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useful, and that frequently potential disputes were avoided or settled by the meeting around the table of people who really knew from firsthand knowledge the problems that confronted labor and management.

Mr. LOOMIS. Insofar as the railroad representatives are concerned, Senator, I think you have that. These committees are made up of men from the railroads, vice presidents, assistant vice presidents, et cetera. I don't believe you would have much different situations if the presidents themselves covered the negotiations. They are not in any degree ignorant of what is being carried on.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, may I just add a word about this.

I believe what Senator Lehman is directing his remarks to also fits into what Senator Morse said a moment ago, that when you get at the level of the White House, which in the minds of the American people is a rather important office, there is the place that you break the pattern that you had prior to that time. Up to that time you had coljective bargaining, you may have had your emergency board, you may have had mediation, and all the other practices which go into the settlement of a dispute. But when you get up to what, the public is led to believe, is the final institution to bring peace and harmony in any dispute, it appears to me that is the time to have the top brass rather than to have the junior officers, because this is not Mediation Board activity, this isn't emergency-board activity. When the President of the United States injects himself into a dispute, whether he should or whether he should not is another question, but once it is done, I think what Senator Lehman is referring to is that this is an unusual situation. This doesn't mean that this is done every day. It isn't done in every dispute. We don't settle all disputes over at the east wing of the White House and apparently do not settle very many. But when that does happen would you be of the mind that there is the time, if it was only out of common courtesy and out of respect for the office and within the pattern and traditions of the American idea of the importance of the White House, that the presidents of the brotherhoods, the international presidents, as well as the presidents of the lines, the carriers, ought to be brought in?

Mr. LOOMIS. No, I am afraid I don't, Senator. I think it is then a matter of opinion as to whether it would make any practical difference. You were not here the other day when I put into the record the powers of attorney which each railroad gives to the conference committee.

Senator HUMPHREY. I have reviewed that testimony with counsel this morning.

Mr. Loomis. There you have had men who have handled the case from its inception and who are thoroughly familiar with all of the details of it, with all that has transpired and taken place. If at that time you brought in railroad presidents, let us say, they would only be authorized to speak for their own railroads. They couldn't speak for the industry unless you went out and got new powers of attorney for that contingency. True, you could bring in probably the presidents from some of the larger lines who might be influential, but as far as their authority went it would be confined to their own lines.

Senator HUMPHREY. My point, Mr. Loomis, is that once a dispute comes up the ladder as high as the White House, it becomes an unusual circumstance just by the fact that it is touched by the White

House or the President or one of his advisers or assistants at the direction of the President, that in the mind of the American people it is away out of focus. It is no longer just a dispute being handled by an emergency board or mediation. It is something that affects the entire national well-being and the national interest.

In other words, it is like the conference of foreign ministers. At the present time in Paris the deputies of the foreign ministers are meeting to sort of talk about the agenda. It is to be hoped that later on the foreign ministers will meet and they will spend some time on the subject matter of the agenda, but I think it is perfectly clear to the people of the world that no real settlement will ever be arrived at in international relations until the heads of state meet. It appears to me that that analogy is somewhat applicable to a major dispute, whether it is in steel or in rails or whether it is in any other area of the American economy. I am willing to accept and value your judgments on this. I am only expressing my own opinion.

Mr. LOOMIS. As far as the record goes, railroad cases have been in the White House off and on since 1912. They have been in the White House with regularity for the past 10 or 12 years. It is a matter of opinion, of course, but I don't think as a practical matter that you would have any difference. The term "junior officers” I believe came

“ from our friends on the labor side.

Senator HUMPHREY. No, that was original with me. I haven't been in all these hearings.

Mr. Loomis. They have used it in several of their press releases.
Senator HUMPHREY. It is just pride of possession.

Mr. Loomis. On July 17 the mediation conferences were transferred to Washington, and on August 4 the conductors and trainmen telegraphed the President asking him to take over the railroads. That telegram appears as item 6 of carriers' exhibit 3, and reads as follows: Addressed to the President, the White House, Washington, D.C.:

As the presidents of the two railway brotherhoods involving the interests and rights of more than 300,000 railway workers, we respectfully inform you that the dispute between our brotherhoods and the carriers of 17 months' standing is reaching serious crisis. In the national interest and to avert a potential substantial interruption in essential railroad transportation, we respectfully recommend to you that our Government take possession of and operate the railroads in the United States until such time as this dispute is settled in fairness to the rights of our members.

Today we are being victimized by the stubborn refusal of the carriers to make any reasonable concessions and compromises to the emergency board report in this case, which report is definitely unacceptable to the membership of our brotherhoods. The serious international crisis which confronts our country is being used by the carriers as an opportunity for misrepresenting our position in this dispute and for prejudicing the public mind as to our rights under the Railway Labor Act. As you well know, the Congress did not provide that the report of emergency board constitutes final and binding decision such as would be the case if the Railway Labor Act provided for compulsory arbitration.

We are satisfied that you recognize the dangers to the legitimate rights of American labor inherent in compulsory arbitration and therefore we do not think that you should permit the carriers to force compulsory arbitration upon us indirectly through the very unfair and unsound emergency board report which has been issued in this case. Under the Railway Labor Act both sides to a dispute have the legal right to refuse to accept the recommendation contained in an emergency board report. We have exercised that right in accordance with the law. Since June 15 when the emergency board report was issued, we have stood ready and willing to negotiate with the carriers a fair and reasonable mediation settlement of our differences over the report, but in the six short meetings we have had with the representatives of the carriers and the National Railway Mediation Board we have found the carriers to be stubbornly unwilling to give open-minded consideration to any mediation proposal in respect to any of the issues involved. It is obvious to us the carriers think that because of the international crisis which confronts us, they can succeed in forcing us to accept without any compromise whatsoever the many unfair and unjust recommendations of the emergency board report. Our brotherhoods are composed of patriotic American citizens and our members are working on every one of the class I railroads of the country. They want to do whatever is necessary for the war effort, but they think they have the right to turn to you as their Commander in Chief in time of national emergency to protect them from this hostile attempt of the carriers to deny to them a fair and just settlement of this dispute. They will work for the Government gladly under Government operation of the railroads during this period of crisis until this dispute can be settled on its merits through mediation, but we most earnestly advise you that there is very deep resentment which is becoming more intense each day among our members against the carriers because of the high-handed way the representatives of the carriers have treated them and their national officers since the emergency board report was issued.

As presidents of the two brotherhoods involved, we think you should know that our membership will not accept the recommendations of the emergency board in respect to wages, hours, and conditions of employment in the absence of some fair modifications and adjustment of those recommendations. The carriers should not be allowed to take advantage of the international situation in their endeavor to force upon our membership conditions which they very well know they could not possibly get by with in time of peace. Therefore to avoid the growing danger of very serious disruption of railway transportation, we urge that the necessary steps be taken for governmental operation of the railroads until such time as a thorough investigation of and hearing upon our claims for improved hours, wages, and working conditions can be had. We want you to know we are at your command for a discussion of the merits of this dispute at any time with you or anyone you designate, but we think you should take note of the fact that the Railway Mediation Board has failed to settle this case mainly because of the fact that the carriers have no desire or good faith will to settle it on a fair basis.

Therefore we think our Government should take over the railroads because we are satisfied that it is only such action that will cause the carriers to proceed to mediate settlement with us in good faith. Respectfully,

R. O, HUGHES, President, Order of Railway Conductors.

W. P. KENNEDY,

President, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. I do not know that the President ever replied to that telegram, but on August 7 the first conference was held at the White House with Dr. Steelman.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Loomis, may I interrupt you to ask if that telegram might be the basis for what I understand is the position taken by the White House that it was the brotherhoods that asked for Presidential intervention in this case?

Mr. Loomis. I suppose it might be, Senator. Whether there are other conversations I couldn't say positively.

Senator MORSE. Hasn't it been the understanding of the carriers that the White House was requested to intervene in the case by the brotherhoods?

Mr. Loomis. That has been our understanding. I don't know that I can put my finger on any definite thing that I could testify to as a witness to substantiate that. It certainly has been our general impression and undertaking.

Senator MORSE. Did the carriers ever ask the White House to intervene in the case ?

Mr. LOOMIS. No.

Mr. MURDOCK. Mr. Loomis, I think you have said you heard the testimony of the representatives of the brotherhoods, haven't you?

Mr. LOOMIS. That is correct.

Mr. MURDOCK. Do you recall that several of them testified that the reason they asked the White House to seize the railroads was that, unless there was Government seizure, since stalemate had been reached, there was danger that the carriers would unilaterally change the rules! I think it is correct under the act, isn't it, that when deadlock is reached the carriers may then, if they wish, unilaterally change the rules!

Mr. Loomis. You brought that question up the other day, Mr. Murdock. Under the act the carriers would be entitled to change the rules 30 days after the report of the emergency board, just as the brotherhoods are free to strike. However, I stated then and I want to repeat that there was never any threat or any intention on the part of the carriers to put those rules into effect until an agreement was reached. At no time, to my knowledge, in any case of that scope-and I don't think of any in individual cases except that Texas-New Orleans incident which I am going to take up later--where the carriers have put in rules except in the Toledo, Peoria & Western, and I think probably the Louisiana & Arkansas cases that I referred to earlier. The Toledo, Peoria & Western I believe had a strike in 1929. They did put in rules and beat the strike, but I think the Louisiana & Arkansas case also involved some rule.

While we are on that, Mr. Hughes refered to my testimony in the Texas & Pacific case. I want to make one correction in it and then make some reference to it. At page 47 where he quoted from that testimony—and I believe it also appeared in his exhibit—the very first line, “the carrier could loftily put its proposed change word “loftily” should, of course, have been "lawfully.”

Mr. MURDOCK. What page is that?

Mr. Loomis. Page 47, first line. The sentence reads: The carrier could loftily put its proposed change into effect if the required time had elapsed following mediation. The word, of course, should be "lawfully."

Mr. MURDOCK. They could do it both loftily and lawfully; couldn't they?

Mr. Loomis. I suppose that could be so. I think, following out that same testimony in the Texas & Pacific case, if Mr. Hughes had read a little further, he would have found that I also stated that the carrier should properly give, although nothing in the law requires it, a certain amount of notice that on a certain date it will put its rules into effect. I think it is only proper that the carrier should give notice that it intends to put its rules into effect within a certain time thereafter, and certainly in this case, if we had had any intention of putting those rules into effect without a settlement, I can assure you that we would have given notice to the organizations that we intended to do that. There was never even any suggestion or hint that we had any such idea in mind.

If that were any real point, they could very readily have asked us whether we had

any

such intention. The question never even came up for discussion.

So I think that is an afterthought that shouldn't be taken very seriously.

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I spoke of the first White House Conference on August 7. On August 16 the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen advised Dr. Steelman and the National Mediation Board of the start of 5-day strikes on the Minnesota Transfer, the River Terminal, and the Kentucky & Indiana Terminal Railroads. On August 17 the Order of Railway Conductors and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen advised Dr. Šteelman and the National Mediation Board of the commencement of 5-day strikes on the Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, and the Elgin, Joliet & Eastern.

On August 19, the night of August 19, Dr. Steelman made a proposal for settlement to the parties. The settlement formula was this:

1. Call off strikes.
2. Establish 40-hour week for yardmen at 23 cents per hour increase.

3. For the period of this agreement set aside the 40-hour agreement and establish a 6-day workweek. Men required to work seventh day to receive time and one-half pay. This does not create guaranties where they do not now exist.

4. Settle all rules, including 40-hour week rules, in accordance with the recommendations of the President's Emergency Board.

5. Roadmen to receive 5 cents per hour increase.

6. Quarterly adjustments of wages on basis of cost-of-living index, one point to equal 1 cent per hour.

7. In consideration of above this agreement is to be effective until October 1, 1953, at which time either party may serve notice of desired changes in accordance with the Railway Labor Act. That proposal was accepted by the carriers and rejected by the two organizations.

On August 23 occurred the meeting at which came up the discussion of whether or not any further strikes were contemplated. The carriers were represented at that meeting by Mr. C. D. Mackay, representing the Southeastern Railroad; Mr. J. W. Oram, of the Pennsylvania Railroad, representing the eastern lines; and myself, representing the western lines. All three of us made memoranda from our notes following that conference. And I should like to read into the record the memorandum which I myself made following that conference on August 23. It reads:

NOTES ON WHITE HOUSE MEETING, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1950 Messrs. Mackay, Oram, and I, representing the carriers, met Dr. Steelman in his office at 3 p. m., Wednesday, August 23.

After a few minutes' discussion, Dr. Steelman left the room to confer with the union leaders and members of the National Mediation Board who were waiting in his conference room.

At approximately 3:30 p. m. he returned to his office and stated that the union leaders had suggested that we recess the conference without setting a definite time for resumption and give both sides an opportunity to consider the situation further. He said that he had asked the union leaders whether the 5-day strikes now in effect would be terminated on schedule since the steel companies had to know whether to get ready to start up their blast furnaces and prepare to resume operations. If I may interpolate at that point, the Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, the Elgin, Joliet & Eastern, and the River Terminal are very important to the steel companies operating at Chicago, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh.

Returning to the memorandum:

He said the union leaders had said the strikes would be called off as scheduled. He also said the union leaders stated they had no other plans for action at this time but simply suggested that both sides retire to give further consideration to the entire situation.

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