preferving the union. They with a principle established, by the operation of which the legislatures may feel the direct authority of the people. The people poffeffing that authority, will continue to exercife it by amending and improving their own work. This conftitution may be found to have defects in it; amendments hence may become neceffary; but the idea of a government founded on contract, deftroys the means of improvement. We hear it every time the gentlemen are up, "fhall we violate the confederation, which directs every alteration that is thought neceffary to be established by the ftate legiflatures only." Sir, thofe gentlemen muft afcend to a higher fource; the people fetter themselves by no contract. If your ftate legiflaturcs have cramped themselves by compact, it was done without the authority of the people, who alone poffefs the fupreme power.

I have already fhewn, that this fyftem is not a compact or contract; the fyftem itself tells you what it is; it is an ordinance and establishment of the people. I think that the force of the introduction to the work, muft by this time have been felt. It is not an unmeaning flourish. The expreflions declare, in a practical manner, the principle of this conftitution. It is ordained and established by the people themselves; and we, who give our votes for it, are merely the proxies of our conftituents. We fign it as their attornies, and as to ourselves, we agree to it as individuals.

We are told by honorable gentlemen in oppofition," that the prefent confederation fhould have been continued, but that additional powers fhould have been given to it: That fuch was the business of the late convention, and that they had affumed to themfelves, the power of propofing another in its ftead; and that which is propofed, is fuch an one as was not expected by the legislatures nor by the people. I apprehend this would have been a very infecure, very inadequate, and a very pernicious mode of proceeding. Under the prefent confederation, congrefs certainly do not poffefs fufficient power; but one body of men we know they are; and were they invested with additional powers, they muft become dangerous. Did not the honorable gentleman himself tell us, that the powers of government, vefted either in one man, or one body of men, formed the very defcription of tyranny? To have placed in the prefent, the legislative,

the executive and judicial authority, all of which are effential to the general government, would indubitably have produced the fevereit defpotifm. From this fhort deduction, one of these two things must have appeared to the convention, and must appear to every man, who is at the pains of thinking on the fubject. It was indifpenfably neceffary, either to make a new diftribution of the powers of government, or to give fuch powers to one body of men, as would constitute a tyranny. If it was proper to avoid tyranny, it becomes requifite to avoid placing additional powers in the hands of a congrefs, conftituted like the prefent; hence the conclufion is warranted, that a different organization ought to take place.

Our next enquiry ought to be, whether this is the most proper difpofition and organization of the neceffary powers. But before I confider this fubject, I think it proper to notice one fentiment, expreffed by an honorable gentleman from the county of Cumberland (Mr. Whitehill;) he afferts the extent of the government is too great, and this fyftem cannot be executed. What is the confequence, if this affertion is true? It ftrikes directly at the root of the union.

I admit, Mr. Prefident, there are great difficulties in adopting a fyftem of good and free governments to the extent of our country. But I am fure that our interefts as citizens, as ftates and as a nation, depend effentially upon an union. This conftitution is propofed to accomplish that great and defirable end. Let the experiment be made; let the fyftem be fairly and candidly tried, before it is determined that it cannot be executed.

I proceed to another objection; for I mean to anfwer those that have been fuggefted, fince I had the honor of addreffing you last week. It has been alleged by honorable gentlemen, that this general government poffeffes powers, for internal purposes, and that the general government cannot exercife internal powers. The honorable member from Weftmoreland (Mr. Findley) dilates on this fubject, and instances the oppofition that was made by the colonies against GreatBritain, to prevent her impofing internal taxes or excifes. And before the fœderal government will be able to impofe the one, or obtain the other, he confiders it neceffary that it fhould poffefs power for every internal purpose.

Let us examine thefe objections; if this government does not poffefs internal as well as external power, and that pow

er for internal as well as external purpofes, I apprehend,
that all that has hitherto been done, muft go for nothing.
I apprehend a government that cannot answer the pupofes
for which it is intended, is not a government for this country.
I know that congrefs, under the prefent articles of confede-
ration, poffefs no internal power, and we fee the confe-
quences; they can recommend ; they can go further, they
can make requifitions, but there they muft ftop. For as far
as I recollect, after making a law, they cannot take a single
ftep towards carrying it into execution. I believe it will be
found in experience, that with regard to the exercise of
internal powers, the general government will not be unne-
ceffarily rigourous. The future collection of the duties and
impofts, will, in the opinion of fome, fupercede the neceffity
of having recourfe to internal taxation. The United States
will not, perhaps, be often under the neceffity of using this
power at all; but if they fhould, it will be exercised only in
a moderate degree. The good fenfe of the citizens of the
United States, is not to be alarmed by the picture of taxes
collected at the point of the bayonet.
There is no
more reafon to fuppofe, that the delegates and reprefenta-
tives in congrefs, any more than the legislature of Pennfyl-
vania, or any other state, will act in this manner. Infinu-
ations of this kind, made against one body of men, and not
against another, though both the reprefentatives of the peo-
ple, are not made with propriety, nor will they have the
weight of argument. I apprehend the greatest part of the
revenue will arise from external taxation. But certainly it,
would have been very unwife in the late convention to have
omitted the addition of the other powers; and I think it
would be very unwife in this convention, to refufe to
adopt this conftitution, because it grants congrefs power to
lay and collect taxes, for the purpose of providing for the
common defence and general welfare of the United States.

What is to be done to effect thefe great purpofes, if an impost should be found infufficient? Suppofe a war was fuddenly declared against us by a foreign power, poffeffed of a formidable navy, our navigation would be laid proftrate, our imposts must ceafe; and fhall our existence as a nation, depend upon the peaceful navigation of our feas? A ftrong exertion of maratime power, on the part of an enemy, might deprive us of these sources of revenue in a few months. It may fuit honorable gentlemen, who live at the western

extremity of this ftate, that they fhould contribute nothing, by internal taxes, to the fupport of the general government. They care not what reftraints are laid upon our commerce; for what is the commerce of Philadelphia to the inhabitants on the other fide the Alleghany Mountain? But though it may fuit them, it does not fuit thofe in the lower part of the ftate, who are by far the most numerous. Nor can we agree that our fafety fhould depend altogether upon a revenue arifing from commerce.

Excife may be a neceffary mode of taxation; it takes place in moft ftates already.

The capitation tax is mentioned as one of thofe that are exceptionable. In fome ftates, that mode of taxation is used; but I believe in many, it would be received with great reluctance; there are one or two ftates, where it is conftantly in use, and without any difficulties and inconveniences arifing from it. An excife, in its very principles, is an improper tax, if it could be avoided; but yet it has been a fource of revenue in Pennsylvania, both before the revolution and fince; during all which time, we have enjoyed the benefit of free government.

I prefume, fir, that the executive powers of government ought to be commenfurate with the government itfelf, and that a government which cannot act in every part, is fo far defective. Confequently it is neceffary, that congrefs poffefs powers to tax internally, as well as externally.

It is objected to this fyftem, that under it there is no fovereignty left in the ftate governments. I have had occafion to reply to this already; but I fhould be very glad to know at what period the state governments became poffeffed of the fupreme power. On the principle on which I found my arguments, and that is the principle of this conftitution, the fupreme power refides in the people. If they chufe to indulge a part of their fovereign power to be exercifed by the ftate governments, they may. If they have done it, the ftates were right in exercifing it; but if they think it no longer fafe or convenient, they will refume it, or make a new diftribution, more likely to be productive of that good, which ought to be our conftant aim.

The power both of the general government, and the state governments, under this fyftem, are acknowledged to be fo many emanations of power from the people. The great object now to be attended to, instead of difagreeing about

who fhall poffefs the fupreme power, is to confider whether the prefent arrangement is well calculated to promote and fecure the tranquillity and happiness of our common country. Thefe are the dictates of found and unfophifticated fenfe, and what ought to employ the attention and judgment of this honorable body.

We are next told, by the honorable gentlemen in oppofition (as indeed we have been from the beginning of the debates in this convention, to the conclufion of their speeches yesterday) that this is a confolidated government, and will abolish the ftate governments. Definitions of a confolidated government have been called for; the gentlemen gave us what they termed definition, but it does not feem, to me at least, that they have as yet expreffed clear ideas upon that fubject. I will endeavour to state their different ideas upon this point. The gentleman from Weftmoreland (Mr. Findley) when fpeaking on this fubject, fays, that he means by a confolidation, that government which puts the thirteen states into one.

The honorable gentleman from Fayette (Mr. Smilie) gives you this definition: "What I mean by a confolidated government, is one that will transfer the fovereignty from the state governments, to the general government.

The honorable member from Cumberland (Mr. Whitehill) instead of giving you a definition, fir, tells you again, that "it is a confolidated government, and we have proved it fo."

Thefe, I think, fir, are the different defcriptions given us of a confolidated government. As to the firft, that it is a confolidated government, that puts the thirteen United States into one; if it is meant, that the general government will deftroy the governments of the ftates, I will admit that fuch a government would not fuit the people of America: It would be improper for this country, because it could not be proportioned to its extent on the principles of freedom. But that defcription does not apply to the fyftem before you. This, inftead of placing the ftate governments in jeopardy, is founded on their exiftence. On this principle, its organi zation depends; it muft ftand or fall, as the ftate governments are fecured or ruined. Therefore, though this may be a very proper description of a confolidating government, yet it must be difregarded as inapplicable to the propofed conftitution. It is not treated with decency, when fuch infinuations are offered against it.