Opinion of the Court. Board of Public Works to enter into the arrangement suggested in the second proposition of the company, it is clear that thereby no easement was created in the land in favor of the Market Company, and the company recognized the fact that Congress might lawfully dispossess the Market Company from the use and occupancy of the grounds. The qualified acceptance of the proposal at most only constituted an implied assurance on the part of the Governor and Board of Public Works that the company, so far as those officials had the power, would not be disturbed in its possession without just cause. There was no agreement that a source of revenue would be supplied adequate to meet the expenditures, or that the District assumed liability for any deficit in the revenue. If, however, the correspondence and action taken thereon could be construed as importing an agreement to impose a pecuniary liability on the District, an inspection of the terms of the organic act of February 21, 1871, c. 62, 16 Stat. 419, providing a government for the District of Columbia, clearly establishes that it was without the power of the officials undertaking to enter into the arrangement. The making of regulations with respect to the use of the market grounds and the establishment of a tariff of charges with the power to subsequently alter or abolish the same, and the authority to incur a pecuniary liability with respect to the improvement of the market grounds, the erection of market buildings and the operation of the market, were beyond question within the province of the Legislative Assembly, and any assumption on the part of the Governor, either with or without the sanction of the Board of Public Works, of authority to conclude the Legislative Assembly in such matters, would have been purely ultra vires. There was nothing in the conduct of the District subsequent to 1874 which, if it possessed the power, could be construed as a ratification of the alleged contract or as importing binding efficacy upon the District. There was certainly no recognition of the Market Company as a mere employé making expenditures and disbursing revenues solely as the agent of a principal, and the District authorities were never notified that the Opinion of the Court. Market Company would look to it for repayment of any deficit in revenues. So long as the company was willing to care for the grounds and to operate the market, while the annual revenues were less than the ordinary expenses of management, as appears to have been the case, without calling upon the District to assume the responsibility for a deficit, there was no occasion for the District to take decisive action. The furnishing of accounts, beginning with 1888, possesses no weight, as manifestly the District was interested in the ascertainment of the fact whether or not there was any surplus revenue to which it was entitled. The facts in the case at bar bear no analogy to those which were present in the cases referred to in Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence,' (Vol. 1, sec. 390,) to which our attention has been directed by counsel for the appellant. There individuals, acting on the supposition that they had a title to or interest in lands, expended money in erecting buildings or other improvements thereon, while the real owner stood by and made no protest. No ground exists for the pretence that such was the case here. A court of equity will not relieve an individual from the operation of the Statute of Frauds which requires that interest in lands be created by an instrument of writing, and impose an equitable lien upon land in favor of one who makes improvements thereon, knowing that the title is in another, especially where the money is expended under an express understanding with reference thereto had with the owner, but will leave the party to the remedies, if any, which a court of law provides. These views dispose of the case and require an affirmance of the decree of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. Decree affirmed. 1 Powell v. Thomas, 6 Hare, 300; Ramsden v. Dyson, L. R. 1 H. L. 129. Statement of the Case. SIMPSON v. UNITED STATES. APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS. No. 51. Argued October 19, 20, 1898. Decided January 8, 1899. The plaintiffs contracted with the United States to construct a dry dock at the Brooklyn Navy Yard according to plans and specifications, and to be built upon a site that was available. No provision was made in regard to quicksands should they come upon such in making the foundations. The main features of the contract are stated in detail in the statement of the case below. In executing the contract the contractors came upon shifting quicksands, by reason of which the work was made more difficult, and was much increased; and being unable to complete the work within the time specified in the contract, they asked for an extension, which was granted. On completion a settlement was had, all the money remaining due under the contract, and some that was due for extra work, was paid. It was not until about three years later that the claim for compensation for the extra labor and materials made necessary by the quicksand was made; and, when it was refused, this action to recover it was brought in the Court of Claims, and there decided adversely to the claimants. Held, That the contract imposed upon the contractors the obligation to construct the dock according to the specifications within a designated time, for an agreed price, upon a site to be selected by the United States, and contained no statement, or agreement or even intimation that any warranty, express or implied, in favor of the contractor was entered into by the United States concerning the character of the underlying soil; and that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed. THIS appeal presents for review the action of the lower court rejecting a claim of the appellants. 31 C. Cl. 217. The essential facts as found by the court below are summarized as follows: Pursuant to an act of Congress appropriating a stated sum for building two "timber dry docks to be located at such navy yards as the Secretary of the Navy may indicate," act of March 3, 1887, c. 390, 24 Stat. 580, 584, the Navy Department on April 19, 1887, advertised for proposals for the building of two dry docks to be located, one at the Brooklyn and the other at the Norfolk Navy Yard. The advertisement, whilst pointing out the general nature of the structures and their dimensions, contained no detailed plan of Statement of the Case. the contemplated work, but announced that "dry dock builders are invited to submit plans and specifications with proposals for the entire construction and their completion in all respects," and, moreover, it was said "bidders will make their plans and specifications full and clear, describing the kinds and qualities of the materials proposed to be used." Besides, the advertisement stated that "for information in regard to the location and site of the docks bidders are referred to the commandants of the Brooklyn and Norfolk Navy Yards." On May the 23d, pending the publication, the Navy Department addressed to the commandant of the Brooklyn Navy Yard the following letter: "To enable the dry dock builders who may apply at the yard under your command for information concerning the proposed new timber dry dock, particularly regarding the foundation of the site selected for the dock, I am instructed by the chief of the bureau to request you to direct the civil engineer of the yard to have the necessary borings made at once with a view of ascertaining the nature of the soil to be excavated for the pit or basin of the dock, as well as to what depth, if any, below the line of water mark it will be necessary to have the piling driven to secure a proper foundation for the structure." Conforming to these instructions, Mr. Asserson, a civil engineer attached to the Navy Department, made an examination of the soil, making borings to a depth of from thirtynine to forty-six feet at a distance of fifty feet along a certain length in the middle of a portion of the ground of the navy yard. The result of these borings was delineated on a profile plan purporting to show the character of the underlying soil. It may be conceded that this plan indicated that the soil at the point referred to was stable and contained no quicksand. Simpson & Co., who were experienced dock builders, applied for information as to the proposed site, and a copy of the plan was handed to the firm. Simpson & Co. never knew of the above letter until after this suit was brought, and they did not intimate to any one that the bid which they proposed to submit for doing the work was to be conditioned on the exist Statement of the Case. ence in the soil of the site to be selected of the characteristics indicated by the profile plan. It is true, however, that Simpson & Co. in making up their estimate and in preparing their specifications took into view the presumed condition of the soil, and that the amount of their bid was made up upon the assumption that the soil underlying the dock would prove to be like that indicated by the plan. In June, 1887, Simpson & Co. bid for the construction of the docks. The first two sentences of their proposal were as follows: "The undersigned, J. E. Simpson & Co., contractors and builders of Simpson's patent timber dry docks, of the city of New York, in the State of New York, hereby offer to furnish, under your advertisement, dated April 19, 1887, and subject to all the requirements of the same, and of the specifications, instructions and plans to which it refers, two timber dry docks of like dimensions, to be built in accordance with plans and specifications herewith submitted. One of said dry docks to be located at the United States navy yard, Brooklyn, in the port of New York, and the other at the United States navy yard, Portsmouth, in the port of Norfolk, Virginia, upon available sites to be provided by the Government, for the sum of one million and sixty-one thousand six hundred ($1,061,600) dollars, United States currency." The price asked for the two docks was very near the sum authorized by Congress to be expended for the purpose. The specifications referred to were prepared by the firm, and contained the following recital: "Location. These dry docks shall be located as follows: One at the United States navy yard, Brooklyn, in the port of New York, and the other at the United States navy yard, Portsmouth, in the port of Norfolk, Virginia, upon available sites to be provided by the Government. The length of each dry dock, respectively, shall be five hundred (500) feet inside of head to outer gate sill." Such other portions of the specifications as are material to be noticed are contained in the subdivision headed "General Construction," and are as follows: |