in State and Church are concerned. However slow the external progress of the New Church appears to have been, it nevertheless extends to all parts of the globe, never having caused disturbance, strife, or bloodshed, which have stained the progress of the old churches.

(To be Continued.)

Review.

THE ARGUMENT A PRIORI FOR THE BEING AND THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE
ABSOLUTE ONE, AND THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS. By WIL-
LIAM HONEYMAN GILLESPIE. Fifth Edition. Pp. 166. London:
Houlston and Sons. 1871.
EXAMINATION OF GILLESPIE: being an Analytical Criticism of the Argument
a Priori for the Existence of a Great First Cause, as developed by Mr.
W. H. Gillespie, in his "Necessary Existence of God." By THOMAS
SQUIRE BARRETT. Second Edition. Pp. 48. London: Provost and
Co. 1871.

THE subject of these two books is one of the greatest importance: we should have been pleased if the perusal of them had satisfied our expectations. Although Christians may not require a scientific argument to prove the truth of that which they believe on the authority of Revelation, they will always welcome every intellectual effort which is calculated to shew the rationale of their faith and even when such efforts are not so successful and convincing as may be desired, they will speak with reluctance of failure in the methods pursued, because they value the end that is intended.

The first of the above works is an endeavour to prove the existence of God, by a logical process called "The Argument a Priori:" and the other is criticism, calling in question the soundness of the process; and, without doubting the conclusion arrived at, indicates a preference for "the argument a posteriori."

The argument a priori is a series of reasonings which attempts to demonstrate the Being of God from certain necessary postulata. The argument a posteriori only undertakes to give probable evidence of His existence from the indications of design which are visible in the objects of creation. The former is, no doubt, the right method for arriving at the conviction that God exists, if it is to be arrived at at all by a process of mere reasoning. It is like attempting to find the circumference from the centre, and not as the other, which seeks the centre from the circumference. "God is to be thought of from essence to person and not from person to essence (A. R. 611). But Mr. Barrett objects to this process, and says: "Science and common sense both teach that the proper way of proceeding is to commence with ascertained facts, and ascend from them to their causes-in other words, science and common sense equally announce that the proper path of discovery is the a posteriori" (p. 8). This, no doubt, is the right process by which to discover the principles which regulate the phenomena of natural philosophy and science; it is the Baconian method in those fields of inquiry, but not in that which relates to the discovery of God's existence. "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?" (Job xi. 7.) Mr. B. indeed asks-"How is the belief (in God) obtained?" and answers it by saying, "At the present day chiefly by education;" but he omits to say how it was obtained at some former day, and altogether fails to intimate whom he supposes to have been the first educator on the sub

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ject and that is the real question. The idea that "man can learn nothing of the Divine from nature, but only from Revelation," if it has occurred to the authors of these two books, is not presented by either of them. They attempt to deal with the question mainly in the way of scientific inquiry and scholastic logic, each, however, contemplating the premises of the other as inefficient, and declaring his reasonings to be inconclusive.

While it is most clear that every effect has its cause, it is equally clear that no series of reasonings from effects to causes will conduct us to a stopping place, and at that stopping place suggest the idea of a great First Cause. As there is no discoverable terminus by such an argument, the notion of something infinite may be suggested, and then imagination, because design is evident in the objects of creation, may clothe that suggestion with the idea of intelligence, and call it God. But this is not a necessary result of the logical process pursued, but rather a breaking down of the argument a posteriori, by an idea of God acquired from some other and prior source. "There is an influx universal from God into the souls of men, teaching them that there is a God, and that He is One” (U. T. 8). But although Mr. Barrett intimates his preference for the argument a Posteriori, he does not pursue it in his "Examination of Gillespie ;" his object in that work being to shew what he considers to be the weak and imperfect proofs of the existence of God, as set forth by Mr. Gillespie in his "Argument a Priori." That it has weak points is evident, though it is handled with scholastic skill, and presented in formula sufficiently succinct to interest the careful attention of educated students. Still it has a most serious defect, which neither the author nor his critic appear to have observed. What this is will presently appear.

any

Mr. Gillespie has arranged his " Argument a Priori" into four divisions, and these into several parts: the parts themselves being treated in the way of Propositions; Prolegomena, Demonstrations, and Scholia. Sub-propositions, Postulates, Sub-Scholia, Corollaries, Epilegomena, Lemmas, and Postulates are attached to some. From this it will appear that the form of the work is not popular. The effort appears to have been to treat the subject as somewhat resembling a geometrical proposition: and if the subject really admitted of such treatment, it may be fairly said that Mr. Gillespie had done it some service. But we think the attempt is a mistake. We can heartily sympathize with the author's purpose to find an argument against the boasts of Atheism, but we cannot conceal from ourselves strong doubts respecting the accuracy of his method and the certainty of its success. To us the work appears to belong to that class of metaphysical philosophy in which words do more to perplex the mind than to furnish it with definite ideas of thought. As an instance, and for the sake of illustrating what we mean, we will take the FIRST DIVISION, on which the whole argument proceeds. It is entitled "The Being, and the Natural Modes." This is arranged into three parts, each having several Propositions, &c. FIRST proposition is that "Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing.” SECOND, that "Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible: with its corollary, that it is necessarily immovable. THIRD, "That there is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Extension.” FOURTH, That the Being of Infinity of Extension is necessarily of unity and simplicity." FIFTH, "That there is necessarily but one Being of Infinity of Expansion." (Observe the former word extension is in this proposition expansion). The Second Part of this Division is treated in precisely the same way, only instead of "Infinity of Expansion" being the subject, it is the "Infinity of Duration," and, from these postulata, it is contended that "The simple, sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration" is necessarily "Intelligent," "All-knowing," "AllPowerful," "Entirely Free," "Completely Happy," "Perfectly Good,"

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The

"Necessarily True," and thus God! By necessity in the above cases the author does not mean that the predicates are compelled, for that would imply a compeller, but that the mind cannot refuse to acknowledge them.

Such is Mr. Gillespie's "Argument a priori for the Being and Attributes." But what does it amount to? That which is asserted is, that "Infinity of Extension" and "Infinity of Duration" necessarily exist; that they are simple, sole, intelligent, and so forth, and thus God! How these expressions differ from asserting that infinite Space and Time are God we do not see : the author certainly does not tell us and his Prolegomena, Demonstrations, Scholia, &c., seem to us a bewilderment of words conveying no definite idea of God, outside the idea that time and space are He! And thus a species of Pantheism is set up to meet the objections of Atheists, which is entirely outside the pale of Christian teaching on the subject. It is not improbable that Mr. Gillespie, by Infinity of Extension and Duration, may mean some metaphysical conception apart from space and time: if so, it is quite certain that he has not succeeded in making it intelligible. But on this point he shall speak for himself. In a "Sub-proposition" (p. 8), he maintains that “The material universe is finite in extension :" and in a "general Scholium as to extension” (p. 15), he says—

"The parts of infinity of extension, or of its substratum, if it have a substratum, being necessarily indivisible from each other, and immovable among themselves : and the parts of the material universe, being divisible from each other and movable among themselves; and it therefore following, that the material universe is not the substratum of infinity of extension, but is finite in extension: here are two sorts of extensions-the one sort, that which the material universe has and the other, the extension of infinity of extension. And as infinity of extension is necessarily existing, and as extension of the material universe must exist, if it exist in the extension of infinity of extension; a part of this, or of its substratum, if it have a substratum, (part, but in the sense of partial consideration ;) must penetrate the material universe, and every atom, even the minutest atom of it.

"It will be proper, therefore, to distingush between these two kinds of extension. And, accordingly, let us confine to matter, namely to the distance of the extremities of matter from each other, the name extension, a part of which (part in the sense of partial consideration only) penetrates all matter to the minutest atom, or corpuscular monad, the name expansion.

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And, therefore, every thing which has been proved to be true in relation to that extension which matter has not, must be true with regard to expansion."

Thus the infinity of expansion which is treated of as God, though distinguished by name from the finite extension of the material universe, expresses no idea which thought can recognise as an entity, besides that of the extension of the universe; and, therefore, notwithstanding the attempted "distinction between the two kinds of extension," it does not take away from the mind, so far as the idea of God is concerned, the notion of Pantheism. Mr. Barrett, in his "Examination," has not referred to this view of the case, he has mainly concerned himself with Mr. Gillespie's logic: and therefore we leave both works to the consideration of those who may feel an interest in such a treatment of the great question respecting the Being and attributes of God. We do not think either of them have done much to convince the Atheist of His error, and we feel sure they add but little to advance the knowledge of true Christian theology on the subject. We have noticed these works because they pretend to great logical skill in the matter, and mainly to state that the existence of God cannot be discovered by mere reasonings, and that the effort is like the attempt of a camel to pass through the eye of a needle.

The true, the only satisfactory position from which to argue for the Being and attributes of God is, that He has revealed Himself. The idea is possessed by mankind; it must have been communicated to them; God in creating man accompanied that creation with the revelation of Himself, and since then the idea has never been permitted to pass away from the human race. The idea "à priori," being discovered, the argument "à posteriori," has a thousand ways to prove the truth of it. We could not " see through Nature up to Nature's God" if He had not previously told mankind of His existence.

“The natural man (says Swedenborg) is desirous of being instructed in celestial and divine subjects by the experience of his senses, which is as impossible as it is for a camel to go through the eye of a needle; for the more he desires to grow wise by such a process, the more he blinds himself, till at length he comes to believe nothing, not even the reality of spiritual existences or eternal life. This is a necessary consequence of the principles which he lays down. He, however, who wishes to grow wise by a wisdom derived from the Lord, and not from the world, says within himself that he ought to believe the Lord, that is, the things which the Lord has spoken in His Word, because they are truths; and according to this principle he regulates his thoughts. Such a person confirms himself in his belief by rational considerations, by science, and by facts derived from nature and the experience of his senses; and he rejects from his thoughts every idea which does not tend to confirm such an opinion." (Arcana Coelestia, 128.)

"There are spirits who belong to the province of the skin, especially that part of it which is scaly, who are disposed to reason on all subjects, having no percep tion of what is good and true; nay, the more they reason, the less perception they have. They suppose wisdom to consist in reasoning, and practise it that they may appear wise. They are informed that it is the character of angelic wisdom to perceive whether a thing is good and true without reasoning: but it is inconceiv able to them that such perception can possibly exist. These consist of such persons, as during the life of the body had confused truth and goodness by scientific and philosophical studies and disputations, whence they regarded themselves as more learned than others, undertaking to establish their reasonings by science and philosophy, without having first taken any principle of truth from the Word" (A. C. 1385.)

"When I related (to certain spirits) the nature of that wisdom which is distinguished on our globe, how amongst the sciences (a skill which is reckoned a proof of erudition) there are also analytical principles established as a means of exploring the things appertaining to the mind and its thoughts, and that these principles are called metaphysics and logic, but that in their exploration they have advanced little further than the use of terms, and the application of certain versatile rules; and that these terms themselves are a ground of litigation, it being disputed what is meant by a form, what by a substance, what by mind, and what by soul; and that these common versatile rules are often applied in sharp contention about truths; it was instantly perceived by communication with those spirits, that such analytical principles take away all sense and understanding of a thing whensoever the mind is confined thereby to mere terms, and thinks on such subjects by artifical rules. They said, such analytical principles were in this case mere black specks, which darkened the intellectual sight, and that they tend to draw down the understanding into dust; they added that with them it is not so, because they have clearer ideas in consequence of being unacquainted with such principles. It was also given to see how wise they were" (A. C. 3348.)

Those passages are cited to intimate what are the true principles on which inquiry into the knowledge of Divine and spiritual things should be conducted, and as a prelude to observing that the above works are conspicuous by the absence of those principles.

R.

Miscellaneous.