both sexes, representing, according to current report, the granges in 131 towns.

Yale University presented a protest against the bill, signed by President Dwight, and setting forth that the university had entered into a contract with the State, that it had more than performed its part of the contract, and that to pass such an act as was proposed would be a violation of this contract, as well as an injury to the university, to the State and to some 81 students who were enjoying free scholarships under the operation of the two acts of Congress. This protest apparently produced little effect upon the committee or the audience. At the close of the hearing the chairman of the committee took the somewhat unusual step of calling for a popular vive voce vote on the question, the result of which was that the spectators gave a unanimous decision. in favor of the bill.

Popular opinion having been expressed in this unmistakable manner, it was expected by the friends of the university that the bill would be quickly passed. Such was not, however, the case. The old bill was dropped, and a new bill was introduced as a substitute for it. No public hearing was held on this bill, and no official intimation was given to Yale University that its interests were again involved. Yet the new bill passed both houses by a large majority, and received the approval of the governor.

This act differs from the first bill in many particulars. It substitutes the word "youth" for "boys" in providing for the scholars of Storrs School, thus offering instruction in farming to both sexes. The original act constituting the Storrs School provided that it was to be open only to the sons of Connecticut citizens, but as a good many girls asked to be admitted, the director of the school decided to take them on the ground, as he puts it in his report for 1892, "that the spirit, if not the letter, of the law would thus be complied with." Under the new act the duty of interpreting the law of the land will not be added to the other duties of the director of the school. The Storrs School is to be henceforth known as the Storrs Agricultural College and its course of study is defined in terms identical with those used in the Congressional act of 1862.

The Sheffield Scientific School is, in the future, to take double the number of free pupils that it has been taking under the contract made in pursuance of the act of 1862, i. e. such a number as would expend in each year a sum equal to the whole of the interest received under that act, if they paid the regular tuition fees. But, oddly enough, the act entirely omits to say that anything shall be paid for this service. It may be understood that the income is to continue to be paid as henceforth, but that is left to implication, while the act very distinctly states that all of the income not paid over to Yale shall go to the Storrs School, and that nothing shall be paid to Yale University, until it has made a new contract with the State. The Storrs School is, however, not required to take any pupils gratuituously. Provision is made in the act for paying to the Sheffield Scientific School an amount sufficient to retain, until graduation, the students who are at present enjoying scholarships under the act of 1890, but no new nominations are to be made, and a commission is provided to assess the damages suffered by Yale University.

It will thus be seen that the new act takes away from the Sheffield Scientific School, not only all of the income granted in 1890, but also that granted in 1862, unless it will assume twice the burden originally contracted for. The income thus lost to the school would amount for the coming year to $25,750.

The movement which led to the enactment of this law goes back in Connecticut to 1886. In that year the master of the State Grange, in his annual report, complained that the farmers of the State did not get the full benefit of the act of Congress of 1862, because of the high standard of admission to the Scientific School, and recommended that means be taken to secure an education especially adapted to them. Ever since that time the Grange has been working to bring this about. In 1887 an attempt by those interested in the movement to carry such a bill led to a declaration by the State Legislature that the agreement made with Yale College in 1863 was an inviolable contract, and the matter was dropped. The growth of the organization has, however,

since that time been so great, that the Legislature of 1893 found no difficulty in passing the present act, in spite of the declaration of its predecessor.

The movement in Connecticut is, of course, only a branch of the National Grange movement. The committee on education of the National Grange reported in 1892 the following resolution: "That the National Grange Legislative Committee be instructed to continue their efforts for the passage of a law by Congress requiring the different States which have united the agricultural and mechanical colleges with classical institutions, to separate the agricultural and mechanical colleges from the classical." The State of Connecticut, however, has not seen fit to await the action of Congress in the matter, but has passed an act which has the effect of nullifying an act of Congress. Congress having offered a certain sum of money to the State for a specific purpose, the State has passed a law, saying that it would take the money and apply it to another purpose.

In a certain parable of the Bible, a certain steward, when he reached the point at which he was unable to dig and ashamed to beg, found a way out of his difficulty by readjusting his master's contracts, and he was commended by his master for so doing. It is evident that Connecticut farmers have not read their Bibles in vain.

Since the last number of the Yale Review was published, four decisions have been rendered in three different States, which bear directly upon the proposition made in that number with regard to increasing the responsibility of trade unions. The first of these decisions is, in point of time, that rendered by Judge Billings of the U. S. District Court for the eastern district of Louisiana, in the case of the Amalgamated Council.

This case grew out of the great strike of last November. A disagreement having arisen between the warehousemen and principal draymen on the one hand, and their employees on the other, the latter, in order to enforce their claims, secured the coöperation of the other labor organiza

tions of the city. These were stated to be forty-three in number and to include some 27,000 men. The principal object of the strike seems to have been to secure the exclusive employment of union men. In the communication sent by the committee of the Amalgamated Council to the Governor of Louisiana, three propositions were submitted: "First, we are willing to arbitrate on wages; second, we are willing to arbitrate on hours; third, we want the question of 'none but union men to be hired when available from and after the final adoption of the tariff on hours' to be accepted with out arbitration." The strike began November 5th and lasted until November 11th. On that day, application was made by the United States District Attorney for an injunction to restrain the Workingmen's Amalgamated Council from interfering with interstate commerce, and the strike at once ceased. This action was brought under the so-called anti-trust act of July 2nd, 1890, which provided that "Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal."

The decision of Judge Billings, which was rendered March 25th, sustained the injunction in all particulars. In this opinion the court laid down the principle that, though the act was originally proposed as a means of restricting combinations of capital, it in point of fact included combinations of labor as well. The decision implied, however, that it did not require people to work against their will; it only prohibited people from preventing others from working. In the language of the court "It is the successful effort of the combination of the defendants to intimidate and overawe others who were at work in conducting or carrying on the commerce of the country, in which the court finds their error and their violation of the statute."

The next decision, which also came from a federal court, was rendered by Judge Ricks of Ohio, in a case of contempt, arising out of the suit of the Toledo, Ann Arbor and North Michigan Railroad Company against the Pennsylvania Company and others. This originated in a strike of the engineers

of the Ann Arbor road. In accordance with rule 12 of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, no member of that organization is allowed to handle the property of another railroad which may be under the ban of the Brotherhood. The consequence was that all of the connecting railroads found themselves unable to haul trains, if there happened to be among the cars one that came from or was destined for the Ann Arbor road. Judge Ricks issued an injunction against the connecting companies and their employees to prevent them from refusing to do business with the Ann Arbor road, and eight of the engineers were arraigned for contempt of court, on the ground that they had disobeyed this order. The provision of law under which the suit was originally brought was sec. 3, of the Interstate Commerce Act, which prevents common carriers from giving undue or unreasonable preference to one company over another.

From the evidence presented, it seems that a number of engineers, when called upon to move a certain train which contained cars intended for the Ann Arbor railroad, left the service of the company. In one case the engine was upon the track within a car's length of the train; in another case the engine was actually coupled. Judge Ricks, however, discharged all of the prisoners except one, upon the ground that they had a perfect right to leave the service of the company, if they chose. In the case of engineer Lennon it appeared that he only pretended to leave the service of the company, but did not actually do so.

On the same day, the main suit was decided by Judges Ricks and Taft, the opinion being written by Judge Taft. In this decision, Chief Arthur of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers was enjoined from enforcing any rule which would require the engineers to make any discrimination in the handling of interstate commerce.

Though Judge Ricks' opinion asserted the right of the court to enjoin employees from leaving the service of a company under certain circumstances, its failure to convict seven of the eight engineers shows that a case must be very aggravated indeed to justify such an injunction. The only action prohibited by Judge Taft's decision was an order