That the prisoner was without the means to pay the fine imposed.

That his occupation was that of a market gardener, and if he had not been released at date of commutation he would have been deprived of the means of his support for the remainder of the year.

May 18, 1883. Charles P. Bragle. Sentenced December 1, 1881; county, Albany; crime, attempting wrongfully to obtain public moneys of and from the county of Albany; term, one year and six months; prison, Albany County Penitentiary.

Sentence commuted to one year and twenty-six days. actual imprisonment in the Albany County Penitentiary. The term to begin on the 22d day of April, 1882, and to end on the 18th day of May, 1883.

This commutation was granted on the grounds:

That the prisoner's term by commutation under the provisions of the statute had nearly expired, and that his conduct in the Penitentiary had been unexceptionable.

It was recommended by the Judge who presided at his trial and by the District Attorney who appeared in this case on behalf of the people.

It also satisfactorily appeared that the prisoner had sufferred a great domestic affliction, in the loss of a child, and the commutation was asked that he might be allowed to be present at the funeral rites.

May 19, 1883. Mortimer A. Wandall.

Sentenced November

15, 1882; county, Westchester; crime, embezzlement; term, six months and fifty dollars fine; prison, Albany County Penitentiary.

Sentenced commuted to imprisonment in the Albany County Penitentiary for the term of six months and four

days, to begin on the 15th day of November, 1882, and to end on the 19th day of May, 1883.

This commutation of sentence was granted on the grounds : That the prisoner's conduct was good in the Penitentiary, and that he was without the means to pay the fine imposed in addition to his term of imprisonment.

That it was his first offense, and that he had previous to conviction borne a good character.

It was recommended by the Police Justice by whom he was committed, by the complainant and a number of citizens of the highest character, who were conversant with the circumstances of the case.

June 13, 1883. James Riley. Sentenced January 22, 1877; county, Queens; crime, burglary first degree; term, eighteen years; prison, Sing Sing, transferred to Auburn.

Sentence commuted to ten years imprisonment with usual deduction for good conduct. The term to begin January 26, 1877.

This convict was one of four or five persons indicted for burglary in the first degree in Queens county. He turned State's evidence, and through his testimony the others were convicted.

As an inducement to testify against the other prisoners, the District Attorney promised him that he would ask for his pardon after he had been imprisoned four or five years. In pursuance of this agreement the District Attorney asked that a pardon be granted.

Solely upon the grounds above stated, I concluded to commute the convict's term to ten years, which, if he earns deduction for good conduct, will terminate his imprisonment August 25, 1883.

June 18, 1883. Joshua Gifford. Sentenced May 4, 1883; county, Oswego; crime, murder, first degree; sentenced to be hanged June 22, 1883. Sentence commuted to imprisonment in the Auburn State prison for the term of his natural life.

The offense of which this man was charged was the killing of his wife, on the 1st day of January, 1883, by repeated blows upon her head with an iron poker and a stick of stovewood.

A commutation of his sentence to life imprisonment was asked by a very great number of the best citizens of the locality where the trial was had, including many public officials.

The Judge who presided at the trial also earnestly recommended that the death sentence be commuted, and unhesitatingly declared that in his opinion such a course would be “in the interest of justice."

The testimony taken was very voluminous, nearly four weeks having been consumed upon the trial. I made quite a thorough examination of the evidence, fully appreciating that a sympathy, by no means discreditable, frequently prompts an appeal for clemency, and 'that my responsibility in this matter could neither be divided nor transferred.

The convict was seventy-seven years of age, and up to the time of his arrest had maintained a good character.

A number of years previous to his crime he married the woman whom he killed. It transpired upon the trial that they had not lived happily together, that they had quite frequently quarreled and once separated.

The killing of his wife by the convict was conceded, and the jury had only to determine whether, if the accused was responsible and was not justified, what was the grade of the homicide he had committed.

Upon the proof there could have been but little difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that there was no justification for the act and that the prisoner was entirely responsible

to the law.

But to constitute his act murder in the first degree, of which he was convicted, it was necessary, under the statute, that it should have been committed "from a deliberate and premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or of any human being."

The deliberation and premeditation, which are indispensable elements of this crime, could only have been inferred from certain facts which were proved. Upon a careful consideration of such facts, they appeared to be entirely consistent with the theory that the homicide was committed intentionally, but without deliberation or premeditation. This defines murder in the second degree, which is punishable by imprisonment in a State prison during life.

The verdict of a jury in such a case should not be lightly questioned or impeached. But when relief from the rigor of the law is invoked, a doubt in the mind of the Executive as to the existence of any element necessary to the crime, as found by the jury, may well be put in the scale with other considerations, on the side of clemency.

Such a doubt in this case, of which I could not rid myself; the advanced age of the convict; his previous good character and fair standing in the community; the almost universal sentiment of his neighbors in favor of his commutation; and the expressed opinion of the learned judge who heard the evidence and pronounced the sentence, that the punishment ' of death should not be inflicted, induced me to commute the sentence in this case from death to imprisonment in a State prison, during the natural life of the convict.

July 28, 1883. Aden Seymour. Sentenced May 1, 1883; county, Chemung; crime, intoxication and vagrancy; term, six months; prison, Monroe County Penitentiary.

Sentence commuted to three months imprisonment in the Monroe County Penitentiary from May 2, 1883, and to end August 1, 1883.

The sentence of this convict was commuted on the grounds: That he was entirely unknown, and was supposed to be a common tramp at the time and place of conviction, and received the punishment it was believed he deserved. Subsequent developments, however, disclosed the fact that he was in the city legitimately seeking employment, and that his antecedents were very respectable. The magistrate before whom the conviction was had joined in the application for the commutation of his sentence.

August 8, 1883. Michael Ready. Sentenced October 26, 1881; county, Onondaga; crime, grand larceny; term, five years; prison, Onondaga County Penitentiary.

The sentence was commuted to three years imprisonment in the Onondaga County Penitentiary, and to begin October 27, 1881.

The sentence in this case in view of all the facts connected with the commission of the offense, was a very severe one. The convict had behaved well in prison and seemed inclined to abandon evil ways and earnestly endeavor to become a useful citizen. The Judge who sentenced him recommended that his term be shortened, and I was convinced that some degree of clemency could be extended to him with a promise of good results.

I therefore determined to commute the sentence in this case to a term of three years. With this commutation the