety. This subcommittee should recognize that the Federal Bail System, relative to State system, has advantages in the amount of available funds, manpower available, and a comparatively smaller caseload. Economically, larger municipalities cannot sustain the additional economic requirements of this bill. We would suggest that with the forms of money bail the Federal, State and local jurisdiction would receive some monies to compensate for the additional substantial enforcement and retrieval expenditures occasioned by a defendant's flight. In the case of a compensated surety the money would be the total amount of the bond or the performance of the retrieval function by the bondsman. The probable correlation between "failures to appear" and rearrests would make it plain that both the "community safety" and "defendant appearance" concerns are viable. The above are simply two ways of looking at the same problem and are mutually compatible under the amendment we suggest. CONCLUSIONS Bill Number S.1554 should be amended to include all forms of release available to the court under the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966. The 1966 release provisions, plus the preventive detention and other release options of Bill S.1554, would invest an acting judicial officer with broad enough discretion to consider and protect the community safety, the defendant's rights and the trial court's efficiency. Respectfully submitted, TYCE S. SMITH JAMES W. REILLEY FOOTNOTES (1) T. Smith & J. Reilley, "The Illinois Bail System: A Second Look" 6 John Marshall Journal of Practice and (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) The The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Ares, Rankin and Sturz, "The Manhattan Bail Project: E. Kennedy, "A New Approach to Bail Release: The Proposed Cook County Clerk's Statistical Reports for Bonds, Cases, Fees, Fines and Costs, December 1, "1975-1978" and "19771980" National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Note 8 supra at page 423 (12) Note 9 supra at page 79 Alternatives TESTIMONY OF FLOYD E. MINCEY ON BEHALF OF FLORIDA SURETY AGENTS ASSOCIATION, INC. MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE: I AM HERE TODAY BECAUSE I SHARE A GREAT CONCERN WITH SENATE BILL 1554 AS IT ASKS FOR ELIMINATION OF SURETY BONDS. IF PASSED IN ITS PRESENT FORM CORPORATE SURETY BONDS AS A FORM OF PRETRIAL RELEASE WOULD NO LONGER EXIST IN THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM. THIS METHOD OF PRETRIAL RELEASE HAS SERVED A USEFUL PURPOSE FOR OVER 200 YEARS. THERE IS STILL A NEED FOR IT TODAY. As CHAIRMAN OF THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE FLORIDA SURETY AGENTS ASSOCIATION AND A MEMBER OF THIS ASSOCIATION SINCE ITS BEGINNING, AS A LICENSED AGENT SINCE 1953 I HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN PROPOSING AND SUPPORTING LEGISLATION TO CORRECT ABUSES IN THE SYSTEM. MY EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN AS AGENT IN A LOCAL OFFICE AND AS GENERAL AGENT SUPERVISING MANY AGENTS IN SIX STATES AND THE LAST TEN YEARS AS OFFICER AND DIRECTOR OF A SURETY INSURANCE COMPANY. FLORIDA NOW HAS BASIC CERTIFICATION FOR LIMITED SURETY AGENTS BEFORE THEY CAN OBTAIN A LICENSE WHICH INVOLVES IN CLASS TRAINING COVERING LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE BUSINESS. THE FLORIDA SURETY AGENTS ASSOCIATION STRONGLY OPPOSES THE ELMINATION OF SURETY BONDS AS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF PRE TRIAL RELEASE. OTHER FORMS OF RELEASE PROGRAMS HAVE TAKEN CREDIT FOR SAVING MILLIONS OF DOLLARS FOR THE TAXPAYER. I HAVE NOT SEEN ONE BUDGET DROP ONLY ESCALATE. IF IN FACT THAT IS SAVING TAX DOLLARS THEN WE MAY BE SURE THE SURETY BOND SYSTEM OVER 200 YEARS HAS SAVED THE TAXPAYERS BILLIONS OF DOLLARS SINCE IT IS OPERATED BY FREE ENTERPRISE AND NOT BY THEIR TAX DOLLARS. 89-649 0-82--18 THERE WILL BE TWO CHOICES RELEASE ON A PROMISE TO APPEAR WITH ADDITIONAL PROMISES THAT THE ACCUSED WILL NOT VIOLATE CONDITIONS OF THE RELEASE OR DETENTION UNTIL TRIAL. SHOULD THE ACCUSED FAIL TO APPEAR OR VIOLATE THE TERMS OF RELEASE WHO WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR LOCATING AND REARRESTING THE NO SHOW? IT HAS BEEN PROVEN ACROSS THIS COUNTRY THAT A "PROMISE TO APPEAR DOESN'T WORK AS PROPONENTS BELIEVED IT WOULD. NO SHOWS ACROSS THE LAND ARE FROM 10% TO AS HIGH AS 60% DEPENDING ON HOW OFTEN IT IS USED. THE LOCALITY AND THE CHARGES INVOLVED. SURETY BONDSMAN COULD NOT SURVIVE WITH THAT HIGH A NO SHOW RATE BECAUSE THOSE THEY DO NOT REARREST THEY WOULD PAY THE FULL AMOUNT OF BAIL POSTED TO THE COURT. (SEE ATTACHED ARTICLE "A") FAILURE TO APPEAR AND GETTING AWAY WITH IT MAKES A MOCKERY OF OUR COURT SYSTEM. NO SHOWS ON OTHER FORMS OF RELEASE REQUIRE ADDITIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT WITH POWERS OF ARREST TO LOCATE AND REARREST BEGINNING THE PROCESS ALL OVER AGAIN. HAD THE SURETY POSTED A BOND THEY WOULD BEAR THE COST OF LOCATION AND APPREHENSION. WHEN A PROMISE TO APPEAR BOND IS POSTED FOR $5,000. AND THE ACCUSED FAILS TO APPEAR, HOW DOES THE COURT COLLECT THE $5000. PROMISE FROM SOMEONE THAT HAS FLED? RIGHT HERE IN WASHINGTON, D. C. YOU HAVE THE D. C. BAIL AGENCY WHICH BEGAN UNDER THE 1966 BAIL REFORM ACT WITH A STAFF OF 4, A GRANT OF $75.000. IN 1967 AND IN 1976 THE COST TO THE TAXPAYERS OF THIS NATION FOR THIS PROGRAM HAD INCREASED TO 61 |