on the part of Kennedy's counsel, he was tried and convicted by a judge of robbery, as charged against him in the indictment, and sent to prison for five years and five months.

This was in December, 1881. In February, 1883, the District Attorney wrote that he concluded, upon examination and before the trial, that the offense was larceny and not robbery, and that the case seemed to lack the element of fear and violence necessary to robbery.

He gave it as his opinion that the prisoner had prisoner had then been punished enough. In June, 1883, he wrote that the case was the only one out of some twenty-five sent to prison during his term, in which he felt that great injustice and wrong had been done, and that the prisoner ought not to have been sent to prison for more than a year.

In December, 1882, the judge who presided at the trial and sentenced the convict for the crime of robbery, wrote that he thought the proof did not justify a conviction for robbery, and that his sentenee should be commuted to one year.

not

Upon such representations, and upon such other facts as were presented to me, it became plainly my duty to correct the wrong for which the judge who allowed a verdict to be entered which, in his opinion, was justified by the evidence, and the District Attorney who asked for and obtained a conviction in a case where it seemed to him the most important element of the offense charged was wanting, were responsible.

August 4, 1883. James McDougal. Sentenced October 11, 1877; county, Oneida; crime, burglary, first degree; term, ten years; prison, Auburn.

The wife of this convict left him, and for some time he could not discover her whereabouts. He learned that she

was living with another man, ostensibly as a domestic, but as it now seems conceded, actually in a very different relation. The husband's repeated requests that she should return to him and restore his child, which she had taken with her, were refused; and his efforts in that direction were resented by the man with whom she was living.

The crime of which the prisoner was convicted consisted in his bursting into the house where his wife had taken up her abode, in the night, apparently with the idea of reclaiming her and his child. He was confronted by the man who had alienated and was harboring his wife, and was by him shot and nearly killed. As soon as he had sufficiently recovered from his wounds to appear in court, he was convicted of burglary in the first degree and sentenced to prison for ten years. Nearly six years of his term of imprisonment having expired, I had but little difficulty in agreeing with the Judge who sentenced him and the District Attorney who prosecuted the indictment, in their opinion that he should be released.

September 11. 1883. John Shine. Sentenced April 21, 1882; county, Onondaga; crime, mayhem; term, seven years; prison, Onondaga County Penitentiary.

This convict was convicted in the county of Onondaga of mayhem, and thereupon was sentenced to imprisonment. for the term of seven years. Judging from the reports I received from those concerned in the trial and conviction, and the affidavit of a physician who examined the wound inflicted, but who was not sworn on such trial, I was satisfied that a verdict of assault and battery would have been much better justified by the facts. The convict had already suffered an imprisonment of nearly one year and five months; his pardon was asked for by a number of respectable citizens

of the county, as well as the complainant who was injured; and it was recommended by the District Attorney who prosecuted and the Judge who sentenced the prisoner. His character was abundantly proved to have been good previous to this accusation, and his conduct in prison was also reported to have been good.

After a careful consideration of all the circumstances attending this case, I was entirely satisfied that the ends of justice would be fully subserved by granting an unconditional pardon.

September 17, 1883. Frank M. Baker. Sentenced, March 3, 1877; county, Cayuga; crime, bigamy; terms, five years each on three indictments; prison, Auburn.

This convict was married in 1871 in the State of Ohio. In the year 1874 a divorce was granted the parties by the courts of that State. The prisoner was charged, as one of his offenses, with marrying another person soon thereafter in this State. If this marriage was bigamous, it of course was only so because, at the time of its solemnization, he had another wife; and the existence of this fact depended upon the validity of the divorce granted in Ohio. It was held invalid by the court before which the indictment was tried, and a conviction followed. An appeal having been taken to the General Term of the Supreme Court, the conviction was by that court reversed, on the ground that the divorce was valid, and a defense to the charge of bigamy. A further appeal was taken by the prosecution to the Court of Appeals, which court reversed the decision of the General Term, and affirmed the conviction. The determination of the latter court was not unanimous, and the late chief judge was of the opinion that the question involved should

be presented to the Supreme Court of the United States for final determination.

That this divorce was invalid in the courts of this State was the judgment of our highest tribunal, and should not be questioned. But on this application the fact that learned judges of one appellate court agreed with the convict in supposing that he could marry a second time with impunity, should have its due weight.

When Executive clemency is invoked, and relief is sought from the hardship of the law's technical administration, not only the motive and intent of the criminal, but any supposition or belief upon which he may have acted, it seems to me, is a proper subject of consideration. A man unlearned in the law should not, perhaps, be too severely punished for an act which he reasonably believed not to be unlawful. But there remained two other alleged marriages, subsequent to those above referred to, upon which the prisoner was convicted of two other bigamies. On each of the three convictions he was sentenced to five years imprisonment, being the extreme penalty permitted by the law.

Of the four marriages alleged against the convict the first and last were freely admitted, the intermediate two were stoutly denied. Representations were made to me. which may well cast a doubt upon the existence of the marriages which were denied, and indications were not wanting that no small degree of private animosity entered into the prosecution. Without, however, discrediting the finding of the jury in this matter, I was satisfied that the imprisonment of the convict should terminate.

If he had been sentenced to imprisonment for ten years, which would have been the extreme penalty upon two convictions, and a severe punishment for the three offenses

charged, the reduction of time which he had earned by good conduct in prison, would have entitled him to his discharge before the date of his pardon.

His pardon was asked by a large number of his friends and acquaintances, who are indorsed as respectable and reliable citizens; and his good character previous to his arrest is abundantly vouched for.

I determined to grant a pardon in this case because I was convinced that in any event, the punishment already suffered by the convict had fully vindicated the law, and answered the ends of justice.

September 21, 1883. John J. Faley. Sentenced September 5, 1882; county, New York; crime, burglary, third degree; prison, New York State Reformatory.

This lad and two others were indicted for breaking a pane of glass in a shop window and stealing property of the value of twenty-five dollars or less. They were charged with burglary in the third degree. The companions of the convict, upon a trial, were convicted of petit larceny and sentenced to six months imprisonment, and to pay a fine of fifty dollars. Faley pleaded guilty to the indictment, and the court sentenced him to the Reformatory. There was no intimation that there was any difference in the guilt of the parties accused, and yet the two who demanded a trial have long since been restored to their friends.

The parents of this boy are hard-working, industrious people, and it was abundantly established that up to the time of his arrest he had been obedient, faithful and honest. He was employed at that time in the same establishment where his father worked. In reply to my inquiries addressed to his former employers, they wrote as follows: "We can and will