REPORT OF THE MAJOR-GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMY. HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Army during the past year, including the reports of the several department commanders and of their chief staff officers; of the commanding officers of the Artillery School at Fort Monroe; of the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth, and those of the Adjutant-General and Inspector-General of the Army. The annual report of the commanding officer of the Cavalry and Light Artillery School at Fort Riley, Kans., will be submitted after the close of the season of practical instruction at that place. During a large part of the year the Army has been employed in the suppression of domestic violence, which took the form, in many cases, of forcible resistance to the execution of the laws of the United States, seizure or destruction of property under the care of United States officers, and open defiance of the national authority. The details of all the operations of the troops, already generally familiar to the public, are described in the accompanying reports of the department commanders, and hence need not be repeated here. These disorders, at first local in their character, spread at length to about one-half in number and two-thirds in area, of all the States and Territories, excluding Alaska. So widespread and formidable an insurrection called for the vigorous action dictated by the President. It became necessary to confer upon the commanding generals of six departments, viz, the Missouri, Dakota, Platte, Colorado, California, and the Columbia, full authority in executing the orders of the Presi dent, to employ the entire military force under their command, according to their own best judgment and the instructions they had received from Headquarters of the Army, to protect public property and enforce obedience to the laws of the United States. At the city of Chicago resistance to lawful authority assumed such formidable proportions that it was necessary to concentrate at that place nearly all the forces that could be made available from all parts of the country, while, on the Pacific Coast, the Navy Department placed at the disposal of the Department Commander the naval and marine forces at the Mare Island Navy-Yard, and those forces rendered valuable services. These responsible duties, thus devolved upon the department commanders, were performed by them and the troops under their command in the most satisfactory manner. The insurrec tion was promptly suppressed and the authority of the Government everywhere enforced, and this without any unnecessary sacrifice of life in any case. Such a result would have been impossible, except for the judicious distribution of troops already existing, under the command of general officers of education, experience, tried fidelity to the national interests, and profound respect for civil authority and the laws of the land. The people of the United States may well be proud of their little Army, so thoroughly devoted to the public interests. The numerous demands for the services of United States troops in connection with domestic disorders disclosed some lack of accurate knowledge respecting the circumstances and conditions under which the military forces of the United States may be lawfully employed and the manner in which the troops may lawfully act in the suppression of such disorders. The circumstances under which the national forces may be employed were materially modified by the act of Congress, approved June 18, 1878, commonly called "the posse comitatus act," and no exact defi nition of the duties of the troops as modified by this act had ever been published. So, also, for the first time at least in many years, it has become necessary to employ the national forces against a lawless mob forcibly resisting the execution of the laws of the United States, former cases of like employment of United States troops having been under the general provisions of the Constitution and laws for the suppression of insurrection in a State, under a call made by the State authorities upon the President, as provided in the Constitution. But by the use of the telegraph the necessary instructions were speedily communicated to all concerned, so that no material departure was actually made in any case from the strict requirements of the law, and as speedily as practicable carefully prepared instructions were issued for the government of the Army, both in respect to the circumstances under which and the purposes for which the troops may be employed, and the manner in which they should act in the execution of lawful orders for the suppression of forcible resistance to the execution of the laws of the United States, or in the protection of property belonging to or under the care of the United States. The prompt and vigorous action of the troops in all cases and the great forbearance manifested by them when subjected to all sorts of insults and indignities, designed to provoke retaliation, were worthy of the very highest commendation. They illustrate in the most striking manner the great value to a government of a well-disciplined force at all times subject to the orders of that government for the enforcement of the faithful execution of its laws. It would seem unnecessary to point out the fact that any force like the militia of a State, or the police of a city, acting primarily under another authority, though highly efficient in their appropriate service, can not be made a reliable instrument for the prompt and effective execution of the laws of the United States. Manifestly, every government should have an adequate force of its own for the execution of its own laws, no less than the judicial and executive officers necessary for the same purpose. The country is now for the first time squarelyconfronted with the necessity of making adequate provision, not only for defense against any possible foreign aggression, but also for defense against domestic violence in the form of forcible resistance to the laws of the United States. It therefore becomes more than ever necessary to calmly and dispassionately consider the adequacy of means to that end. A just estimate of these means requires consideration of the vast extent of the United States territory and the great amount of property, widely dispersed throughout this territory, either belonging to the United States or in such condition as to be under the protection of the National Government. When these facts are duly considered it becomes manifest that the present strength of the Army is not adequate to the performance of the service which may at any time be required. It is true that in the recent emergency, by the most prompt and vigorous action and the concentration of troops from various parts of the country, the duty required was promptly and effectively performed. But the military resources were taxed nearly to the extreme limit for this purpose, and in the event of such extension of disorders, as was for some time threatened and made to appear more than probable, it was found by careful estimate that the resources of the Government would prove inadequate to give the necessary protection in all parts of the country; so that vast injury would have resulted to the public interests throughout a large part of the United States before the resources of the Government could have been so augmented as to have suppressed the insurrection. It is certainly manifest that the present condition of the country, with a population of nearly seventy millions, under the danger of disorder now known to exist, can not be met by the same force that was deemed adequate twenty-five years ago, when the population of the country was less than half its present amount, and domestic violence was not apprehended. One man to 14 square miles of territory, or one man to twenty-eight hundred of population, is surely a very small guard to protect property and prevent violation of law, leaving out of consideration the force necessary to guard the extended seacoast against sudden attack by a foreign enemy. It is also worthy of remark that more than once in the last summer an infuriated mob in a single city was twice as formidable in numbers and capable of doing vastly greater injury to life and property than the most formidable combina tion of Indian warriors that ever confronted the Army in this country. In other words, the Army has recently been required to deal with an enemy far more numerous and dangerous to the country than any savage enemy which it has heretofore been called upon to meet. It seems clear that the effective strength of the Army should now be considerably increased. Yet, this can be done at a very small comparative increase in cost. The present regimental organizations need not be largely increased. Two additional regiments of artillery for the necessary sea coast defense; two additional regiments of cavalry to patrol the long lines of railroad under Government protection, and the present twenty-five regiments of infantry, converted into three battalion organizations, would, it is believed, be a just, conservative esti mate of what is now actually needed. For this the existing number of commissioned officers is nearly sufficient. But a considerable perma nent increase in the enlisted strength of the Army should be made, and a still further increase authorized to be made by the President when, in his judgment, an emergency requiring it may reasonably be foreseen. Such disorders as those which have afflicted the country during the last year do not come suddenly or unexpectedly. Intelligent observation fully justified the prediction of such troubles a year before they appeared. Coincident with the first indication of coming disorder was a diminution of industrial employment, by which large numbers of honest and faithful laborers were deprived of their accustomed work, and hence sought enlistment in the Army. These men could not be received because of the limit fixed by law upon the enlisted strength of the Army. These applicants for enlistment during the first eight or twelve months were not the kind of men who participate in the operations of a lawless mob. They were simply honest laborers who could no longer obtain employment in civil life and hence sought it in the Army. If authority had existed by which the President could have received a few thousand of these men into the ranks, they would have become well disciplined, reliable soldiers by the time the troops were called out to suppress mob violence. After the restoration of peace and prosperity has given assurance that the Army will not probably be employed in the suppression of domestic violence for several years, the ranks may well, in the discretion of the President, be reduced, to save expense. It is not a good military system in which the Executive has no authority whatever to increase the effective strength of the Army in time of need, but must await the slow process of legislation for that purpose. The organization being fixed by law, with maximum and minimum limits of strength, the Executive should be authorized to vary the enlisted strength between those limits according to his estimate of the necessities of the country. The cost of the suggested increase in the strength of the Army would be utterly insignificant as compared with the damage which might have been done in a single day in one city, if the military force assembled at that point had proved inadequate. Wise forethought, in apparent anticipation of such conditions as those which have confronted the Government during the last year, dictated several years ago the establishment, under authority of Congress, of large military posts near the great business and railway centers of the country. Several of these large posts are now in condition to be occupied by troops, while others are in process of construction, and a few others are still demanded, for which it is presumed Congress will in due time make the necessary appropriations. As a consequence of the execution of this policy, small frontier posts, formerly necessary in connection with the spread of civilization over the vast western territory and the suppression of Indian hostilities therein, now no longer necessary for such purposes, have been abandoned. A few others may doubtless be abandoned in the near future, but the larger posts in the vicinity of the great Indian reservations must doubtless be maintained for many years. The present strength of the Army is not quite adequate to supply appropriate garrisons for all the posts now occupied or ready for occupation, while the new posts which must undoubtedly be authorized by Congress in the near future, especially along the seaboard where permanent fortifications are contemplated, will be entirely without appropriate garrisons, unless the Army is suitably increased. But if the very moderate increase in the effective strength of the Army which has been recommended be authorized and the military posts heretofore recommended be constructed, the Army will be, so far as can now be anticipated, in a fairly effective condition to enforce the faithful execution of the laws of the United States. This view of the military necessities of the country must, it would seem, be manifest to every intelligent citizen. But, in respect to the military necessities which may possibly arise out of conflict with foreign powers, it has for many years seemed impos sible to impress upon the people of the United States in general the views entertained by all thoughtful military students. This impossibility appears to have resulted very largely from the national selfesteem which grew out of the results of the great domestic conflict through which the country passed in the period from 1861 to 1865. The condition of the public mind since that time has been that of confident invincibility against any possible foreign attack. However humiliating it may be to this confident self-esteem, it is nevertheless a simple duty to point to the great military lesson which is now being taught to the entire world. The most populous and one of the most wealthy of all the nations of the earth is subjected to extreme humiliation and disgrace, to result possibly in the overthrow of a dynasty, at the hands of a little nation of one-tenth its population and about one-tenth its territorial area. And why is this? It is not because that great people are lacking in talent, or general education, or military courage, but because they have failed to develop their military strength and resources. In disciplined troops, in arms and equipments of all kinds, in efficient ships of war and in general military preparation and education they are far behind the enterprising little military nation that is now teaching them and the world this tremendous lesson. The relation of the United States to the great military powers of Europe now exhibits a far greater disparity in respect to preparation for war than that which has existed between China and Japan. Will the people of the United States and their representatives have the modesty to appreciate and the wisdom to profit by this lesson? The Atlantic Ocean is, under modern conditions, little more serious an obstacle to the navies and transports of Europe than are the Japan and Yellow seas to those of Japan. Whence comes our feeling of security? Are the other nations of the earth so much more in love with us and our institutions than are our own people that we can always rely upon the friendship and good will of foreigners, while many thousands of our own citizens must be controlled by the strong military arm? Are our statesmen so far more skilled in statecraft and diplomacy than others that we can rely upon their ability to always secure by such means the interests and honor of the United States in competition with the often conflicting interests of other countries? Or are the people of this country ready to see the national honor sacrificed when need be to secure material interests or avoid conflict of arms? What guarantee of peace with honor has the history of the world ever assured except preparation for war, and now that modern science has so radically changed the conditions of military and naval success, how much more impossible has security for peace consistent with honor become, except through thorough preparations for war! This modern feeling of security among apparently a large majority of the people of the United States, which appears to have arisen out of the domestic conflict in which the country was engaged from 1861 to 1865, and the immense military strength developed in that conflict, was to a large extent justified for a certain period of time. Both the military strength developed during and continuing to exist for some years after the civil war, and the moral influence produced thereby upon the military nations of the world, justified for a time a feeling of confidence which seemed to render unnecessary preparations for war. As a consequence of this the ancient policy of the United States, which had been followed from the foundation of the Government to the year 1861, of thorough preparation in the way of seacoast fortifications and an |