THE UNITED STATES REVIEW. NOVEMBER, 1855. THE PRESIDENTIAL NEGATIVE-VETOS OF THE questions as to the power to be vested in the national executive, his term of office, and the salary to be paid him, occupied no small portion of the debates of the Convention of 1787, as reported by Mr. Madison. Several members were not only opposed to giving the President a suspensive veto upon the legislation of Congress, but also to his election for more than one term, and some, among whom was Dr. Franklin, were opposed to the payment of any salary or compensation to the President. It was more than once intimated that those members who favored the veto power and a reëlection for more than one term, favored monarchy. In reply to these insinuations, Mr. Madison said he "was not apprehensive of being thought to favor any step towards monarchy. The real object with him was to prevent its introduction. Experience had proved a tendency in our government to throw all power into the legislative vortex. The executives of the States are, in general, little more than ciphers; the legislatures omnipotent. If no effectual check be devised for restraining the instability and encroachments of the latter, The a revolution of some kind or other would be inevitable. preservation of republican government, therefore, required some expedient for the purpose, but required, evidently, at the same time, that, in devising it, the genuine principles of that form should be kept in view." If, at that early day, some restraints were necessary to prevent all power being absorbed "in the legislative vortex," how clearly has it since been demonstrated that some restraints were necessary to arrest unconstitutional and vicious legislation on the part of the two Houses of Congress. Even a qualified negative, however, encountered the strong prejudices of the people during the discussions in the Convention. General Hamilton, who in the Convention had supported the proposition not only for an executive for life, but for an absolute negative on the part of the executive, in the 67th No. of Publius (The Federalist) describes the prejudices of that day against the clause of the Constitution in the following language: "The authorities of a magistrate, in few instances greater than those of a governor of New-York, have been magnified into more than royal prerogatives. He has been decorated with attributes superior in dignity and splendor to those of a king of Great Britain. He has been shown us with the diadem sparkling on his brow and the imperial purple flowing in his train. He has been seated on a throne surrounded with minions and mistresses; giving audience to the envoys of foreign potentates in all the supercilious pomp of majesty. The images of Asiatic despotism and voluptuousness have not been wanting to crown the scene. We have been taught to tremble at the terrific visages of murdering janissaries; and to blush at the unveiled mysteries of a future seraglio." This is a vivid and without doubt a truthful delineation of the popular prejudice of a large portion of the people of the United States, at that period, growing out of their aversion to monarchy, from the government of which they had so lately been liberated. It is perhaps a matter of wonder that the members of the Convention of 1787 had the boldness to interweave in the Constitution, and to defend before the people, a proposition bearing even so distant an affinity to the royal prerogative, as the supensive veto. About three years after the adoption of our federal Constitution, the French people tried their hand at constitution-making. The debates in their National Convention exhibit a compound of philosophy, violence, and ferocity, foreshadowing the delirium which shortly thereafter pervaded the whole nation. The - question was, whether the king should be vested with an absolute, or a qualified veto merely suspending legislative action for one or two sessions. Poor Louis XVI., anxious to appear disinterested, addressed a memorial to the Assembly, disclaiming the prerogative of royalty the absolute veto-and desiring only the suspensive veto. Immediately on the receipt of this memorial, the party in the Assembly which had contended for the suspensive veto changed ground and maintained that the king had no right to renounce a prerogative which might be beneficial, in its exercise, for the public good - that it should be retained by him in spite of himself. A suspensive veto, however, was finally carried by a large majority; but it is well known that the first time the king had occasion to use it, and as he supposed for the public safety, he was ruined. The popular clamor, excited by the Jacobins, knew no bounds. The terms, Monsieur Veto and Madame Veto were applied among other gross insults to the king and queen. The same or similar terms of reproach have too often been applied to our patriotic presidents when they have had occasion to suspend by their negative an act of Congress designed to foster individual or local interests, and especially to President Jackson when grappling with that monster of privilege and fraud, the late Bank of the United States. Loud complaints have been made against the exercise of this so-called one-man power. But these clamors have never been heeded. Every intelligent man knows that the executive power, as it should be in a republic, is subordinate, not only to the legislative, but to the judicial. Notwithstanding the suspensive veto of the president, it must be admitted that Congress only has grasped at powers not granted by the Constitution. It is the legislature and not the executive, so far in the history of our country, which has assumed powers and forced upon the country measures detrimental to the public interest. "The propriety of a negative," says Gen. Hamilton, in the 73d No. of Publius, "has, upon some occasions, been combated by an observation, that it was not to be presumed a single man would possess more virtue or wisdom than a number of men; and that unless this presumption should be entertained, it would be improper to give the executive magistrate any species of control over the legislative body. But this observation, when examined, will appear rather specious than solid. The propriety of the thing does not turn upon the supposition of superior virtue or wisdom in the executive; but upon the supposition that the legislative will not be infallible; that the |