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with his dead and wounded. In such a contest our own loss was necessarily severe, probably not less than 2,500 killed, wounded, and missing."

The battle of Perryville was a Confederate victory; but it had really been fought to cover Gen. Bragg's retreat, which he had previously resolved upon, in view of the rapidly augmenting forces of the enemy, who had now perfected his communications, and the danger of risking a Confederate army in Kentucky after the season of autumnal rains had made the roads impracticable for retreat. On the 13th October, Bragg put his army in motion for Cumberland Gap, secured his retreat with a vast amount of spoil, and ended the campaign of Kentucky.

The campaign fell greatly below public expectation, and was long a theme of violent criticism in the Confederacy. On the other end of the line of operations in the West, Breckinridge had failed at Baton Rouge, and Van Dorn at Corinth; and the general feeling in the Confederacy was that of disappointment at the results of a campaign that had been so extensive in its plan, and so promising in its early announcements. Of the operations in Kentucky a fair critic has said: "Gen. Bragg has been blamed for having failed to bring all his force into the field at Perryville, in which case, it is alleged, he might have crushed the enemy; but the crisis of the campaign was not the battle of Perryville, which was obviously fought to cover the retreat of the army, but the junction of Buell with Wright at Louisville; it was at Mumfordsville, or in its vicinity, that Gen. Bragg should have concentrated his army for the decisive battle, and should have fallen on Buell during his march to Louisville, forcing him either to accept battle on his adversaries' terms, or to have fallen back on Nashville, and left Louisville and even Cincinnati to their fate."

In Kentucky, the disappointment of the party of Southern sympathizers was very great, and Bragg was mercilessly criticised. It was said that the people of Kentucky looked upon the fleeting presence of his army as a "horse-show," or military pageantry, and not as indicating the stern reality of war; and the excuse was made for their not rising in arms to expel the Federal authority, that they were diffident in following the fortunes of the Confederacy under the leadership of such an officer as Bragg. A clamour was raised in Richmond for the removal of a commander who had

done so much to raise public expectation and then disappoint it. But Gen. Bragg had no sooner got his army through Cumberland Gap, than leaving it under the command of Gen. Polk, he hurried to Richmond to make the necessary explanations, and demonstrate there the successes he claimed to have obtained.

It was strongly urged on his side that, although the Kentucky campaign had fallen short of the prime object of the liberation of that State, yet it had had the effect of relieving portions of Alabama and Tennessee, had obtained considerable advantages, and had secured supplies of vital necessity to the Confederate armies. A member of Gen. Bragg's staff gave the following as the advantages gained in the advance upon Kentucky:

"1st. Buell, who had been threatening Chattanooga, and even Atlanta, was forced to evacuate East Tennessee in 'double-quick.' "2d. North Alabama was thereby relieved from Federal occupation.

"3d. We got possession of Cumberland Gap, the doorway through that mountain to Knoxville and the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

"4th. We took from 18,000 to 20,000 prisoners at Richmond, Mumfordsville, and other places.

"5th. We brought off a far greater amount of arms and ammunition than we carried into Kentucky.

"6th. Jeans enough to clothe the Army of the Mississippi were brought off, besides what Gen. Smith obtained. I know not what this amounts to; but I understand it is, as it ought to be from his longer stay in the State, much larger.

"7th. We beat the enemy in three considerable battles-at Richmond, Mumfordsville, and Perry ville, and our cavalry whipped them in twenty smaller ones.

"8th. And last, we have paid a debt of honour due by the Confederate States to Kentucky. We have offered her an army to help her liberation, and her exclusion would be no longer an obstacle in honour or on principle to a treaty of peace with the United States."

The truth is, the sum of these successes was not inconsiderable, and the public reception of the results of the Kentucky campaigr

was scarcely just, because the popular imagination had been too much excited by the hope of yet more important consequences. The Government, however, was much consoled by the rich spoil that had been gathered: 15,000 horses and mules, 8,000 beeves, 50,000 barrels of pork, 1,000,000 yards of Kentucky cloth, &c., &c. It was ascertained that Gen. Bragg's army was better disciplined, better clothed, and better fed than when it commenced the campaign; that it was in better health and tone; and so there was no hesitation in continuing him in command. In a few weeks he was again in front of the enemy at Nashville, where Gen. Rosecrans, having superseded Buell, was reorganizing and preparing his troops for a forward movement.

CHAPTER XXV.

Battle of Murfreesboro.-Interval of repose.-Retreat to Chattanooga.-Gen. Bragg refuses to fight at the instance of the War Department-Reinforced from the Army of Northern Virginia.-Battle of Chickamauga.-A commentary in the Richmond Whig-Violent quarrel between Gens. Bragg and Longstreet.-The disaster of Missionary Ridge.-Gen. Bragg relieved from commaud and appointed "military adviser" of President Davis.-Explanations in a Richmond journal. Gen. Bragg's last service in the field.-Fall of Wilmington.-Gen. Bragg's military career criticised.-His ardent Southern patriotism.

THE year 1862 was to expire with a grand conflict of arms in the West. On the 26th December the enemy advanced in force from Nashville to attack Gen. Bragg at Murfreesboro. It had been well ascertained that his strength was over sixty thousand effective men, while the force which Bragg had on the field, the morning of the battle, was less than two-thirds the Federal numbers. On the 28th December this force was concentrated in front of Murfreesboro. Rosecrans disposed the mass of his troops on his left, prepared to force the passage of the Stone River on the north of the Murfreesboro rail; whilst his right, more extended and more advanced, formed an angle with the centre and left, and faced in an almost due easterly direction. The Nashville turnpike and the river divided both armies into two wings; the Confederate left, under Gen. Hardee, composed of the divisions of Cleburne and McCown, with Breckinridge in reserve, being formed on the east bank of the river, with its left resting near the Nashville road.

It was determined by Gen. Bragg, that on daylight of the 31st December, Hardee should open the battle, the attack to be taken up by Polk's command in succession to the right flank; the object being to force the enemy back on Stone River, and, if practicable, by the aid of cavalry, cut his communications with Nashville. The attack was made at seven o'clock in the morning. Of its effect Gen. Bragg writes: "The enemy was taken completely by surprise; general and staff-officers were not mounted; artillery horses not hitched, and infantry not formed; a hot and inviting breakfast of coffee and other luxuries, to which our gallant and hardy men

had long been strangers, was found upon the fire unserved, and was left whilst we pushed on to the enjoyment of a more inviting feast-that of captured artillery, flying battalions, and hosts of craven prisoners, begging for the lives they had forfeited by their acts of brutality and atrocity."

For two miles, through fields and forests, over ditches, fences, and ravines, Hardee routed and pushed the enemy; and it seemed that the day was decided with the breaking of Rosecrans' right wing. His line was thrown back entirely at right angles to his first position. But here the battle paused, and the enemy rallied all his energies for a desperate struggle. In front of the Confederate centre was an oval hill, not very high, but commanding in all directions, and exceedingly available. Upon this hill Rosecrans placed a crown of twenty guns, supporting it right and left and rear by large masses of infantry, and took his stand to contest what remained of the day. The position was well chosen, and despe rately held; it proved impracticable for Bragg; two attempts were made to carry it by infantry, and were unsuccessful. Abandoning any further experiment of assault, Gen. Bragg brought up his artillery, and with a tremendous but ineffectual cannonade on both sides, the day ended.

Of the results of the day Gen. Bragg telegraphed to Richmond: "We assailed the enemy at seven o'clock this morning, and after ten hours' hard fighting have driven him from every position except his extreme left, where he has successfully resisted us. With the exception of this point, we occupy the whole field. We captured four thousand prisoners, including two Brigadier-Generals, thirty-one pieces of artillery, and some two hundred wagons and teams. Our loss is heavy; that of the enemy much greater." The next day he sent the following dispatch:

MURFREESBORO, January 1, 1863.

The enemy has yielded his strong point and is falling back. We occupy the whole field and shall follow. **** God has granted us a happy New Year.

BRAXTON BRAGG.

But he was sadly mistaken in his interpretation of the wily movement of Rosecrans; for, instead of retreating, that commander