RATIFY THE TREATY. DECLARE THE NATION'S

POLICY.

I gladly avail myself of the columns of the Journal to suggest a few reasons why the opponents of a colonial policy should make their fight in support of a resolution declaring the nation's purpose rather than against the ratification of the treaty.

The conflict between the doctrine of self-government and the doctrine of alien government supported by external force has been thrust upon the American people as a result of the war. It is so important a conflict that it cannot be avoided, and, since it deals with a question now before Congress, it must be considered immediately. It is useless to ask what effect this new issue will have upon other issues. Issues must be met as they arise; they cannot be moved about at will like pawns upon chess board.

The opponents of imperialism have an opportunity to choose the ground upon which the battle is to be fought. Why not oppose the ratification of the treaty?

First, because a victory won against the treaty would prove only temporary if the people really favor a colonial policy.

That a victory won against the treaty would depend for its value entirely upon the sentiment of the people is evident. A minority can obstruct action for a time, but a minority, so long as it remains a minority, can only delay action and enforce reflection; it cannot commit the nation to a policy.

When there seemed some probability of the rejection of the treaty the friends of the administration began to suggest the propriety of withholding the treaty until the new senate could be convened in extra ses

sion. As the new senate will have a considerable Republican majority it would be quite certain to ratify the treaty. Thus an effort to prevent the ratification of the treaty would be likely to fail in the very beginning. But let us suppose it possible to defeat. ratification in both the present and the next senatewhat would be the result? Would the imperialists abandon the hope of annexing the Philippines so long as they could claim the support of the President and a majority of both houses? Could a minority of the Senate prevent the annexation of Hawaii? As we are now in possession of the Philippine Islands the advocates of a colonial policy might secure an appropriation sufficient to pay the twenty millions agreed upon and leave the rest of the treaty for future consideration. In other words, if the opponents of imperialism have a majority in both houses they can declare the nation's policy; if the imperialists have a majority in both houses they cannot be permanently thwarted by a minority in the Senate.

A resolution declaring the nation's policy recognizes that the destiny of the United States is in the hands of all the people and seeks to ascertain at once. the sentiment of the people as reflected by their representatives.

If that decision is in harmony with the policy which has prevailed in the past the question will be settled and the people will return to the consideration of domestic problems. If, however, the advocates of imperialism either postpone consideration or control the action of Congress an appeal will be taken to the voters at the next election. So great a change in our national policy cannot be made unless the authority therefor comes directly and unequivocally from that source of all power in a republic-the people.

In answer to those who fear that the question of

imperialism, if discussed, will draw attention away from other questions, it is sufficient to say that the people cannot be prevented from considering a question which reaches down to the foundation principles of the republic. Instead of avoiding the issue it is the part of wisdom to deal with it at once and dispose of it permanently.

Second, the rejection of the treaty would be unwise because the opponents of the treaty would be compelled to assume responsibility for the continuance of war conditions and for the risks which always attend negotiations with a hostile nation.

The rejection of the treaty would give the administration an excuse for military expenditures which could not be justified after the conclusion of peace, and the opponents of the treaty would be charged with making such appropriations necessary. It must be remembered that in case the treaty is rejected negotiations must be renewed with an enemy whose ill-will is not concealed. Who is able to guarantee the nation. against new dangers and new complications? In order to form an estimate of the risks which would thus be incurred, one has only to recall the unexpected things which have happened since war was declared. Is it wise to so make the attack as to assume all the risks when the same end can be gained by a plan which throws the risks upon our opponents? If the imperialists vote down a resolution declaring the nation's policy or postpone its consideration, they become responsible for any loss of life or expenditure of money which may follow as a result of such action.

I suggest below a few reasons in support of a resolution declaring it to be the nation's purpose to establish a stable government in Cuba and the Philippines and then to give the inhabitants independence under