White." It would seem that the author regarded this expression as supporting his own theory of no original sovereignty in the States. The decision of Texas v. White, however, lends no support whatever to such a theory. It is rather in the respect here in question a masterly, rapid, and perfectly accurate sketch of the procession of events which led to the adoption of the constitution; in which it is truly said, but in direct contradiction of the theory of Professor Pomeroy, that, "The union of the States was never a purely artificial and arbitrary relation. It began among the colonies. It was confirmed and strengthened by the necessities of the war, and received definite form and character and sanction from the articles of confederation. By these the union was solemnly declared to be perpetual. . . . But the perpetuity and indissolubility of the union by no means imply the loss of distinct and individual existence or of the right of self-government by the States. . . . Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to the States, through their union under the constitution, but it may not unreasonably be said that the preservation of the States and the maintenance of their governments are as much within the design and care of the constitution as the preservation of the union and the maintenance of the national government. The constitution in all its provisions looks to an indestructible union composed of indestructible States." With still greater emphasis, the Chief Justice in Lane County v. Oregon, said: "The people of the United States constitute one nation under one government, and this government, within the scope of the powers with which it is invested, is supreme. On the other hand, the people of each state compose a state having its own government and endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence. The States disunited might continue to exist. Without the States in union there could be no such political body as the United States. Both the States and the United States existed before the Constitution." These golden words and phrases set in its true light the character of the States as original political communities," endowed with all the functions essential to sep

arate and independent existence"-an existence older than that of the United States, independent of the existence of the United States, and capable of surviving the destruction of the United States.

Professor Pomeroy, as has been observed, regards his theory as essential to the forensic defence of the integrity and perpetuity of the Union. "The extreme opponents of nationality" he says, "reason with irresistible logic from the premises assumed by them-the original sovereignty of the States." If the question be one of historical fact, it must be settled, as our author himself remarks, "as any other matter of history." The historical evidences seem to have settled the question; but it must not be conceded that any the least detriment or weakness to the defences of the Union can come from the conclusion here reached. Webster's, Marshall's, Madison's, Hamilton's, Chase's great defences of the Union--the finest exhibitions of forensic and judicial power and grasp which our country or modern times have witnessed—are all-sufficient now, as they have been till now. No theories which are not according to historical facts can give strength to any cause. The Union and the Constitution rest upon impregnable foundations-foundations, forensically, nowhere else so powerfully asserted and built up as in Webster's speeches in the Senate from 1830 to 1834; judicially, nowhere else so convincingly expounded and settled as in Marshall's judgments from 1801 to 1835. Happy the nation, fortunate the people, who can point to such men and to such intellectual monuments, and say, "These are my defenders; these are my defences!"

It would have been easy to have made citations of opinions from all our most important legal text-writers, jurists and constitutional lawyers,-Mr. Webster once criticised this use of the word by asking, "And what, Sir, is an unconstitutional lawyer?"-to establish the proposition of the absolute political and legal sovereignty of the States before the adoption of the Federal Constitution; but since the one eminent authority who has assailed it, has chosen to put his arguments on grounds of historical fact, it has seemed wise to offer this brief discussion of the question on the same

grounds. The great ability of Professor Pomeroy, the high value set upon his writings by all competent lawyers and scholars-writings marked by unusual keenness of analysis and clearness of method,-as well as the importance of the results involved in the question here considered, may well warrant the present article.

New York.

DANIEL H. CHAMBERLAIN.

IT

THE SCOPE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

T has been customary to treat the scope and method of political economy as parts of one investigation. In this way the method of the science has received the conscious attention, while its scope gets but a few passing remarks. The student fails to realize that the scope of a science is really as fundamental a problem as its method, and that the latter depends on the former for many important premises. Customs and habits of thought, inherited from the past, lead us to group particular discussions together, calling the arbitrary line that separates them from other groups of problems the boundary of a science. With this limitary line once fixed by the arbitrary notions perhaps of some great man or group of men, succeeding writers accept the prescribed limits without question, thus keeping the content of the science within such narrow limits that both its method and the character of its doctrine are pre-determined.

The boundary lines between the various social sciences. have not been fixed by any systematic study of their relations nor by any logical order of sequence. They have their place in history because of the practical interest which social reformers have had in them as means of securing progress, or at least as a means of maintaining the existing social order against retrogression or decay. Each succeeding social science has had the same aim-to give new sanctions to the progressive forces of society. Each science, however, has succeeded in conquering but a section of the general field of social science, and this section it holds against its newer rivals. Religion, morality, natural law, politics, and economics have arisen to answer the one supreme question: What is the binding authority to which appeal can be made and for which men will have respect? For a time, the potent force that held men and nations in peaceful relations was religion. When its authority began to decline, an appeal was made to moral principles, in the hope that they would increase the respect for law, and thus advance the interests

of social progress. When this hope failed, resort was had to natural law, to politics, and finally to economics; and from each of these sciences laws and practical rules were secured that have helped to resist the forces that tended to dissolve society, and in many cases have been real causes of social progress.

But these efforts have not been well coördinated. On the contrary, each movement has been independent, and, for a time at least, has attempted to cover the whole field of social reform while between each group of workers there has been usually a spirit of opposition, due to differences in the instincts and motives which have prompted them to action. Since the time of Malthus there has been an open war between the economists and the believers in moral and political reform, while the aims and plans of these moral and political reformers are usually at variance; even religion and morality are too often in conflict, as is shown by the causes which lead to the death of Socrates and the silencing of Kant. Under these circumstances there could hardly fail to be a conflict as to the scope of each of the social sciences. Each science has seized all the ground it could, and has spent more energy in defending its title to what it has, and its claims to what it has not, than in utilizing the resources that lie within its own undisputed realm.

The history of economic theory shows most clearly the effects of this conflict regarding the scope of the science. As it was the latest of the sciences to appear, it found its rivals well fortified in all the regions they cared to occupy. The phenomena of wealth had been neglected because of the antipathy that social reformers had to wealth getting, which they looked upon as a source of evil. Therefore, it was a sort of no man's land, which fell to the possession of the economists. It seemed to be a barren region not worthy of occupation, and yet, when developed through the genius of the Physiocrats and Adam Smith, it proved to be one of the richest fields of investigation, and, at the same time, a potent cause of social progress.

The peculiarities of the present position of economics as a science did not become manifest until the beginning of this