CHAPTER IV

AMERICA'S PAST ATTITUDE

It is quite in order at this point to review the question of the right of the United States to intervene in the affairs of Cuba, and the attitude of that country toward the Island in other days.

The legal right of any country to interfere in the domestic affairs of any other country is by no means clearly determined. Pomeroy, in his work on International Law, states (p. 242, et seq.): "How far the right of intervention legitimately extends, under what circumstances it may be invoked, to what extent it may be carried, are questions which have given rise to much discussion - questions that have never been authoritatively settled, and perhaps never will be settled." The proffer, through diplomatic channels, of what is known as the "good offices" of a nation, with the object of effecting a cessation of hostilities and the establishment of peace in another nation, is a recognized procedure. This, however, is a very different matter from direct and armed interference. Upon this point, authorities differ regarding the precise line of demarkation between warranted and unwarranted intervention. Justification is recognized for a limited measure of interference for the support of existing treaty relations and for the protection of the person and property rights of foreign residents in countries disturbed by war. This is instanced in the landing of American marines on the isthmus of Panama in November,

1901, and even in the presence of the Maine in Havana harbor at the time of her destruction. Such action does not, however, include any right of active participation upon either side of an existing conflict. It is only a protective measure though it may lead to more direct action.

The eminent French statesman, M. Guizot, advanced the opinion that only in the case of extreme need of selfpreservation is there justification in international morals for an armed intervention. Wheaton, in his "Elements of International Law," defines the recognition of belligerent rights by saying:

"It is certain that the state of things between the parent state and insurgents must amount in fact to a war in the sense of international law that is, powers and rights of war must be in actual exercise otherwise the recognition is falsified, for the recognition is a fact. The tests to determine the question are various.

Among the tests are the existence of a de facto political organization of the insurgents, sufficient in character, population, and resources, to constitute it, if left to itself, a State among the nations, reasonably capable of discharging the duties of a State; the actual employment of military forces on each side, acting in accordance with the rules and customs of war, such as the use of flags of truce, cartels, exchange of prisoners, and the treatment of captured insurgents by the parent State as prisoners of war."

Wheaton also says:

"Until the revolution is consummated, whilst the civil war involving a contest for the government continues, other States may remain indifferent spectators of the controversy, still continuing to treat the ancient government as sovereign, and the government de facto as a society entitled to the rights of war against its enemy; or may espouse the cause of the party which they believe to have justice on its side. In the first case, the foreign State fulfils all its

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obligations under the law of nations; and neither party has any right to complain, provided it maintains an impartial neutrality. In the latter, it becomes, of course, the enemy of the party against whom it declares itself, and the ally of the other; and as the pristine law of nations makes no distinction in this respect between a just and an unjust war, the intervening State becomes entitled to all the rights of war against the opposite party."

Vattel declares it permissible to succor a people oppressed by its sovereign. He says (Book II, Chap. IV, p. 157): “As to those monsters who, under the title of sovereigns, render themselves the scourges and the horror of the human race, they are savage beasts whom every brave man may justly exterminate from the face of the earth." Wheaton, Bluntschli, and Mamiani, all concede the right of other nations to aid an oppressed race.

In his message of April, 1898, Mr. McKinley took a broader and probably more rational ground. He justifies American intervention in Cuba upon the following grounds:

"First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door.

"Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection.

"Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the Island.

"Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this Government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business relations, when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined — where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by war ships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising — all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a semiwar footing with a nation with which we are at peace.

In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the Island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes."

It is of important interest to note, at this point, the fact that this message makes no mention of Cuban independence. Three issues were possible - reform of the Spanish system of government and the establishment of autonomy in the Island; Cuban independence; or annexation to the United States. No one of these was considered. The primary ground of American intervention was the conservation and protection of American interests. The United States had declined to recognize the government established by the insurgents, and had waived definite action upon

their claim to recognition as belligerents. Her services as mediator had been duly tendered to the Government at Madrid, through diplomatic channels.

This attitude on the part of the United States was entirely consistent with the history of her past relations with the Island of Cuba. For nearly a century the United States had realized the possibility of a time when her active interference in Cuban affairs might become a necessity for the defence and protection of American interests, both in the Island and at home. Two features were prominent. One was the ever-recurring possibility that the Island of Cuba might pass under the control of some other power than that of Spain; the other, the importance of Cuba in its various relations to the United States.

Yet the existence of European colonies on this side of the Atlantic was a fact which could never be ignored. In 1803, Louisiana, which had passed from Spanish into French possession, was purchased from France. In 1808, Thomas Jefferson deprecated the transfer of Cuba from Spanish possession to that of any other country. A year later, he considered the possibility of American acquisition of Cuba. For many years, England's possible acquisition of territory in the West Indies was an active feature in American diplomatic relations. The Monroe Doctrine was anticipated by President Madison's message to Congress on Jan. 3, 1811, in which he said that "the United States could not see without serious inquietude any part of a neighboring territory in which they have in different respects so deep and so just a concern pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other foreign power.'

It was the question of Cuba's future which led, almost directly, to the enunciation of that Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which, though an unwritten law, has stood and still