LECTURE VI.

PROPHECY.

PART I.

IN Holy Scripture a "prophet" is "one who speaks for God," as well as "one who foretells events to come," and prophecy is a general name for Divine Revelation, including moral lessons and truths of the spiritual world, along with predictions of events in human history that were beyond mortal foresight, and whose disclosure, therefore, witnessed the presence and aid of the omniscience of the Almighty. It should not be forgotten that to proclaim by words and courageous deeds the laws of morals, and to assert God's righteous government of the world amid the disorders and corruptions of society, may be a true evidence of God's presence and help, even though such evidence may not strike the imagination or produce conviction so powerfully and readily as the clear announcement of events to come. Hence every prophecy is intimately connected with some vindication of God's moral government of the world: it either sets forth His law or it forbids the transgression of it, or it threatens the punishment of some conspicuous offender, or it unfolds a series of great events in whose issue at least, if not in its progress, the divine presence and rule are unmistakable. Prophecy, therefore, in its most comprehensive sense, is a powerful support of religion; it keeps alive in the world faith and hope; it brings home to each

heart God's loving providence; it shelters the weak and tempted, and checks the violent and lawless.

In the formal argument for the evidence of a divine. and special revelation, we naturally turn to the most striking and conspicuous meaning of prophecy, because every one feels that a single clear prediction of some memorable fact, plainly established, would be sufficient to authenticate a revelation. No one but the Maker and Ruler of the world can foretell with certainty in the distant future any one event depending on the concurrence of a multitude of unknown forces and independent wills, whose springs are in His hands alone. It has been well said that every true prophecy is also a real miracle.' And as the miracle rightly understood vindicates God's freedom and independence of His own creation, while not derogating in any respect from the perfection of natural laws, so prophecy (it is worthy to be said with emphasis) witnesses to the perfection of God's omniscience without depriving man of either his freedom or responsibility. We may not be able and we are not required to frame a philosophy or to construct a statement reconciling divine sovereignty with human freedom, or showing how there may be certain foreknowledge at all of an event strictly contingent on the choice of free beings. But we are permitted to receive both classes of truths upon their own proper evidence, without possibility of reasonable question. Our own consciousness assures us that we are free, and our conscience makes it certain that we are responsible; miracles vindicate God's sovereignty, and prophecy witnesses to His omniscience. The power and knowledge of the Almighty, like His justice and His goodness, are doubtless the same in essence as these attributes in the creatures whom He framed after His own image; but in Him they are names of perfections without defect or limit of any kind, the objects of boundless trust and

'What the miracle is in the de- culum potentiæ scientia").—Beck, partment of action, prophecy is in Propäd. Entwicklung, S. 178. the department of knowledge (mira

love and satisfaction. We need not hesitate to say that what we, with our limited faculties, do not know and cannot imagine of Him is doubtless far more wonderful and glorious than what we can and do.

Almighty God seeks the love and service of His creatures by methods suited to their capacities and situation. He addresses their reason and heart as well as their conscience. If we here seek to describe prophecy in its office as, next after miracles, the great pillar of the external evidence of religion, we say it must fulfil three conditions: First, it must be known to have been uttered before the event; second, the event must be of such a nature, or at such a distance, as to be undiscoverable by human reason; and, thirdly, the terms of the prediction must clearly and adequately correspond to the particulars of the accomplishment. These three conditions, it is plain, will effectually exclude forged prophecies coming after the event, or probable anticipations, or, lastly, equivocal coincidences. We are never to forget that neither the clearest predictions, nor in fact the evidence of miracles, or evidence of any sort, can literally compel belief in the truth of religion. No external evidence can win a real submission from the mind or heart. It might be safely concluded, on general principles, that even as the Almighty does not force obedience from his responsible creatures, so neither does He thrust supernatural evidence of heavenly truths upon the attention of the unwilling and the unprepared. These, then, are almost axioms in the subject of religious evidence. It is no objection that some of its most important branches should be probable rather than demonstrative, moral rather than physical or scientific. The most suitable evidence that can be addressed to a being such as man, who has strayed from the right path and whose nature has become disordered, but has still noble powers and is responsible for their use, is such proof as appeals not only to the reason and the feelings, but also to the will. The free and responsible creature must be left with power to

listen or to close the ears, to be convinced or to doubt, to receive or to reject. The evidence, in other words, is not purely logical, nor merely an address to the feelings, nor simply authority, nor a display of naked power. It partakes at times and in parts of all these, and is strong or weak according to the interior state of those addressed. What can be thus said of religious evidence as a whole finds striking illustrations in the department of prophecy in particular. First, it must not be forgotten that prophecy is but one of many kinds of evidence for revelation. Though a single prophecy could establish a divine communication, and a series of prophecies abundantly prove a religion, still, as a matter of fact, prophecy authenticates the same heavenly truths as are attested by miracles, recommended by their own sublimity or beauty, verified by their effects upon individuals and upon society. The collective or cumulative force, therefore, of miracles, prophecy, moral fitness, benign effects, and temporal triumphs over material power and unwilling witnesses, should in fairness be considered when we strive to estimate the just weight of each. Prophecy, though wonderful and divine, is after all but one evidence amid several kinds. But, secondly, it is plain from the very conditions of an unimpeachable prophecy that no one can form an intelligent and fair judgment of its claims to our acceptance without research, patience, and candor. It may be said that no one can reasonably expect these from unbelievers or the indifferent, much less the prejudiced and hostile. And we must admit, in reply, that religion offers no evidence that can convince any of these classes against their will.

Since no prophecy can be either refuted or verified till after the event, it is naturally liable to remain for some

'The "evidences are exceedingly other; they are connected only in dissimilar. . . . They are not the subject which they conspire to necessarily connected in their origin; attest.”—Davison on Prophecy, Disc. they are independent in their prin- I., D. 31. ciple; they do not infer each the

time after its delivery neglected as an ambiguous oracle. It is only such testimony as the Church (first the Jewish, then the Christian) has preserved to the authenticity of the prophetic writings, and the date of their composition -testimony of an especial witness appointed to guard and preserve them, beside the ordinary evidence for any celebrated writing or book-only such abundant proof as this might seem able to fix beyond question the time of the delivery of the prophecy. And even though this may not be disputed without manifest captiousness, still it requires some candor to admit that the terms descriptive of a future event are quite beyond the natural sagacity of some mind speculating on a kindred theme. Or, if this point be conceded, it may not still be practicable to remove every scruple concerning the possibility of fortuitous coincidences between the terms of the prediction and the terms of the fulfilment. A reasonable certainty that there has been an actual fulfilment of any important event, or series of events, cannot be reached without some knowledge of history, often not without considerable research, weighing of events, balancing of authorities. It might be thought that this circumstance removes much of prophecy from the possibility of being evidence to any but the learned. But though we grant that the leading events of history may be safely accepted on the ground of general notoriety, still, as the very problem which prophecy lays before us involves the comparison of distant and dissimilar events, often the criticism and sometimes the translation of language, and some ability to examine witnesses and weigh evidence, it is quite manifest that its evidence is rather probable than demonstrative. Though abundant to convince a thoughtful and candid inquirer, one who has patience enough to carry him through a laborious search, and to give him a motive for life and a support in death, this evidence will yet never force any one to believe; it will not even seem strong to the mind that will not submit to the conditions of its discovery; it may even be proclaimed to be no evi