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and feasible route for such canal, together with the proximate and probable cost of constructing a canal to each of two or more of said routes." The President was further authorized to "investigate and ascertain what rights, privileges, and franchises, if any, may be held or owned by any corporations, associations, or individuals, and what work, if any, has been done by such corporations, associations, or individuals in the construction of a canal at either of said routes, and particularly at the so-called Nicaraguan and Panama routes, respectively, and likewise to ascertain the cost of purchasing all the rights, privileges and franchises," and "the probable or proximate cost of constructing a suitable harbor at each of the termini of said canal with the probable annual cost of maintenance of said harbors, respectively." Then the act provided generally that the President should "make such full and complete investigation as to determine the most feasible and prac、 ticable route across said isthmus for a canal, together with the cost of constructing the same and placing the same under the control, management, and ownership of the United States."

Three Main Considerations.-This action by Congress settled these general points: First. That there must be a canal across the American isthmus. Second. That the canal must be built, owned, controlled, and protected by the United States. Third. That the canal must be built upon the best route. It was a great advance from the old position of all political parties and all general considerations of canal legislation in this country. But the war with Spain and the necessity for quickly concentrating the navy for defense on either coast made the new policy necessary, and it met with general and hearty approval. There was to be no further consideration of aid to individuals or corporations holding con cessions and desirous of securing the assistance of the Government in their enterprise. Such had been the trend of proposed legislation before Congress for more than half a century.

President McKinley fully appreciated the action of Congress. It meant that he should assume responsibility for an investigation as to all canal routes across the Isthmus, rather than the cost and feasibility of the Nicaragua Canal. He therefore exercised the utmost care in selecting the Commission to make this investigation. The construction of an inter-oceanic canal by the Government is the greatest public work that has ever been projected, and through territory not belonging to the United States. It is proposed to inaugurate a gigantic business enterprise by the Government, and the President went about the preliminaries in a business-like way, selecting for the Commission the most eminent military and civil engineers to be found in this country.

The Canal Commission. The members of the Commission com

prise distinguished officers of the Army and Navy, civil engineers who stand in the very front of their profession, and a distinguished jurist, a former member of the Senate. At the head of the Commission the President placed Rear-Admiral Walker from the Navy. He associated with him Lieut. Col. Oswald H. Ernst and Col. Peter C. Hains, of the Army. From civil engineering life he took George S. Morrison, Alfred Noble, William H. Burr, and Lewis M. Haupt. Ex-Senator Samuel Pasco was made the legal member of the Commission and Prof. Emory R. Johnson was added as an authority on the industrial and commercial value of an interoceanic canal.

The Commission divided itself into committees for the special study of five questions: 1. To investigate the Nicaragua route. 2. To investigate the Panama route. 3. To investigate other possible routes. 4. To investigate the industrial, commercial, and military value of a canal. 5. To investigate the rights, privileges, and franchises. Working parties were organized and sent into the field. Of these twenty working parties were organized in Nicaragua with 159 engineers and assistants and 455 laborers; 5 in Panama with 20 engineers and assistants and 41 laborers; 6 in Darien, with 54 engineers and assistants and 112 laborers. The Commission visited Europe to examine the plans and records of the Panama Canal Company in Paris; the Kiel Canal in Germany, the North Sea Canal in Holland, and the Manchester Canal and Liverpool Docks in England. The Commission also visited Nicaragua, Costa Rico, and Panama, going over both the Nicaragua and l'anama routes carefully.

First Report of Commission. -The Commission made a short preliminary report to the President on November 30, 1900; a detailed report on November 16, 1901, and their last report on January 18, 1902. Both the earlier reports concluded with the statement that "the most practicable and feasible route" for an isthmian canal, to be "under the control, management, and ownership of the United States, is that known as the Nicaragua route," while the last report concluded with the statement that such route "is that known as the Panama route." There is no inconsistency in these conclusions. All the reports show that the Commission considered the Panama route far superior to the Nicaragua route, in harbors, in elevation, in cost of construction, in cost of maintenance, in facility of navigation; in everything, in short,, which goes to make a desirable canal route; but the Panama route' was owned by the New Panama Canal Company, which was itself engaged in constructing the canal there.

At the time of the preliminary report no proposition for a sale to the United States could be drawn from the Panama Company

in spite of all efforts of the Commission to get one. At the time of the report of November 16, 1901, the nearest approach to a price being named by the company had been a valuation of some $109,000,000 placed upon the property by the then, president of the company. The Commission (in the report of November, 1901) had estimated its value to the United States at $40,000,000, and they stated in that report that they considered that "the price fixed by the Panama Canal Company for a sale of its property and franchises is so unreasonable that its acceptance can not be recommended by this Commission." Their conclusion, therefore, in favor of the Nicaragua route was expressly stated by them to have been reached upon a consideration of "the actual situation as it now stands and having in view the terms offered by the New Panama Canal Company."

It must be remembered that the act did not direct the Commission to ascertain and report merely the best route for a canal, but the best route for a canal to be "under the control, management, and ownership of the United States." The Commission were "bound by this last limitation. All three of the Isthmian Canal Commission reports make it plain that they considered the Panama route the superior, but since the exorbitant price made it impossible to acquire that route for the United States, the Commission had no choice under the limitations of the act but to accept the inferior route, the Nicaragua.

On January 4 of the present year, however, the New Panama Canal Company did make a definite offer to sell and transfer all its rights, property, and works to the United States, including plans and archives, for the sum which the Commission had estimated them to be worth to the United States-$40,000,000.

Thereupon, President Roosevelt, construing the previous reports of the Commission for the adoption of the Nicaragua route as having been due to the prohibitory price put upon the property and concessions of the New Panama Canal Company, reconvened the Commission to report further in the light of the changed situation. The Commission met, and, the only obstacle to the ac quisition of the Panama route having thus been removed, the Commission unanimously recommended acceptance of the offer and unanimously decided that "the most practicable and feasible route for an isthmian canal, to be under the control, management, and ownership of the United States, is that known as the Panama route." This is the last report, of January 18, 1902, and was immediately submitted by the President to both Houses of Congress. Supplemental Report of Commission.-In that last report the Commission says:

"In reciting its conclusions in the report dated November 16, 1901,

this Commission stated that the selection of the most feasible and practicable route must be made between the Nicaragua and Panama locations, adopting a plan of canal with locks in each case.

"It concluded that the water-supply features were satisfactory on both sides, that both dams, by which the summit levels would be sustained, were practicable, the advantage being in favor of the Conchuda dam at Nicaragua; that the plan of regulating the summit level was practicable in each case, though less simple on the Nicaragua route than on the Panama; that the present means of transportation were inadequate on the Nicaragua route, while a well-equipped railroad was in operation along the entire length of the Panama route; that there are now no natural harbors at Nicaragua, while serviceable ones exist at both ends of the Panama route, and although with the completion of the harbors as planned one route would have little advantage over the other, the balance was probably in favor of Panama; that owing to the absence of harbors and railroads the period of preparation at Nicaragua would be twice that at Panama.

"It was also the sense of the Commission that the total time required for the construction of the canal by the Panama route would be ten years and eight years by the Nicaragua route, with a greater probability of exigencies causing delays on the latter than on the former.

"The estimated cost of constructing the Nicaragua Canal is $45,630,704 more than the cost of completing the Panama Canal. "The estimated annual cost of maintenance and operation is $1,300,000 greater at Nicaragua than at Panama.

"The Panama route would be 134.6 miles shorter than the Nicaragua route from sea to sea, with fewer locks and less curvature both in degrees and miles. The estimated time for a deep-draft vessel to pass through the Nicaragua Canal was placed at thirtythree hours, as against twelve hours for Panama, these estimates being the time of actual navigation and not including delays for winds, currents, or darkness.

"If the passage were made without interruption about a day could be saved by the Nicaragua over the Panama route by ordinary steamers handling commerce between our Pacific ports and all Atlantic ports, and about two days by steamers of the same class trading between our Gulf ports and North Pacific ports. The 'time advantage of the Nicaragua route would be less in the case of fast high-powered steamers, the use of which is increasing. Between Atlantic ports and the west coast of South America the Panama route has the advantage of about two days, and between the Gulf ports and the west coast of South America the Panama route has the advantage of about one day. The trade of the west

ern coast of South America is a very important one, which has hitherto been in European hands.

“The Panama route is an old highway of commerce, along which no considerable industrial development is likely to occur. During the construction of a canal on the Nicaragua route business relations would be established with Costa Rica and Nicaragua which would be likely to continue. Existing conditions indicate hygienic advantages at Nicaragua, though equally effective sanitary measures must be taken in both cases.

"The offer from the New Panama Canal Company to convey all its property, including all interest in the Panama Railroad, to the United States will make the estimated cost of the two canals as follows: Nicaragua Panama

$189,864,062 184,222,358

"The transfer would give title to all the land now held by both the Panama Canal Company and the Panama Railroad Company, which covers nearly all lands required for the construction of the canal. The land held by private parties at Nicaragua must be acquired, and its acquisition may prove expensive.

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"The advantage of the two canal routes have been restated according to the findings of the former report. There has been no change in the views of the Commission with reference to any of these conclusions then reached, but the new proposition submitted by the New Panama Canal Company makes a reduction of nearly $70,000,000 in the cost of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama according to the estimates contained in the former report, and with this reduction a canal can there be constructed for more than $5,500,000 less than through Nicaragua. The unreasonable sum asked for the property and rights of the New Panama Canal Company when the Commission reached its former conclusion overbalanced the advantages of that route; but now that the estimates by the two routes have been nearly equalized the Commission can form its judgment by weighing the advantages of each and determining which is the more practicable and feasible.

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"After considering the changed conditions that now exist and all the facts and circumstances upon which its present judgment must be based, the Commission is of the opinion that 'the most practicable and feasible route for an isthmian canal to be under the control, management, and ownership of the United States' is that known as the 'Panama route.'"

President McKinley also directed the efforts of the State De

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