ciple. Most organizational arrangements are less ambitious-expedient responses to urgent problems dictated more by politics than political science. Government takes on a patchwork appearance. From time to time attempts are made to sort out and rearrange agencies and functions in more orderly patterns, even to the extent of disestablishing or reforming old departments. Not every worthy government cause which seeks wider acceptance and ampler resources through separate departmental status can be accommodated. A multiplicity of departments would defeat the rationale for departmental organization. On the other hand, if a department embraces too many missions or disparate functions, it becomes unwieldly-a conglomerate or a holding company in which the secretary struggles constantly to keep in line strong-willed administrators of operating agencies.

In a dynamic, democratic society, governmental reorganization, despite the obstacles, signifies changing policy, a new approach-and reorganization on a departmental scale makes the greatest impact. Accordingly every administration can be expected to give special attention to such possibilities. Since World War II, each President has opted for a new department-Truman for DOD, Eisenhower for HEW, Kennedy for HUD, and Johnson for DOT (38). The Nixon Administration has established an advisory group on reorganization, whose recommendations are yet to be made (39). Characteristically, the post-World War II departments each represent a coalescence of established agencies and resources to subserve a broader policy or purpose of government. In several instances, the way was prepared by interim coordinating organizations. Thus, the DOD was preceded by a looser federation formally known as the Military Establishment, HEW by the Federal Security Agency, and HUD by the Housing and Home Finance Agency. The Department of Transportation, the latest departmental creation, did not go through a transitional form but established transportation agencies were a base upon which to build.

Science and technology, comprising large sectors of government activity with various organizational forms, have a similar potential for departmental organization. When great national problems arose, requiring positive and pointed government response, independent agencies were created-the AEC for the control of atomic energy after Hiroshima, the NSF to preserve the post-World War II momentum of research and development, and NASA after Sputnik. With the passing years, as missions are completed or redirected and as agencies mature, it is difficult to maintain the momentum and the excitement of the early days. New problems emerge, priorities are reassessed, talents are turned elsewhere. The atomic energy program is about 25 years old, the NSF has been in business 18 years, and the space agency, past its 10th birthday, will age rather quickly after a lunar landing. Reorganization generates its own excitement, infuses new energies, develops new missions.

CANDIDATES FOR INCLUSION

Thus AEC and NASA, independent technical agencies with multibillion-dollar yearly budgets, are prime candidates for transfer to a new department. Their interests increasingly will overlap as boosters and spacecraft come to depend more on nuclear technology. Both are sponsors of hardware development as well as basic research. Both are involved in intricate ways with Department of Defense programs. Both have large laboratory complexes and diversified resources for research and development. Both are faced with probable cutbacks and the need to reassess missions for the long term. The reassessment, in NASA's case, is associated with the moon landing, which will climax a decade of technical effort directed largely to this single goal. New vistas of space exploration beckon, but in the welfare decade of the 1970's more earth-bound causes will exert a strong gravitational pull on funds.

As for the AEC, the growth of nuclear stockpiles to what many regard as overkill dimensions and the gradual shift to industry of responsibility for nuclear power development are less climactic. The safety and regulatory functions associated with nuclear power, which some foresee as AEC's major responsibility ahead, could well be transferred to the Federal Power Commission, possibly helping to rejuvenate an old-line agency, just as the Federal Communications Commission has had to grapple with the regulatory aspects of satellite communications. Nuclear ordnance development and fabrication possibly could be shifted to the Department of Defense (40). The Department of Science and Technology would have, one may conceive, a space service and an atomic service, perhaps less ambitious than at present but still performing vital scientific and technical

work. The reorganization also would permit a realignment and better integration of the great laboratory complexes associated with these two agencies. Indeed, the realignment process for federal laboratories as a whole could be speeded up by this means.

The National Science Foundation is a somewhat different type of agency. It maintains no laboratories except a few contract research centers and builds no large projects or systems, with the exception of the ill-fated Mohole project. It values its relative independence and freedom from political influences in supporting academic science. In terms of prospective departmental status, it could be argued that NSF has as much affinity with education as with science, and if a separate Department of Education were to be created, undoubtedly there would be advocates for inclusion of NSF. On the other hand, education reaches out toward areas of contemporary concern not closely identified with science, such as job training and placement and manpower development, so that some envisage education as the organizing principle for a Department of Human Resources (41). Hornig favors the science-education nexus. He would make NSF the "core" of a Department of Science, linking basic research closely with higher education. In this concept, the new department would be little concerned with technology as distinguished from science, leaving technological development to "agencies with specific tasks and missions” (35).

In the writer's view, the prospects for departmental status are greatly improved if technology and science are conjoined. Creating a new department is difficult enough in itself, but technology provides more leverage and power for organizational change than basic research or pure science. The new department would need a bigger core or a broader base than that offered by NSF alone. In any event, the writer sees no serious obstacle to making the NSF a component of a Department of Science and Technology. In that way grants and other financial support to academic institutions could be better integrated, since NASA and AEC also are substantial contributors to academic science. Furthermore, the 1968 amendments to the National Science Foundation Act add applied research to the agency's responsibilities and thereby bring it closer to the technological concerns of other government agencies (42).

There is good logic in establishing a Department of Science and Technology to house not only older, more mature agencies but also new ones, which have not yet found a suitable home. Oceanography and related disciplines or technologies may be put in this class. Numerous government agencies are engaged in marine science activities, but the Congress has been groping for a decade or more to find the organizational base for a broad program of ocean development. The 1966 legislation, which created a temporary commission and a council for marine sciences and resources, stated a policy and provided a coordinating group but sidestepped the basic organizaitonal problem (43). The Commission on Marine Sciences, Engineering and Resources, on the eve of its demise, proposed that a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency be created as "the principal instrumentality within the Federal Government for administration of the Nation's civil marine and atmospheric programs." At the same time, the commission pointed out that it was proposing "an organization which can easily fit into a more fundamental restructuring of the Federal Government" (44). Clearly, the commission was leaving the door open for incorporation of marine sciences and resources in a Department of Science and Technology.

IMMEDIATE ADVANTAGES

One of the immediate advantages in creating a new government house for science and technology is the opportunity it affords for eliminating the clutter in the Executive Office of the President or at least making room for needed new services. The Aeronautics and Space Council and the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development both could be abolished or, along with PSAC and OST, shifted in whole or in part to the new department, though it must be recognized that the President will continue to need a science adviser with some staff of his own. The Vice President, now statutory chairman of the space and marine councils, could retain his valuable association with government science and continue to gain the technical information and insight needed for leadership in our technocratic society by serving in some appropriate capacity, possibly as chairman of the advisory apparatus annexed to the new department. The Office of Telecommunications Management, for want of a better alternative, also could be housed in the Department of Science and Technology. This office

needs strengthening to deal with communications problems of growing severity and technical sophistication. The Post Office and Transportation Departments each could make a claim for telecommunications management, but obviously they have enough problems of their own.

The removal from the Executive Office of its scientific or technical councils and offices is not a downgrading of science but a practical recognition that the President cannot give them sustained attention (45). Moreover, they have less impact on affairs than is usually supposed. Their directors parade before the government departments and agencies clothed in the uniform of Presidential prestige but are uncertain to what extent they can speak or act in his name. The department head directing a broad range of scientific and technical programs with a large budget has power and prestige of a more compelling kind. His command of resources, public visibility, and cabinet participation enable him to serve as principal science adviser to the President in a much more direct and positive way than the White House adviser or Executive Office functionary several steps removed from the scene of departmental action and operations. If the scientific community is concerned about prestige for science in government, there is considerable trade-off value in a department head as against the Executive Office coordinator or consultant.

Another advantage is that the new department could house technical agencies or bureaus which are obstacles to, or casualties of other reorganizations. For example, in January 1967, President Johnson proposed a merger of the Departments of Commerce and Labor (46). He did not push the proposal when the response in congressional and some other quarters seemed unfavorable. Despite the inevitable resistance, there was merit in a merger, the objective being a department of economic affairs or economic development. Since the Department of Commerce has acquired by historical accretion a number of important technical services now encompassed in the Environmental Science Services Administration, the National Bureau of Standards, the U.S. Patent Office, and other units, it would have made sense, in the event of a Commerce-Labor merger, to extract these technical agencies and place them in a Department of Science and Technology.

Finally, a Department of Science and Technology would provide better interface with the Department of Defense. Although it would not be wise to transfer research and development commands, offices, or agencies from the Department of Defense to the civilian department in any wholesale fashion, conceivably several military-managed laboratories, agencies, or programs could be transferred on a selective basis if their relationship to military needs is limited, if they now serve many government users, and if their concern is more with science than with defense (47). A civil department conveniently could assume DOD responsibilities in supporting educational centers of excellence or sponsoring certain kinds of social or other research. This need not be a one-way transfer process, since formation of a new department might well involve assignment of certain functions to the military, as mentioned before in the case of nuclear ordnance. More systematic coordination and congruence of policy and program can be achieved by two major departments in balance than by one department on the military side dealing with assorted scientific and technical agencies on the civil side. Even a casual perusal of the numerous memoranda of understanding, working arrangements, and coordinating mechanisms between the DOD and NASA, for example, suggests the complexity of these interagency relationships. Complexity cannot be eliminated but it can be reduced. The logic here is even more persuasive as agencies wrestle with joint projects and interacting programs.

All the decisions as to the composition of the Department of Science and Technology need not, of course, be made at one time. If the universe of government agencies is surveyed and all possible candidates identified, then problems of transfer would seem too overwhelming for immediate solution. The important first step is to assemble the independent agencies and subagencies as the departmental core, and then to build around them. This in itself will be a monumental task, but the vision of the National Academy committee of 1884 may still be sound (48).

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. Act of 7 July 1884, 23 Stat. 219. The commission, composed of three members each from the House and Senate, was known as the Allison Commission after its chairman, Senator William B. Allison of Iowa. Lyman served as one of the House members on the commission until the end of the 48th Congress on 3 March 1885. He was defeated for reelection.

2. Congr. Rec. 15, 6175 (7 July 1884).

3. The NAS committee's report was transmitted to Lyman by O. C. Marsh, president of the National Academy of Sciences, by letter dated 16 Oct. 1884. It was printed in Senate Misc. Doc. No. 82 (serial No. 2345, 49th Congress, 1st session (1886) vol. 4; also as appendix D to the Report of the National Academy of Sciences for 1884 (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20 April 1885), p. 33.

4. The NAS committee proposed that the commission include the president of the National Academy of Sciences; the secretary of the Smithsonian Institution; two nongovernment civilian scientists of high reputation appointed by the President of the United States for 6-year terms; one officer of the Corps of Engineers; one Navy professor of mathematics skilled in astronomy (the last two to be designated by the President for 6-year terms); the superintendent of the Coast and Geodetic Survey; the director of the Geological Survey; and the officer in charge of the Meteorological Service. The secretary of the department including the science agencies would be ex officio president of the commission, and the commission would be attached to the office of the secretary.

5. Senate Rep. No. 1285, 49th Congress, 1st session (8 June 1886), p. 54. 6. See A. Hunter Dupree, Science and the Federal Government (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1957), p. 215. Dupree writes of this period: "In contrast to the glorious and successful defense of the new scientific bureaus, the experts had done a ragged job for a Department of Science. The National Academy had done nothing to push the brainchild of its committee, which admitted political defeat in advance" (p. 230).

7. Congr. Rec. 92, A14 (1 Feb. 1946). The Luce bill provided for a Secretary appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, and five Assistant Secretaries, appointed by the President, to head, respectively, the following bureaus Physics and Mathematical Sciences, Public Health and Social Sciences, Scientific Education and Information, Biological Sciences, and Engineering and Technological Sciences. The Secretary would be empowered to appoint an advisory council of not more than 100 members representing all branches of science.

8. Science the Endless Frontier, A Report to the President on a Program for Postwar Scientific Research (July 1945). The report was reprinted by the National Science Foundation (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., July 1960).

9. Congr. Rec. 93, 10567 (17 Nov. 1947). See Don K. Price, Government and Science (New York Univ. Press, New York, 1954), p. 48.

10. Science and Public Policy, Report of the President's Scientific Research Board (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 4 Oct. 1947), vol. 3, p. 23.

11. Public Law 81-507, 64 Stat. 149 (10 May 1950).

12. Progress Report on Science Programs of the Federal Government, Senate Rep. No. 2498, 85th Congress, 2d session (9 Sept. 1958), p. 14; Congr. Rec. 105, 1078 (23 Jan. 1959).

13. Public Law 85-567, 72 Stat. 426 (29 July 1958).

14. Killian's address, made on 29 Dec. 1958, was printed in Science Program— 86th Congress, Senate Rep. No. 120, 86th Congress, 1st session (23 March 1959), p. 3.

15. D. K. Price, Government and Science (New York Univ. Press, New York, 1954), p. 63. Price was discussing the potential role of NSF as a central science agency and not specifically a Department of Science.

16. Senate Rep. No. 120, 86th Congress, 1st session (23 March 1959), p. 26. Berkner's views were set forth in an address, "National Science Policy and the Future," at Johns Hopkins University (16 Dec. 1958), published in the same report, appendix D, p. 110. Brode's address on the same subject as retiring presidnet of the AAAS (28 Dec. 1959) was placed in the Congressional Record, along with press articles and editorials, by Senator Kefauver [Congr. Rec. 106, 615 (18 Jan. 1960]. For additional materials on the pros and cons of a department, see Science and Technology Act of 1968, Analysis and Summary by the Staff of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, Senate Doc. No. 90, 85th Congress, 2d session (April 1958). 17. Senate Rep. No. 120, 86th Congress, 1st session (23 March 1959), p. 29. 18. Create a Department of Science and Technology, hearings before the Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations, Senate Committee on Government Operations, 86th Congress, 1st session, on S. 676 and S. 586 (16-17 April 1959), pt. 1, pp. 47 and 71.

19. Establishment of a Commission on a Department of Science and Technology, Senate Rep. No. 408 (18 June 1959), p. 6.

20. Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci. (Jan. 1960), p. 27; Senator Humphrey placed this article in the Congressional Record [106, 5235 (10 March 1960)].

21. Organizing for National Security: Science Organization and the President's Office, staff study by the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Senate Committee on Government Operations, 87th Congress, 1st session (committee print, 14 June 1961), p. 1.

22. House Doe. 372, 87th Congress, 2d session (29 March 1962).

23. Senator Humphrey placed an excerpt from the Stover report in the Congressional Record [108, 11822 (27 June 1962)]. A statement by Stover supporting the commission proposal was printed in Establishment of a Commission on Science and Technology, Senate Rep. No. 1828, 87th Congress, 2d session (6 Aug. 1962), p. 50. The report The Government of Science proposed that the Department of Science and Technology absorb the activities of NSF, PSAC and FCST, along with the Weather Bureau, National Bureau of Standards, Office of Saline Water, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Navy Hydrographic Office, Naval Observatory, portions of the Smithsonian's research work, and the Antarctic programs of the Navy and NSF. Larger agencies such as NASA and NIH were cited as candidates for inclusion, though AEC was excluded on the ground that its size and operational character could overwhelm the new department.

24. Create a Commission on Science and Technology, hearings before the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 87th Congress, 2d session, on S. 2771 (24 July 1962), pt. 2; Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1962, hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 87th Congress, 2d session (17 April 1962). Jerome B. Wiesner wrote later: "Possibly the most important consequence of providing a statutory basis for the scientific activities in the Executive Office of the President is that the Director may now appear before Congress to explain, when possible, the Government-wide views of activities and problems" [Where Science and Politics Meet (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965), p. 47].

25. Systems Development and Management, hearings before the Military Operation Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 87th Congress, 2d session (1 July 1962), pt. 1, p. 156.

26. Establishment of a Commission on Science and Technology, Senate Rep. No. 1828, 87th Congress, 2d session (6 Aug. 1962).

27. Congr. Rec. 108, 15968 (8 Aug. 1962).

28. Senator McClellan placed excerpts from the Wiesner testimony in the Congressional Record on two separate occasions [109, 2395 (18 Feb. 1963) and ibid. (23 May 1963), p. 9299]. It was also carried in the committee report cited below (29).

29. Establishment of a Commission on Science and Technology, Senate Rep. No. 16, 81st Congress, 1st session (4 March 1963). 30. Congr. Rec. 109, 3808 (8 March 1963). In remarks accompanying the bill Senator Humphrey said an independent "Hoover-type" commission was needed to (i) counterbalance the exceutive's excessive dependance on a small in-group of scientists for policy advice and program evaluation; (ii) review, with the aim to improve, the activities of the NAS-NRC as well as those of the government agencies; and (iii) examine federal organization for information retrieval. 31. Referring the bills to the House Committee on Science and Astronautics signified a change in jurisdictional policy. Heretofore such bills had been referred to the House Committee on Government Operations, which generally has jurisdiction over organization matters.

32. National Goals and Policies. House Rep. No. 1941, 80th Congress, 2d session (29 Dec. 1964), p. 49. The Select Committee expired with the 88th Congress on 3 Jan. 1965. In accordance with one of its recommendations, a Subcommittee on Research and Technical Programs was established within the House Committee on Government Operations. This subcommittee chaired by Representative Reuss, was in existence through the end of the 90th Congress. 33. R. Lapp, The New Priesthood (Harper & Row, New York, 1965), p. 204. Lapp proposed that the Department of Science make basic research grants (on a lump-sum basis); manage the government laboratories; absorb all or part of the functions of OST, PSAC, and FCST; and take over the functions of