have committed the exercife of the powers of government. This chain may confift of one or more links; but in all cafes it fhould be fufficiently ftrong and difcernable.

To be left without guide or precedent was not the only difficulty, in which the convention were involved, by propofing to their conftituents a plan of a confederate republic. They found themselves embarrassed with another of peculiar delicacy and importance; I mean that of drawing a proper line between the national government, and the government of the several ftates. It was easy to discover a proper and fatisfactory principle on the fubject. Whatever object of government is confined in its operation and effects within the bounds of a particular state, should be confidered as belonging to the government of that ftate; whatever object of government extends in its operation or effects beyond the bounds of a particular state, should be confidered as belonging to the government of the United States; but though this principle be found and fatisfactory, its application to particular cafes would be accompanied with much difficulty; because in its application, room must be allowed for great difcretionary latitude of construction of the principle. In or der to leffen, or remove the difficulty, arifing from difcretionary construction on this fubject, an enumeration of particular inftances, in which the application of the principle ought to take place, has been attempted with much industry and care. It is only in mathematical science that a line can be defcribed with mathematical precifion. But I flatter myself that upon the strictest investigation, the enumeration will be found to be fafe and unexceptionable; and accurate too in as great a degree as accuracy can be expected in a fubject of this naParticulars under this head will be more properly explained, when we defcend to the minute view of the enumeration, which is made in the proposed constitution.

ture.

After all, it will be neceffary, that, on a fubject so peculiarly delicate as this, much prudence, much candour, much moderation and much liberality, fhould be exercised and difplayed both by the fœderal government and by the governments of the feveral ftates. It is to be hoped, that those virtues in government will be exercised and displayed, when we confider, that the powers of the fœderal government and thofe of the state governments are drawn from fources equally pure. If a difference can be discovered between them, it is in favor of the federal government, because that govern

ment is founded on a representation of the whole union; whereas the government of any particular state is founded only on the representation of a part, inconfiderable when compared with the whole. Is it not more reafonable to suppose, that the counfels of the whole will embrace the intereft of every part, than that the counfels of any part will embrace the interefts of the whole?

I intend not, fir, by this defcription of the difficulties with which the convention were furrounded, to magnify their fkill or their merit in furmounting them, or to infinuate that any predicament in which the convention ftood, fhould prevent the clofeft and moft cautious fcrutiny into the perform ance, which they have exhibited to their conftituents and to the world. My intention is of far other and higher aimto evince by the conflicts and difficulties which must arife from the many and powerful causes which I have enumerated, that it is hopeless and impracticable to form a conftitu- . tion, which, in every part, will be acceptable to every citizen, or even to every government in the United States; and that all which can be expected is, to form fuch a conftitution, as upon the whole, is the beft that can poffibly be obtained. Man and perfection!a ftate and perfection!an affemblage of states and perfection!-can we reasonably expect, however ardently we may wish to behold the glori

ous union?

I can well recollect, though I believe I cannot convey τό others the impreffion, which, on many occafions, was made by the difficulties which furrounded and pressed the convention. The great undertaking, at fome times, feemed to be at a ftand, at other times, its motion feemed to be retrograde. At the conclufion, however, of our work, many of the members expreffed their aftonishment at the fuccefs with which it terminated.

Having enumerated fome of the difficulties, which the convention were obliged to encounter in the course of their proceedings, I fhall next point out the end, which they propofed to accomplish. Our wants, our talents, our affections, our paffions, all tell us that we were made for a state of fociety. But a state of fociety could not be fupported long or happily without fome civil restraint. It is true, that, in a state of nature, any one individual may act uncontrolled by others ; but it is equally true, that in fuch a state, every other individual may act uncontrolled by him. act uncontrolled by him. Amidft this uni

verfal independence, the diffentions and animofities between interfering members of the fociety, would be numerous and ungovernable. The confequence would be, that each member, in fuch a natural ftate, would enjoy lefs liberty, and fuffer more interruption, than he would in a regulated fociety. Hence the univerfal introduction of governments of fome kind or other into the focial ftate. The liberty of every member is encreased by this introduction; for each gains more by the limitation of the freedom of every other member, than he lofes by the limitation of his own. The refult is, that civil government is neceffary to the perfection and happiness of man. In forming this government, and carrying it into execution, it is effential that the intereft and authority of the whole community fhould be binding in every part of it.

The foregoing principles and conclufions are generally admitted to be juft and found with regard to the nature and formation of single governments, and the duty of fubmiffion to them. In fome cafes they will apply, with much propriety and force, to states already formed. The advantages and neceffity of civil government among individuals in fociety, are not greater or stronger than, in fome fituations and circumstances, are the advantages and neceffity of a fœderal government among ftates. A natural and a very important. question now prefents itself---is fuch the fituation-are fuch the circumstances of the United States? A proper anfwer to this question will unfold fome very interefting truths.

The United States may adopt any one of four different fyftems. They may become confolidated into one government, in which the feparate exiftence of the states fhall be entirely abforbed. They may reject any plan of union or affociation, and act as feparate and unconnected states. They may form two or more confederacies. They may unite in one fœderal republic. Which of these systems ought to have been formed by the convention? To fupport, with vigour, a fingle government over the whole extent of the United States, would demand a fyftem of the most unqualified and the most unremitted defpotifm.-Such a number of feparate ftates, contiguous in fituation, unconnected and difunited in government, would be, at one time, the prey of foreign force, foreign influence, and, foreign intrigue; at another, the victim of mutual rage, rancour and revenge.

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Neither of these systems found advocates in the late convention: I prefume they will not find advocates in this. Would it be proper to divide the United States into two or more confederacies? It will not be unadvifeable to take a more minute furvey of this fubject. Some afpects, under which it may be viewed, are far from being, at first fight, uninviting. Two or more confederacies would be each more compact and more manageable than a fingle one extending over the fame territory. By dividing the United States into two or more confederacies, the great collifion of interefts, apparently or really different and contrary, 'in the whole extent of their dominion, would be broken, and, in a great measure, difappear in the feveral parts. But thefe difadvantages, which are difcovered from certain points of view, are greatly overbalanced by inconveniences that will appear on a more accurate examination. Animofities, and, perhaps wars, would arife from affigning the extent, the limits, and the rights of the different confederacies. The expences of governing would be multiplied by the number of foederal governments. The danger refulting from foreign influence and mutual diffentions, would not, perhaps, be lefs great and alarming in the inftance of different confederacies, than in the inftance of different though more numerous unaffociated ftates. These obfervations, and many others that might be made on the fubject, will be fufficient to evince, that a divifion of the United States into a number of feparate confederacies, would probably be an unfatisfactory and an unfuccefsful experiment. The remaining fyftem which the American states may adopt, is a union of them under one confederate republic. It will not be neceffary to employ much time, or many arguments to fhew, that this is the moft eligible fyftem that can be propofed. By adopting this fyftem, the vigour and decifion of a wide-fpreading monarchy may be joined to the freedom and beneficence of a contracted republic. The extent of territory, the diverfity of climate and foil, the number, and greatnefs, and connection of lakes and rives, with which the United States are interfected and almoft furrounded, all indicate an enlarged government to be fit and advantageous for them. The principles and difpofitions of their citizens, indicate that in this government, liberty fhall reign triumphant. Such indeed have been the general opinions and wifhes entertained fince the era of independence. If thofe opinions and wishes are as well-founded as they have been general, the late con

vention were justified in proposing to their co nftituents, cne confederate republic, as the beft fyftem of a national govern ment for the United States.

In forming this fyftem, it was proper to give minute attention to the intereft of all the parts; but there was a duty of ftill higher import-to feel and to fhew a predominating regard to the fuperior interefts of the whole. If this great principle had not prevailed, the plan before us would never have made its appearance. The fame principle that was fo neceffary in forming it, is equally neceffary in our deliberations, whether we fhould reject or ratify it.

I make these obfervations with a defign to prove and illuftrate this great and important truth-that in our decifions on the work of the late convention, we fhould not limit our views and regards to the state of Pennsylvania. The aim of the convention was to form a fyftem of good and efficient government on the more extensive scale of the United States. In this, and in every other inftance, the work fhould be judged with the fame fpirit, with which it was performed. A principle of duty as well as candour demands this.

We have remarked, that civil government is neceffary to the perfection of fociety: We now remark that civil liberty is neceffary to the perfection of civil government. Civil liberty is natural liberty itself, divested only of that part, which, placed in the government, produces more good and happiness to the community, than if it had remained in the individual. Hence it follows, that civil liberty, while it refigns a part of natural liberty, retains the free and generous exercife of all the human faculties, fo far as it is compatible with the public welfare.

In confidering and developing the nature and end of the fyftem before us, it is neceffary to mention another kind of liberty, which has not yet, as far as I know, received a name. I fhall diftinguifh it by the appellation of fæderal liberty. When a fingle government is inftituted, the individuals, of which it is compofed, furrender to it a part of their natural independence, which they before enjoyed as men. When a confederate republic is inftituted, the commmunities, of which it is compofed, furrender to it a part of their political independence, which they before enjoyed as ftates. The principles, which directed, in the former cafe, what part of the natural liberty of the man ought to be given up, and what part ought to be retained, will give fimilar directions in the latter cafe. The ftates fhould refign, to the national go