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244

BOOK II. CHAPTER XIV. § 7.

of a more reckless and improvident
class than themselves. What at first
sight seems the injustice of excluding
the more numerous body from sharing
the gains of a comparatively few, dis-
appears when we consider that by
being admitted, they would not be
made better off, for more than a short
time; the only permanent effect which
their admission would produce, would
be to lower the others to their own
level. To what extent the force of
this consideration is annulled when a
tendency commences towards dimi-
nished over-crowding in the labouring
classes generally, and what grounds of
a different nature there may be for re-
garding the existence of trade combi-
nations as rather to be desired than
deprecated, will be considered in a
subsequent chapter of this work, with
the subject of Combination Laws.

§ 7. To conclude this subject, I
must repeat an observation already
made, that there are kinds of labour of
which the wages are fixed by custom,
and not by competition. Such are the
fees or charges of professional persons:
of physicians, surgeons, barristers, and
even attorneys. These, as a general
rule, do not vary, and though competi-
tion operates upon those classes as
much as upon any others, it is by di-
viding the business, not, in general, by
diminishing the rate at which it is
paid.
The cause of this, perhaps, has
been the prevalence of an opinion that
such persons are more trustworthy if
paid highly in proportion to the work
they perform; insomuch that if a lawyer
or a physician offered his services at
less than the ordinary rate, instead of
gaining more practice, he would pro-
bably lose that which he already had.
For analogous reasons it is usual to

pay greatly beyond the market price of
their labour, all persons in whom the
employer wishes to place peculiar trust,
or from whom he requires something
besides their mere services. For ex-
ample, most persons who can afford it,
pay to their domestic servants higher
wages than would purchase in the
market the labour of persons fully as
competent to the work required. They
do this, not merely from ostentation,
but also from more reasonable motives;
either because they desire that those
they employ should serve them cheer-
fully, and be anxious to remain in their
service; or because they do not like to
drive a hard bargain with people whom
they are in constant intercourse with;
or because they dislike to have near
their
persons, and continually in their
habits which are the usual accompani-
sight, people with the appearance and
ments of a mean remuneration. Ŝimi-
lar feelings operate in the minds of
persons in business, with respect to
their clerks and other employés.
berality, generosity, and the credit of
the employer, are motives which, to
whatever extent they operate, preclude
taking the utmost advantage of compe-
tition: and doubtless such motives
might, and even now do, operate on
employers of labour in all the great
departments of industry; and most de-
sirable is it that they should.
they can never raise the average wages
of labour beyond the ratio of population
to capital. By giving more to each
person employed, they limit the power
of giving employment to numbers; and
however excellent their moral effect,
they do little good economically, unless
the pauperism of those who are shut
out, leads indirectly to a readjustment
by means of an increased restraint on
population.

Li

But

CHAPTER XV.

OF PROFITS.

§ 1. HAVING treated of the labourer's share of the produce, we next proceed to the share of the capitalist; the profits of capital or stock; the gains of the person who advances the expenses of production-who, from funds in his possession, pays the wages of the labourers, or supports them during the work; who supplies the requisite buildings, materials, and tools or machinery; and to whom, by the usual terms of the contract, the produce belongs, to be disposed of at his pleasure. After indemnifying him for his outlay, there commonly remains a surplus, which is his profit; the net income from his capital: the amount which he can afford to expend in necessaries or pleasures, or from which by further saving he can add to his wealth.

As the wages of the labourer are the remuneration of labour, so the profits of the capitalist are properly, according to Mr. Senior's well-chosen expression, the remuneration of abstinence. They are what he gains by forbearing to consume his capital for his own uses, and allowing it to be consumed by productive labourers for their uses. For this forbearance he requires a recompense. Very often in personal enjoyment he would be a gainer by squandering his capital, the capital amounting to more than the sum of the profits which it will yield during the years he can expect to live. But while he retains it undiminished, he has always the power of consuming it if he wishes or needs; he can bestow it upon others at his death; and in the meantime he derives from it an income, which he can without impoverishment apply to the satisfaction of his own wants or inclinations.

Of the gains, however, which the possession of a capital enables a person to make, a part only is properly an equivalent for the use of the capital itself; namely, as much as a solvent

person would be willing to pay for the loan of it. This, which as everybody knows is called interest, is all that a person is enabled to get by merely abstaining from the immediate consumption of his capital, and allowing it to be used for productive purposes by others. The remuneration which is obtained in any country for mere abstinence, is measured by the current rate of interest on the best security; such security as precludes any appre ciable chance of losing the principal. What a person expects to gain, who superintends the employment of his own capital, is always more, and generally much more, than this. The rate of profit greatly exceeds the rate of interest. The surplus is partly compensation for risk. By lending his capital, on unexceptionable security, he runs little or no risk. But if he embarks in business on his own account, he always exposes his capital to some, and in many cases to very great, danger of partial or total loss. For this danger he must be compensated, otherwise he will not incur it. He must likewise be remunerated for the devotion of his time and labour. The control of the operations of industry usually belongs to the person who supplies the whole or the greatest part of the funds by which they are carried on, and who, according to the ordinary arrangement, is either alone interested, or is the person most interested (at least directly), in the result. To exercise this control with efficiency, if the concern is large and complicated, requires great assiduity, and often, no ordinary skill. This assiduity and skill must be remunerated.

The gross profits from capital, the gains returned to those who supply the funds for production, must suffice for these three purposes. They must afford a sufficient equivalent for absti nence, indemnity for risk, and remu

sons.

BOOK 11. CHAPTER XV. § 2.

246
neration for the labour and skill re-
quired for superintendence. These
different compensations may be either
paid to the same, or to different per-
The capital, or some part of it,
may be borrowed: may belong to some
one who does not undertake the risks
or the trouble of business. In that
case, the lender, or owner, is the per-
Fon who practises the abstinence; and
is remunerated for it by the interest
paid to him, while the difference be-
tween the interest and the gross profit
remunerates the exertions and risks of
the undertaker. Sometimes, again,
the capital, or a part of it, is supplied
by what is called a sleeping partner;
who shares the risks of the employ
ment, but not the trouble, and who, in
consideration of those risks, receives
not a mere interest, but a stipulated
share of the gross profits. Sometimes
the capital is supplied and the risk
incurred by one person, and the busi-
ness carried on exclusively in his name,
while the trouble of management is
made over to another, who is engaged
for that purpose at a fixed salary.
Management, however, by hired ser-
vants, who have no interest in the
result but that of preserving their
salaries, is proverbially inefficient, un-
less they act under the inspecting eye,
if not the controlling hand, of the per-
son chiefly interested: and prudence
almost always recommends giving to
a manager not thus controlled, a re-
muneration partly dependent on the
profits; which virtually reduces the
case to that of a sleeping partner. Or
finally, the same person may own the
capital, and conduct the business;
adding, if he will and can, to the man-
agement of his own capital, that of as
much more as the owners may be will
But under
ing to trust him with.

may be described respectively as inte-
rest, insurance, and wages of superin-
tendence.

§ 2. The lowest rate of profit which
can permanently exist, is that which
is barely adequate, at the given place
and time, to afford an equivalent for
the abstinence, risk, and exertion im-
plied in the employment of capital.
From the gross profit, has first to be
deducted as much as will form a fund
sufficient on the average to cover all
losses incident to the employment.
Next, it must afford such an equivalent
to the owner of the capital for forbear-
ing to consume it, as is then and
there a sufficient motive to him to per-
sist in his abstinence. How much
will be required to form this equiva-
lent, depends on the comparative value
placed, in the given society, upon the
present and the future: (in the words
formerly used) on the strength of the
effective desire of accumulation. Fur-
ther, after covering all losses, and re-
munerating the owner for forbearing to
consume, there must be something left
to recompense the labour and skill of
the person who devotes his time to the
business. This recompense too must
be sufficient to enable at least the
owners of the larger capitals to receive
for their trouble, or to pay to some
manager for his, what to them or him
will be a sufficient inducement for un-
dergoing it. If the surplus is no more
than this, none but large masses of
capital will be employed productively;
and if it did not even amount to this,
capital would be withdrawn from pro-
duction, and unproductively consumed,
until, by an indirect consequence of its
diminished amount, to be explained
hereafter, the rate of profit was raised.

Such, then, is the minimum of any and all of these arrangements, the profits: but that minimum is exceedsame three things require their remu-ingly variable, and at some times and neration, and must obtain it from the gross profit: abstinence, risk, exertion. And the three parts into which profit may be considered as resolving itself,

It is to be regretted that this word, in this sense, is not familiar to an English ear. French political economists enjoy a great advantage in being able to speak currently of les profita de l'entrepreneur.

places extremely low; on account of the great variableness of two out of its three elements. That the rate of necessary remuneration for abstinence, or in other words the effective desire of accumulation, differs widely in different states of society and civilization, has been seen in a former chapter.

There is a still wider difference in the element which consists in compensation for risk. I am not now speaking of the differences in point of risk between different employments of capital in the same society, but of the very different degrees of security of property in different states of society. Where, as in many of the governments of Asia, property is in perpetual danger of spoliation from a tyrannical government, or from its rapacious and illcontrolled officers; where to possess or to be suspected of possessing wealth, is to be a mark not only for plunder, but perhaps for personal ill-treatment to extort the disclosure and surrender of hidden valuables; or where, as in the European middle ages, the weakness of the government, even when not itself inclined to oppress, leaves its subjects exposed without protection or redress to active spoliation, or audacious withholding of just rights, by any powerful individual; the rate of profit which persons of average dispositions will require, to make them forego the immediate enjoyment of what they happen to possess, for the purpose of exposing it and themselves to these perils, must be something very considerable. And these contingencies affect those who live on the mere interest of their capital, in common with those who personally engage in production. In a generally secure state of society, the risks which may be attendant on the nature of particular employments seldom fall on the person who lends his capital, if he lends on good security; but in a state of society like that of many parts of Asia, no security (except perhaps the actual pledge of gold or jewels) is good: and the mere possession of a hoard, when known or suspected, exposes it and the possessor to risks, for which scarcely any profit he could expect to obtain would be an equivalent; so that there would be still less accumulation than there is, if a state of insecurity did not also multiply the occasions on which the possession of a treasure may be the means of saving life, or averting serious calamities. Those who lend, under these wretched governments, do it at

the utmost peril of never being paid. In most of the native states of India, the lowest terms on which any one will lend money, even to the govern. ment, are such, that if the interest is paid only for a few years, and tho principal not at all, the lender is toler ably well indemnified. If the accumulation of principal and compound interest is ultimately compromised at a few shillings in the pound, he has generally made an advantageous bargain.

§ 3. The remuneration of capital in different employments, much more than the remuneration of labour, varies according to the circumstances which render one employment more attractive, or more repulsive, than another. The profits, for example, of retail trade, in proportion to the capital employed, exceed those of wholesale dealers or manufacturers, for this reason among others, that there is less consideration attached to the employment. The greatest, however, of these differences, is that caused by difference of risk. The profits of a gunpowder manufacturer must be considerably greater than the average, to make up for the peculiar risks to which he and his property are constantly exposed. When, however, as in the case of marine adventure, the peculiar risks are capable of being, and commonly are, commuted for a fixed payment, the premium of insurance takes its regular place among the charges of production; and the compensation which the owner of the ship or cargo receives for that payment, does not appear in the estimate of his profits, but is included in the replacement of his capital.

The portion, too, of the gross profit, which forms the remuneration for the labour and skill of the dealer or producer, is very different in different employments. This is the explanation always given of the extraordinary rate of apothecaries' profit; the greatest part, as Adam Smith observes, being frequently no more than the reasonable wages of professional attendance; for which, until a late alteration of the

law, the apothecary could not demand | ferent employments of capital. If a business can only be advantageously carried on by a large capital, this in most countries limits so narrowly the class of persons who can enter into the employment, that they are enabled to keep their rate of profit above the general level. A trade may also, from the nature of the case, be confined to so few hands, that profits may admit of being kept up by a combination among the dealers. It is well known that even among so numerous a body as the London booksellers, this sort of combination long continued to exist. I have already mentioned the case of the gas and water companies.

any remuneration, except in the prices of his drugs. Some occupations require a considerable amount of scientific or technical education, and can only be carried on by persons who combine with that education a considerable capital. Such is the business of an engineer, both in the original sense of the term, a machine-maker, and in its popular or derivative sense, an undertaker of public works. These are always the most profitable employments. There are cases, again, in which a considerable amount of labour and skill is required to conduct a business necessarily of limited extent. In such cases a higher than common rate of profit is necessary to yield only the common rate of remuneration. "In a small scaport town," says Adam Smith, a little grocer will make forty or fifty per cent upon a stock of a single hundred pounds, while a considerable wholesale merchant in the same place will scarce make eight or ten per cent upon a stock of ten thousand. The trade of the grocer may be necessary for the conveniency of the inhabitants, and the narrowness of the market may not admit the employment of a larger capital in the business. The man, however, must not only live by his trade, but live by it suitably to the qualifications which it requires. Besides possessing a little capital, he must be able to read, write, and account, and must be a tolerable judge, too, of perhaps fifty or sixty different sorts of goods, their prices, qualities, and the markets where they are to be had cheapest. Thirty or forty pounds a year cannot be considered as too great a recompense for the labour of a person so accomplished. Deduct this from the seemingly great profits of his capital, and little more will remain, perhaps, than the ordinary profits of stock. The greater part of the apparent profit is, in this case, too, real wages." All the natural monopolies (meaning thereby those which are created by circumstances, and not by law) which produce or aggravate the disparities in the remuneration of different kinds of labour, operate similarly between dif

§ 4. After due allowance is made for these various causes of inequality, namely, differences in the risk or agreeableness of different employments, and natural or artificial monopolies; the rate of profit on capital in all employments tends to an equality. Such is the proposition usually laid down by political economists, and under proper explanations it is true.

That portion of profit which is properly interest, and which forms the real remuneration for abstinence, is strictly the same, at the same time and place, whatever be the employment. The rate of interest on equally good security, does not vary according to the destination of the principal, though it does vary from time to time very much, according to the circumstances of the market. There is no employ ment in which, in the present state of industry, competition is so active and incessant as in the lending and borrowing of money All persons in business are occasionally, and most of them constantly, borrowers: while all persons not in business, who possess monied property, are lenders. Between these two great bodies, there is a numerous, keen, and intelligent class of middlemen, composed of bankers, stockbrokers, discount brokers, and others, alive to the slightest breath of probable gain. The smallest circumstance, or the most transient impression on the public mind, which tends to an increase or diminution of the demand for loans

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