"needy and distressed people"; it has appropriated billions for the setting up of a Reconstruction Finance Corporation,18 Home Owners' Loan Corporation, and the Federal Housing Corporation.20 None of the enumerated powers would justify these (purchase of Florida from Spain, Alaska from Russia) expenditures. Yet surely no one would presume to say that Congress exceeded its power in making the Louisiana purchase, or in setting up the Geological Survey, which has increased the natural resources, or that Congress should never have contributed to the country's educational needs. It is thus entirely clear that wholly without regard to the enumerated powers, Congress may use Federal moneys for any purpose which it deems will accomplish the "general welfare". Surely it could not be said that a bill which will provide a system of unemployment and social insurance for millions of unemployed, sick, disabled, and aged, is less for the "general welfare" than any of the bills which have just been mentioned. If Congress passes the bill, it will thereby declare that, in its judgment, the bill is for the "general welfare" and no court has the power to substitute its judgment on this question for that of Congress. The fact is that the Supreme Court has itself stated that it has never in its entire existence, attempted to set limitations to the power of Congress to appropriate moneys.21 On the contrary, the Supreme Court has explicitly declared that the exercise of the appropriating power is not a subject for judicial consideration.22 The Supreme Court has appreciated that if individual taxpayers were permitted to harass and obstruct the Federal Government with questions as to the propriety of national expenditures, that this would render unworkable the whole machinery of the Federal Government. There is a case in which a taxpayer tried to stop the Secretary of the Treasury from paying out moneys for the construction of the Panama Canal.23 The United States Supreme Court declared that the taxpayer could not interfere. The Court pointed out that the taxpayer could not show any "direct injury", since he could not point to any property belonging to him which was directly affected by the way the Federal Government spent its money. After all, the money in the United States Treasury appropriated, might very well be interest on the foreign debts or the proceeds of the sale of Government property and no taxpayer could point to any specific tax or any specific moneys paid by him which was used for the appropriation in question. The United States Supreme Court, however, went much further than this technical argument with respect to the matter of "direct injury." The Court declared explicitly that the question of the purpose for which Congress may use moneys, is a legislative question, not a judicial one. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has deemed itself to be without power to pass upon the propriety of the exercise by Congress of its appropriating power.24 Clearly, the bill is not merely a wholly constitutional exercise of the appropriating power, but there is no way by which the propriety of the exercise of the appropriating power can be questioned. II. THE BILL DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER While the bill does indeed invest the Secretary of Labor with large discretion, this does not render the bill unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court has, again and again, sustained delegations of power to the President, Cabinet officers, and commissions. The Court has recognized that Congress might very well find it impossible to do more than to "lay down an intelligible principle to which the person or body administering the bill is directed to conform." 25 The Court has appreciated the practical difficulty of fixing precise and definite standards in advance of the complex contingencies certain to arise and has recognized that Congress might "form the necessities of the case, be compelled to leave to the executive officers, the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute." 26 Thus, the Tariff Act of 1922 was held constitutional, 17 Emergency Relief and Construction Act, 1932, 47 Stat. 709, July 21, 1932, c. 520. 18 Jan. 22, 1932, c. 8, 47 Stat. 5. 19 June 13, 1933, c. 64, 48 Stat. 128. 20 National Housing Act, No. 479, 73d Congress, approved by President, June 27, 1934. n Mass. v. Mellon, 262 Ú. S. 447, 487-88; in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, U. S. v. Realty Co., supra, and Mass. v. Mellon, supra, the Supreme Court refused to pass on the question of the propriety of the exercise of the appropriating powers. 22 Mass. v. Mellon, supra. 23 Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24. 24 Mass. v. Mellon, Wilson v. Shaw, U. S. v. Realty Co., supra. 25 Hampden v. U. S., 276 U. S. 394. 26 Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 496. although it vested the President with the power to raise or lower the tariff upon any imported article whenever it found that the American products were at a competitive disadvantage with those imported from abroad.27 A much broader power was held to have been constitutionally delegated to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue by the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921, which authorized the Commissioner to adjust the rate of excess-profits tax.28 Again an act of Congress, which gave the Secretary of the Treasury, on the recommendation of experts, the power to fix and establish standards of purity, quality, and fitness for consumption of certain commodities imported into the United States, was held constitutional.29 In the recent "hot oil" case the United States Supreme Court has, it is true, declared that the "hot oil" control clause of the N. R. A. was invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. But, in that case, no "primary purpose" or "primary standard" was clearly stated. The legislation there considered is wholly distinguishable from this bill for here a primary purpose is stated, and it is clear that the Secretary of Labor is not invested by this bill with anything more than a properly constitutional "administrative discretion". Indeed, the discretion invested in the Secretary of Labor is narrow, for the beneficiaries who are to receive the compensation are named, the minimum compensation is prescribed, the maximum compensation is ascertainable, and the nature of the compensation is fixed. Certainly the discretion here vested in the Secretary of Labor is far less wide than that vested in the Secretary of Agriculture by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.31 In the latter bill, the Secretary of Agriculture was granted the power "to provide for rental or benefit payments in connection with crop-reduction in such amounts as the Secretary deems fair and reasonable." The Congress which found no difficulty in regarding the Agricultural Adjustment Act as a constitutionally proper delegation of power, can certainly find no constitutional difficulty on this score with this bill. III. THE ABSENCE OF AN APPROPRIATION OF A SPECIFIC AMOUNT, DOES NOT Render THE BILL UNCONSTITUTIONAL No specific amount is appropriated by this bill. But this does not render the bill unconstitutional. For general indefinite appropriations are common. The first of such general indefinite appropriations was passed when Congress directed that all expenses accruing and necessary for the maintenance of lighthouses should be paid out of the Treasury of the United States. Since then hundreds of statutes containing similar indefinite appropriations, have been passed. From the moment the bill is enacted, this general appropriation becomes a charge upon the Treasury of the United States. When it is determined that any individual is entitled to a certain amount of compensation, his claim is a claim on the United States, to be honored by the Treasury just as any matured bond or other obligation of the United States must be honored. Like all other matured claims on the United States, these claims for compensation when fixed, must be provided for as a part of the Budget of the Federal Government. IV. THE BILL DEPRIVES NO ONE OF HIS PROPERTY WITHOUT THE "DUE PROCESS OF Unlike all other unemployment and social insurance plans, this bill does not involve the setting up of "reserves" created by enforced contributions by employers or employees. The only way that any person could regard himself as in anywise deprived of property for the purpose of financing this bill, would be by regarding this bill as a taxing measure. The bill provides that "it is the sense of Congress that if any further taxation is necessary to provide funds for the purposes of this act, it shall be levied on inheritances, gifts, and individual and corporation incomes of $5,000 a year or over." Even if it can be argued that this is a taxing measure, the bill is a proper exercise of the taxing power of Congress. Congress has the power under the Constitution, to lay taxes for the "general welfare", subject only to two limita Hampden v. U. S., supra. 28 Heiner v. Diamond Alkali Co., 288 U. S. 502. Buttfield v. Stranahan, supra. The "hot oil" decision, Sup. Ct. Rept. but see Carpenter on the "Constitutionality of the N. R. A.", Southern California Law Review, Jan. 1934, p. 125; Cheadle on the "Delegation of Legislative Function", 27 Yale Law Journal, 892. May 12, 1933, c. 25, 48 Stat. 31. "Act of Aug. 7, 1789, c. 9, 1 Stat. 53. Introduction to hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations on H. R. 9410, 73d Congress, 2d session. tions.34 In the case of duties, imports and excises, "this must be uniform." In the case of direct taxes, they must be apportioned according to the census. Neither limitation, however, applies to incomes, gifts, or inheritances since the sixteenth amendment.35 Thus, a tax levied by Congress on incomes, inheritances and gifts, is wholly proper, so long as Congress deems it to be for the "general welfare." Once Congress has levied such a tax, the tax cannot be assailed by any tax payer, since the courts will not review the exercise of the Congressional discretion involved. The decision of Congress is thus final.86 The limitation on the taxing power of the States, "that the taxation must be for a public purpose", is not a limitation applicable to the Federal Government." But even if it were, clearly the purposes for which funds are to be raised by taxation, and to be spent under this bill, is a "public purpose." The fact that private individuals benefit, does not alter the fact that it is to the public interest that these private individuals receive such public benefit.38 Finally, what is or is not a "public use" or purpose, has been held by the United States Supreme Court to be a question concerning which the legislative authority is best able to judge. Just as in the case of the exercise of the appropriating power, so in the case of the exercise of the taxing power, where the tax is levied on incomes, inheritances and gifts, the tax payer is wholly without remedy. When Congress determines that such a tax is for the "general welfare", its decision is final and cannot be constitutionally assailed. 39 V. THIS BILL DOES NOT VIOLATE THE STATES' RIGHTS It has been argued that this bill is unconstitutional on the ground that it involves a usurpation of the rights of the States. This argument is based upon the proposition that the power of Congress to regulate commerce and industry is limited to the "interstate commerce power" and that any regulation by the Federal Government of intrastate business and of matters "not commerce", is unconstitutional. This argument is wholly inapplicable to the present bill. For this bill is not an exercise of the interstate commerce power; it is an exercise of the appropriating power. This bill does not involve any regulation of intrastate commerce or of matters "not commerce." It does not involve the setting up of "reserves"; it does not set up such business relationships as might possibly be involved in the creation of special accounts with employers or employees, based on their contributions to a reserve fund. The bill in no wise interferes with the conduct of any intrastate business. It does not prohibit the transportation of any product by intrastate business such as was held invalid in the child labor case. The bill does not affect the liability of employers to employees in intrastate business such as was held invalid in the employers' liability case.40 The bill simply sets up an obligation of the United States Government to pay out of the United States Treasury compensation to all who are unemployed, sick, disabled, or aged, and it provides for the governmental machinery for the proper disbursement of the compensation. The Supreme Court has explicitly declared that no State will be heard to complain that the Federal Government is invading State rights when it simply exercises its appropriating power.41 42 Even if, however, this exercise of the appropriating power, should, by any stretch of the imagination, be regarded as a regulation of matters "not commerce" and of intrastate commerce, it does not follow that the plan is beyond the powers of Congress. For it is the present doctrine of the United States Supreme Court that Congress has the power to regulate intrastate commerce and matters that are "not commerce" at all, provided that the burdensome character of these activities on interstate commerce is clear and direct.13 Thus the United States 34 Hilton v. U. S., 3 Dall. 171; Pollack v. Farm Land & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601. as The 16th amendment reads as follows: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." 36 Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433. 37 Billings v. U. S., 232 U. S. 261. 38 Noble Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104; Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112; O'Neill v. eamer, 239 U. S. 244. 39 Greene v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 232. 40 Child Labor case, 247 U. S. 251. 41 First Employers Liability case, 207 U. S. 462. 42 Mass v. Mellon, supra. 43 Safety Appliance Act, case 222 U. S. 20; Wisconsin R. R. Com. v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 257 U. S. 553; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 485; Board of Trade v. Olson, 262 U. S. 1; Colorado v. U. S., 271 U. S. 153. Supreme Court has held the Packers and Stock Yard Act of 1921 constitutional, although that act gave the Secretary of Agriculture supervision over the commission men and livestock dealers in the stockyards of the Nation and thus enabled the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate prices and practices in matters wholly intrastate.44 The Court appreciated that the object of the act was to "free and unburden" the flow of interstate commerce. Again, in another case, the passenger rates of a branch line of a railroad, wholly within the boundaries of a single State and physically detached from the interstate lines of the same railroad, were held constitutionally subject to the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission, by reason of the effect of the intrastate rates on interstate rates and interstate business.45 The Court has again and again regarded similar acts as a proper exercise of the "interstate commerce power."46 Certainly, it must be clear, that Congress in 1933 and 1934 has proceeded upon the constitutional theory that it lies within the province of the Federal Government to prevent practices which deter the free flow of interstate commerce and to promote practices which stimulate interstate commerce." The Congress which passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, declared that the loss of the purchasing power of the farmers endangered the entire economic structure of the Nation.48 The mechanism set up by that act was conceived as a device to restore purchasing power. Certainly the workers' bill is similarly an effort to remove obstacles to the free flow of interstate commerce. Clearly it provides for the " general welfare" much more directly than the N. R. A., the A. A. A., the P. W. A., and the other emergency acts which Congress has enacted during the Roosevelt administration. This bill is an effort to deal with the same problem, the crisis in the purchasing power of the people of the United States. The basic conception of this bill is that the millions of workers and farmers throughout the United States who are unemployed, sick, disabled, and aged, lack purchasing power and that the soundest way to restore that purchasing power is to give them money, but not to give them money by way of charity or relief, but to give them money as of right, as a compensation for a disability which they suffer, due to no fault of their own and due to the operation of social forces. The basic idea of this bill thus is that funds should be given to create purchasing power for the masses who must spend the money for the necessities of life and who, in spending the money for these necessities, will thereby remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate commerce. Furthermore, a consideration of the advantages of the Federal as against State or Federal-State social-insurance systems, will show the "administrative necessity" of a Federal system. The vast growth of American industry spanning the entire continent and the development of a national economy that is interconnected and interdependent, has completely transformed the Nation which was the subject of the Constitution. For most purposes of business and commerce, State boundaries have ceased to exist. The existence of 48 governmental systems endeavoring to solve problems essentially national in scope in 48 different ways, has created stupendous contradictions and difficulties. The lack of purchasing power of the unemployed, sick, disabled, and aged is a national phenomenon, national in scope; its causes are bound up with the causes of the national economic crisis. Finally, the Federal system is the only feasible one, because it is only the Nation which can deal with the problem as it must be dealt with. The problem of unemployment is a problem of mass unemployment, with millions out of work. The loss in purchasing power of the unemployed, the sick, the disabled, and the aged, runs into billions of dollars. Only the Federal Government, with its vast resources and imponderable taxing power, can provide the means to meet a problem of such magnitude. Many of the States simply do not have adequate financial resources or adequate taxing power, but their unemployed need compensation no less than the unemployed of the wealthier States. And it is equitable that the wealthier States should contribute to the support and maintenance of the human beings in the poorer States, from which the income may very well have been withdrawn. The incomes and inheritances earned or created by Nation-wide industry are, as a practical matter, largely beyond the taxing power of any but the one State where the income is received, or in the case of inheritances, Stafford v. Wallace, supra. 45 Colorado v. U. S., supra. 44 Cases cited under note 43. "See Declaration of Policy, National Industrial Recovery Act, June 16, 1933, c. 90, 48 Stat. 195. "See Declaration of Policy, National Industrial Recovery Act, June 16, 1933, c. 90, 48 Stat. 195. where the deceased had his home at the time of his death. Only the Federal Government can effectively distribute the burden, because only it can effectively reach incomes and inheritances and make them available for the people of all States. We must remember that the bill here considered does not depend for its constitutionality on any consideration of the "interstate commerce power", upon the argument that the regulation of intrastate business is necessary because of its effect on interstate business. In this respect, this bill rests on a far sounder constitutional basis than do the N. R. A. and the A. A. A. Those acts stand or fall, depending upon the extent to which the interstate commerce power can be properly exercised. But this bill is merely an exercise of the appropriating_power. It rests upon the same constitutional basis as do the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act and Home Owners' Loan Corporation Act, which involve merely an exercise of the power of Congress to spend Federal moneys. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, the Home Owners' Loan Corporation Act, and, indeed, the bulk of the national emergency legislation which has been enacted during the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations, involve an understanding of the national character of our problems. Furthermore, they indicate an appreciation of the inadequacy and the cumbersomeness of the Federal subsidy system. These acts all provide for direct aid to persons, firms, and corporations in the States. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation supplies Federal moneys direct to bankers throughout the country. The Home Owners' Loan Corporation supplies Federal moneys direct to mortgagees throughout the country. There is no sensible reason why the congressional understanding of the national character of our economic problems, equal to the task of applying this understanding to bankers and mortgagees throughout the country, should fail to apply it to these who are neither bankers nor mortgagees. Bankers' relief and mortgagees' relief have all been envisaged as Federal problems, requiring Federal solution. The unemployment and social insurance problems are even more clearly Federal problems. They require a similar national solution. The Congress which passed the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, apparently, was convinced that it was for the "general welfare", that the banks in this country should be given money out of the Treasury of the United States, so that the banks could stay in business. The Congress which passed the Home Owners' Loan Corporation Act, apparently, was convinced that it was for the "general welfare", that individuals and corporations owning mortgages affecting real estate, who were totally unable to liquidate them, should be given bonds of the United States in payment for their mortgages. When Congress passes this bill, it will at last have realized that it is for the "general welfare" that all human beings in the United States who, through no fault of their own, are unable to earn the necessities of life, should receive money so that they may purchase the necessities of life and, in so doing, maintain not only their very lives, but the economical life of this country. The bill, in view of the foregoing considerations is clearly consitutional. Mr. DAVID GORDON. I am appearing in behalf of Mr. Weinstock. STATEMENT OF DAVID GORDON, NEW YORK CITY, REPRESENTING THE COMMITTEE FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE Mr. GORDON. I am representing the organization of Mr. Weinstock. I represent the American Federation of Labor trade-union committee. I am the secretary of the New York Federation of Labor trade-union committee. I represent the wish for unemployment insurance of my own local union, Local 107, of the A. F. of L. To those who question our authority, we need say but one word. The movement of the A. F. of L. trade-union committee of the United States is the one which has focused the attention of the membership towards genuine unemployment insurance against such quack remedies as the Wagner-Lewis bill, one sponsored by the A. F. of L. chiefs. The support that our resolutions and motions received in |