1. An appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia from the
decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference controversy
presents all the features of a civil case, a plaintiff, a defendant and
a judge, and deals with a question judicial in its nature, in respect of
which the judgment of the court is final, so far as the particular action
of the Patent Office is concerned; and such judgment is none the less a
judgment because its effect may be to aid an administrative or executive
body in the performance of duties legally imposed upon it by Congress
in execution of a power granted by the Constitution. United States v.
Duell, 576.
2. In deciding whether a patent shall issue or not, the Commissioner of
Patents acts on evidence, finds the facts, applies the law and decides
questions affecting not only public, but private interests; and likewise
as to reissues, or extension, or on interference between contesting claim-
ants; in all of which he exercises judicial functions. Ib.
3. Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, held to be directly in point, and the lan-
guage on page 59 held to be also in point in which the court, speaking
of that clause in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which confers
upon Congress the power "to promote the progress of science and use-
ful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors, the ex-
clusive right to their respective writings and discoveries," says: "The
legislation based on this provision regards the right of property in the
inventor as the medium of the public advantage derived from his inven-
tion; so that in every grant of the limited monopoly two interests are
involved that of the public, who are the grantors, and that of the
patentee. There are thus two parties to every application for a patent,
and more when, as in case of interfering claims or patents, other private
interests compete for preference. The questions of fact arising in this
field find their answers in every department of physical science, in every
branch of mechanical art; the questions of law necessary to be ap-
plied in the settlement of this class of public and private rights have
founded a special branch of technical jurisprudence. The investiga-
tion of every claim presented involves the adjudication of disputed
questions of fact upon scientific or legal principles, and is, therefore,
essentially judicial in its character, and requires the intelligent judg
ment of a trained body of skilled officials, expert in the various
branches of science and art, learned in the history of invention, and
proceeding by fixed rules to systematic conclusions." Ib.
As there was no finding of facts by the court below, and no statement of
facts in the nature of a special verdict, this court must assume that the
judgment of the court below was justified by the evidence, and affirm
the judgment of the Supreme Court. Marshall v. Burtis, 630.
1. Under the act of June 3, 1856, c. 44, 11 Stat. 21, the State of Michigan
took the fee of the lands thereby granted, to be thereafter identified,
subject to a condition subsequent that, if the railroad, to aid in whose
construction they were granted, should not be completed within ten
years, the lands unsold should revert to the United States; but, until
proceedings were taken by Congress to effect such reversion, the legal
title to the lands and the ownership of the timber growing upon them
remained in the State, and the United States could not maintain an
action of trespass against a person unlawfully entering thereon, and
cutting and removing timber from the land so granted: and timber so
cut and separated from the soil was not the property of the United
States, and did not become such after acquisition of the lands by re-
version; and the United States could not avail themselves of the rule
that in an action of trover, a mere trespasser cannot defeat the plain-
tiff's right to possession by showing a superior title in a third person,
without showing himself in priority with, or connecting himself with
such third person. United States v. Loughrey, 206.
2. In 1890, appellee, under the Desert Land act of 1877 applied to reclaim
and enter a tract of land, which was part of an even-numbered section
of lands within the limits of the grant to the Union Pacific Railway
Company. The entry was approved, the claimant made the prelimi-
nary payment thereon and received a certificate of entry. Subse-
quently he abandoned the entry, and it was cancelled in 1895. This
action was brought to recover the sum so paid. Held, that, as he had
voluntarily abandoned the entry, he had no cause of action for the
sum which he paid to initiate it. United States v. Healey, 160 U. S.
136, examined and shown not to be inconsistent with this decision.
United States v. Ingram, 327.
See TAX AND TAXATION, 4, 5, 8.
1. Under the circumstances stated in the finding of facts, Lynde acquired
a good title, (as between himself and the mortgagor company and the
companies which succeeded it by consolidation,) to the thirty-six bonds
purchased by him, as well as the right to claim the benefit of the mort-
gage executed to Parkhurst. Pittsburgh, Cincinatti &c. Railway Co. v.
Long Island Loan & Trust Co., 493.
2. The state court having adjudged that there was no rule of law arising
out of the public policy of the State, as manifested by state legislation,
that required it to deny to the holders of those bonds the rights and
privileges pertaining to commercial paper, purchased in good faith, in
the ordinary course of business; and in view of the fact that the lien
attending the thirty-six bonds purchased by Lynde did not arise after
the institution of the foreclosure suits, but had its origin in the execu-
tion and delivery of the Parkhurst mortgage and the authentication by
the trustee of the bonds named in it; and in view of the further fact
that the trustee in the prior mortgage was not made a party to the
foreclosure suits, and was not bound by the decree; under the well
settled rule that a sale of real estate under judicial proceedings cou-
cludes no one who is not, in some form, a party to such proceedings,
this court holds, that the pendency of the foreclosure suits did not
interfere with the negotiation or transfer of the bonds secured by the
prior Parkhurst mortgage; that the decree in those suits did not im-
pair in any degree the lien created by that mortgage; that the pur-
chase of the bonds by Lynde could not be regarded as hostile to the
possession taken of the property embraced by the Roosevelt mortgage
for the purpose of selling it in satisfaction of the debts secured thereby;
and that the state court did not fail to give due effect to the several
decrees in the Circuit Courts in the Roosevelt foreclosure suits, when
it held that those decrees did not prevent the defendant in error from
claiming the benefit of the lien created by the mortgage to Parkhurst
to secure the payment of the bonds purchased by Lynde. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 14;
TAX AND TAXATION, 4, 5, 8.
See LOUISIANA, LOCAL LAW OF.
See LOUISIANA, LOCAL LAW Of.
If a party neither pleads nor proves what has been decided by a court of
competent jurisdiction in some other case between himself and his
antagonist, he cannot insist upon the benefit of res judicata, and this,
although such prior judgment may have been rendered by the same
court. United States v. Bliss, 321.
See LOUISIANA, LOCAL LAW of.
1. An indictment based upon that portion of Rev. Stat. § 3082, which
makes it an offence to "fraudulently or knowingly import or bring
into the United States, or assist in doing so, any merchandise con-
trary to law," charging that the defendant, on a date named, “did
knowingly, wilfully and unlawfully import and bring into the United
States, and did assist in importing and bringing into the United
States, to wit, into the port of Philadelphia," diamonds of a stated
value, "contrary to law, and the provisions of the act of Congress in
such cases made and provided" is clearly insufficient, as the allega-
tions are too general, and do not sufficiently inform the defendant of
the nature of the accusation against him. Keck v. United States, 434.
2. An indictment for a violation of Rev. Stat. § 2865, which charges
that the defendant "did knowingly, wilfully and unlawfully, and
with intent to defraud the revenue of the United States, smuggle
and clandestinely introduce into the United States, to wit, into the
port of Philadelphia," certain "diamonds" of a stated value, which
should have been invoiced and duty thereon paid or accounted for,
but which, to the knowledge of the defendant and with intent to
defraud the revenue, were not invoiced nor the duty paid or ac-
counted for, sufficiently describes the offence to make it clear what
articles were charged to have been smuggled. Ib.
3. Under the tariff act of 1894, c. 349, diamonds were subject to duty. Ib.
4. Mere acts of concealment of merchandise, on entering the waters of
the United States, do not, taken by themselves, constitute smuggling
or clandestine introduction. Ib.
5. The offence described in Rev. Stat. § 2865, is not committed by an
act done before the obligation to pay or account for the duties
arises. Ib.
6. The word "smuggling" had a well understood import at common
law; and, in the absence of a particularized definition of its signifi-
cance in the statute creating it, resort may be had to the common
law for the purpose of arriving at its meaning. Ib.
7. A review of the principal statutes enacted in this country regulating
the collection of customs duties establishes that, so far as they em-
braced legislation designed to prevent the evasion of duties, they
proceeded upon the theory of the English law on the same subject;
that is, that they forbade all the acts which were deemed by the law-
maker means to the end of smuggling, or clandestinely introducing
dutiable goods into the country in violation of law, and which were
likewise considered as efficient to enable the offender to reap the
benefits of his wrongful acts; and that therefore they forbade and
prescribed penalties for everything which could precede smuggling
or follow it, without specifically making a distinct and separate
offence designated as smuggling, or clandestine introduction. Ib.
8. Whether we consider the testimony of the captain alone, or all the
testimony contained in the record, it unquestionably establishes that
there was no passage of the package of diamonds through the lines
of the customs authorities, but, on the contrary, that the package was
delivered to the customs officer on board the vessel itself, at a time
when or before the obligation to make entry and pay the duties
arose, and that the offence of smuggling was not committed within
the meaning of the statute. Ib.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
When a later statute is a complete revision of the subject to which the
earlier statute related, and the new legislation was manifestly in-
tended as a substitute for the former legislation, the prior act must
be held to have been repealed. United States v. Ranlett and Stone, 133.
See USURY, 1, 2.
B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.
See CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL,
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED JURISDICTION, B, 5, 16;
STATES;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 16;
CRIMINAL LAW;
CUSTOMS DUTIES, 1, 3, 7, 8, 9;
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1;
LIMITATION, STATUTES OF;
PUBLIC LAND, 1, 2;
SMUGGLING, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7;
1. The collection of taxes assessed under the authority of a State is not
to be restrained by writ of injunction from a court of the United
States, unless it clearly appears, not only that the tax is illegal, but
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