the books and pamphlets laid before us it is manifest to us that hydriodic acid is now well known and is accounted to be of varied excellence by American physicians against whose competence no suggestions have been made.

On the other hand, expert opinion is offered of the worthlessness of hydriodic acid by gentlemen of the medical profession who do not know and have not used or tried the acid. Surely the better plan is to waive matters of personal etiquette and have the thing brought to a practical, satisfactory, as well as scientific test by skilled observers in applied medicine.

The broad distinction between the Washington case, 23 O. R. 299 (from which judgment the framers of the "rider" in this case appeared to have borrowed their language), and the present is that there he dared not or would not or did not deny what was charged against him-by his silence he in effect confessed its truth and admitted the falsehood (see page 310). The false statement there acted upon by the Council and confirmed by the Court as sufficient to be "infamous," was the representation that persons in the last stage of consumption were suffering from catarrhal bronchitis, and that he could cure them.

Now, I am far from belittling the importance of professional ethics in regard to physicians or other learned professions. There is no doubt that this man has grievously offended against their conventional rules, well recognized, though, it may be, not forming a written code, which obtains among the members of every learned and honorable profession. In two respects he has violated proper decorum: Modesty and propriety have been forgotten in his self-advertising and discreditable pro-lamation; and he has, in the second place, kept to himself and for himself this apparently valuable remedy, and has not made. known the formula in order that its benefits may be shared in by the profession and the public.

But neither of these offences against the comity of the profession invites per se imputation of moral delinquity-which is, I think, contemplated by the terms infamous and disgraceful. Yet the obnoxious conduct is sufficient to put the offender practically outside of the professional pale, but whether it can call down the statutory punishment of exclusion from practice seems to me, as at present advised, to be answerable in the negative.

To resort to the advertising question the English rule against it, even in the most marked form, is exceedingly strict; not so in America and Canada, where a moderate and limited use of

advertisement is permissible. One reason of this rule (though there are others) grows out of the desire to mark emphatically the distinction between a trade and a profession. In the case of a mere money-making business, advertising in any and every extreme of extravagance and exaggeration is considered a legitimate outcome of sharp competition. The professional man, however, is not on this plane; he is not to thrust himself forward and solicit particularly any form of public appeal. It was regarded in the profession as a badge of charlatanism to advertise in any but the simplest way of giving notice of the whereabout of the practitioner's office. The vendor of patent medicines and proprietary remedies might puff their uses and publish their testimonials and tout for customers; but not the physicians. No doubt, as said by Dr. Brundette Coates, medical men, from the necessity of living, have become indifferent to the censures of the body of the profession or to the knowledge that they are offending against the great concensus of professional opinion. They have a living to get and they get it by such means as offer themselves. Competition induces struggling physicians to follow courses not always consistent with self respect, and which fall short of a high standard of honor and propriety. II. International Treatise of Ethics, page 28. This is the shelter under which the appellant takes refuge, and though his action may be undesirable and reprehensible, derogatory to himself and injurious to the higher interests of the profession, it perhaps has to be left to himself as to its discontinuance.

To deal further with his "secretiveness," as a witness calls it, the rules which govern English medical practice (e.g., those promulgated by the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons) forbid the use of secret remedies and methods of treatment, and the rule is enforced by appropriate penalties. These secret remedies (commonly called nostrums) are special preparations of which the formulæ are unknown in whole or in part. The reason why they should not be encouraged is because it is unscientific to prescribe a dose of anything the nature of which the physician does not know. Hence it easily follows that if one discovers something which proves of real efficacy in disease, the ethical claims of the profession persuades, if not compels, him to place his discovery at the disposal of his brethren and the public without other reward than professional approval and public esteem.

If, however, a stronger compulsion, arising out of his own needs and the stress of competition among the ranks of a

crowded profession, overmaster his ethical claim, and he retains control and proprietorship of his nostrum, then he has to incur the condemnation of his fellows in placing money above the high standard of his profession.

There is, however, a distinction marked in the cases between patent and proprietary medicines. Patent medicines are properly those, the component parts of which are of record in the patent office, and anyone can by enquiry find out of what they are made up, whereas the ingredients of a nostrum or proprietary medicine can only be ascertained by analysis. Pharmaceutical Society v. Armson, 1894, 2 Q. B. 720 at p. 726. It is permissible for the physician to prescribe this kind of patent medicine, and even as to nostrums there is to be observed if knowledge exists or is obtained of the substantial ingredients entering into the composition of the secret remedy, then its use might be justified both by the discoverer and other members of the profession. Dr. Saunby's Medical Ethics, 1902, p. 67.

I think there is no doubt but that the substantial ingredient which gives importance to "grippura" has been laid bare by analysis, and that it is sufficiently made known to the profession to induce the next step (which I venture to recommend) namely, to apply the practical test as to its alleged efficacy in various ailments.

If the use of hydriodic acid in this and other like preparations known and prescribed by United States physicians is in truth an agent of varied use and value in the treatment of disease, it is surely the thing to be taken up by the profession and applied to public needs. If after satisfactory testing it stands approved, it will not need to be circulated by advertising as a valuable secret, but will be generally prescribed and distributed by the profession and used by their patients.

There appears to me to be a good suggestion in the view presented by Dr. Saunby (though he writes of cases which do not respond to the usual treatment). He writes: "The application of new methods of treatment or new remedies ought not to be undertaken without due and great care. The general reason for such experiments is the impossibility of progress without the trial of new suggestions, and on particular grounds the remedy may be resorted to, if there is reasonable prospect of its affording relief and that it is harmless." Medical Ethics, 1902, p. 55.

Upon the present evidence it does not appear to be proved (always assuming honesty and fair dealing, to begin with)

that the alleged discovery is a mere pretence; that the remedy is worthless and neither cures nor helps those who take it; that the whole scheme is a delusion; that it is put forward dishonestly or carelessly, not for the good of the public but for the gain of the advertiser.

If, however, it fails to stand the scientific, as well as the empirical, testing the situation may be very materially changed. The question after that would probably be whether he could reasonably and sincerely retain faith in the virtues of "grippura," and honestly recommend and advertise it on that footing.

The Medical Council does not appear to possess such extensive power to discipline and exclude delinquents as has been given by the Legislature to the Law Society. To the Benchers is entrusted power to enquire into the conduct of lawyers who are charged with professional misconduct or of conduct unbecoming a member of the Law Society. R. S. O., 1897, ch. 172, sec. 44. Under such language there is power to deal with cases where the charge is a violation of the conventional or other regulations, which are either described or commonly observed in the profession. See re Rythe, 6 B. & S., 704 per Cockburn, C. J.

So to a more limited extent in medicine, if one has been admitted to practice on certain explicit conditions and has given an undertaking to observe them (e.g., a promise not to advertise in any offensive way), his breach of that engagement might well be regarded, if wilfully and deliberately made, as disgraceful conduct in a professional respect. Such a case was considered in Ex. Partridge, 19 Q. B. D. 467, and again in the same connection in Partridge v. General Medical Council, 25 Q. B. D. 95.

That element is wanting in the case now in hand; at all events no definite delinquency is charged in that respect, for no code of medical ethics was in force here till about 1898; before that time the method of confining oneself to medical ethics or etiquette rested in the honor and good sense of the individual.

The conclusion I reach is that there has not been a due enquiry in this Crichton case, and the appeal should be allowed. As a consequence, his name (if struck off) should be restored to the register; but this judgment is to be without prejudice to the question whether on subsequent enquiry there may not appear to be on proper grounds for erasing his name. This

is the term which was imposed in the Partridge case, 25 Q. B. D. 95.

As to costs I cannot say that this proceeding has been frivolous or vexatious. The conduct of the appellant has been such as to provoke complaint and to invite investigation. It has offended against the provisions of the Ontario Code of Ethics, which declares it to be derogatory to the dignity and prestige of the profession to resort to the practice of secrecy on the one hand and publicity on the other-which though not in force when he was registered-yet declare the professional standard of conduct which he has disregarded, to set up a trade standard for himself, so that while in the result he may be right legally, he is wrong professionally.

Having regard to these and like considerations I do not think the Council, who are discharging a quasi-public duty, should be called upon to pay costs of the investigation of this appeal.

HON. JUSTICE MAGEE.

I concur fully in the admirable judgment of my Lord the Chancellor and have but little to add as to the proceedings taken against the appellant.

Under sec. 33 of the Ontario Medical Act the Council may cause enquiry to be made into the case of a person alleged to be liable to have his name erased from the register, and sec. 35 enacts that the Council shall ascertain the facts by a committee, and a written report of the committee may be acted upon, and a standing committee is to be maintained for such purposes.

By sub-section 5 of the same section, notice of the meeting held for "taking the evidence or otherwise ascertaining the facts," shall be served upon the person whose conduct is the subject of enquiry, and such notice shall embody a copy of the charges made against him, or a statement of the subject matter of the enquiry.

The By-laws of the Council, as published in the annual announcement, which is among the exhibits, also provide for a committee on discipline, whose duty it is to consider all complaints against members that may be referred to it by the Council, and shall be governed in its precedence by statute, and the by-laws also provide that a committee appointed to report on any subject referred to them by the Council shall report a statement of facts and also their opinion thereon in writing.

In this case the Council adopted a report of the Standing