that the owner of the property taxed has no adequate remedy by the
ordinary processes of the law, and that there are special circum-
stances bringing the case within some recognized head of equity
jurisdiction. Pittsburgh &c. Railway v. Board of Public Works of West
Virginia, 32.
2. A railroad bridge across a navigable river forming the boundary line
between two States is not, by reason of being an instrument of inter-
state commerce, exempt from taxation by either State upon the part
within it. Ib.
3. A railroad bridge is taxable under the Code of West Virginia of 1891,
c. 29, § 67; and, although the board of public works assesses sepa-
rately the whole length of the railroad track within the State, and
that part of the bridge within the State, yet, if the railroad company
does not, as allowed by that section, apply to the auditor to correct
any supposed mistake in the assessment, nor appeal, within thirty
days after receiving notice of the decision of the board, to the circuit
court of the county, and the officers of the State make no attempt to
interfere with the company's possession and control of its real estate,
nor, until after the expiration of the thirty days, either to impose a
penalty for delay in paying the taxes, or to levy on personal property
for non-payment of them, the company cannot maintain a bill in
equity in a court of the United States to restrain the assessment and
collection of any part of the taxes. Ib.
4. The provision in Sec. 2 of the act of July 27, 1866, c. 278, 14 Stat.
292, 294, which exempts from taxation within the Territories of the
United States, the right of way granted by the act to the Atlantic
& Pacific Railroad Company, operates to exempt from such taxation
the land itself to the extent to which it is made by the act subject
to such right of way and all structures erected thereon. New Mexico
v. United States Trust Co., 171.
5. In so deciding the court does not question the rule of construction
declared in Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Railroad v. Thomas, 116
U. S. 665, and followed in Yazoo &c. Railroad v. Thomas, 132 U. S.
174; Wilmington & Weldon Railroad v. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 279; Keo-
kuk & Western Railroad v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 301; Norfolk & West-
ern Railroad v. Pendleton, 156 U. S. 667; and Covington &c Turnpike
Co. v. Sandford, 169 U. S. 578, but rests the present decision simply
on the terms of the statute. Ib.
6. When a notice is duly given to landowners by municipal authorities
in full accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the State
touching the time and place for determining the amounts assessed
upon their lands for the cost of street improvements, such notice, so
authorized by the legislature, will not be set aside as ineffectual on
account of the shortness of the time unless the case is a clear one.
Bellingham Bay &c. Railroad Co. v. New Whatcom, 314.
7. In view of the character of the improvements in this case, of the
residence of the plaintiff in error, of the almost certainty that it must
have known of the improvements, and of the action of the Supreme
Court of the State, ruling that the notice was sufficient, it is held by
this court to have been sufficient. Ib.
8. Before proceedings for the collection of taxes, sanctioned by the Su-
preme Court of a State, are stricken down in this court, it must
clearly appear that some one of the fundamental guarantees of right
contained in the Federal Constitution has been invaded. Ib.
9. This bill was filed to enjoin the enforcement of a tax, imposed under the
laws of Montana, upon lands granted by Congress by the act of July 2,
1864, c. 217, to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and acquired
by the appellant on the reorganization of the company. There was a
controversy as to the character of the lands taxed - whether mineral
or non-mineral. The lands have never been patented or certified to
the company; the company claimed that it had only a potential inter-
est therein; and the relief sought was that the lands be adjudged not
subject to such assessment and taxation until the issue of patents
therefor by the United States. It was stipulated in the court below
that the sole question desired to be submitted was, whether the lands
described in the bill were subject to taxation under the laws of the
United States and of the State of Montana. The court sustained the
taxation. In this court the position of the company was stated by its
counsel as follows: "The question for decision is not whether the rail-
way company has any interest in its grant, or in the lands in question,
which may be subjected to some form of taxation; but whether the
lands themselves are taxable: whether the present assessment which is
on the lands themselves can be sustained. We may well concede that
the taxing power is broad enough to reach in some form the interest
of the railway company in its grant. That interest becomes con-
fessedly a vested interest upon construction of the road. It then be-
comes property and may well be held subject to some form of taxation.
But here the legislature authorizes a tax upon, and the assessor makes
an assessment upon, the land itself by specific description: the whole
legal title to each parcel being specifically and separately assessed.
When the plain fact is, that neither the assessor, or the railway com-
pany can place its hand on a single specific parcel and say whether it
belongs to the company or to the United States." Held, that although
the question submitted by stipulation had been somewhat changed in
form, the same result must be reached, and the judgment of the court
below be affirmed. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Myers, 589.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 5, 11, 12, 13;
JURISDICTION, B, 3;
LOUISIANA, LOCAL LAW OF.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 14.
See CORPORATION;
EVIDENCE, 3, 4, 5, 6.
1. Usury is a statutory offence, and Federal courts, in dealing with such a
question, must look to the laws of the State where the transaction took
place, and follow the construction put upon such laws by the state
courts. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Trust Co. v. Krumseig, 351.
2. When a State thinks that the evils of usury are best prevented by mak-
ing usurious contracts void, and by giving a right to the borrowers to
have such contracts unconditionally nullified and cancelled by the
courts, as in this case, such a view of public policy, in respect to con-
tracts made within the State and sought to be enforced therein, is
obligatory on the Federal courts, whether acting in equity, or at law;
and the local law, consisting of the applicable statutes, as construed
by the Supreme Court of the State, furnishes the rule of decision. Ib.
3. These views are not applicable to cases arising out of interstate com-
merce where the policy to be enforced is Federal. Ib.
4. Whether the contract between the parties in this case was, as a contract
of life insurance, void because the defendant had not complied with
the statutes of Minnesota, has not been considered by the court. Ib.
Mrs. Ruth died on the 16th of June, 1892, having on the first day of the
same month and year executed both a will and a codicil. After revok-
ing all previous wills and codicils and directing the payment of debts
and funeral expenses, the will bequeathed all the real, personal or
mixed property to the American Security and Trust Company for the
benefit of a granddaughter, Sophia Yuengling Huston, during her
natural life. On the death of the granddaughter the will provided
that the trust should end, and that it should be the duty of the trustee
to pay over to the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania the sum
of five thousand dollars for purposes stated, and to deliver all the
"residue and remainder of the estate of whatever kind" to the Home
for Incurables, to which corporation such residue was bestowed for a
stated object. The codicil was as follows: I, Mary Eleanor Ruth,
being of sound and disposing mind and memory and understanding,
do make and publish this codicil to my last will and testament — I
hereby revoke and annul the bequest therein made by me to the Home
for Incurables at Fordham, New York city, in the State of New York,
and I hereby give and bequeath the five thousand dollars (heretofore
in my will bequeathed to said Home for Incurables) to my friend
Emeline Colville, the widow of Samuel Colville, now living in New
York city, said bequest being on account of her kindness to my son
and myself during his and my illness and my distress. Held, That
the effect of the codicil was to revoke the bequest of five thousand
dollars, made by the will in favor of the Hospital of the University of
Pennsylvania, and to substitute therefor the legatee named in the
codicil. Home for Incurables v. Noble, 383.
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