with the dispassionate atmosphere of our Supreme Court. But the liability to abuse resides, after all, not in the direct raising of the issue, but in the personal character of the suit as a criminal prosecution.

Thirdly, as already stated, the form of the decision was in Athens both direct and a complete answer to the question raised. With us, the decision being in form merely a part of the decision of another issue, it not infrequently happens that, while deciding one part of a law to be unconstitutional, the court leaves wholly out of consideration, because not bearing on the special case in hand, other portions of the same law, which may or may not be valid. For a decision on those other portions we must wait until another victim shall raise another case involving them. The advantage is here not on the American side.

The most marked difference, however, is in the constitution of the court. The Athenian dikaσTńplov which sat upon a question of this kind was constituted like the other popular courts. It was a body of ordinarily 501 men, so selected as to be in fact, as it was intended to be, a fair representative of the citizens above thirty years of age. The Athenian political system left no place for the development of a special juridical class, or even of a special legal class. On the one hand there was not the necessity for such classes that exists among us, for the law was far less extensive and far simpler than ours, or even that of Rome four centuries later. Any citizen of average ability might easily possess a good degree of acquaintance with every part of it; probably most citizens, such being the wide distribution of political experience among them, did in fact possess as full an acquaintance with it as the average lawyer to-day has with our infinitely more complicated and extensive law. Hence a popular court which would be absurdly incompetent among us might in Athens be perfectly competent. On the other hand the existence of a professional class having charge of the law and its interpretation tends towards building up a solid and permanent system of law and legal doctrine. The conservatism of a professional order leads to some method of recording and preserving precedents or

principles, which are appealed to as of special weight in determining how new cases shall be decided. The absence of such a professional class in Athens rendered impossible the growth of such a body of law as the later law of Rome. Perhaps this was not an unmixed evil. It is sometimes said that the Athenian courts were courts both of law and of equity. It would be more accurate to say that, through not having a professional class of lawyers and judges, Athens never became possessed of a system of law and legal practice so inflexible that a special device, like equity, was found necessary in order to soften its rigor. Yet on the whole there is of course no doubt that it is an immense gain to have judicial decisions rendered by a body of specially trained, independent, permanent judges.

Nevertheless, in spite of these differences, the resemblances between the two institutions are sufficiently close and essential to be highly noteworthy. First, the ground of the decision is practically the same. As between a vóμos and a pioua the difference was just that which our courts recognize between the constitution and an act of Congress. The one belonged to the fundamental law, the constitution; it could be changed only by a specific and comparatively slow and cumbersome process; it was of superior authority to any mere ordinance of the Ekklesia. As between an old and a new vóμos also the same principle was recognized. The law regulating amendments to the constitution was held to belong so distinctly to the fundamental law, that the sovereign people itself could not violate it; any action taken in violation of it was ipso facto null and void. This was the ground on which the court made the decision. And if any other conflict was found between a newer and an older vóμos, instead of the later superseding the earlier, the rule was reversed; the later law was unconstitutional because the earlier was superior in authority.

Again, the effect of the ypaþǹ τаρavóμшv was identical with the effect of this one function of our Supreme Court. Particular laws, if found unconstitutional, ceased to exist. Legislative action was open to revision and sifting by a process which was effective, and whose result was cheerfully

acquiesced in by the people. The natural consequence of this was that the yрaon mapavóμov, like our Supreme Court, was, and was considered to be, the greatest safeguard of the constitution. The orators frequently dwell upon it in this light; and in 411 B. C., when the oligarchical clubs under the lead of Antiphon desired to do away with democracy and take the power into their own hands, they realized that nothing could be done so long as the ypapǹ Taрavóμwv stood in the way. Accordingly, as we are informed by Thukydides and more definitely by Aristotle in the Athenian Constitution, one of the first acts of the conspirators was to suspend the ypaþǹ waρavóμwv in a revolutionary way and by intimidation. That left the path open to propose and carry through a packed Assembly whatever measure they chose, since no way remained for the courts to review and annul the Assembly's action. On the restoration of the democracy the papǹ Tapavóμov again became part of the constitution; and the encomiums of it which have come down to us date from the period after its importance had by this experience been so signally illustrated.

Yale University.

T. D. GOODELL.

I

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF PARTY.'

N the life-history of a great political party there are five natural divisions or chapters; the first deals with its origin; the second, with the period between organization and advent to power; the third, with its experiences while in power; the fourth, with its experiences while in opposition; the fifth, with the causes and circumstances of its dissolution.

The study of a considerable number of parties, conducted according to this plan, will show that they, not less than plants or animals, follow a certain course of development; in this development that the different stages of growth and activity are under the control of definite laws, and succeed one to another in a fixed order; that there is, in fact, a typical party life to which every party tends to conform, just as there is a typical life for each of the countless organisms of the natural world.

I. THE ORIGIN OF PARTIES.

In the history of the United States' there are four periods, each of which is marked by the rise of new parties. The

A pioneer in this line of investigation is Friedrich Rohmer, a Swiss. His writings on party appeared in their first form in 1842. They were afterwards edited and published by his brother Theodore Rohmer under the title "Lehre von den politischen Parteien." Rohmer found a disciple and expositor in the eminent jurist and political philosopher J. C. Bluntschli. The latter has embodied in his book on the "Charakter und Geist der politischen Parteien" a full statement of Rohmer's views. The substance of this book may be found in an English form in the article on Political Parties, in the Cyclopædia of Political Science Political Economy and United States History. The services of Rohmer and Bluntschli in extending, if not introducing, the study of party from a psychological standpoint are of great value.

The facts cited for the sake of illustration in the following pages are taken almost wholly from American political history. The reasons for this are two : first, the home field is more familiar, second, the writer believes that party has attained a fuller development and has revealed its nature and tendencies more clearly in the United States than in any other country.

first began near the close of the Revolution and terminated early in the second administration of Washington. It gave birth to two parties, the Federalist and the Republican or, as it was called later, Democratic-Republican party. The second period covers the years from 1820 to the beginning of Jackson's second administration in 1833. Within this space the Anti-Masonic and the National Republican or Whig parties were organized. The third period began in 1840 with the first appearance of the Liberty party in a presidential campaign, and closed with the formal disruption of the Democratic party in 1860. In addition to the Liberty party, these years witnessed the rise of the KnowNothings and the modern Republicans. The fourth period began in 1876 and has not yet closed; thus far its progeny consists of the Greenback, the Labor, and the Prohibition parties, and the People's party.

A study of these periods will show that the process by which a new party is formed is the following: in the first place a considerable body of citizens becomes dissatisfied with the policy of the government and the policies advocated by existing parties. The cause of this dissatisfaction is that they have become converts to a new policy which promises to do more for the welfare of the state, or the welfare of the class or section to which they belong, or-and this is always the case when a great party is about to be formed-for both the welfare of the state and that of the particular interests with which they are most closely associated. They then seek recognition and support for their views from existing parties; when, however, it becomes clear that these cannot be obtained, they organize and enter the political arena as a new party. The date when the first successful steps towards organization are taken is usually determined by some event that either makes the need of the new policy seem more urgent than before, or else proves beyond the possibility of doubt that no existing party can be won over to its service. It was, for example, the part taken in 1854 by the Southern Whigs in the repeal of the Missouri Compromise that determined the date of the organization of the Republican party.