Opinion of the Court. ant to their ultimate conception, they amount simply to the proposition that the United States by the written contract guaranteed the nature of the soil under the site of the proposed dock, and assumed the entire burden which might arise in case it should be ascertained, during the progress of constructing the dock, that the soil under the selected site differed to the detriment of the contractors from that delineated upon the profile plan which had been made by an officer of the United States. Considering the contract itself, it is clear that there is nothing in its terms which supports, even by remote implication, the premise upon which the claimants must rest their hope of recovery. The contract imposed upon the contractors the obligation to construct the dock according to the specifications within a designated time for an agreed price upon a site to be selected by the United States. We look in vain for any statement or agreement or even intimation that any warranty, express or implied, in favor of the contractors was entered into concerning the character of the underlying soil. The only word which it is claimed supports the contention that a warranty was undertaken by the United States as to the condition of the soil is the statement, found in the opening portions of the specifications, that the dock was to be built in the navy yard upon a site which was "available," and great stress was laid in the argument at bar upon this word. But the word "available" intrinsically has no such meaning as that sought to be given it. It certainly cannot be said that the site selected for the dock was not available for the purpose, since one has been actually erected thereon. It is conceded in argument that the word "available" has not naturally the meaning which must be attributed to it in order to support the contention that there was a warranty as to the condition of the soil. But it is said the word should be construed as having such signification, because bidders were referred to the commandants of the navy yards for information as to the sites of the docks, and the plan showing the result of the examination made upon a portion of the yard was submitted to them. In other words, whilst admitting the rule that the contract is the law of the case, and Opinion of the Court. that the rights and obligations of the parties are to be alone determined from its context, the argument invokes a departure from that rule, and asks that the contract be so construed as to create a right in favor of one of the parties in conflict with the natural significance of the language of the contract, because of antecedent negotiations which took place between the parties. Aside from the contradiction which this contention involves, the meaning now claimed for the word "available" cannot be adopted without departing from the intention of the parties as manifested by the terms of the contract, and the documents forming part of it, and such meaning cannot moreover be sanctioned without doing violence to the context of the contract. The advertisement for bids was made in April, 1887. The bid and specifications which accompanied it were drawn by the firm, and were submitted in June, 1887. The advertisement to which they were an answer called for a full and explicit statement of what was proposed to be done by the contractors and what were the requirements upon which they expected to rely. The contractors were experienced and competent dock builders. If it had been their intention to only undertake to build the dock for the price stipulated, provided a guarantee was afforded them by the United States that the soil upon which the dock was to be constructed was to be of a particular nature conforming to a plan then existing, a purpose so important, so vital, would necessarily have found direct and positive expression in the bid and specifications, and would not have been left to be evolved by a forced and latitudinarian construction of the word "available," used only in the nature of a recital in the specifications and not in the contract. The fact that the bidders knew that a test of the soil in the yard had been made, and drew the contract providing that the dock should be located on a site to be designated by the United States without any express stipulation that there was a warranty in their favor that the ground selected should be of a defined character, precludes the conception that the terms of the contract imposed such obligation on the Government in the absence of a full and clear expres Opinion of the Court. sion to that effect, or at least an unavoidable implication. This is made clearer by other portions of the contract and specifications. The seventh paragraph of the contract contained a stipulation that "the construction of the said dry dock and its accessories and appurtenances herein contracted for shall conform in all respects to and with the plans and specifications aforesaid." Now, the recital in the specifications as to an "available" site is only contained in the opening clause thereof, and naturally suggests only that it relates solely to some place in the yard which should be selected in the discretion of the Government suitable for the erection of a dry dock. So also in the specifications as to the materials to be furnished, which follow the recital as to the location of the dock, there is not contained a word implying that a particular piece of ground in the navy yard, having soil of a specially stable character, was to be the site on which the dock was to be placed. The contrary, however, is clearly implied from the provisions as to foundation and other piling which were to be used in supporting and enclosing the structure. The foundation, brace and cross-cap piles, it was stipulated, were to be "of such length as may be required for the purpose, and well driven to a firm bearing," while it was stipulated that the sheet piling should be "driven close and to such depth as may be found necessary to make good work;" and these provisions were followed by a clause reciting that "should the character of the bottom be found such as to warrant a modification of the pile system of floor construction, a concrete bed of not less than six feet in thickness may be substituted for the foundation piles." Light is thrown upon the plain meaning of the contract by the conduct of the parties in the execution of the work. It is not pretended that, when the character of the subsoil was discovered, the slightest claim was preferred that this fact gave rise to an extra allowance. The fact is that the contractors proceeded with the work, obtained delay for its completion, made their final settlements and received their last payment without ever asserting that any of the rights which they now claim were vested in them. Without deciding that such con Statement of the Case. duct would be decisive if the claim was supported by the contract, it is nevertheless clear that it affords a just means of adding forceful significance to the unambiguous letter of the contract and the self-evident intention of the parties in entering into it. Judgment affirmed. HOME FOR INCURABLES v. NOBLE. COLVILLE v. AMERICAN SECURITY AND TRUST COMPANY. APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Nos. 57, 61. Argued November 9, 10, 1898. Decided January 8, 1999. Mrs. Ruth died on the 16th of June, 1892, having on the first day of the same month and year executed both a will and a codicil. After revoking all previous wills and codicils and directing the payment of debts and funeral expenses, the will bequeathed all the real, personal or mixed property to the American Security and Trust Company for the benefit of a granddaughter, Sophia Yuengling Huston, during her natural life. On the death of the granddaughter the will provided that the trust should end, and that it should be the duty of the trustee to pay over to the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania the sum of five thousand dollars for purposes stated, and to deliver all the "residue and remainder of the estate of whatever kind" to the Home for Incurables, to which corporation such residue was bestowed for a stated object. The codicil was as follows: I, Mary Eleanor Ruth, being of sound and disposing mind and memory and understanding, do make and publish this codicil to my last will and testament - I hereby revoke and annul the bequest therein made by me to the Home for Incurables at Fordham, New York city, in the State of New York, and I hereby give and bequeath the five thousand dollars (heretofore in my will bequeathed to said Home for Incurables) to my friend Emeline Colville, the widow of Samuel Colville, now living in New York city, said bequest being on account of her kindness to my son and myself during his and my illness and my distress. Held, That the effect of the codicil was to revoke the bequest of five thousand dollars, made by the will in favor of the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, and to substitute therefor the legatee named in the codicil. MARY E. Ruth died on the 16th of June, 1892, having on the first day of the same month and year executed both a will Statement of the Case. and a codicil. After revoking all previous wills and codicils and directing the payment of debts and funeral expenses, the will bequeathed all the real, personal or mixed property to the American Security and Trust Company for the benefit of a granddaughter, Sophia Yuengling Huston, during her natural life. On the death of the granddaughter the will provided that the trust should end, and that it should be the duty of the trustee to pay over to the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania the sum of five thousand dollars for purposes stated, and to deliver all the "residue and remainder of the estate of whatever kind" to the Home for Incurables, to which corporation such residue was bestowed for a stated object. The codicil unquestionably gave to Emeline Colville a bequest of five thousand dollars. The will and codicil are printed in full in the margin.1 1 I, Mary Eleanor Ruth, residing in the city of Washington and the District of Columbia, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do make and publish and declare this to be my last will and testament, hereby revoking and making null and void any and all former wills and codicils by me at any time made. First. I direct my executor hereinafter named to first pay out of my estate my funeral expenses and all just debts. Second. I give, devise and bequeath all of my estate, real, personal or mixed, whether in possession, reversion or remainder, now acquired or hereafter to be acquired, and wheresoever situate, to the " American Security and Trust Company" of Washington city, District of Columbia, its successors and assigns, in trust nevertheless for the following uses and purposes only, that is to say To invest and to reinvest the proceeds of my said estate in its discretion from time to time in any of the following classes of securities; that is either in United States bonds or in municipal or state bonds or in first mortgage bonds of dividend paying railroads or in loans secured by first trusts upon real estate in the District of Columbia, said loans not to exceed three fourths market value of said real estate; and to pay over so much of the annual income from said investments and reinvestments to the guardian or guardians of my granddaughter Sophia Yuengling Huston, as may be sufficient to provide for her maintenance, education and support until she becomes of the full age of twenty-one years, after which period the entire income so annually received from said investments and reinvestments shall be paid over by said trustee to my said granddaughter for her sole use and benefit for and during the period of her natural life. Provided, however, that the income thus provided for my said granddaughter for and during |