I had the honor of giving a definition, and I believe it was a juft one, of what is called an ariftocratic government. It is a government where the fupreme power is not retained by the people, but resides in a select body of men, who either fill up the vacancies that happen, by their own choice and election, or fucceed on the principle of defcent, or by virtue of territorial poffeffions, or fome other qualifications that are not the refult of perfonal properties. When I speak of perfonal properties, I mean the qualities of the head and the difpofition of the heart. We are told that the reprefentatives will not be known to the people, nor the people to the reprefentatives, because they will be taken from large diftricts where they cannot be particularly acquainted. There has been fome experience in feveral of the ftates, upon this fubject, and I believe the experience of all who have had experience, demonftrates that the larger the diftrict of election, the better the reprefentation. It is only in remote corners of a government, that little demagogues arife. Nothing but real weight of character, can give a man real influence over a large diftrict. This is remarkably fhewn in the commonwealth of Maffachusetts. The members of the houfe of reprefentatives, are chofen in very fmall diftricts, and fuch has been the influence of party cabal and little intrigue in them, that a great majority feem inclined to fhew very little disapprobation of the conduct of the infurgents in that state. The governor is chofen by the people at large, and that ftate is much larger than any district need be under the propofed conftitution. In their choice of their governor, they have had warm difputes; but however warm the difputes, their choice only vibrated between the moit eminent characters. Four of their candidates are well known; Mr. Hancock, Mr. Bowdoin, general Lincoln, and Mr. Gerham, the late prefident of congrefs. I apprehend it is of more, confequence to be able to know the true intereft of the people, than their faces, and of more confequence fill, to have virtue enough to purfue the means of carrying that knowledge ufefully into effect. And furely when it has been thought hitherto, that a reprefentation in congrefs of from five to two members, was fufficient to reprefent the intereft of this ftate, is it not more than fufficient to have ten members in that body? and thofe in 1 greater comparative proportion than heretofore? The ciens of Pennsylvania will be reprefented by eight, and the 1 1 ftate by two. This, certainly, though not gaining enough, L I had the honor of giving a definition, and I believe it was a juft one, of what is called an ariftocratic government. It is a government where the fupreme power is not retained by the people, but refides in a felect body of men, who either fill up the vacancies that happen, by their own choice and election, or fucceed on the principle of defcent, or by virtue of territorial poffeffions, or fome other qualifications that are not the refult of perfonal properties. When I fpeak of perfonal properties, I mean the qualities of the head and the difpofition of the heart. We are told that the representatives will not be known to the people, nor the people to the reprefentatives, because they will be taken from large diftricts where they cannot be particularly acquainted. There has been fome experience in feveral of the ftates, upon this fubject, and I believe the experience of all who have had experience, demonftrates that the larger the diftrict of election, the better the reprefentation. It is only in remote corners of a government, that little demagogues arife. Nothing but real weight of character, can give a man real influence over a large diftrict. This is remarkably fhewn in the commonwealth of Maffachusetts. The members of the houfe of reprefentatives, are chofen in very fmall diftricts, and fuch has been the influence of party cabal and little intrigue in them, that a great majority feem inclined to fhew very little disapprobation of the conduct of the infurgents in that ftate. The governor is chofen by the people at large, and that ftate is much larger than any district need be under the propofed conftitution. In their choice of their governor, they have had warm difputes; but however warm the difputes, their choice only vibrated between the most eminent characters. Four of their candidates are well known; Mr. Hancock, Mr. Bowdoin, general Lincoln, and Mr. Gorham, the late prefident of congrefs. I apprehend it is of more, confequence to be able to know the true intereft of the people, than their faces, and of more confequence fill, to have virtue enough to purfue the means of carrying that knowledge ufefully into effect. And furely when it has been thought hitherto, that a representation: in congrefs of from five to two members, was fufficient to reprefent the intereft of this ftatè, is it not more than fufficient to have ten members in that body? and thofe in a greater comparative proportion than heretofore? The citizens of Pennfylvania will be reprefented by eight, and the ftate by two. This, certainly, though not gaining enough, is gaining a good deal; the members will be more diftributed through the ftate, being the immediate choice of the people, who hitherto have not been reprefented in that body. It is faid that the house of reprefentatives will be subject to corruption, and the fenate poffefs the means of corrupting, by the fhare they have in the appointment to office. This was not fpoken in the foft language of attachment to government. It is perhaps impoffible, with all the caution of legiflators and ftatefmen, to exclude corruption and undue influence entirely from government. All that can be done,' upon this fubject, is done in the conftitution before you. Yet it behoves us to call out, and add, every guard and preventative in our power. I think, fir, fomething very important, on this fubject, is done in the prefent fyllem. For it has been provided, effectually, that the man that has been bribed by an office, fhall have it no longer in his power to earn his wages. The moment he is engaged to ferve the fenate, in confequence of their gift, he no longer has it in his power to fit in the houfe of reprefentatives. For "no reprefentative fhall, during the term for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office, under the authority of the United States, which thall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during fuch time :" And the following annihilates corruption of that kind. "And no perfon holding any office under the United States, fhall be a member of either houfe, during his continuance in office." So that the mere acceptance of an office as a bribe, effectually deftroys the end for which it was offered. Was this attended to when it was mentioned, that the members of the one houfe could be bribed by the other? "But the members of the fenate may enrich themfelves," was an obfervation, made as an objection to this fyftem. As the mode of doing this has not been pointed out, I apprehend the objection is not much relied upon. The fenate are incapable of receiving any money, except what is paid them out of the public treafury. They cannot vote to themfelves a fingle penny, unlefs the propofition originates from the other house. This objection therefore is vifionary, like the following one, "that pictured groupe, that numerous hoft, and prodigious fwarm of officers, which are to be appointed under the general government." The gentlemen L tell you that there must be judges of the fupreme, and juďges of the inferior courts, with all their appendages:there will be tax-gatherers fwarming throughout the land. Oh! fay they, if we could enumerate the offices, and the numerous officers that must be employed every day, in collecting and receiving, and comptrolling the monies of the United States, the number would be almoft beyond imagination. I have been told, but I do not vouch for the fact, that there are in one thape or another, more than a thoufand perfons in this very ftate, who get their living in affeffing and collecting our revenues from the other citizens. Sir, when this bufinefs of revenue is conducted on a general plan, we may be able to do the bufinefs of the thirteen ftates, with an equal, nay, with a lefs number-inftead of thirteen comptroller generals, one comptroller will be fufficient; I apprehend, that the number of officers, under this fyftein, will be greatly reduced from the number now employed. For as congrefs can now do nothing effectually, the ftates are obliged to do every thing. And in this very point, I apprehend, that we fhall be great gainers. Sir, I confefs I with the powers of the fenate were not as they are. I think it would have been better if thofe powers had been diftributed in other parts of the fyftem. I mentioned fome circumftances in the forenoon, that I had obferved on this fubject. I may mention now, we may think ourfelves very well off, fir, that things are as well as they are, and that that body is even fo much reftricted. But furely objections of this kind come with a bad grace from the advocates, or thofe who prefer the prefent confederation, and who with only to encreafe the powers of the prefent congrefs. A fingle body, not conftituted with checks, like the propofed one, who poffefs not only the power of making treaties, but executive powers, would be a perfect defpotifm; but, further, thefe powers are, in the present confederation, poffeffed without control. As I mentioned before, fo I will beg leave to repeat, that this fenate can do nothing without the concurrence of fome other branch of the government. With regard to their concern in the appointment to offices, the prefident muft nominate before they can be chofen; the prefident must acquiefce in that appointment. With regard to their power in forming treaties, they can make none, they are only auxi |