is too long, but because it is too short. By the time your readers see this Judge Platt will have decided whether or not there is any thing in this protest. Meanwhile racing men will doubtless have been bestirring themselves to get the law authorizing pool-selling and betting generally on race-tracks through the Legislature. Their strong argument is that it is good for a country to have a fine breed of horses; that racetracks encourage the breeding of fine horses, and that without the patronage of those who are drawn to the races by the excitement of betting, racing associations could not support themselves. To this however it might be answered that if gambling on race-tracks were suppressed, the breed of "sports" might be improved. For at present as between the race-horses and the majority of the men who gather to see them run, the horses are by far the finer animals. The other day I came in upon a theatrical manager as he was writing the following advertisement: "Wanted-A lawyer who can draw up a contract between a manager and an actor which the latter can't break." When I asked him in what paper he intended to insert it, he said: "It's a gag for the new burlesque I'm going to bring out. You don't suppose I'd advertise for such a contract. Why, it would be money thrown away. There's no such thing as a contract an actor can't break; at least not in this world. I never knew a contract yet that was proof against a case of big head." A case of big head arises when an actor who makes a success in a small part immediately considers himself entitled to all the privileges of a star. GUSTAV KOBBE. NEW YORK, March 18, 1885. CORRESPONDENCE. "ENJOIN." Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Are you quite correct in your approval of Mr. Gilbert M. Tucker's criticism on the word enjoin as used by lawyers, and have they so perverted the meaning as to reverse it completely? According to Webster's Dictionary this verb is defined in its legal use "to prohibit or restrain by a judicial order or decree;" and there is quoted, as an authority, a sentence from Kent in these words: "This is a suit to enjoin the defendants from disturbing the plaintiffs." So in Burrill's Law Dictionary a similar definition is given: "To command a person from doing a thing; to prohibit or restrain by express command." In the same work will be found the law French verb "enjoyndre," from which enjoin is derived, and reference is made to the use of that word by Britton over two centuries ago, and it has been followed up and used in that sense to the present day by judges and commentators of the law, whose pure English has never before been questioned. You rightly advise Mr. Tucker to go for the barbarians who use 64 'garnishee" as a verb; but do enjoin him to spare the lawyers who use that forcible word enjoin, which is almost a necessity in certain judicial proceedings. If age and usage are to be regarded in establishing the proper use of the English language, the word enjoin has a fixed and definite signification in our legal lore; and it is unnecessary to displace it by having recourse "to the vilest newspaper slang, injuncted,” or substituting any other word in its stead. ready before the Court of Appeals and its steadily increasing calendar, there seems to be a view of this subject that your correspondents have overlooked. In our zeal to relieve that very worthy body of its onerous duties we should remember that our State is the largest in commercial importance of any, and contains the monetary center of the continent, hence it is no apology for us to refer to the courts of last resorts in other States, or to lament the larger amount of our legal business, and still impair the rights and opportunities of suitors to find a remedy. Let us look for a moment at some branches of the courts; to illustrate, take the Surrogate Court of any county of New York State, and assume that we found the present Surrogate Court unable to hear and determine all cases that came before it. Would we restrict men from leaving estates, or prohibit dying? And still a large number of the cases in the Court of Appeals come up from that court. Another illustration might be drawn from the United States Patent Office. Many worthless inventions are patented. Can we say that a device must be rejected because the cost of the same and the interests it affects are small? By no means; to do so would cripple the industries of our whole country. If we have sufficient business for twenty-one judges, why not employ them, and let them work in three sections, but in harmony with each other, and so classify them that while all do not hear the argument, the opinion in every case embodying any new question, or wherein the entire seven judges who hear the argument are not unanimous, or any case wherein they deem that justice will be promoted thereby, shall be read before all the judges, and concurred in by a majority, thus seven judges would hear and decide every case, and cases involving close questions and such as are of especial magnitude, would receive the scrutiny and thought of twenty-one. Since the writer of this has been connected with the courts of this State the amount has substantially been made to determine in many cases the merits of the controversy by making only those cases involving a certain amount or upwards appealable to that court; this together with the compulsory stipulation for judgment absolute, renders it upon the border line of discrimination in favor of restricting appeals to the few, a practice in my judgment most pernicious, and unworthy the great Empire State. These are but suggestions, which we hope may call out the thoughts and opinions of other and abler minds upon both sides of this important subject. In the meantime we await with much interest any elaboration that "will amount to satisfactory demonstration" that a class of counsel for the Court of Appeals and for work in banc will ever be of very much service to suitors (who are really the parties whose necessities are greatest) in facilitating their rights or interests. ROCHESTER, March 9, 1885. THEBA COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. K. HE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, March 17, 1885: Judgment reversed and judgment on case ordered for defendant-Theodore H. Benedict and another, respondents, v. William H. Webb, appellant.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Sylvia A. White, respondent, v. William Law, executor, appellant; George S. Allison, respondent, v. Rosa Schmitz and others, appellants; Margaret Parker, administratrix, respondent, v. Ulster and Delaware R. Co. Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the eventMayor, etc., of New York, appellant, v. Hannah A. Kelly, administratrix, etc., respondent.-Order affirmed with costs-William Custer, respondent, v. Green Point Ferry Co., appellant.-Orders reversed with costs-Mary Emma Wyckoff, respondent, v. Seth W. Scofield and others, appellants.-Motion for restitution denied, $10 costs-Ambrose S. Murray, etc., respondent, v. Robert H. Bedell and others, appellants. Motion for restitution granted, $10 costsMargaret C. Wallace, etc., respondent, v. Robert H. Rerdell, appellant. The Albany Law Journal. OUR ALBANY, MARCH 28, 1885. CURRENT TOPICS. by age the business of their court will engross the time of twice the present number of judges, even if it is not the case now. But is anybody going to move in the premises? Where is the New York City Bar Association? Why do not some of its members give up kicking against the pricks of codification, and do the State a little real service by helping to provide some measure of relief in this exigency? The London Law Times says: "Opinion in favor of codification is certainly growing-at any rate, among the laity. The strength of the deputation from the Associated Chambers of Commere, which waited upon the Lord Chancellor last week, shows bankers, who have lately devoted a surprising very clearly that merchants, manufacturers and amount of attention to questions of law reform, have learned to expect very great things from the reduction of commercial law to a written system. It is easy to understand the longing for simplicity and precision which is at the bottom of this expection. Business men are not the only people who feel it. Whether a commercial code, when ob UR correspondents have recently discussed the subject of the relief of our Court of Appeals. We see no reason to change the opinion which we have long entertained and expressed, that the proper mode of relief is to have more judges and a double court. Our correspondent, E. M. M., ante, 219, admirably presents the reasons for this preference. There is probably very little disposition in any quarter to relieve the court by cutting off appeals, unless possibly appeals from interlocutory orders, and the like. But there is a disposition in a certain influential quarter to advocate resort to a commission, composed wholly or in part of certain of our Supreme Court judges who are not fully occupied at present. If any of the Supreme Court judges are not busy enough, they can have their hands full by judicious transfers in their own court. The radical objection to any commission tained, would prove the unmitigated blessing it is is that it is a mere temporary expedient, whereas expected to be, is a question we need not trouble ourselves to answer. A complete code will hardly the State ought to have at all times a sufficient be seen by the present generation, but the common number of judges to dispose of the business withlaw has now reached a stage of its development at out compelling suitors to wait for a "block," and which codification sets in as a natural and inthen take up with the decision of pro tempore evitable process, and when, for good or bad, this judges. We must look at the situation squarely, and confess that our seven judges cannot do the process has once begun, its completion is only a matter of time. The lord chancellor points to the business, and never again will be able to, and that law of insurance as the next most promising subthey will constantly be falling further behind. The growth of the State and its legal business inject for the treatment which has already been apthe last fifteen years has been enormous. What it plied to the law of bills of exchange, bankruptcy, will be in the next fifteen no man can predict. merchant shipping and joint-stock companies. His lordship despairs of the complete codifiBut resources should at once be provided sufficient cation of the law of contracts, but we see no reato transact the probable business, and to do it intelligently and considerately. In doing what they should not eventually be covered. It is a pity the son why in this piecemeal fashion the whole ground now do our judges are overworked and hurried, and occasionally their work shows the inevitable lord chancellor should have had to point to the legal members of Parliament as the chief obstacles result of lack of time for research and reflection to law reform and the more pity because it is only occasionally, however, for the correctness of their decisions on the whole is remarkable. undoubtedly true." They will have a complete code in England before they know it, and they the continual growth of the calendar is a constant cannot do better than to go on copying us. temptation to hurry and to overwork. There is no conceivable reason why there should not be a double court. Even a commission makes a double court for the time. We are prepared to hear some one object to the expense, and yet thousands of dollars are squandered every year in spoiling fair stone in the capitol with grotesque and inappropriate carving, without exciting much comment. Possibly we do not know, it is only a suspicion our honored judges may have some personal feeling against a double court. But they ought not; the task before them is beyond their power, or the power of any other seven men, and they ought to welcome any scheme of permanent relief. The problem of adequately serving the State in its legal business is far above personal considerations. By the time the present judges are all disqualified VOL. 31-No. 13, But Dr. Frank H. Hamilton has an article in the current number of Popular Science on "Medical Expert Testimony." It is designed as a defense of or apology for medical experts, but we cannot say it is very conclusive or advances any new ideas on the subject. The doctor, speaking of the constant disagreements of such experts, says "lawyers also do not often agree in opinion as to the merits of the cases of their respective clients." But the cases are very different. The lawyer sees only one side; the doctor sees both sides, or ought to. Doctor Hamilton is opposed, and wisely, we think, to the employment of permanent experts as advisers to the courts. He candidly admits that all wisdom is not among the doctors "in reference to questions of seems to us to have been the brightest genius among the remarkable group of men who founded our institutions, a born architect of States, who had by intuition a profounder knowledge of the principles of government than other men acquire by length of years, study and experience. In our times, when the question of finance is the most engrossing one in national affairs, his works are worthy of the most careful consideration. Although many of his ideas on State policy were in conflict with those which have obtained sway in this country, yet as a government financier he fully merits the magnificent praise bestowed on him by another great American statesman: "He smote the rock of our national resources, and abundant streams of revenue gushed forth; he touched the corpse of the public credit, and it sprang upon its feet." It is a curious reflection that however States may grow and wealth increase, the principles of finance and of general national prosperity are the same in all ages. Opening this volume at random, we smile at the statement that the States owe a debt of fifty millions, and that Hamilton hopes that it may be paid off, sanity or insanity, most men of intelligence who have reached adult life are experts." But the Doctor unconsciously illustrates the limitations of medical men as witnesses by a leaf from his own experience in the Cole-Hiscox case. He says: "The jury rendered a verdict of acquittal on the ground of unsound mind; but no medical expert had testified that Cole was insane. In the course of my examination as an expert witness, the court asked me whether I thought that Cole, at the time he committed the act for which he was under trial, knew the difference between right and wrong, and that the act was in violation of the law.' To which I replied in effect that Cole, being suddenly confronted by the man who had wronged him, did not probably consider whether the act which he was about to commit was in violation of the law or not.' If the jury made use of this reply to pronounce him insane, the responsibility of their verdict does not rest upon me. The verdict of 'unsound mind' was given, as it has been in many similar cases, because they did not think he ought to be punished for the act, and they were quite willing to give a very broad and partial interpretation to any testi-"without burthening the people," in twenty years! mony which in the remotest degree seemed to favor the defense. Subsequently from several sources I learned that my testimony, inferred only from the verdict, had been subjected to criticism." This shows how incapable most physicians are of answering a simple direct question. "Did he know the act was wrong and unlawful?" "Well, he probably did not think about it." That was no answer at all, and ought to have been struck out. Why couldn't he have said, "yes, but he was in such a passion that he did not stop to think, or he didn't care." Dr. Francis Wharton has been appointed legal adviser to the State department of the Federal government on questions of international law. It is a good idea to make such an appointment, and no fitter man could be found for the place. Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons, of the city of New York, have undertaken a very important and deserving enterprise in the publication of a new and complete edition of Alexander Hamilton's works. The only other complete edition is out of print, and dear. This is edited by Henry Cabot Lodge, and will be completed in nine volumes, the first of which is just issued, the remainder to follow at short intervals. It will embrace " The Federalist," which heretofore has been published only in a separate form. No better selection of an editor could have been made, as is shown by Mr. Lodge's excellent contributions to the series of "American Statesmen." The first volume is a sumptuous book, one of the most admirable examples of American bookmaking. The greatness of Hamilton has always been appreciated by his countrymen, but of late there seems to have been a revival of interest in the study of his character, career and writings. He And yet Hamilton's theories are as respectfully studied now as when they were first advanced. We shall reserve further comment until the series is more forward in publication, and we shall have better opportunity to speak of this great man's genius and services as they deserve. But there is no time better than the present to say that every liberal lawyer ought to possess and study Hamilton's works, and that this promises to be decidely the best edition. NOTES OF CASES. N Banks v. Manchester, United States Circuit IN Court, Ohio, the question of copyright in judicial decisions was decided by Sage, J. The plaintiff, contractor with the State of Ohio for the publication of volumes 41 and 42 of the State reports, sought to restrain the defendant, publisher of the American Law Journal, from publishing any of the decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court to be reported in those volumes. The head-notes in that State are prepared by the judges. The court said: "Nowhere in the statute law, relating to the publication of reports, is authority given to the reporter or to any other person to acquire a copyright in the decisions or opinions of the judges. This is significant, in view of the unanimous opinion of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States in Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 668, that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by that court. The legislation in the State of Ohio must be considered to have been enacted with reference to that opinion, and therefore to have been intended to limit the provisions above cited to the volumes of reports, and to exclude copyrights of the opinions of the judges. It is in accordance with sound public policy, in a Commonwealth where every person is presumed to know the law, to regard the authoritative exposition of the law by the regularly constituted judicial tribunals as public property, to be published freely by any one who may choose to publish them. And such publication may be of every thing which is the work of the judge, including the syllabus and the statement of the case, as well as the opinion. The copyright of the volume does not interfere with such free publication. It protects only the work of the reporter-that is to say, the indexes, the tables of cases, and the statement of points made, and authorities cited by counsel. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 653; Little v. Gould, 2 Blatchf. 165 and 362; Chase v. Sanborn, 4 Cliff. 306; Myers v. Callaghan, 5 Fed. Rep. 726; S. C., 10 Biss. 139; Myers v. Callaghan, 20 Fed. Rep. 441. Counsel for complainants cite Judge Drummond's dictum in Myers v. Callaghan, 5 Fed. Rep. 728, that 'if an adequate compensation was paid by the State to the reporter for the work done by him in preparing volumes of reports, then whatever property there was in the volumes arising from the labors of the reporter ought to belong to the State and not to him.' 'Now,' say counsel, 'in Ohio the State undertakes to pay the reporter 'adequate compensation,' and by the statute that amount is all he can receive. He has no perquisites. The theory is that the State pays him for his labor, and that the result of his labor belongs to the State.' And counsel proceed to claim that this is precisely the theory upon which the State is entitled to the decisions of the judges. They are paid a stipulated price or sum for their services, and this by their consent impliedly given when they accept the office is in full of their services, and the result of their labors is the property of the State.' Mr. Drone, in his work on Copyright, page 161, states substantially the same view, although he says he has seen no sound, clear exposition of the law governing copyright in judicial decisions, and that it has not been expressly declared in any modern case that copyright will vest in a judicial decision. Mr. Justice Story, one of the judges who concurred in the decision in Wheaton v. Peters, said (in Gray v. Russel, 1 Story, 21) that while it was held in that case that the opinions of the court, being published under the authority of Congress, were not the proper subject of copyright, it was as little doubted by the court that Mr. Wheaton had a copyright in his own marginal notes, and in the arguments of counsel as prepared and arranged in his work. Whether the State, through its reporter, can secure a copyright in the opinions of its judges, is however not a question arising, nor can it be decided in this case. It is sufficient to say that the State has not adopted legislation for such copyright, that the enactments providing for copyright for the volumes of reports, or of the reports, do not authorize copyrights of the opinions of the judges." In Lathrop v. Thayer, Massachusetts Supreme Court, January, 1885, it was held that a tenant at will is not liable to his landlord for the destruction of the premises by fire by the mere negligence of the tenant. The court said: "The diligence of the counsel for the plaintiff has not shown us any case in which it has been held that a tenant at will is liable to his landlord for injuries occasioned by his negligence in kindling or keeping fires in stoves, fireplaces or chimneys intended to be used for heating the premises. Such a case is presented in Scott v. Hale, 16 Me. 326, but the defendant had a verdict. In the case cited of Parrott v. Barney, 1 Deady, 405, App., 1 Sawyer, 435, the tenancy was from year to year, and the damage was for explosive substances stored in the building. There is nothing in United States v. Bostwick, 94 U. S. 53, or Robinson v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 252, that decides that a tenant at will is liable for the negligent burning of a building let. The law of negligence has been largely developed in recent times, and is argued that there is no sound reason why it should not be applied in the same manner to real property as to personal, and to tenancies at will as well as to tenancies for a term. It may well be doubted whether the existing condition of the law of negligence is altogether satisfactory, and whether it would be well to establish an unlimited liability on the part of every tenant at will of real property to his landlord for every injury occasioned by any act of negligence on his part, or that of his servant in the use of the property. However this may be, we do not feel at liberty to overturn long-established rules of law gov- ̧ erning real property. It is competent for landlords and tenants to make in writing any stipulations they see fit. When there is no writing, and the tenant takes the precarious estate of a tenancy at will, we think it has been generally understood that the tenant is not liable for the burning of the tenement let occasioned by his negligence or that of his servant in the keeping of fires set for the purpose of, and in the places designed for, heating the premises so that they may be fit for occupation. The fact that no action can be found to have been maintained for this cause of action is strong evidence of this. The ancient law has been acquiesced in, and consciously or unconsciously the cost of insurance to the landlord, or the value of the risks, enters into the amount of the rent. think on this part of the case the exceptions should be sustained. If the law were to be established anew, it might with much force be contended that the test of the liability of the defendants in this case ought to be the same as to all of the property destroyed, but it would deserve consideration whether in such a case as this is, it would not be more reasonable to hold the defendants liable only for gross negligence amounting to reckless conduct. The existing law has however introduced many distinctions. A bailee of chattels for hire is liable only for the want of ordinary care, but if the bailee promises to return the chattel absolutely, then he is liable, although the chattel is destroyed by inevitable accident. Harvey v. Murray, 136 Mass. 377. The obligations of tenants under a written lease to We their landlords, except as far as statutes have imposed arbitrary liabilities, are determined by the construction of the lease. But landlords are at common law exempt from many liabilities toward their tenants for the condition of the premises, which they are under toward strangers, who are lawfully upon the premises while in their possession. Bowe v. Hunking, 135 Mass. 380; Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134 id. 357; S. C., 45 Am. Rep. 344. Disregarding the use of fire in clearing land and for other agricultural purposes, and confining ourselves to the case at bar, which is the use of fire in stoves for the purpose of heating the building, it is manifest that in many cases prudence might require a reconstruction of the chimneys and the purchase of new stoves. In many cases it would be difficult to determine how far the bad condition of the premises contributed to the injury occasioned by the fire. We think the reasonable rule is that if landlords would protect themselves from the mere negligence of their tenants, they should take a written lease with proper covenants; and that a tenant at will is not liable to his landlord for the mere negligence of himself or his servants in kindling or guarding fires in stoves or chimneys for the purpose of heating the premises; that he is liable for willful burning, and also for such gross negligence as amounts to reckless conduct." that R. and others had played at the house of H. H. was called and testified that he saw no gaming in his house. He was then asked: "Was there a roulette table in the room?" H. was not compelled to answer this question (2). 2. It is alleged that a bond sued on was given for an illegal consideration, viz., the sale of the commerce of a ship, contrary to law. The obligee declines to answer not only as to this fact, but also as to what the consideration was, and why the debt had not been proved in bankruptcy, as having a tendency to accuse him of violating the law. His refusal is proper (3). 3. On the trial of S. a witness is asked whether he knows the handwriting of an advertisement referring to the libel, and if so, to name the person. He is bound to answer the first question but not the second (4). 4. In an action on a bill of exchange a witness is shown the bill and asked whether it has ever been in his possession. He replies that as he is under indictment for usury in the same transaction he must refuse to answer. His refusal is proper (5). 5. Fornication was a crime in Tennessee in 1860. In that year on the trial of an action for seduction, a witness is asked "if he knew of any man having had sexual intercourse with the girl?" The witness may refuse to answer (6). 6. A witness is asked: "Do you know of any one, other than yourself, being engaged in gam RULES AS TO THE PRIVILEGES OF WIT- bling during the last two years?" The question is NESSES. III. RULE. No witness is compellable against his objection to answer questions (a), or to produce documents or other evidence (b) which may have a tendency to render him amenable to indictment for a crime (1), or prosecution for a penalty (c). (A.) I. R. was sued on a bill of exchange which it was alleged had been won at gaming. It appeared (1) Cartwright v. Green, 8 Vesey, 407 (1802); Bishop of London v. Fytche, 21 Brown, 97; Ex parte Tymes. 11 Vesey, 525; Claridge v. Hoare, 14 id. 65; Paxton v. Douglas, 16 id. 241; Oliver v. Haywood, 1 Anstr. 83; Amherst v. Hallis, 9 N. H. 108 (1837); Janvren v. Scammon, 29 id 290 (1854); Macarty v. Bard, 9 La. 381 (1836); State v. Foster, 23 N. H. 354 (1851); Eaton v. Farmer, 46 id. 200 (1865); Warner v. Lucas, 10 Ohio, 340 (1840); Phelin v. Kenderline, 20 Penn. St. 363 (1853); Poole v. Perritt, 1 Speers, 128 (1842); State v. Edwards, 2 N. & M. 13 (1819); Floyd v. State, 7 Tex. 251 (1851); People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229 (1830); State v. Olin, 23 Wis. 318 (1868); Kirschner v. State, 9 Wend. 140 (1859); State v. Talbott, 73 Mo. 358 (1881); State v. Marshall, 36 Mo. 401 (1865); Byass v. Sullivan, 21 How. Pr. 52 (1860); Re Tappan, 9 id. 394 (1854); Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624 (1855); People v. Lobman, 2 Barb. 216 (1848); Curtis v. Knox, 2 Denio, 341 (1845); Hayes v. Caldwell, 10 Ill. 33 (1848); Taney v. Kemp, 4 H. & J. 348 (1818); Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga. 255 (1853); Neale v. Connigham, 1 Cranch C. C. 76 (1802); United States v. Strother, 3 id. 432 (1809); Southard v. Rexford, 6 Cow. 258 (1826); Lister v. Boker, 6 Blackf. 439 (1843); Emery's case, 107 Mass. 173 (1871); Sodusky v. McGee, 5 J. J. Marsh. 621 (1831); Newcomb v. State, 37 Miss. 383 (1859); Campbell v. State, 23 Ala. 82 (1853); Re Lewis, 39 How. Pr. 155 (1869); People v. Herrick, 13 Johns. 82 (1816); United States v. Dickinson, 2 McLean, 328 (1840); State v. Staples, 47 N. H. 113 (1866); Douglass v Wood, 1 Swan, 393 (1852): Forney v. Fernell, 4 W. Va. 729 (1871); Moloney v. Dows, 2 Hilt. 247 (1858); East v. Chapman, 1 Mood. & Malk. 46 (1827); King v. Adly, 1 M. & Rob. 94 (1831); Friend's case, 13 How St. Tr. 16; Rosewell's case, 10 id. 165; Hardy's case, 24 id. 720; O'Corgley's case, 26 id. 1351; Lord Macclesfield's case, 16 id. 1146. proper (7). 7. In an action of trespass a witness is asked to state what he knew in regard to any person tearing down and carrying away the property in controversy. The witness refuses to answer because it may tend to criminate himself. The witness' refusal is legal (8). 8. A witness is asked whether he had not testi fied falsely in a former case. The witness may refuse to answer (9). 9. In an action of libel a witness is asked (being shown the manuscript of the publisher's libel): "Did you write this paper?" The witness may refuse to answer (10). 10. In an action on a promissory note a witness is asked whether the note was not given for a gaming consideration. The witness may refuse to answer (11). 11. E. being indicted for sending a challenge and fighting a duel, several witnesses are asked: "Have you heard E. acknowledge that he sent a challenge to or fought a duel with F.?" They refuse to answer. Their refusal is proper.(12) (2) Fisher v. Ronalds, 12 C. B. 763 (1852). |