may not poffefs more wifdom or patriotifm, than what may be found in a fingle body, yet they will neceffarily introduce a greater degree of precifion. An indigefted and inaccurate code of laws, is one of the most dangerous things that can be introduded into any government. The force of this obfervation is well known by every gentleman that has attended to the laws of this ftate. This, fir, is a very important advantage, that will arife from this divifion of the legislative authority.

I will proceed now to take some notice of a still further reftraint upon the legislature---I mean the qualified negative of the prefident. I think this will be attended with very important advantages, for the fecurity and happiness of the people of the United States. The prefident, fir, will not be a stranger to our country, to our laws, or to our wishes. He will, under this conftitution, be placed in office as the prefident of the whole union, and will be chosen in such a manner that he may be justly ftiled THE MAN OF THE PEOPLE; being elected by the different parts of the United States, he will confider himself as not particularly interested for any one of them, but will watch over the whole with paternal care and affection. This will be the natural conduct to recommend himself to those who placed him in that high chair, and I confider it as a very important advantage, that such a man muft have every law prefented to him, before it can become binding upon the United States. He will have before him the fulleft information of our fituation, he will avail himself not only of records and official communications, foreign and domeftic, but he will have alfo the advice of the executive officers in the different departments of the general government.

If in confequence of this information and advice, he exercife the authority given to him, the effect will not be loft-he returns his objections, together with the bill, and unlefs two thirds of both branches of the legislature are now found to approve it, it does not become a law. But even if his objections do not prevent its paffing into a law, they will not be ufelefs; they will be kept together with the law, and, in the archives of congrefs, will be valuable and practical materials, to form the minds of pofterity for legislation—if it is found that the law operates inconveniently, or oppreffively, the people may difcover in the prefident's objections, the fource of that inconvenience or oppreffion. Further, fir,

when objections fhall have been made, it is provided, in order to fecure the greatest degree of caution and reponfibility, that the votes of both houses fhall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the perfons, voting for and against the bill, fhall be entered in the journal of each house respectively. Thus much I have thought proper to fay, with regard to the diftribution of the legislative authority, and the restraints under which it will be exercised.

The gentleman in oppofition ftrongly infifts, that the general clause at the end of the eighth fection, gives to congrefs a power of legiflating generally; but I cannot conceive by what means he will render the word fufceptible of that expanfion. Can the words, the congrefs fhall have power to make all laws, which fhall be neceflary and proper to carry into execution the foregoing powers, be capable of giving them general legiflative power?-I hope that it is not meant to give to congrefs merely an illufive fhew of authority, to deceive themselves or conftituents any longer. On the contrary, I trust it is meant, that they fhall have the power of carrying into effect the laws, which they fhall make under the powers vested in them by this conftitution. In answer to the gentleman from Fayette (Mr. Smilie,) on the subject of the prefs, I beg leave to make an observation; it is very true, fir, that this conftitution fays nothing with regard to that fubject, nor was it neceffary, because it will be found, that there is given to the general government no power whatfover concerning it; and no law in pursuance of the conftitution, can poffibly be enacted, to deftroy that liberty.

I heard the honorable gentleman make this general assertion, that the Congrefs was certainly vefted with power to make fuch a law, but I would be glad to know by what part of this conftitution fuch a power is given? Until that is done, I fhall not enter into a minute investigation of the matter, but shall at prefent fatisfy myfelf with giving an anfwer to a question that has been put. It has been asked, if a law should be made to punish libels, and the judges thould proceed under that law, what chance would the printer have of an acquittal? And it has been faid he would drop into a den of devouring monsters.

I prefume it was not in the view of the honorable gentle. man to say there is no fuch thing as a libel, or that the writers of fuch ought not to be punished. The idea of the liberty of the prefs, is not carried fo far as this in any country

what is meant by the liberty of the prefs is, that there should be no antecedent restraint upon it; but that every author is refponsible when he attacks the fecurity or welfare of the government, or the fafety, character and property of the individual.

With regard to attacks upon the public, the mode of proceeding is by a profecution. Now if a libel is written, it must be within fome one of the United States, or the district of congrefs. With regard to that diftrict, I hope it will take care to preferve this as well as the other rights of freemen; for whatever diftrict congrefs may chufe, the ceffion of it cannot be completed without the confent of its inhabitants. Now fir, if this libel is to be tried, it must be tried where the offence was committed; for under this conftitution, as declared in the second section of the third article, the trial must be held in the ftate; thereforeon this occafion it must be tried where itwas published, if the indictment is for publishing; and it must be tried likewife by a jury of that ftate. Now I would alk, is the perfon profecuted in a worfe fituation under the general government, even if it had the power to make laws on this fubject, than he is at prefent under the state government? It is true, there is no particular regulation made, to have the jury come from the body of the county in which the offence was committed; but there are some states in which this mode of collecting juries is contrary to their established cuftom, and gentlemen ought to confider that this conftitution was not meant merely for Pennfylvania. In fome states the juries are not taken from a fingle county. In Virginia, the fheriff, I believe, is not confined, even to the inhabitants of the ftate, but is at liberty to take any man he pleases, and put him on the jury. In Maryland. I think a fett of jurors ferve for the whole Weftern Shore, and another for the Eastern Shore.

I beg to make one remark on what one gentleman has faid, with refpect to amendments being propofed to this conftitution. To whom are the cconvention to make report of fuch amendments? He tells you, to the prefent congrefs. I do not wish to report to that body, the reprefentatives only of the ftate governments; they may not be difpofed to admit the people into a participation of their power. It has also been fuppofed, that a wonderful unanimity fubfifts among thofe who are enemies to the propofed fyftem. On this point I alfo differ from the gentleman who made the

obfervation. I have taken every pains in my power, and read every publication I could meet with, in order to gain information; and as far as I have been able to judge, the oppofition is inconfiderable and inconfiftent. Inftead of agree-. ing in their objections, thofe who make them, bring forward fuch as are diametrically oppofite. On one hand, it is faid, that the reprefentation in congrefs is too fmall; on the other, it is faid to be too numerous. Some think the authority of. the fenate too great; fome that of the house of reprefentatives; and fome that of both. Others draw their fears. from the powers of the prefident; and like the iron race of Cadmus, thefe opponents rife, only to deftroy each other.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1787, A. M.

MR. WILSON.

Take detached parts of any fyftem whatsoever, in the manner these gentlemen have hitherto taken this constitution, and you will make it abfurd and inconfiftent with itself. Í do not confine this obfervation to human performances alone; it will apply to divine writings. An anecdote, which I have, heard, exemplifies this obfervation: When Sternhold and Hopkin's verfion of the pfalms was usually fung in churches, a line was first read by the clerk, and then fung by the congregation. A failor had stepped in, and heard the clerk read this line:

"The Lord will come, and he will not-"

The failor ftared; and when the clerk read the next line,, "Keep filence; but speak out,'

the failor left the church, thinking the people were not in their fenfes.

This ftory may convey an idea of the treatment of the plan before you; for although it contains found fenfe, when connected, yet by the detached manner of confidering it, it appears highly abfurd.

MR. WILSON.

Much fault has been found with the mode of expreffion, ufed in the firft claufe of the ninth fection of the first article. I believe I can affign a reason, why that mode of expreffion was used, and why the term flave was not directly

H

admitted in this constitution ;-and as to the manner of lay ing taxes, this is not the first time that the fubject has come' into the view of the United States, and of the legislatures of the feveral ftates. The gentleman (Mr. Findley) will recollect, that in the prefent congrefs, the quota of the foederal debt, and general expences, was to be in proportion to the value of LAND, and other enumerated property, within the ftates. After trying this for a number of years, it was found on all hands, to be a mode that could not be carried into execution. Congrefs were fatisfied of this, and in the year 1783, recommended, in conformity with the powers they 'poffefs'd under the articles of confederation, that the quota fhould be according to the number of free peóple, including those bound to fervitude, and excluding Indians not taxed. These were the very expreffions used in 1783, and the fate of this recommendation was fimilar to all their other refolutions. It was not carried into effect, but it was adopted by no fewer than eleven, out of thirteen ftates; and it can not but be matter of furprife, to hear gentlemen, who agreed to this very mode of expreffion at that time, come forward and ftate it as an objection on the prefent occafion. It was natural, fir, for the late convention, to adopt the mode after it had been agreed to by eleven states, and to use the expreffion, which they found had been received as unexceptionable before. With refpect to the claufe, reftricting congrefs from prohibiting the migration or importation of fuch perfons, as any of the ftates now exifting, fhall think proper to admit, prior to the year 1808. The honorable gentleman fays, that this claufe is not only dark, but intended to grant to congrefs, for that time, the power to admit the importation of flaves. No fuch thing was intended; but I will tell you what was done, and it gives me high pleasure, that fo much was done. Under the prefent confederation, the ftates may admit the importation of flaves as long as they pleafe; but by this article after the year 1808, the congrefs will have power to prohibit fuch importation, notwithstanding the difpofitian of any ftate to the contrary. I confider this as laying the foundation for banishing flavery out of this country; and though the period is more diftant than I could with, yet it will produce the fame kind, gradual change, which was purfued in Pennsylvania. It is with much fatisfaction I view this power in the general government, whereby they may lay