Thus the whole situation was changed. Coincident with this unfortunate step, the American press was filled with

discussion concerning an extra session of Congress for the consideration of the Cuban question. The month of February was a time of confusion, misunderstanding, and cross-purposes. President McKinley was insistent upon an immediate settlement of the Cuban matter, and Congress was anxious for a prompt termination of its session. Although the Cuban Constitution was not definitely accepted in its final and completed form until February 15, its general outline was made public on January 21, and it was known that it contained no reference to the future relations of the two countries. The adjournment of Congress was due on March 4. The Cubans had been and were being criticised both for undue haste and for unreasonable delay in their proceedings. The matter was discussed in Cabinet conferences in Washington, and these conferences resulted in the submission of the suggestions which have been quoted in the foregoing paragraphs. Senator Platt, of Connecticut, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Relations with Cuba, expressed his opinion that Congress had no power to deal directly with the Cuban Constitution. He said, "We can neither approve, reject, nor in any way amend or modify the Cuban Constitution by act of Congress. Cuba, being a foreign country, is privileged to establish her own government without let or hindrance." But in the matter of future relations, he held that, although Cuba was a foreign country, the United States, by virtue of the grounds upon which it intervened in Cuban affairs, possessed certain rights and privileges in the Island, and that it was in duty bound, in the interests of both countries, to safeguard those rights and privileges.

From his particular standpoint, and from that of those who supported him, there can be no question of the correctness of his views. By its own act, the United States was

pledged to the establishment of Cuban independence. It was also virtually pledged to the establishment of a stable government by the Cuban people. It had made itself the guarantor of a government which should be capable of protecting life and property in the Island. It had assumed responsibilities which could not be disregarded. Stable government and security of life and property are not possible of full assurance by the mere promulgation of laws or constitutions. The point upon which the whole controversy of the time really turns is whether there was warrant and justification for an assumption that the Cubans could not or would not, by their own conduct, endorse and carry out the requisite conditions.

The Cuban view of the matter was not entirely harmonious, even in the Convention. So far as demarkation is possible, it may be said that a conservative element favored an active and recognized American supervision with some measure of American control. The radical element stood for the terms of their Constitution which declared Cuba to be "a sovereign and independent state." The numerical strength of these respective groups was impossible of determination by estimate. A plebiscite was urged by some, but the proposals were disregarded, and active discussion continued. The situation was further complicated by the knowledge, which promptly reached the Island, that the Senate Committee on Relations with Cuba was engaged in the preparation of a measure which, if accepted and passed by Congress and signed by the President, was tantamount to an ultimatum. It was known that this measure proposed to make the withdrawal of American authority conditional upon the acceptance of terms which the Cubans regarded as subversive of their independence as a nation, and a direct violation of the pledge of the Joint Resolution.

CHAPTER XV

EFFECT OF THE PLATT AMENDMENT

THE position taken at this time by the American authorities is not readily to be understood or excused. It was distinctly inconsistent and illogical. Having instructed the Cubans, in Order No. 301, to include in their Constitution the terms of the future international relations; and, later, by Order No. 455, having instructed the omission of those terms; the matter was definitely taken out of the hands of the Cubans by American action. This was done before the Convention had been allowed a reasonable time for consideration of the subject.

An amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill was rushed through both houses of the American Congress with only an hour or two of discussion. No excuse whatever appears for the summary despatch of a measure of such importance as the international relations of two countries whose future, politically and commercially, demanded the closest and most amicable of ties. It is safe to assume that the situation was not a little influenced by the reports and opinions of the Military Governor, who supposed himself to be in close touch with Cuban affairs and accurately informed regarding Cuban opinion. He was neither in harmony nor in touch with the real Cuban sentiment.

A peculiar incident arose at this time, and was of no small influence in determining the attitude and action of the United States Congress. On February 26, there was an

interview at the Palace, in Havana, between General Wood and General Maximo Gomez. The report of this interview was given to representatives of the American press by General Wood, and was duly telegraphed by them to the United States. That report, as sent and published, was as follows:

"HAVANA, February 26. General Gomez visited Governor General Wood this morning, and assured him that the stories of unrest and dissatisfaction at the continuance of the United States intervention were false, and that he had been misrepresented in statements to the effect that he favored an immediate withdrawal of the United States troops, and giving Cuba absolute independence. If they withdrew now he feared bloodshed, beyond doubt. Within sixty days, the Cubans would be fighting among themselves. General Gomez added, 'If the Americans were to withdraw to-day, I would go with them.'. . . General Gomez had no objection to the outline of the future relations between the United States and Cuba as recommended by the United States Senate."

American legislators have stated that this message was either a determining factor or a strong influence in their vote upon the Platt Amendment. Lacking, admittedly, an adequate personal familiarity with the subject, they accepted this alleged statement of General Gomez as the expression of a qualified Cuban opinion. Gomez was known as the head and front of Cuba's struggle for national independence, and it is natural that his statement should be accepted without question. The matter turns upon the accuracy of this submitted report.

In Havana, nothing was known in regard to it until the arrival of the American papers, on the 29th. Those contained the report from which the above extract is taken. A copy was shown to General Gomez at his house and the matter translated to him. In a rage of indignation, he