Some of the lands claimed to have been forfeited to the United States have been patented, and are in the actual occupation of the patentees, or persons claiming under them; and other portions of said lands for which patents have been issued are unoccupied, and are wild lands, as is true of some of the lands claimed by the United States, which have not been sold or patented, and are not in the actual physical possession of any person or party.

The following is a sufficient reproduction of the diagram:

to have authorized the construction of a main road from Portland to Astoria, and that the lands adjacent to and coterminous with such main road, on both sides, were granted in order to accomplish that purpose, and also to have authorized the construction of a branch from the main line, at a junction near Forest Grove, to McMinnville, then it I would follow that all of the lands available on both sides as far as Forest Grove, and to an extent of 20 miles on each side, would be absorbed in aiding to build the main line;

*The circuit court (Bellinger, J.) held that the lands within the quadrant were included within the lands forfeited to the government, and decreed accordingly. 57 Fed. 426. The circuit court of appeals for the Ninth circuit reversed this decree, and directed a decree in favor of the Oregon & California Railroad Company. 29 U. S. App. 497, 14 C. C. A. 600, and 67 Fed. 650. Thereupon the present appeal was prosecuted.

Asst. Atty. Gen. Dickinson and George H. Williams, for the United States. J. Hubley Ashton and Joseph H. Choate, for appellees.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

If the act of May 4, 1870, should be held

and so of the lands along the main line from Forest Grove to Astoria. And, inasmuch as the line from Forest Grove to Astoria, and from Forest Grove, at the junction with the main line, south towards McMinnville, was, in its general bearing, at right angles to the main line from Portland to Forest Grove, the line from Portland to Forest Grove would absorb nearly all of the lands lying east of the branch line to McMinnville, and a part of the lands lying east of the line from McMinnville through Forest Grove, the point of junction, northward towards Astoria. Hence but little could be earned for building the branch line except the lands lying west of it and south of the point of junction at Forest Grove, and none of the land lying north of a line drawn from Portland through

from Portland to Astoria, and a road expressly stated to be from a point of junction near Forest Grove to the Yamhill river.

We are unable to see why any other than their usual meaning should be attributed to the words "point of junction." "Junction," in the ordinary acceptation as applied to railroads, is the point or locality where two or more lines of railway meet. Two lines of distinct companies, or separate roads of the same company, or a main line and a branch road of the same company, may have points of union or meeting, styled "junctions," but this can hardly be predicated of a single continuous road from one point to another. If the act had not used the word "junction," and had defined the line as running from Portland to Astoria, and to McMinnville via Forest Grove, there would be more force in the suggestion that Forest Grove was a point of bifurcation of one road rather than a point of junction of two roads; but the act was not couched in those terms, and the word "junction" cannot be rejected, or wrested from its obvious meaning.

As the road from Portland to Astoria and the road from Forest Grove to McMinnville were to be constructed by and belong to one company, and together constituted a single enterprise, they were naturally spoken of as one railroad, as, in that sense, they were. But this is of no special significance in the present inquiry, which is whether, in view of the language of the act and the purposes to be accomplished, a main road and a branch road were provided for, in aid of which the lands were granted subject to the adjustment applicable to two roads. And the general rule is that "words importing the singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things, words importing the plural number may include the singular," as provided in the first section of the Revised Statutes.

Nor are we impressed with the argument that the title of the act compels to another conclusion. The title is, "An act granting lands to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from Portland to Astoria and McMinnville in the state of Oregon." The text of the act is: "That for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from Portland to Astoria, and from a suitable point of junction near Forest Grove to the Yamhill river near McMinnville in the state of Oregon," the grant is made. Insert the comma after Astoria in the title, which appears after that word in the act (and, for the purpose of arriving at the true meaning of a statute, courts read with such stops as are manifestly required,-Hammock V. Trust Co., 105 U. S. 77, 84; U. S. v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 628, 10 Sup. Ct. 625), and the title is sufficiently comprehensive to fairly describe a road from Portland to Astoria, and a road to McMinnville, as the subject of the act. The title is no part of an act, and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or control the words of

the act unless they are doubtful or ambigu ous. U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 386; Railroad Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174, 188, 10 Sup. Ct. 68. The ambiguity must be in the context, and not in the title, to render the lat ter of any avail.

And so of the title of the act of January 31, 1885. That title is, "An act to declare forfeiture of certain lands granted to aid in the construction of a railroad in Oregon," and the granting act is referred to in the text by its title. We do not regard the use of the singular number as persuasive of the intention of congress that, in the adjustment of the grant as affected by the forfeiture, the fact that a main road and a branch road were provided for should be ignored.

It seems to us quite clear that a main road was to be built from Portland, the principal city of Oregon, situated on the*Columbia river, to Astoria, a port on the Pacific Ocean, at the mouth of that river, a distance of some 1281⁄2 miles, being over 100 miles beyond Forest Grove; and a branch from Forest Grove to McMinnville, a distance somewhat exceeding 21 miles. It is not denied that, as stated in the opinion of the circuit court, "four-fifths of the line of road from Portland to Astoria traversed a rough and wholly unsettled district, but one known to be rich in timber, and believed to be in iron and coal, with considerable areas of agricultural land," while the 21 miles from Forest Grove to McMinnville ran through "the heart of the Willamette valley, and through the oldest settled portion of the country." The opening up to settlement of unoccupied and inaccessible territory and the establishment of railroad communication between Portland and Astoria by the construction of the main line were the obvious induce ments to and the primary objects of the grant, and the construction of the branch, though included in the act, was subordinate and subsidiary. The line, both main and branch, was wholly within the state of Oregon, and we cannot assume that, if the promoters had sought aid merely for a road running from Portland by way of Forest Grove to McMinnville, the application would have been granted.

The grant contemplated a main line which ran from Portland west to the point of junction, and a branch from the point of junction nearly south, substantially at right angles, and devoted the lands north of the junction, not absorbed by the road from Portland to that point, to the building of the road to the north; and, while the company was left free to construct parts of the road as might suit its convenience, its action could not change the effect of the grant or control its administration to the contrary of the manifest intention of congress.

On the 20th of May, A. D. 1871, a map of definite location was filed with the secretary of the interior, described in the certificate of the company's officers as showing the location of the Oregon Central Railroad from the

city of Portland, Oregon, to the Yamhill river near McMinnville, a distance of forty-seven and three-fourths (47%) miles, and also*from a junction near Forest Grove towards Astoria to a point one mile north of the summit of the range of hills dividing the Tualatin from the Nehalem valley, a distance of 20 miles, as definitely fixed in compliance with said act of congress."

Subsequently the company certified a map of definite location of the road between Astoria and Castor Creek (the western point in the preceding map), which was filed with the secretary of the interior, and transmitted by him, February 2, 1872, to the commissioner of the general land office. The lands were withdrawn under both these maps.

The first section of constructed road from Portland 20 miles west to Hillsboro was accepted February 16, 1872. The second section was accepted June 23, 1876. This was a section of 271⁄2 miles from Hillsboro via Forest Grove to McMinnville, constructed on a curve thus described by counsel for the railroad companies: "The line of this section of the road runs from the twentieth mile post for about two miles (for the most part upon indicated curves) to a point a little south of the Portland base line, and thence extends west about two miles-almost entirely upon a tangent until it passes Cornelius-to a point about two miles east of Forest Grove, when it begins to curve upon a radius of 8,564 feet (equal to about 1.6 miles) until it reaches about a southwest by west direction, in which it runs upon a tangent 8,956 feet (equal to about 1.7 miles), passing the town of Forest Grove at a distance of about onehalf or three-quarters of a mile. From the end of this tangent it again curves until it reaches a southwesterly direction, and then proceeds on southerly by various curves to the Yamhill river."

If these maps of definite location and the construction of the road from Hillsboro to McMinnville via Forest Grove in the manner described are to be regarded as an attempt to make a part of the main road from Portland to Astoria and the branch a continuous and single road from Portland to McMinnville, eliminating Astoria altogether, and to entitle the company to claim all the lands within the quadrant by reason of the construction of the railroad on the above-stated curve, we can only say that that attempt was unsuccessful, *and the rights of the government remained unaffected by the course pursued by the company.

It is forcibly argued that the acceptance of the completed section from Hillsboro to McMinnville amounted to a construction by the secretary of the interior of the granting act as providing for one continuous railroad from Portland via Forest Grove to McMinnville. But we cannot accede to this view. At the time of that acceptance the entire line of both main and branch roads had been definitely located, and the lands withdrawn. It could

not be presumed that all the lands would not be earned, or that a forfeiture would be declared. Still less can it be supposed that it occurred to the secretary that what the company was apparently doing for its own convenience was being done with the design of committing the department to the recognition of the untenable position that the lands within the quadrant passed by virtue of the building of the road to McMinnville. This was a matter not then before the secretary for determination, and when it did arise was otherwise disposed of.

And this is true as respects the approval of the first map of definite location. Such approval was diverso intuitu, and should be given no effect as contemporaneous construction. Under that location lands were withdrawn from Portland to Castor Creek, as well as to McMinnville, and the overlap at the east of the road to McMinnville was inevitable, and was not a loss to be made up from lands belonging to other parts of the grant.

In the view we take of the grant, the termini of the main road were Portland and Astoria, and of the branch the junction and McMinnville. Lands lying north of a line drawn at right angles with the branch at its northern terminus were not within the grant made in aid of the branch. Lands lying west of a line drawn at right angles with the main road at the junction were not within the grant for the main road east thereof.

As heretofore remarked, however, some of the lands lying east of the quadrant were not only coterminous with the uncompleted portion of the main road beyond Forest Grove, but* were embraced within the limits of the completed road from Portland to the junction, and therefore congress, in the act of forfeiture, was careful to save those lands from its operation. There is nothing in the language used from which it can properly be concluded that congress intended to accept the theory of the railroad companies that the circuitous route adopted in construction entitled them to the lands in the quadrant because thereby brought within the grant, or to do anything more than so qualify the phraseology as to prevent an unintended forfeiture. So far as the act operated as a legislative interpretation, it was in harmony with the granting act as subsequently construed by Secretary Lamar, and cannot be treated as proceeding on the theory of prior construction, which we do not agree had been had. And although the failure of the company to build beyond Forest Grove towards Astoria left but one road, and that from Portland to McMinnville, it would be quite inadmissible to make the defeat of the primary object of congress the basis of imputing to that body the intention of narrowing the forfeiture declared for noncompliance with the conditions imposed.

In U. S. v. Union Pac. Ry., 148 U. S. 562, 13 Sup. Ct. 724, the question before us was not presented. The decision there was controlled by the determination that the whole line was

a continuous main line, and that the grant was not cut in two by one company being authorized to contract with another for the construction of part of the line and a proportionate share of the grant. The whole line was built. Here the grant for building the line from Portland beyond Forest Grove to Astoria became fixed by the location of the road, as did the grant in aid of the road from the junction to McMinnville. The main line was not constructed beyond the junction. The lands in controversy were not adjacent to nor coterminous with the branch road between lines drawn perpendicularly to its termini, were not coterminous with the road from Portland to the junction, and were donated to build the portion of the main line which was abandoned. The ruling in the former case has no decisive bearing under the facts in this. **The decree of the circuit court of appeals is reversed, the decree of the circuit court is affirmed, and the cause remanded to that court accordingly.

Mr. Justice FIELD and Mr. Justice SHIRAS, dissent.

(164 U. S. 546)

ROWE v. UNITED STATES. (November 30, 1896.) No. 439.

HOMICIDE-SELF-DEFENSE- WITHDRAWAL AFTER ASSAULT-DUTY TO RETREAT.

1. On the issue of self-defense, there was evidence that defendant, while in an hotel office with deceased, being provoked by insulting words of the latter, kicked him lightly, and then stepped back, and leaned against the counter, whereupon he was assaulted by deceased with a knife. Held, that it should have been left to the jury to say whether the conduct of the defendant, after kicking the deceased, was a withdrawal in good faith from further contest; and it was error to charge to the effect that, if defendant kicked deceased, however lightly, he could not justify, on the ground of self-defense, the killing of deceased in resisting his assault, though such killing may have been necessary to save defendant's own life. 2. Where one, after making a slight assault upon another, provoked by insulting words of the latter, in good faith withdraws from further contest, his right of self-defense is restored if the assaulted person then, in violation of law, pursues him with a deadly weapon, and seeks to take his life, or do him great bodily harm.

3. Where the evidence showed that the killing was done in resisting a deadly assault with a knife by the deceased, in the office of an hotel at which both parties were stopping, it was error to charge that if defendant, by stepping aside, could have avoided the attack, or if he could have inflicted a less dangerous wound, or "paralyzed the arm" of his assailant, the killing was not justifiable, on the ground of self-defense.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas.

Ben T. Duval and William M. Cravens, for plaintiff in error. Asst. Atty. Gen. Dickinson, for the United States.

Mr. Justice HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an indictment for murder, alleged to have been committed by the plaintiff in

error, in the Cherokee Nation, Ind. T., on the 30th day of March, 1895; the person killed, Frank Bozeman, being a white man, and not an Indian. The verdict was guilty of manslaughter, and, a motion for new trial having been overruled, the accused was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary at Columbus, Ohio, for the term of five years, and to pay to the United States a fine of $500. We extract from the record the following agreed statement as to the evidence:

"The testimony on the part of the government tended to show: That on the evening of the 30th of March, 1895, the defendant, David Cul Rowe, who is a Cherokee Indian, and the deceased, Frank Bozeman, a white man, a citizen of the United States, and not an Indian, met at an hotel at Pryor's Creek, Ind. T., at the supper table. That the defendant appeared to be drinking, but was not much intoxicated. That defendant said that he had his gun, and that he had a right to carry it, as he was a 'traveler.' That he had made a gun play in that town on one occasion, and he would make another one. That he said to deceased, 'What do you think of that? The deceased did not reply, and defendant said to him, 'God damn you, I'll make you hide out, or I'll make you talk to me.' That in a short time deceased got through his supper, and walked out into the office of the hotel, and presently defendant came out of the dining room. That defendant said something to deceased, which was not understood by the witnesses, but the deceased did not answer. That defendant turned to some other parties present, and said, 'He [meaning deceased] will not talk to me.' That one of the parties addressed said to defendant, "Talk Cherokee to him.' That the deceased then said, 'He has got too damn much nigger blood in him to talk anything with any sense.' That defendant then kicked at deceased, hitting him lightly on the lower part of the leg. That immediately deceased sprang at defendant, striking him with a knife, and cutting him in two places on the face. That, after deceased began cutting defendant, the latter drew his pistol, and fired, shooting deceased through the body. That, at the time the defendant fired, the two men were in striking distance of one another. The shot struck deceased in the right arm, near the elbow, and ranged through the body from right to left side. That, when shot was fired, deceased ran, and, when defendant turned round, the blood was streaming from his face, where he had been cut by deceased, and he said to the bystanders to go for a doctor, that he was killed. That, a short time after the difficulty, the knife used by deceased on defendant was found near the place where the the trouble occurred. That a knife was also found on the person of deceased after his death.

"The testimony on the part of the defense tended to show that, on the day of the difficulty, defendant came into town from his home, about 20 miles distant, with his wife, to do